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ABSTRACT 
 This research explores the ways in which young Turkish university students 
understand, express and negotiate religious practice versus secularism in the public and 
private spheres as these have emerged in the early twenty-first century, in light of the 
historical polarization between Islamism and secularism in Turkey. Data was collected 
using qualitative research methodologies, including participant observation and in-depth 
interviews with forty-five university students in Istanbul, Turkey. This latter method 
allowed participants to express their perceptions and experiences about the relationship 
between Islam and secularity in the context of Turkey’s move to democracy, and the 
success of the AKP religious party in democratic elections. The thesis begins with a review 
of relevant scholarly literature; first, debates on the relationship between Islam and the 
secular state, and secularist policies of Turkey; second, social and cultural conceptions of 
the relationship between Islam and secularity in Turkey; third, philosophical and 
conceptual debates on Islam and secularity. Examining this issue, I explore (1) the 
perceptions and views of university students on secularism and Islamism, the secularist 
state and the Islamic state; (2) their understanding and experience of religiosity and 
secularity; (3) the impact of religious groups in Turkey on the relationship of university 
students with religion, secularity and modernity; (4) the divisions or cohesion of Turkish 
society based on religion, culture, and lifestyle. I then move on to present and examine one 
of the most prominent public events of Turkish politics in 2013, the Gezi Park Protests, in 
terms of the subject of my thesis. The thesis concludes that Turkish university students, 
both secular and religiously oriented, do successfully negotiate the secular spaces of the 
public sphere, and have developed new kinds of religiosity and Islamic understanding that 
stress individual choice and shape their attitudes towards the state, politics, and fellow 
students who choose to embrace different lifestyles. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 AIMS AND OBJECTIVES 
This research explores the ways in which university students in Istanbul understand, 
express and negotiate religion and secularity in the early twenty-first century amidst 
historically constituted, politically affirmed and culturally mediated polarization between 
Islamism and secularism. The outcome of this study aims to make a contribution to the 
field of social change in the context of secularism and Islamism, the regional field of 
Turkish studies, and the thematic field of Islamic studies.  
Examining this issue, I explore the perceptions and views of university students on 
secularism and Islamism, the secularist state and the Islamic state; their understanding and 
experience of religiosity and secularity; the impact of religious groups in Turkey on the 
relationship of university students with religion, secularity and modernity; if there is 
division or cohesion in society based on religion, culture, and lifestyle. I present and 
examine one of the most prominent political issues of Turkish politics in 2013, the Gezi 
Park Protests, which started on 27th May 2013 in order to protest the pedestrianisation of 
Taksim Square, in the context of my thesis. The starting hypothesis for my research is that 
Turkish university students, both secular and religiously oriented, do successfully negotiate 
the secular spaces of the public sphere and religiosity; they develop new kinds of 
religiosity and Islamic understanding that shape their attitudes towards the state, politics, 
and those who embrace different lifestyles. These innovative ways of understanding have 
not yet been appreciated in the scholarly literature, as I show throughout this thesis. 
Casanova (1994) questions the understanding of modernization as set out by Max 
Weber, who argued that a key feature of modernity was the relegation of religion – of 
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religious beliefs, practices and sentiments – to the private sphere. In other words, not only 
has modernity’s relocation of religion into private sphere, i.e. its privatization, has had 
significant consequences regarding individuals’ self-identification and self-representation 
in public; according to this modernization thesis religion no longer has a role to play in the 
public sphere. Casanova (2006) disputes this linear view, arguing that religion has had a 
major role in the late twentieth century in overturning authoritarian regimes (for example 
in Poland or Spain), and that even modern liberal democratic systems have been 
unsuccessful in relegating religion to the private sphere. According to Casanova, 
Tocqueville “questioned the two central premises of the Enlightenment critique of religion, 
namely that the advancement of education and reason and the advancement of democratic 
freedoms would make religion politically irrelevant. He (Tocqueville) anticipated, rather 
presciently, that the democratization of politics and the entrance of ordinary people into the 
political arena would augment, rather than diminish, the public relevance of religion” 
(2006: 20). And indeed, Casanova contends, Tocqueville’s assumptions have been 
confirmed by the history of democratic politics: “Religious issues, religious resources, 
interdenominational conflicts, and secular-religious cleavages have all been relatively 
central to electoral democratic politics and to the politics of civil society throughout the 
history of democracy … Religion itself has now become a contentious public issue” (2006: 
20).  
Casanova observes that the de-privatization of religion is an ongoing process within 
modernity negating hegemonic understandings. Evidence of this is the multiplicity of 
religious practices and expressions and how religions have negotiated their cultural, social 
and political presence in the public sphere. Indeed, religion has always been part of the 
public sphere and civic interactions as individuals publicly express and negotiate their 
social and cultural identities and political representations: “Finally, on empirical grounds 
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there are good reasons why we should expect religion and morality to remain and even to 
become ever more contentious public issues in democratic politics. Given such trends as 
increasing globalization, transnational migrations, increasing multiculturalism, the 
biogenetic revolution, and the persistence of blatant gender discrimination, the number of 
contentious public religious issues is likely to grow rather than diminish” (2006: 22). 
My findings show that there are multiple degrees of self-understanding, self-
identification, and self-representation of religiosity in public among students in Turkey. I 
also reveal that they also have different self-understandings of piety and religious 
observation, whether or not they organize their life according to religious principles, and 
they have different ways of identifying with religion and with religious activities and 
practices, and diverse ways of representing themselves as religiously observant persons. 
This lack of homogeneity of what is meant by ‘religion’, ‘religiosity’ and religious 
‘practice’ call for a sociological analysis that is capable of capturing this multiplicity and 
diversity.  
My thesis indicates that there is a continuum of religious or secular practices, a 
spectrum of levels of observation of religious rules. Furthermore, all these social and 
cultural positions have different political implications for different groups and individuals. 
Individuals understand religion and the role of religion in their lives at multiple levels yet 
consider these a profound component of their lives and identities. As Casanova argues, 
exclusion or suppression of such a constitutive component from individuals’ public self-
identifications may become a hindrance to their rights and liberties.  
Casanova’s suggests that we need to discover new forms of religion and religiosity 
at three different levels of analysis: “the individual level, the group level, and the societal 
level” (2006: 17). I address this further in Chapter One, the literature review chapter. In 
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Chapter Two, I explore the kinds of religiosity and secularism defined and practised by 
Turkish university students at these three levels.  
The key research questions I thus address in this study are: 
(a) What are the understandings and experiences of Muslim university students in 
Turkey with regard to the concepts of Islam and secularity? 
This question aims to reveal how university students define and position Islam, e.g. 
as a belief system, as a political ideology or as an organizing force in society; whether they 
define and position secularism as a world view or limit it to the political area. It 
interrogates how university students understand religiosity in terms of their own definitions 
and understanding of their practices of religion, and of religious identity in general.  
(b) What tensions and conflicts do students perceive between Islam and secularity, 
the process of secularization and the state ideology of secularism, and how are these 
experienced? 
This question concerns the perceptions and experiences of the participants about 
their positioning between the requirements of Islam and the secularist characteristics of the 
Turkish state and public space. Where participants see any conflict and experience tension 
between Islam and secularity, the chapter aims to reveal how they interpret and rationalise 
these two concepts.	  
(c) Whar are the roles of the major actors struggling to develop and maintain an 
Islamic consciousness among university students and what influence do non-governmental 
organizations and religious groups have on the lives of university students in particular, on 
their religiosity and religious or non-religious sense of identity? 
This research question mainly focuses on the role of secular and religious 
movements and groups in Turkey, in terms of their impacts on the participant university 
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students. There are a number of religious groups in Istanbul providing accommodation for 
university students and organizing events for them in line with their worldviews and 
Islamic understandings and interpretations. These have a significant influence on students 
with regard to their perceptions of religion, sense of identity, and their conduct in their 
social life. 
(d) To what extent may polarization and conflict be observed between university 
students, in relation to religion and the variety of lifestyles and worldviews determined by 
their faith or secularity? 
In the final part of the thesis, this question approaches the concept of polarization 
among university students arising from their understandings of religion and secularity, and 
their ways of living. I seek to discover whether or not polarization appears to exist in their 
relationships with ‘other’ students who embrace different worldviews and lifestyles.  
My study draws on empirical research, primarily forty-five interviews with 
university students to look at the relationship between religion and secularity as understood 
and experiences by Turkish university students. Based on in-depth interviews and 
observations over a period of more than seven months in Istanbul, my thesis thus focuses 
on the current condition of political Islamism and secularism in Turkey, the perceptions of 
religiosity and secularity among university students, the perceived role of religious groups 
in Turkish society and their impact on university students, the views of students about 
joining religious groups and being religious in a secular environment, and whether the 
social situation in Turkey could be described as one of division or cohesion.  
I argue that religion in the contemporary period of Turkish democracy, in contrast 
to the Enlightenment assumptions, has taken its central place in the public sphere, both in 
politics and civil society. This has revealed new ways of self-identification, self-
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understanding and self-representation of the individuals of Turkey. According to these new 
developments, secularism, secularity, Islam, and religiosity are understood and defined 
differently according to the previous decades of the country. The struggles of religious 
groups in the last five decades have had a significant role in Turkish democracy, 
particularly on that religion and religiously observant people have gained their places in 
the public sphere. I also argue that although there is an apparent division and 
differentiation between religiously observant and non-observant Muslims of Turkey in 
terms of their understanding and practicing religion, and lifestyles, this does not 
necessarily imply that these different segments of the society cannot coexist in the same 
public sphere. Religiously observant people have created new ways both developing new 
understandings and producing their own spaces, in which they practice their values more 
freely. To build my arguments I conducted qualitative research focusing on Turkish 
university students in Istanbul. 
 
1.2 RATIONALE, BACKGROUND, AND CONTEXT 
As a religion with its own philosophy, legal system, culture and civilization, Islam 
inevitably is in tension with anti-religious secularity as this has developed in modern 
Turkey. Indeed, this is tense relationship between Islam and secularity is one of the most 
conflict-ridden issues in Muslim countries today as evidenced by recent events in Egypt 
and North Africa. This issue has excited the interest of a range of people for some time, as 
Toprak notes. “The question of Islam and its impact on Turkish society and politics has 
been one area of concern for scholars, for foreign policy analysts in major capitals of the 
West and in the European Community, and for international investors” (Toprak, 1995: 90). 
The topic is at the centre of debate in almost all countries with majority Muslims 
populations. The EU has about 18 million Muslims (Gökay and Aras, 2003), and is 
	   7 
witnessing problems relating to its willingness to accept immigrants, some relating 
specifically to the reception of religiously observant Muslims. This has led to constant 
debates on multiculturalism, religious pluralism, integration, assimilation, democratic 
secular governance (Roy, 2007). However, as Bryan Turner has argued, “when serious 
attention is given to religious movements outside the West, both sociologists and 
philosophers have given far too much attention to fundamentalism in general and to radical 
Islam in particular” (2011: 147). Other than radical and political Islamism, there are 
various forms of religiosity, Islamism, Islamic revivalism and Islamic understanding in 
Muslim-majority countries, and indeed among immigrants, and this fact calls for 
qualitative research focusing on the variety of Islamic approaches in different societies. 
Each society has its own complex historical and contemporary factors that require very 
specific analysis. 
When we consider secularity and Islam in Turkey, we need to begin from the fact that 
Turkey has a unique position in being the most secular of all Muslim-majority nations 
(Daver, 1988). Keyman explains why in Turkey Islam and secularity are significant, 
arguing that “Turkey constitutes a sociologically illuminating, theoretically challenging 
and politically timely case study for an analysis of the increasing complexity and 
ambiguity embedded in the historically and discursively unsettled relationship between 
secularism and religion” (Keyman, 2007: 216). As Göle points out: “The Turkish 
experience allows for an in-depth analysis of the conflict between secularists and 
Islamists” (1997: 47). One of the aims of my thesis is to analyse the current condition of 
this conflict as understood and experienced by Turkish university students. 
The relationship of Islam and secularity in Turkey is paradoxical because, Kuru (2009) 
argues, Turkey is one of the most religious societies and at the same time one of the most 
secularist states. In the light of this paradox I look at university students in order to come 
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to a better understanding of how they negotiate and accommodate this tension in their 
lives. 
Turkey’s regional and global interconnectedness is unique. Internationally, it has close 
relations with both the USA and the Arab states. It has attempted to join the European 
Union since 1987, and tries to establish deep-rooted relations with states in Central Asia, 
the Middle East, Russia and Africa. In terms of its historical and cultural background, as 
well as its political and economic relations, Turkey is, a bridge between East and West. 
Sociological, political and economic developments in such a country are likely to prove of 
high importance in the world. Turkey is a place in which there are different religions, 
civilizations, cultures and ethnic groups, and the Turkish understanding and practice of 
Islam is significantly different from that of other Muslim countries, particularly in terms of 
its struggle to reconcile modernity and religion. It has Eastern and Western dimensions 
(Öktem, 2002). 
Turkey has witnessed a dramatic change over the last decades in its Turkish-Islamic 
culture as a result of the impact of globalization and modernization processes, the Internet, 
political developments, and the increasing size of its educated population. These changes 
have particularly occurred in the understanding and interpretation of Islam in relation to 
modern life. For instance, ten years ago, listening to music with stringed instruments was 
the subject of serious argument among Islamists (Shankland, 2007). Today, even to 
mention this is generally seen as an out-dated issue. Apart from a limited number of 
studies that deal with the topic in a comprehensive way (Szyliowicz, 1969, 1970, 1972), 
studies and writings on youth and student activism concentrate on the political student 
movements of the 1960s, particularly the leftist movements (Belge, 1994). Avcı (2012) is 
one of the few scholars focusing on contemporary religiously observant university 
students. She examines the changing conditions after 1997, and one of her findings is that 
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while before 1997, the main concern of religiously observant people was tebliğ (religious 
proselytizing), after the military memorandum it has been temsil (religious representation). 
This, she argues, has facilitated the visibility of religion and the increasingly widespread 
expressions of religiosity. Researching the situation of even a decade ago might lead to 
wrong conclusions about the present; hence interviewing the new generation who will 
shape the near future of Turkey was chosen in my study, in order to explore Turkey’s 
rapidly changing socio-political and cultural scope.  
In order to better understand the huge changes in Turkey in the last few decades, it 
will be helpful to look at three areas: economic infrastructure and technology; thought and 
science; politics, law, and social life. In the past dozen years in particular, Turkey has 
experienced rapid change both economically and socially, Even before that, as Zürcher 
explains, 
… following the military coup of 1980, the power of the armed forces was used to 
suppress all existing political and trades union formations, and to introduce a new 
economic policy, aimed at export-led growth and a free internal market, cutting 
wages and subsidies. Even after the gradual liberalization from 1983 onwards, 
political life had to take place within the limits of the very restrictive constitution of 
1982. Internationally, Turkey came to be even more closely linked to the United 
States. (2004: 5)  
These changes have affected people’s lifestyles, politicization, educational levels, 
and relationships with others, and they have had to develop new strategies in order to 
protect their values and to adapt themselves to the new world. With regard to changes 
related to religion and religious life, Zürcher says,  
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From 1984 onwards the press, both Kemalist and socialist-oriented, constantly 
drew attention to the growth of Islamic currents as manifested in the building of 
new mosques; the enormous growth in the number of imam-hatip (preacher) 
schools, whose graduates were now allowed to enter university; the growing 
religious content of school books and of the state-controlled radio and television; 
the growing number of Islamic publications and bookshops and incidents during 
the month of fasting, Ramazan, during which people who were smoking or 
drinking were attacked. The fiercest criticism was reserved for the explicit way in 
which members of the cabinet took part in religious ceremonies. All these 
developments were seen as so many attempts to undermine the secular character of 
the state, but legally and institutionally Turkey remained (and has remained to this 
day) a secular republic. (2004: 288-9) 
Çarkoğlu and Toprak conducted a quantitative research study in 2006, “Religion, Society, 
and Politics in a Changing Turkey”. In the study they compared their findings with 
findings of research they conducted in 1999. The surveys used a nationwide representative 
sample of the Turkish population, providing an opportunity to assess changes in social 
conditions in Turkey:  
During the seven years between 1999 and 2006, Turkey underwent important 
changes. The most significant of these changes was the recovery from economic 
crisis that peaked in February 2001, resulting in massive unemployment and high 
rates of inflation. During the last two years, the economy has shown high rates of 
growth and inflation has been reduced from rates in excess of 50% to less than 
10%. At the same time, a one-party government came to power in 2002 for the first 
time in decades, which put an end to unstable coalition governments. Between 
1999-2002 and thereafter, a series of reform packages that aimed to comply with 
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the EU’s Copenhagen criteria moved Turkish democracy towards greater 
consolidation. As a result, Turkey started membership negotiations with the EU at 
the end of 2005. (2007: 13)  
The following are some of the findings of the 2006 study regarding changes in 
attitudes and preferences in Turkish society concerning secularism, Islam and politics: 
Religiosity is increasing in Turkey. Between 1999 and 2006 the percentage of 
people who consider themselves ‘very religious’ and those who define their identity 
primarily as Muslim has increased from 6% to 13% and from 36% to 46%, 
respectively. Although the percentage of people who approve of religious parties 
has also increased, this cannot lead to the conclusion that the support for a secular 
system is on the decline. Both our 1999 and 2006 surveys show that Turkish people 
do not perceive secularism to be under threat and do not think that there is a real 
possibility of a Shari’ah-based religious regime in Turkey. Moreover, there is no 
finding in our study that indicates a rising support for a religious state. On the 
contrary, when specifically asked if they are in favor of a Shari’ah state, the 
number of those who gave an affirmative answer has declined from 21% in 1999 
down to 9% in 2006. Nevertheless, there is significant tension around the issue of 
secularism or laicism in the country. When asked to place themselves on a 
hypothetical continuum that has Islamists on one side and secularists on the other, 
20% placed themselves closer to the secularist end, while 49% placed themselves 
closer to the Islamist side, leaving about 23% in the middle. Evaluating the recent 
political developments in the country, about 32% indicated that religious 
fundamentalism that is supportive of a religious state is on the rise, while 23% 
thought that there is a major threat to secularism in the country. Cross-tabular 
analysis suggests that a bi-polar distribution defines these evaluations. Those who 
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are relatively well-off, better educated and live in urban areas tend to be on the 
secularist end. On the other hand, reactions to strict secularist policies have also 
declined. Those who indicate that religious people are subject to state repression 
declined significantly, from about 43% to 17%. However, the findings show that 
8% to 11% of secularists, depending on the question asked, believe that religious 
people threaten their lifestyles. These findings show that the kind of tension 
mentioned above is similarly felt in the daily lives of common people. Related to 
the above, 77% of Turkish people believe that democracy is the best form of 
government, and that secularism can be protected by democratic means (54%). 
(Çarkoğlu and Toprak, 2007: 13-14).  
These studies indicate that the trend of changes in various areas in the society is not 
consistently with for or against secularism, even though religious activity is less repressed 
and has become more visible in the public sphere. 
In a report, prepared by KONDA Research and Consultancy in June 2014, it is 
claimed that all our values, knowledge, behaviour patterns, ways of thinking - in other 
words our whole lives - have changed in the last thirty years. Life, work, social relations 
and politics have come to be independent of ‘space and time’ because of new technologies 
and new kinds of network models. The KONDA report goes on to say that on the other 
hand, while governments lasted only 10.5 months on average between 1983 and 2002, the 
AKP has now been in power for twelve years. The economy has grown impressively in 
recent decades. Sixty per cent of the population lived in the country thirty years ago; today 
eighty per cent live in towns and cities. This internal migration has had its impact on 
traditions and customs, values, lifestyles, cultural identities, and social relations. The 
changes have created tensions and polarization in the society between different political 
and religious groups, lifestyles, identities, and worldviews (KONDA, 2014; 82-83). In this 
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situation it would be impossible to adequately comprehend the understandings and 
perceptions of the new generation using knowledge based in the old social conditions pre-
2002. We need to discover both the changing conditions and the perceptions of young 
people in the new social context. This is the aim of the present thesis. 
Leyla Neyzi approaches these changes from a different perspective. Analysing the 
construction of youth in public discourse in Turkey, she divides the history of the republic 
into three periods. In the first period, 1923-1950, youth “came to embody the new nation”; 
in the second period, 1950 to 1980, “youth were reconstructed in public discourse as 
rebels. Despite the change in discourse, educated young people in these two periods 
continued to identify with the mission of building a new nation in the name of ‘the 
people’”. In the third period, the post-1980 period, there is a significant difference, she 
says, from modernist construction. Hence, “Today, young people are increasingly able to 
express themselves through the new media, challenging their construction in public 
discourse, the established hierarchy between elders and juniors, and the mission imposed 
on them by adult society. This suggests that the construction of age in Turkish society may 
be changing in the current period” (2001: 426).  
A social and intellectual divide in Turkey between Islamists and Westernists 
existed even in the Ottoman Empire in the 19th century (Toprak, 2005). This division and 
conflict continues still, under a variety of designations such as progressivists versus 
reactionists, public versus state (Berkes, 2002), the forces of tradition against the forces of 
modernity (Monshipouri, 2004), Islamists against Kemalists (Turam, 2008), and so on. 
David Shankland mentions two public cultures in Turkey, which were the results of Islam 
being incorporated into Turkish political parties. One public culture is that a secular 
lifestyle, which is “[t]he established republican preoccupation with the European 
foundations of the nation”. Shankland describes the other public culture as “alternative 
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lifestyle”, one “concentrating on piety; avoiding music, dance and alcohol, it was centred 
on the mosque, the five pillars of Islam and the Qur’an. Many of its adherents, though they 
may vary enormously in their orientation, were members of the brotherhoods, still 
proscribed but largely tolerated” (2007: 364). 
This differentiation and polarization is historically constituted because the roots of 
the modernization and westernization of Turkey go back to the nineteenth-century 
Ottoman Empire. Tanzimat (reorganization) refers to the period of reformation between 
1839 and 1871. In this period, the scope of Islamic, Shari‘a, law became limited almost 
completely to family law; new secular laws and institutions were created. Secular schools 
were founded and education partly secularized. Along with political and institutional 
reforms came cultural changes. As a result of new relationships with Western countries 
and new bureaucratic relations, change occurred in the daily life of both elites and the mass 
of people, with the introduction of Western style clothing, for example translation offices 
and new kinds of gatherings (Zürcher, 2003). As Zürcher states, “The reform policies of 
Tanzimat had never been based on popular demand” (2003: 66), and this kind of reform 
inevitably met with opposition from different segments of society, one of which were 
traditionalist Muslims. Westernist or secular reforms, accompanied by traditionalist or 
religious opposition continued throughout the final period of the Ottoman Empire and into 
the new Turkish Republic, especially in its early years. 
In the late eighteenth century, the Ottoman Empire, just before it’s collapse, 
roughly consisted of Anatolia (modern-day Turkey), most of the Arab world (with the 
modern states of Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Israel, Iraq, Kuwait, parts of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, 
Libya, Tunisia and Algeria) and the Balkans (with modern-day Serbia, Bosnia, Kosovo, 
Macedonia, Albania, Greece, Bulgaria and large parts of Romania). These newsly 
established countries embraced different state ideologies, most of which were secular to 
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various degrees. However, As Wing and Varol argues, “Among the fifty-two majority-
Muslim states, the constitutions of only two countries, Turkey and Senegal, prescribe 
secularism.  Indeed, (…), the Turkish version of secularism is arguably the strictest version 
of secularism implemented by any nation” (2007: 3). The Kemalist-secularist reforms 
played the most important role in the secularization process of the county (Zürcher, 2003).  
After the secularist reforms of the Turkish Republic, conflict between Islam and 
secularity took a different form. The leaders of the newly founded Turkish state, in order to 
modernise society, embraced six fundamental policy principles which became part of the 
constitution in 1937: republicanism (cumhuriyetçilik), nationalism (milliyetçilik), populism 
(halkçılık), secularism (laiklik), statism (devletçilik), and reformism (inkılapçılık / 
devrimcilik). Among these principles, secularism has played a crucial role in the process of 
creating modern Turkey (Keyman, 2007). To achieve the vision of a modern nation state, 
various reforms were made, particularly in the areas of law, education and culture, aimed 
at breaking with the Ottoman past, weakening the influence of Islam in society and 
becoming much closer to Western civilization (Stirling, 1958; Mardin, 1981). Among 
related reforms made in the early republican period, the Sultanate was abolished in 1922; 
as were religious courts (Şer’iyye mahkemeleri), the Caliphate, and religious schools 
(medreses) in 1924, the year in which the Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) was 
established, and the education system unified (Tevhid-i Tedrisat). In 1925 religious shrines 
(türbes) and dervish convents (tekkes) were closed down, and the turban and fez prohibited 
and replaced by the Western-style hat or cap. In 1926 the Italian penal code was adopted, 
religious marriages and polygamy were abolished and the Swiss civil code was adopted 
along with the Western clock and the Gregorian calendar. Western numerals and the Latin 
alphabet were adopted in 1928, and the constitution amended to remove Islam as the 
official state religion. Women were progressively enfranchised in the years 1930, 1933 and 
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1934, and Western weights and measures adopted in 1931. Language reform was instituted 
in 1932, removing some Arabic and Persian words and making changes to the rules of 
grammar. The traditional Arabic ezan (call to prayer) was replaced with a Turkish one in 
1932. All courtesy titles (Bey, Effendi, Pasha) were abolished, except in the army, in 1934, 
and the use of family names was mandated. In 1935 the official day of rest was changed 
from Friday to Sunday. And in 1937 the principle of laicism or secularism was inserted 
into the constitution. 
The state adopted secularism as a modernising ideology and as Shankland points 
out, “the early republican governments attempted to relegate religious conscience as much 
as was humanly possible to the sphere of the private individual” (2007: 360). According to 
Göle, the state’s ideology “became a ‘didactic secularism’: moralistic and pedagogical, 
teaching and imposing a modern way of life” (1997: 49). Accordingly, the secular public 
sphere was to be controlled by the state.  
On the other hand, the state’s strict political control of religion in almost all its 
aspects was continually challenged from within Turkish civil society (Keyman and 
İçduygu, 2005). This encompassed a great number of Islamic Sufi orders, Islamic NGOs, 
and Islamic social movements. These groups or movements have aimed to conserve 
Islamic values, tradition and culture in society, particularly in cities, and to develop the 
religious and moral consciousness of their members.  
Coşgun (1999) argues that, except a few writers and a few magazines, there was no 
Islamic youth organization or movement until the late 1960s. 1969 was the year in which 
the Islamic movement began to take form among university students in Turkey. This was 
under the umbrella of Milli Türk Talebe Birliği (MTTB). Coşgun analyses the movements 
of Islamic university students after 1980 as constituting four stages. The first stage began 
in 1980 with the military coup and ended 1987, in which demonstrations and protests 
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emerged against the prohibition of the headscarf in universities. The second stage was 
between 1987 and 1992. In this period, movements and protests were concerned with the 
headscarf affair, while other problems experienced by Turkish Muslims and Muslim world 
also discussed. Fights were a feature of this stage. In the third stage, from 1992 to 1997, 
the Islamization policies of the president, Turgut Özal, were felt even in universities. As 
Zürcher (2003) points out, these Islamic groups and movements strengthened in Turkey in 
the 1990s. According to Coşgun, the start of the fourth stage with the military intervention 
on 28 February 1997. After this memorandum, there was huge pressure on all the Islamic 
movements and almost all of them changed their strategies according to the new condition. 
At the time of Coşgun’s analysis, the results of the memorandum were still strongly felt all 
over the country. However, since 2002, the Islamic-rooted political party, Justice and 
Development Party (AKP) came into power and has won three elections so far. This has 
inevitably influenced all the Islamic movements in Turkey including those of university 
students. With this research, one of my aims is to examine the influences of this change on 
the new university students of Turkey, the current conditions of the religious groups in 
Turkey and their influence on university students in terms of their religiosity and their 
positioning between Islam and secularity, as seen from both political and sociological 
aspects. 
The form of this aforementioned conflict changed especially after 2002 following 
the founding of the AKP (Justice and Development Party) by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in 
2001, and its success in the subsequent three elections up to the present day. Until recently, 
Islamists were the ones to have felt repressed by secularist elites, especially the military. 
Now it is the turn of secularists to express anxiety at the Islamist threat to their preferred 
form of society (Zürcher, 2003). During the time the AKP has been in office, as Keyman 
(2010) points out, particular secular intellectuals, like Binnaz Toprak, have styled 
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themselves “anxious moderns” because of the speed of cultural and social transformation; 
the growing power of the AKP in the areas of legislation, execution and jurisdiction; the 
enhancement of the conservative tendency in Turkish society; and finally because of the 
ineffective opposition of the secular political parties, CHP and MHP (Göl, 2009). 
Shankland explains the secularist anxiety regarding an Islamist leader before the 
presidential elections in 2007, saying “there are pent-up feelings, movements under the 
surface, in Turkey that give rise for grave concern and are hardly likely to be resolvable in 
the short term” (2007: 358). The Gezi Park protests that occurred in May and June 2013 
can be seen as resulting, to a substantial degree, from these anxieties, regarding so-called 
Islamic authoritarianism and interference with secularist people’s lifestyles. The Gezi Park 
protests started on 27th May 2013 in order to protest the pedestrianisation of Taksim 
Square. In the beginning, a few hundred activists gathered in Gezi Park. During the 
demonstration, they set up tents and read books for a few days. Brutal police intervention 
on the night of 31st May provoked protests around the world, and the number of the 
protestors increased dramatically in the first week, evidently encouraged, rather than 
deterred, by police brutality. There were a great number of booths of various organisations 
in the park, mostly secular and leftist as well as few religiously oriented or Islamic, 
handing out leaflets and discussing their demands, the policies of the government, and the 
aims of the protest. Thousands more protested across Istanbul and Turkey, some banging 
pots and pans at their windows, and there were protests by Turkish people in capitals 
across Europe. At the beginning of June the content of protests changed to more general 
criticism of the government, and the attitude of the then Prime Minister in particular. 
During this period, between the 1st and the 15th of June, there were a number of clashes 
between police and demonstrators both in Istanbul Taksim Square and in some other cities 
of the country, such as Ankara, Izmir, Adana, Hatay, Eskisehir and Mersin. During these 
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the police used tear gas and water cannons resulting in serious injuries and death cases. 
Evidence from my fieldwork in the Gezi Park protests showed that the aforementioned 
tensions are still highly relevant in Turkey today and deserve an in-depth study. 
University students provide a good case study for the research because they are 
drawn from a wide range of socio-economic backgrounds and geographical areas, and as a 
result, are more like to represent the Turkish society demographically. Students take the 
university entrance exam in their last year of high school, when they select thirty 
universities and faculties in different cities in which they would like to study. After the 
exam, they are placed in a suitable university and faculty according to their exam results. 
There are no fees for students getting good enough exam grades to get into a state 
university. This results in a great deal of social mobility among the youth of the country, 
and in a wide diversity of socio-economic, geographic, and cultural backgrounds among 
university students. For university education, and therefore for research focusing on 
university students, Istanbul is the most significant Turkish city, with nearly fifty 
universities, and more than half a million students, which is more than the population of 
the forty-one other cities in Turkey (Hürriyet, 2014; ÖSYM, 2014). Istanbul’s 
concentration of university students provides a variety of spaces in which religiously 
observant and secularist students meet and interact. In Istanbul it is possible to find almost 
all the various religious and secular groups and non-governmental organizations targeting 
mainly university students. 
University students have been chosen for my research focus because they are set to 
be the major actors in Turkey in the near future. For example, amidst high social mobility, 
as a growing number of prospective middle classes, young people have come from the 
periphery to the centre in recent decades, supplanting the older secular urban elite in both 
power and influence. According to Gökay and Aras, the tension between these two classes 
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“is one of the key factors to understand the rise and increased support for the Islamist 
political parties” (2003: 156), as Islamist parties predominantly claim to represent and 
target lower social classes in the society. 
Moreover, the number of young people in universities has increased sharply 
between 2000 and 2010 in Turkey. According to the Higher Education Statistics published 
by ÖSYM (Student Selection and Placement Centre), the number of undergraduate 
students in Turkish universities in the 2009–10 academic years was 3,322,559 up by a third 
from the 2,106,351 in 2004–5, and double the 1,607,388 number of students in 2000–1 
(ÖSYM, 2001, 2005, 2010). 
When we talk about social, political and religious activism by young people in 
Turkey, university students are the first group that comes to mind. Student activism has 
always played a significant role in the political mobilization of Turkish society. Mustafa 
Kemal Atatürk, for instance, was himself an idealistic university student, gathering around 
him Turkish nationalist youth groups, whose members became known as Jön Türkler 
(Young Turks) in the late Ottoman period. He attended one of the schools intended to 
modernize higher education founded by Sultan Mahmud II (1784–1839). While the Sultan 
conceded primary education to religious institutions, he adopted quite the opposite policy 
regarding higher education.  
According to Berkes (2002), the establishment in 1834 of Harbiye military 
academy was the most important phenomenon in the history of secularization in Turkey, 
eventually enabling the army to form much of the basis of the established order of 
reformism and revolutionism. Berkes argues that the major events in the later period 
cannot be understood without considering the impact of the education provided by this 
academy. Its graduates included Mustafa Kemal Atatürk among a host of powerful and 
influential people setting much of the tone of military, political and cultural life for Turkey 
	   21 
from the later Ottoman period down to today. He says,  
In addition to having a wholly secular base, the new army tradition had evolved 
from within; it had not been superimposed by European officers. Therefore, the 
Turkish military had roots in the society. From Mahmud’s time to our own, Turkish 
officers have been in the vanguard of social, political, intellectual, and educational 
progress. Failing to be satisfied with the civilian preparatory schools and unable to 
reform them, the military developed an autonomous system. The military pioneered 
the simplification of the Turkish script which led to the adoption of the Latin 
alphabet, exceeded all other bodies in mass educational activities, and contributed 
some of the outstanding educationalists. (Berkes, 1998: 111) 
The state ideology of secularism was exerted on the society through both coercive 
and consensual means, in the guise of modernization and secularization. In this context, 
education was one of the most important instruments, which Althusser (1971) includes in 
the ideological tools of state. According to Althusser, the state maintains itself and its 
power through certain institutions such as the army, courts, and police, through which the 
state applies pressure on the people and punishes dissenters when it sees it is necessary in 
order to maintain its power. However, employing pressure and punishment would be a 
weakness. Therefore, “[t]he effective state uses ideological state apparatuses such as the 
church, schools, and the mass media to ensure that people think the right way and do not 
want to deviate or dissent” (Bruce and Yearly, 2006: 144). In the Turkish experience, this 
was all the more so regarding the indoctrination of the youth with modern nation-state 
ideals, as young people were considered to be the future architects of a stronger secular 
nation. 
University students worldwide have found various ways through which they are 
able to express themselves. Groupings like student clubs and unions have had a similar 
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function among Turkish university students for the last five decades or so. Political youth 
movements are generally affiliated with leftist and rightist ideologies, reflecting tensions 
between revolutionary and pro-status quo forces. The range of youth movements, both 
leftist and rightist, had support on university campuses. The first organized political 
opposition by young people in Turkey was of leftist university students against Adnan 
Menderes, who was the Prime Minister between 1950 and 1960. There were further such 
activities in 1968, inspired by Marxist ideals, and from time to time since. Türkiye Halk 
Kurtuluş Partisi-Cephesi (THKP-C) [People’s Liberation Party-Front of Turkey] and 
Türkiye Halk Kurtuluş Ordusu (THKO) [People’s Liberation Army of Turkey] are the 
best-known societies founded by young leftists (Başer, 2001). Although religious groups 
have had some support among young people, especially university students, they have 
tended to remain largely ‘invisible’, owing to government pressure on religiously 
observant people. During my fieldwork, when I looked for representative students of 
religious groups at universities, it was almost impossible to find them through an official 
channel. As Toprak says, the aforementioned pressure “pushed the Islamist opposition 
underground” (2005: 32, 33), among other oppositions. The Islamist groups chose other 
ways of reaching young people with their ideas and ideals, establishing student hostels, 
founding private universities, and organising Qur’an courses. For these reasons, in 
researching the views and practices of university students, it is important to look beyond 
the on-campus unions in order to be comprehensive, and this very fact necessitates doing 
qualitative research in which the researcher can reach the target groups and samples, 
through gatekeepers, and conduct interviews with their help. 
Turkey, having substantially suffered from political polarization and violence in the 
1960s and especially in the 1970s among university students, workers, police, teachers and 
even bureaucrats, ended up with a military intervention in 1980” (Şimşek, 2004: 111). 
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Until the late 1980s there was strict control over all social movements. From that time, 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have been tolerated by the state. Contrary to 
1960s and 1970s, these movements and NGOs have many dimensions: “Since the mid-
1980s, the most widespread movements have been Kurdish ethnic nationalism, Islamism, 
feminism, the Alevi cultural movement, environmentalism and human rights activism” 
(Şimşek, 2004: 112).  
The tension among the university students regarding secularism versus Islamism 
has emerged and has been visible at Turkish universities in the last two decades. The most 
important and prominent issue that has caused this tension has been the headscarf affair. 
Since 1981, female students who wear headscarves have been prohibited from attending 
schools in Turkey. They “began to demonstrate in various ways to protest that the 
authorities were keeping them out of the campus. Although the issue was of direct concern 
mainly to women, male students made up the majority of the protestors” (Şimşek, 2004: 
121). They defended the protests saying, “I cannot practice my faith as I wish” (Çayır, 
2000: 66).  
My review of the literature in the following chapter shows that there is no single 
definition of secularism: American secularism, Anglo-Saxon secularism, the French style 
of secularism, and the Turkish each has its own characteristics, while sharing features with 
other state ideologies. As is seen in this chapter, scholars generally hold the view that 
Turkish secularism aims to secularize the country in both its institutions and culture. It has 
been successful in secularizing institutions such as education and law, while less successful 
at secularizing ordinary people’s consciousness and culture. Tension between state and 
society has arisen especially in this second area. The wearing of the headscarf, Qur’an 
courses, İmam-Hatip religious high schools, are the best-known examples expressing this 
tension in the political area. Scholars generally liken Turkish secularism to French 
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secularism, seeing the main difference between them as the existence in Turkey of the 
Diyanet or Directorate of Religious Affairs, which is generally seen as the Turkish state’s 
dedicated tool for control of religion. In addition to the Diyanet, a great number of reforms 
were introduced at the founding of the Turkish republic in order to westernize and 
secularize the country, from the abandonment of Arabic script to abolition of the Caliphate 
and certain religious institutions, including the Ottoman legal system. There is no 
consensus on the roots of secularism in Turkey. Some scholars view it as deriving from the 
Ottoman time, while others see it as a Republican innovation. It is the present author’s 
view that westernizing and modernizing reforms in the nineteenth-century Ottoman 
Empire led on to the far more thoroughgoing and systematic secularization of the 
Republic. 
A review of the scholarly literature indicates that the present thesis has a big gap to 
fill, there being no study using qualitative research to investigate the condition of religion 
and secularity in Turkey, examining the tension and accommodation between them from 
the viewpoint of university students. This research approaches the issue from a variety of 
perspectives, and each empirical chapter presents interviews, observation and analysis. 
 
1.3 THE STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
Chapter Two sets out the major theoretical debates concerning Islam and secularity in 
Turkey. I also review the literature that has explored young people’s experiences of the 
relationship between religion and secularity. I organize the literature related to the subjects 
of this study into three categories: debates on the relationship between Islam and secular 
states; sociological and cultural conceptions of the relationship between Islam and 
secularity in Turkey; and philosophical and conceptual debates on Islam and secularity. 
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Before analysing pertinent statements of research participants in the subsequent empirical 
chapters, I introduce and summarize earlier arguments on the topic of the thesis, and reveal 
the gap in the field that I aim to fill with this study. 
Chapter Three outlines the qualitative research methods, interviewing, and 
observations used for the empirical study, and explains why the methods chosen are the 
most suitable for the study. Application of these methods to my research is explained, such 
as conducting forty-five in-depth interviews with male and female university students, and 
the observations made over a period of nearly seven months in Istanbul. Consideration is 
given to the rationale behind the use of systematic and purposive sampling, rather than 
random sampling, and how research participants/interviewees were accessed. After 
clarifying details of observation methods used in the fieldwork, I introduce my position as 
both insider and outsider to the society, and the advantages of this position, and consider 
ethical issues arising in the course of the research. 
Chapter Four examines the relationship between religion and secularity as 
experienced by university students in Turkey politically. Drawing on my informants’ 
responses, I explore the extent to what polarization between religion and secularity still 
exists in contemporary Turkish society and, in particular, what changes are to be found in 
the views and ideals of students who are religious. An answer is sought as to whether 
Kemalist secularist and Islamist projects may be deemed to have thrived or failed in their 
aims. An analysis of university students’ experiences regarding tensions and other 
difficulties they experience in practising their religion in the public sphere is the core 
theme of this chapter. Also discussed in detail are the current perceptions of political Islam 
and the views of my research participants on this. 
Chapter Five examines religiosity, religiousness and secularity as understood and 
perceived by today’s university students in Turkey. Endeavouring to explore the religiosity 
	   26 
of Turkish university students, I put certain specific questions to them and observed them 
going about their daily lives. I also examine the secularization thesis as applied to 
university students in Turkey. The approach to this issue adopted is to consider the beliefs 
and values of Turkish university students, rather than by examining such metrics as the 
percentage of them attending prayers at mosques, for instance. 
Chapter Six considers religious groups in Turkey and their place in both the private 
and public lives of Turkish university students. After considering who the main targets are 
of the various religious groups, I look at the issue from the students’ point-of-view, 
considering their views and experiences; the object being to elucidate the perceptions 
university students have of Turkish religious groups, and the ways these groups affect their 
lives in terms of religiosity and secularity; how they influence the students’ political 
attitudes towards the secular Turkish state; the impact on the students’ lifestyles publicly 
and privately; and what students think of the religious groups, for good and for ill. 
Chapter Seven looks at the extent of divisions between secular and religiously 
observant students, explores their origins, as seen by the students, and assesses the debate 
from conceptual, political, and social angles. Another aim of this chapter is to explore 
whether the differentiation in Turkish society results in extreme polarisation or whether it 
is a natural consequence of a pluralistic society. At this point, important questions arise: 
What is the essential character of change in Turkish society? Should differentiation of the 
king exists in the society today be termed “division”? If we can speak of “division”, is this 
something novel, and if it is, is it harmful? 
Chapter Eight addresses the main topic of my thesis through the data gathered from 
the Gezi Park protests in Istanbul. The protests occurred during the period of my research. 
When the protests took place, in May and June 2013, Turkish society generally, and 
religiously observant people in particular, were uncertain as to the exact nature of the Gezi 
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Park protests. Observing developments through the various media including social media, 
much of the population was unsure whether the protesters were engaged in democratic 
action against the government and some of its policies, or whether theirs was an objection 
rather to the religious identity of the Prime Minister and the religiously observant people 
whom he claims to represent. Were religion, and the Islamic revival in the country the 
main issue? And were these protests headed for a crisis in Turkey, with who knew what 
consequences for the traditionally religious population? Did these protests demonstrate that 
religion cannot co-exist with secularity, and that there is a deep-rooted and irresolvable 
tension between religious and secular Muslims in Turkey? Analysing the data from the in-
depth interviews I conducted during the protests with both the protesters and the people 
who were against protests, and the observations I made in the field in Istanbul, I try to 
answer these questions in Chapter Eight. 
Chapter Nine summarises the main findings of my research and states how the 
study contributes to the literature on the relationship between Islam and secularity, with 
particular reference to Turkey, university students, Islamic movements, secularism, and the 
place of religion in modern countries. 
 
1.4 DEFINITIONS OF THE KEY TERMS 
Islam: In this study, I conducted my interviews with forty-five Turkish university students 
who defined themselves as Muslims. According to the Encyclopedia of Islam and the 
Muslim World, “Islam is the name identifying the faith tradition and community of those 
who believe that there is one God and that the prophet Muhammad was God’s messenger, 
and the person who submits is a ‘Muslim’” (Voll, 2004: 359). There is no single Islamic 
understanding and practice common to all Muslim societies. The various Islamic sects, 
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brotherhoods, philosophical schools, and movements, each has its own understanding and 
practices. Some groups are very similar, some very different. Sunni and Shia Islam, for 
instance, as the most well known major sects, have different interpretations of the Qur’an, 
different methodologies of Islamic law, and different doctrines. Although Turkey mostly 
embraces Sunni Islam, it is very difficult to assert that there is only one Islamic 
understanding in Turkey. Among Sunni Islamic sects, the majority of people in Turkey 
adopt the Hanafi and Shafi‘i schools (madhhab), while others adhere to the teachings of 
Alawism, about which there has been a great deal of debate as to whether it is a religion, 
an Islamic sect, or just an Islamic interpretation. 
Islamism: Islamism is the most common term for political Islam, the aim of which is to 
Islamize the country whether by winning political power through the ballot box or through 
a revolution. This is how the term is understood in the present study. Turkish Islamism is 
generally discussed in the context of reaction to the top-down secularist policies of the 
state. Although its roots go back to the beginning of the Turkish Republic, it is generally 
argued that political Islam in Turkey only got seriously underway with the works of 
Necmettin Erbakan (1926–2011). He established a religious movement, Milli Görüş, and 
political parties, in order to promote Islamism. The governing party at the time of writing 
(2013) is the AKP (The Justice and Development Party) that is seen as owing its inception 
to the works of Erbakan. Because of their distinctively different goals and methods, the 
majority of Turkish religious movements are not categorised here, or in most other studies, 
as Islamist. In addition, along with the Milli Görüş movement, there are a number of small 
political Islamist groups in Turkey. In this thesis, by “Islamist” I mean those wanting to 
apply Islamic political principles and rulings to the state and the legal system, focusing on 
the political aspect of Islam rather than Suf mysticism and the philosophical aspects of the 
religion. 
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Religious: In this study, in order to express the Turkish word “dindar”, the terms 
“religious” and “religiously observant” is used interchangeably referring to those who 
believe in Islamic doctrines, observe Islamic values, principles and rulings, and want to 
practise them both in their private and public lives, as far as possible. Those who wish to 
practise are included in this category, even if they are unable to do so fully. Other terms 
such as pious, faithful, and devout can translate the Turkish term dindar, but here the 
preferred words are “religious” and “religiously observant”. In Turkish, the word 
“muhafazakar” (conservative) and “dindar” (religious) might be used interchangeably in 
some cases. 
Secularity: In this research, I use the term secularity as a general concept, which comprises 
the political ideology, secularism, the social process, secularization, and being secular, that 
is, not pious.  
Secularism: The term secularism is used in this study to mean the state ideology of Turkey. 
As an ideology more broadly there is no single definition of the term; there are different 
kinds of secularism: American secularism; Anglo-Saxon secularism; and the French style 
of secularism, are the main ones. Each has its own characteristics while sharing features 
with other state ideologies. While it is seen as similar to French secularism, Turkish 
secularism has distinctive characteristics. As is seen in Chapter Two, scholars generally 
hold the view that Turkish secularism aims to secularize the country in both its institutions 
and culture, and to keep religion and religious activities under state control, while keeping 
religious practices in the private sphere. In Chapter Four, I explain how secularism has 
been understood and applied in Turkey and what the characteristics of Turkish or Kemalist 
secularism are. By “secularists” I mean those who embrace secularism and Kemalism – i.e. 
the beliefs of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk – and Kemalist principles in their public and private 
lives. All Turkish school students, as mentioned, are taught that there are six fundamental 
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principles to the ideology of Kemalism: Republicanism (Cumhuriyetçilik); nationalism 
(milliyetçilik); populism (halkçılık); secularism (laiklik); statism (devletçilik); and 
revolutionism (inkılapçılık/devrimcilik). 
Secularist: In this study, because of its different meaning in the Turkish context, secularist 
(or laik in Turkish) does not imply unbeliever, atheist or non-Muslim. The term applies as 
well to Muslims who believe that religion is more about faith, morality and worship than 
about the legal system, religious rulings, commandments and prohibitions applying to 
public and private life; implied is that religion is to be confined to the private sphere. 
Although secular Muslims may believe in Islamic doctrines and practise religious 
observances such as attending Friday prayer and fasting during the month of Ramadan, 
they do not accept all rulings related to politics and the legal system. Nor do they organize 
their daily and public lives according to religious rules and principles. They may not accept 
wearing of the headscarf on religious grounds, or the religious prohibition of alcoholic 
drink. In this thesis “secularist” and “non-observant” are used interchangeably. 
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CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
“On empirical grounds there are good reasons why we should expect religion and 
morality to remain and even to become ever more contentious public issues in 
democratic politics. Given such trends as increasing globalization, transnational 
migrations, increasing multiculturalism, the biogenetic revolution, and the 
persistence of blatant gender discrimination, the number of contentious public 
religious issues is likely to grow rather than diminish. The result is a continuous 
expansion of the res publica while the citizen’s republic becomes ever more 
diverse and fragmented. The penetration of all spheres of life, including the most 
private, by public policy; the expansion of scientific-technological frontiers giving 
humanity Demiurgic powers of self-creation and self-destruction; the compression 
of the whole world into one single common home for all of humanity; and the 
moral pluralism that seems inherent to multiculturalism—all these transcendent 
issues will continue to engage religion and provoke religious responses.” 
(Casanova, 2006: 22) 
This chapter combines and organizes literature related to this thesis: literature concerning 
Islam; secularism; Turkey; and the position of people between religion and secularity. As 
this study approaches the issue from multiple perspectives, the literature and the discussion 
of other studies are split into three categories, which are debates on the relationship 
between Islam and the secular state, social and cultural conceptions of the relationship 
between Islam and secularity in Turkey, and philosophical and conceptual debates on Islam 
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and secularity. I organize and present the debates on the issues related to Islam and 
secularity mainly in the political, sociological and philosophical areas.  
In this chapter, my aim is to introduce and review earlier findings and arguments on 
the topic of the thesis, and summarize them, before analysing pertinent statements of my 
research participants in the data chapters (Chapters Four, Five, Six, Seven and Eight), and 
to show the gap in the literature that this study is intended to fill.  
The geographical scope of the literature extends beyond Turkey since other states 
and societies have experienced comparably similar tensions before and now. The literature 
on the relationship between religion and secularity is mostly from and concerning the 
West. Terms such as secularization, modernization and sacralisation emerged first in the 
West, and this necessitates consideration of their meanings in their original context, in 
order to establish their significance in modern Turkey.  
The first section, about debates on the relationship between Islam and secular state, 
especially Republican Turkey, combines writings and studies looking at secularism as state 
ideology, particularly in Western countries, before explaining the characteristics of Turkish 
secularism. An outline is provided of the history of secularism in Turkey and the Ottoman 
Empire, and of views and arguments of scholars on political Islam, Islamism, and Islamic 
organizations in Turkey since the time of President Turgut Özal (PM from 1983 to 1989). A 
summary of university-student activism in Turkey forms the last part of the first section. 
The second section looks at the arguments of scholars concerned with Islamization 
and secularization considered sociologically and anthropologically. The problem of 
secularization and sacralisation is discussed for the West as well as Turkey. The place of 
religion, Islam in particular, in Turkish culture and society is considered in this section. I 
discuss here civil religion in the context of Turkey and the cult of Atatürk. After indicating 
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various Islamic views and movements in Turkey, consideration is given to the tensions and 
struggles of religious Turkish Muslims, in their private and public lives, from the 
viewpoints of researchers and writers. Finally in this section I look at new Islamic 
lifestyles which have come about in recent decades. 
The third and final section looks at philosophical problems and debates related to 
the relationship between religion and secularity. Definitions of the key terms, bid‘ah, 
tajdid, ijtihad, ‘ibadat, mu‘amalat, and hudud are briefly considered, and the problem of 
the compatibility of Islam and secularity is discussed by reviewing previous studies. The 
salient question in Islamic thought is addressed: reform or renewal? Renewal in Islamic 
thought, with its principles and limits, is a central concept in the context of modernity and 
secularity. Consideration of the principles of the concept of renewal should lead to an 
answer to the question of whether Islam and secularity are compatible. The principles of 
Islamic jurisprudence are important here. Key debates in the area of Islamic jurisprudence 
are outlined here, covered more fully in the data chapters. During the fieldwork all these 
issues were discussed with the research participants either directly or indirectly.  
 
2.2 DEBATES ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ISLAM AND THE 
SECULAR STATE 
Within the scholarly political strand, some analysts consider the varieties of secularism and 
differentiate Turkish style secularism from that of some other countries. These scholars see 
the roots of Turkish secularism in the nature of the Ottoman Empire and its conclusion, 
and state policies and dispositions such as Atatürk’s reforms, including the formation of 
the Directorate of Religious Affairs, and the power of the army (Karpat, 1959; Daver, 
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1988; Berkes, 2002; Zürcher, 2003; Gökay and Aras, 2003; Keyman, 2007; Roy, 2007; 
Gözaydın, 2009; Kuru, 2009).  
Scholars taking a political approach are generally aware of the diversity of types of 
secularism possible, even though they give them different names. For example, Ahmet T. 
Kuru divides secularism as a state policy into two types: assertive and passive. Assertive 
secularism implies actively excluding religion from the public sphere and limiting it to the 
private sphere. On the other hand, passive secularism accords the state a passive role with 
state allowing “the public visibility of religion” (2009:11). While Islam is incompatible 
with assertive secularism, it is compatible with passive secularism. Kuru makes a 
significant observation: “Secularism is perceived as an antireligious ideology in several 
Muslim countries. The main reason for that is the dominance of assertive secularism in 
countries such as Uzbekistan and Tunisia… These Muslims may rethink secularism if they 
recognize the alternative passive secularism, which is dominant in some other states with 
Muslim populations, such as Senegal and Indonesia...” (2009: 246). He also argues that the 
assertive secularism of Turkey violates religious freedom.  
Fuat Keyman looks at two aspects of secularisation, differentiating between ‘an 
objective social-structural process’ and ‘a subjective cultural process.’ Objective 
secularisation refers to the separation of state and religion. By contrast, subjective 
secularisation “implies the secularization of consciousness, meaning that the modern, 
emancipated self relates to nature, interacts with the other and looks upon its own life 
through secular reason rather than traditional religious codes” (2007: 218). Keyman 
evaluates Turkey’s success and failure in terms of these two secularism projects: “It has 
become clear that while it has been successful in establishing and maintaining objective 
secularization both institutionally and constitutionally, Turkish secularism has been weak 
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in creating a secular social ethos strong enough to achieve subjective secularization” (Ibid, 
223). 
Secularist state policies are also considered, as they exist in key countries, 
prominent among them France, Great Britain and the USA. Generally, French-style 
secularism is termed “laïcite”, and is seen as protecting the state against religion, while 
Anglo-Saxon style secularism is seen as more inclined to protect religion from state 
interference. Whereas the state is tolerant of religion in the USA - while establishing a 
strict separation between religion and state - in France it tries to confine religion to the 
private sphere (Kuru, 2009). Secularism in Turkey is generally thought to be closer to 
French laïcisme than Anglo-Saxon secularism, with an emphasis on protecting the state 
from religious expansion, influence or penetration (Göle, 1997; Toprak, 2005; Roy, 2007; 
Kuru, 2009).  
Although French style secularism became a prototype for the founders of the 
Turkish republic, it has taken a different form in Turkey. Turkish secularism differs from 
laïcisme and other secularisms in that not only are Islam and the state separate and the 
power of religion much limited in the public sphere; there is, in addition, control of 
religion by the state; in Karpat’s words, secularisation in Turkey “also aimed at liberating 
society from the hold of Islam, and bringing about a new type of free individual” (1959: 
288). Using Keyman’s terms we can say that Turkish secularism aims at both objective and 
subjective secularization. Casanova approaches this characterictic of the Turkish Republic 
by questioning the possibility of a proper democracy as long as these policies of the state 
towards religion exist:  
The ‘six arrows’ of Kemalism (republicanism, nationalism, secularism, statism, 
populism, and reformism) could not lead towards a workable representative 
democracy. Ultimately, the project of constructing such a nation-state from above 
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was bound to fail because it was too secular for the Islamists, too Sunni for the 
Alevis, and too Turkish for the Kurds. A Turkish state in which the collective 
identities and interests of those groups that constitute the overwhelming majority of 
the population cannot find public representation cannot possibly be a truly 
representative democracy, even if it is founded on modern secular republican 
principles” (Casanova 2001: 1064).  
Fuat Keyman adds another statement: “for non-Muslim minorities Turkey is too Muslim” 
(Keyman, 2010: 143). 
Scholars discussing this issue focus on different aspects of Turkish secularism. 
Özbudun and Keyman (2002) consider the aims of the founders of the republic, arguing 
that their main aim was to break with the Islamic and Ottoman past and to ‘catch up’ with 
Western civilization. According to them, secularism in Turkey, therefore, does not mean 
only separating state and religion; it means excluding the sacralised tradition in order to 
prevent it from overwhelming the state. As Berkes (2002) and Subaşı (2004) point out, the 
main aim is seen as deactivating religion in the areas of economics, politics, education, 
science, and the public sphere. 
Some scholars focus on the methods used by the state to secularize the country. The 
outstanding agent is the army, acting alongside state top-down prohibitions and restrictive 
policies. In this respect, Gökay and Aras argue that “From the start, the Turkish republic 
emerged as a state with a military backbone, possessed of an official ideology—known as 
Kemalism after the founder of the republic, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk—committed to statism 
and a tight information policy, and administered by a militantly secular small modernizing 
elite” (2003: 150-1). 
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When Turkish secularism is discussed, the first feature that comes to the forefront 
is the control of religion by government institutions, particularly the Diyanet İşleri 
Başkanlığı (the Directorate of Religious Affairs) that was established in 1924 after the 
abolition of the caliphate. The aim of this institution was both the control of religion and 
channelling of religious affairs and movements (Gözaydın, 2009). Zubaida argues that in 
this way “Religion is bureaucratized as a department of state…” (2003: 159). Instead of 
criticizing the policy of state control of religious affairs, Daver (1988) and Berkes (2002) 
argue that removing the traditional religious institutions, such as Tekkeler, Zaviyeler 
(Islamic lodges and monasteries, which were abolished in 1925 as one of the republican 
revolutions), Medreseler (Islamic schools), and establishing Diyanet, was a necessity of 
historical circumstances. 
Some scholars (Mardin, 1981, Berkes, 2002; Karpat; 2009) seek the roots of the 
Turkish secularization process in the Ottoman Empire: “The historical context also brings 
out features which are crucial to an understanding of the future of laicism in Turkey” 
(Mardin, 1981: 191). 
Daver argues that Turkey started to be secularized after the fall of the Ottoman 
Empire, because the Empire was “mainly theocratic in character and outlook” (1988: 32). 
This line of argument is based on the fact that the Sultan of the Empire was, at the same 
time, the head (caliph) of all Muslims, and Islam was the state religion. However, even the 
system of customary law (örfi hukuk) in the Ottoman Empire is seen as essentially a 
secular system by some thinkers; if this point is accepted it can be seen that secularisation 
was already in existence in the Ottoman period (Berkes, 2002). Secularization, in the sense 
of Westernization and modernization, only really became apparent during the times of the 
Sultans Selim III (1761–1808) and Mahmud II (1784–1839), when the Empire lost much 
power after military defeats and had to accommodate to the new power of Europe, 
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particularly with the Treaty of Karlowits in 1699. The Empire was no longer able to give 
direction to socio-political developments, which were now dominated by the European 
powers, especially France (Feldman, 2008: 59). Tanzimat Fermanı (the Imperial Edict of 
Reorganization) in 1839, Islahat Fermanı (the Imperial Reform Edict) in 1856, and the 
Treaty of Lausanne in 1923 were only some outcomes of this weakened state. The fall 
from dominance came as a big shock to Muslims and particularly those of Turkey, and 
stymied attempts to make new legal arrangements in the sphere of Islamic law in the light 
of changing economic and political circumstances.  
After these developments, Toprak argues, “Ottoman opinion was divided into two 
camps about the route to be followed in order to ‘catch up’ with the West.” (2005: 29). 
These camps were the Islamists and Westernists. As she says, the second camp, the 
Westernists, won out over the Islamists in the establishment of the new state. Yet the 
conflict still continues. Inspired by the concept of the “two Frances”, adopted after the 
social division in France in 1905, Hanioğlu (2011) refers to the “two Turkeys” in order to 
explain this long-standing division in Turkish society. 
Political writers on Islam and secularity in Turkey have dealt with the history, 
ideas, leaders and processes of Islam-inspired political parties or organizations, including 
political Islam and Islamism, and so forth (Mardin, 1981, 1989; Yavuz, 1997, 1999; 
Meeker, 1994; Gülalp, 1999; Fuller, 2002; Keyman and İçduygu, 2005; Kara, 2011a). 
Several scholarly works are concerned with Islamist political parties and Islamic 
movements in terms of their challenge to the secular state. Despite the state not attacking 
Islam as a faith, but rather attacking religious leaders such as the Ulema and religious 
institutions, religiously observant people were uncomfortable with the Turkish 
government’s policies, except in periods of government détente with Islamic movements. 
Adnan Menderes (PM from 1950 to 1960), Turgut Özal (PM from 1983 to 1989) and R. 
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Tayyip Erdoğan (PM from 2003 to 2014) are prominent Prime Ministers of such 
governments. 
Believers who want to live in an Islamic state or who criticize the state for its 
restrictions on Islam are generally referred to as “Islamists”. ‘Islamism’ and ‘Islamists’ 
usually refer to political Islam. Göle explains this difference between Islamist and Muslim 
saying; “‘Islamism’ indicates the reappropriation of a Muslim identity and values as a basis 
for an alternative social and political agenda to that of the state. ‘Muslim’ is not 
synonymous with ‘Islamist,’ in the sense that the first expresses a religious identity and the 
latter implies a political consciousness and social action” (1997: 47). For this reason, 
Turam (2007) for instance, in order to separate political and apolitical movements, refers to 
the latter as “Islamic”. I also use the terms Islamism and Islamist in this thesis to mean 
political Islam and political Islamism. 
The narrative promoted by scholars of political Islam is that the state implemented 
its secular reforms in such a thoroughgoing, not to say harsh, way that it broke the power 
of Islam and religious leaders. This gave rise to an Islamist opposition, which at first 
operated underground (Toprak, 2005). When the country democratized, this opposition 
then surfaced. Although the state tried to stop the Islamization of society, even to the point 
of staging military coups and interventions, Islamic movements and parties continued to 
exist in one way or another. 
When political Islam in Turkey is discussed, Necmettin Erbakan (1926-2011) and 
his parties are sure to be mentioned almost immediately. Erbakan was the leader of a series 
of Islamist political parties - a series, rather than one single party, because they were seen 
as a threat by the secular elites of Turkey and successively banned.  
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Toprak, in considering the background to political Islam, writes: “Overtly religious 
people were not accepted into the political, social, or intellectual elite circles. The republic 
marginalized them, caricatured them as fanatics, and considered them uncivilized. It was 
these marginalized groups that later formed the backbone of political Islam” (2005: 32). 
Apart from religious political parties and a number of religious movements, such as 
the Milli Görüş movement that was founded by Necmettin Erbakan in 1969, other Islamic 
movements have not generally been associated with politics. However, in some periods 
they have been accused of having a hidden Islamist agenda, meaning that although the 
Islamic movements do not appear to work in the political sphere, they nevertheless want to 
revolutionize the state and make it Islamic in the manner of Iran. Gökay and Aras, for 
example, explaining the concerns of the secular elite, argue that the state placed Islam, “at 
the core of its cognitive map of threat perception” (2003: 154). Göle (1998) has almost the 
same opinion; according to her, Islam has been one of the major phobias of Turkish 
nationalism. Although they have not been apparently active in the political sphere, 
educating primary, high school and university students and establishing charities and 
societies in various areas of the society, Islamic organizations and movements are 
influential in politics both directly and indirectly. So elucidating this issue is crucial for my 
study, because of the fact that university students have been one of the main target groups 
of the Islamic movements in Turkey. 
Despite the fact that most of the scholars of Turkish origin are opposed to the 
aforementioned attitudes and policies of the state, Kara’s (2011b) analysis seems to 
corroborate the state’s anxiety. He locates the Islamic opposition in two categories: active 
and passive oppositions. According to him, the former refers to political Islam, and the 
latter refers to the attitudes of other religious movements and people. He argues that 
religiously observant Muslims do not want the religious sphere to be an area of political 
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fight and conflict, and that they prefer to wait until conditions are suitable. For him, this is 
a vernacular/local opposition and, therefore, resistant and functional. 
Writing on Islamism or political Islam generally focuses on Islamist parties, 
probably because power, organizations, ideas and processes are relatively easy to observe 
and measure. There are various other movements which challenge the control of the 
secular state and the secularization of society or the adoption of a modern lifestyle. Most 
such movements are ‘underground’ and it is therefore difficult to estimate their power, 
numbers, or impact on society. Qualitative research by way of in-depth interviews and 
participant observations work will help disclose more about these groups and movements.  
 
2.3 SOCIAL AND CULTURAL CONCEPTIONS OF THE RELATIONSHIP 
BETWEEN ISLAM AND SECULARITY IN TURKEY 
The second group of scholars concerned with secularism concentrates on the sociological 
aspect of the secularity-religion issue. Some authors within this category trace the 
theoretical background by drawing upon Weber’s secularization thesis. Weber theorized 
the separation of different types of expertise within the modern state, an end to the 
‘enchantment’ of the world, and the impact of globalization, capitalism and modernism on 
contemporary society (see Bellah, 1958; Berger, 1973, 1995, 1999; Smelser, 1995; Asad, 
1999; Beriş, 2003; Monshipouri, 2004; Giddens, 2008). 
The ‘secularization thesis’ is one of the most central in sociological theory. 
According to this thesis, societies will secularize in parallel with their modernization, i.e. 
the power and impact of religion will decline as they modernize. The founding fathers of 
sociology, Weber, Durkheim, and Marx, all subscribed to this thesis (Giddens, 2008: 553). 
However, others argue that the development of late-modern societies shows that religion 
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will continue to have an important place in society; only its forms will change to accord 
with new social conditions. Berger does not agree with the founding fathers of sociology, 
especially when it comes to the post-modern times. He argues that sacralisation is 
characteristic of post-modern times, supporting this argument by saying, “Secularization 
on the societal level is not necessarily linked to secularization on the level of individual 
consciousness. Certain religious institutions have lost power and influence in many 
societies, but both old and new religious beliefs and practices have nevertheless continued 
in the lives of individuals, sometimes taking new institutional forms and sometimes 
leading to great explosions of religious fervor…” (1999: 3).  
As evidence of a powerful religious revival became impossible to ignore, a number 
of scholars rejected the theory of secularization totally. In contrast, Casanova (2006) 
proceeds by drawing an analytical distinction between three meanings of the term. He 
argues that there are different connotations to the notion of secularization, and suggests 
that we need to distinguish between three of them. According to him, the first meaning of 
secularization is “the decline of religious beliefs and practices” in modern societies. This is 
the most common description of the term in academic debates. “The privatization of 
religion” is the second meaning, and “the differentiation of the secular sphere (state, 
economy, science)” is the third one. After presenting these three connotations, Casanova 
highlights the importance of “the examination of the validity of the three propositions 
independently of each other and thus refocus the often fruitless secularization debate into 
comparative historical analysis that could account for different patterns of secularization, 
in all three meanings of the term, across societies and civilizations” (2006: 8). He then 
argues that differentiation remains the defensible core of secularization, while religious 
decline is empirically false. 
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As mentioned in the Introduction, Casanova suggests that we need to discover new 
forms of religion and religiosity at three different levels of analysis: “the individual level, 
the group level, and the societal level” (2006: 17). Following his suggestion in this thesis I 
explore the kinds of religiosity and secularism defined and practiced by Turkish university 
students at these three levels in this research.  
As an example of analysis at the individual level, Casanova gives the concept of 
“individual mysticism”	   introduced by Ernst Troeltsch as one of the types of religion. 
Thomas Luckmann calls this “invisible religion”, religion that is difficult to see and 
measure when sociologists try to gauge the degree of religiosity in a society. According 
Casanova, modern people have an opportunity to know and choose among various 
meaning systems in a way that formerly was available only to elites. “What is certainly 
new in our global age is the simultaneous presence and availability of all world religions 
and all cultural systems, from the most “primitive”	   to the most “modern,”	  often detached 
from their temporal and spatial contexts, ready for flexible or fundamentalist individual 
appropriation”	  (Casanova, 2006: 18). 	  
His group level includes collectivities such as cults, religious communities and 
voluntary congregations. As we have seen, Casanova criticizes the theory of modernization 
that holds that in the process of modernization tradition and Gemeinschaft (community) 
will lose their power and influence in society. On the contrary, following Tocqueville, he 
says “modernity…	   offers new and expanded possibilities for the construction of 
communities of all kinds as voluntary associations, and particularly for the construction of 
new religious communities as voluntary congregations”	   (2006: 18). Along with instances 
in other religious communities, he sees some forms of Islam, such as Tablighi Jamaat, and 
Sufi brotherhoods, as voluntary congregations.	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Casanova’s	  “imagined religious communities”	  fall within the scope of the societal 
level. He argues, “secular nationalism and national ‘civil religions’	   will continue to be 
prominent carriers of collective identities, but ongoing processes of globalization are likely 
to enhance the re-emergence of the great ‘world religions’	   as globalized transnational 
imagined religious communities”	   (2006: 19). He criticizes Samuel Huntington’s thesis of 
“The Clash of Civilizations”, as Huntington’s concept of civilization is geo-political, 
whereas globalization breaks the boundaries and de-territorializes all cultural systems.	  
The popularity of new religious movements in the West may be viewed as a great 
challenge to the classic secularization thesis and a significant new research area in 
sociology. The USA is an example of religion having a significant role in a modern, indeed 
in many ways the most modern, country. Considering this and being aware of the differing 
conditions of countries, Asad (1999) also suggests that the secularization thesis needs to be 
reconsidered. I consider that the main reason for the variety of views on this topic arises 
from the various types of secularization being considered: cultural, sociological, 
philosophical, institutional, and political. So that while political secularization may be 
much in evidence in a country, sacralisation may nevertheless have power in the area of 
culture. 
Debates on secularization and the place of Islam have become popular in Turkey in 
recent decades. Since the beginning of the Republic, the aim of the state has been to reduce 
the influence of religion in the areas of economics, politics, education, and culture, while 
globalization and modernization have spread a secular lifestyle across the world. In these 
circumstances, changes in the power of religion in society, the changing faces of Islam and 
Islamic organizations have been major concerns of sociologists in Turkey.  
Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu (2009) claim that Islam has had a very important place 
in Turkey in the sense of forming Turkish identity, and that religiosity is widespread 
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among the population. Keyman says “Islam has been a significant symbolic system, giving 
meaning to human existence and thereby forming an effective cultural basis for individual 
and communal identity in Turkey” (2007: 224). According to Göle (1997) Islam has been a 
vitally important component of Turkish identity, especially as a symbolic force and 
cultural reference. Indeed, after outlining the ontological, psychological, political and 
ideological significance of Islam, Mardin (1981) criticizes Kemalism for not understanding 
the role of Islam in Turkish society. 
Although some scholars, like Daver (1988), Toprak (2005), and Keyman (2007) 
believe that the secularisation of society and its modernization are a continuing project, a 
recent survey conducted by Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu (2009) gives a surprising picture of 
religion in contemporary Turkish society, showing that the practise of religious worship 
and attending religious activities are very common; and that in the case of a law made by 
parliament conflicting with a religious ruling, two thirds of the population tend to favour 
following the religious ruling. 
Whether the state ideology of Turkey is a kind of ‘religion’ and the founder of the 
new state, Atatürk, is a ‘cult’ are among the most discussed issues in the debates on 
Turkey, secularisation and the society. Bozdoğan (2001), Navaro-Yashin (2002), Bellah 
(2005), Özyürek (2006), and Kucukcan (2010) are among the prominent scholars who 
discuss this issue.  
Beginning from the time of Mahmut II, modernising the state and the society was a 
key project even in the Ottoman Empire. However, the founders of Turkey embraced 
another way of secularising the new country. They considered delinking Turkey from the 
legacy of the Ottoman Empire, because of their belief that the latter was shaped by Islamic 
values. “Three main areas were identified to establish a secular state and a nation: The first 
area to undermine traditional strongholds of Islam was secularization of state, education, 
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and law. The second target was the replacement of religious symbols with the symbols of 
European civilization. The third area was the secularization of social life and removing the 
impact of popular Islam in everyday life” (Kucukcan, 2010: 964). Kucukcan applies the 
notion “civil religion”, coined by Bellah, to Turkey. He argues that Turkey was established 
in this way in order to preserve the new nation-state. For that purpose, “new cults, myths, 
symbols, and rituals were created. One striking example is what one might call the Cult of 
Ataturk and Kemalism” (2010: 966). Other scholars use the term ‘cult’ for Atatürk as well. 
Bozdoğan, for instance, argues that Atatürk began to be a cult in his own time. He looks at 
the architecture in the republic period and gives some examples: “Public spaces, squares, 
schoolyards, and parks throughout the country were rapidly filled with statues of Atatürk 
sitting, standing, on horseback, in military outfits, or in civilian clothes, and every public 
building displayed busts and portraits of the national hero” (Bozdoğan, 2001: 283). He also 
argues that the mausoleum of Atatürk, Anıtkabir, is “the ‘holiest’ site of modern Turkey” 
and the target of building it was to complete the “Atatürk’s elevation to the status of 
‘deity’”. For him, it was the “monument to the casting of the nation as secular religion, the 
nationalist substitute for a space of religious ritual, prayer and spirituality” (2001: 282-
286). 
Navaro-Yashin (2002) and Özyürek (2006) look at the issue from a different 
standpoint. For them, the productions that are related to Ataturk and the nation-state have 
been commercialized and become an industry in the country: “In recent years, production 
of Ataturk icons and figures has become a major industry in Turkey, akin to the production 
and sale of religious icons and materials in areas where there are sizeable Catholic and 
Orthodox populations and shrines, and thus his image has been commercialized and even 
used in large scale advertising campaigns by private companies” (Özyürek, 2006: 119–
122). 
	   47 
The nature of this religiosity and how people understand Islam needs to be 
clarified. First it has to be said that there has been little research on this issue. People in 
Turkey might be secular in, for instance, their economic and political lives, while they are 
religious in their private lives. It is a fact that not all Turkish religiously observant Muslims 
are in favour of an Islamic state; something similar can be said about secularists, that they 
are not all anti-religious. Classifying people in familiar categories is not so easily done, 
and evaluating Turkish society using the same terminology used to describe Western 
societies may lead researchers far astray. In order to avoid this we need qualitative research 
that looks at people closely and analyses them in depth. This sort of work is very rare in 
the literature. My thesis addresses this weakness and gap by offering an original empirical 
study of religiosity and secularity in Turkey. 
Scholars within this sociological and anthropological cohort concentrate more on 
the everyday life and significant events in Turkey. They generally do not focus on 
theorising the mobilization of Islamists and secularists, the struggle of religiously 
observant Muslims to combine Islamic practices and institutions with the realities of 
modern secular society, the new Islamic lifestyle, culture and consumerism, the situation 
regarding Islamic symbols (see Göle, 1997, 1998; Mardin 1997; Shankland, 1999; Neyzi, 
2001, 2005; Navaro-Yashin, 2002; White, 2002; Toprak, 2005; Çınar, 2005; Henkel, 2007; 
Turam, 2004, 2007, 2008). 
Sociological and anthropological studies have defined the issue of what is meant by 
Islamism in various ways. For instance, while most other scholars argue that Turkish 
society has been divided into two camps, Islamists and secularists, Shankland (1999) 
criticizes this view and argues that Turkish society is rather heterogeneous. There are 
various types of religiously observant Muslims as well as non-observant or secularist 
people in Turkey. Placing them in just a few categories can mislead researchers. Fuller 
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(2002) draws attention to the same point, saying: “The Islamist phenomenon is hardly 
uniform, however; multiple forms of it are spreading evolving, and diversifying. Today 
one encounters Islamists who may be either radical or moderate, political or apolitical, 
violent or quietist, traditional or modernist, democratic or authoritarian.” (2002: 49). 
Although not always in agreement on classification, a number of other writers have 
remarked on the internal diversity of attitudes in Turkish society with regard to religion, 
among them Toprak (1995), Göle (1997), Berger (1999), Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu 
(2009), and Bulaç (2011). Kuru, for example, comments on this differentiation in Turkish 
Islamic society saying: “… there are various identities (Sunni and Alevi), associations (the 
Diyanet, tariqats, and movements), and political views among Muslims in Turkey that 
make establishment of one single interpretation of Islam almost impossible” (1999: 241). 
About this, Bulaç (2011) takes a different approach and argues that there are three main 
groups of Muslimism (Müslümanlık) in Turkey: political, social, and intellectual. 
According to him, political Islamists belong to the first group, Islamic movements 
(cemaats) and religious orders (tariqats) belong to the second group, and intellectuals and 
writers belong to the third group. 
Some sociologists and anthropologists address the problems of piety in a secular 
state and modern society. Heiko Henkel, for instance, is concerned with the question of 
how contemporary religious Turkish Muslims, particularly in Istanbul, create Muslim 
spaces and what roles in the Islamic revival these play. Visiting old and modern 
neighbourhoods in Istanbul the author reached the conclusion that although there are many 
Islamic references in the old neighbourhoods of Istanbul, e.g. Fatih, they are integrated and 
intermeshed with secular society and institutions. In modern areas, although there are few 
visible references to Islam in institutions, such as mosques, and people’s lifestyles, Islamic 
tradition still exists there. Henkel argues therefore that Islam exists “in a way of living 
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rather than in a territory” (2007: 59). By contrast with the time of the Ottoman Empire, in 
modern Turkey social groups are no longer confined to particular neighbourhoods: it is 
possible to find people from completely different cultural backgrounds even sharing an 
apartment. However, considering my own empirical research I would argue that there are 
exceptions: in some areas, almost everyone is secularist, while in others a substantial 
majority practise their religion. Sometimes ten or fifteen people with a similar background 
may combine their resources and build an estate of flats; some of these projects are of a 
substantial size. According to Henkel, practising some traditions referenced to Islam such 
as taking off shoes at the door, if considered in a broad way can be the means of creating a 
“Muslim space”. Practices of the Prophet Muhammad may be used in the same way. He 
suggests that contemporary Turks use their modern houses, furniture and other things in a 
Muslim way. Although state-enforced secularism makes it difficult, they may endeavour to 
create space to practise their religious tradition. 
Jenny White (2002), through conducting research in a large working class district 
of Istanbul, Ümraniye, set out to explore Islamist mobilization in Turkey. She argues that 
although there are some similarities between secularists and Islamists, especially in 
interpersonal and institutional relations, Islam-inspired groups are more successful in 
mobilizing people. This is, according to her, because of the secularists’ belief in the 
Kemalist form of modernity, which is against the traditional forms of fundamental social 
institutions and some norms of society. They believe society must change in accordance 
with “modernity,” with state power if necessary. In sum, they do not practise “vernacular 
politics.” White also draws attention to a significant point: The source of the strength of 
the Islamic movement is the belief of their adherents that when they struggle in those 
movements, they do not consider themselves doing politics; they consider themselves 
“practising community” even when they struggle in the political sphere.  
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Developments in the economic, political, and social spheres have inevitably caused 
some changes in understandings and attitudes of Turkish people towards a new way 
between Islamism and secularism. It is argued that there has been a significant 
transformation in the social behaviour of both religiously observant and non-observant 
people. According to Turam, the majority in Turkish society do not base their lives on 
either religious or Kemalist ideas. She says, “The majority of Turkish citizens do not 
associate with either Kemalist or Islamic actors. Hence, they do not mobilize or organize 
collectively with any of these groups.” (2008: 41). Toprak agrees with this view: “They 
[religiously observant people and religious groups] have integrated themselves into the 
centers of political power, economic wealth, social status, and intellectual prestige.” (2005: 
37). 
A survey in 2000 concluded that the majority of Turkish people (77.3 per cent) 
believe that the early republican reforms were responsible for much progress in the country 
(Çarkoğlu and Toprak 2000). Recent political reforms by the AKP are crucial new factors 
in a changing society. According to Turam, “In addition to political reforms, AKP’s pro-
free-market attitudes have precipitated the rise of an Islamic bourgeoisie” (2008: 40). The 
importance of this statement can be understood much better when we remember Berger’s 
(1973) suggestion; he believes that independence in the economic sphere causes 
secularization much more than independence in the political sphere. 
Related sociological and anthropological studies were conducted in the last two 
decades, using qualitative research methods, such as participant observation and semi-
structured interviews. However, using qualitative research methods is quite new in Turkish 
and Islamic studies in Turkey. Interestingly, although there are a great number of sociology 
and theology faculties in Turkey, there has been little participant observation based 
research investigating the condition of Islam in Turkish society and the tension (or lack of 
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it) people find between Islam and secularity. One reason might be the state’s partial 
suppression of Islam. Another reason, researchers might have difficulty in finding 
participants willing to be involved and talk freely about their experiences and ideas.  
 
2.4 PHILOSOPHICAL AND CONCEPTUAL DEBATES ON ISLAM AND 
SECULARITY 
From a philosophical perspective, the topic of the relationship between Islam and 
secularity is approached in terms of their different worldviews, value systems, and, their 
perceptions of a universe and knowledge. They are also discussed in terms of their 
compatibility with each other (Kara, 1993, 2010; Davutoğlu, 1996, 2000; Casanova, 2001; 
Paçacı, 2008; Ramadan, 2009).  
Secularization has various definitions. As I have argued, it has philosophical, 
sociological, and political aspects, and interpretation depends on which aspect the writers 
consider. Larry Shiner, drawing attention to the fact that secularization has not only one 
dimension but rather covers different spheres, distinguishes six forms of secularization: 
“Decline of religion, conformity with this world, disengagement of society from religion, 
transposition of religious beliefs and institutions, desacralization of the world, movement 
from a ‘sacred’ to a ‘secular’ society” (1967: 209-217). 
Smelser remarks on some factors contributing to the secularization of society. 
According to him the chief factors are the development of science, nation-states, 
capitalism, compromises on religious matters, the loss of collectivity in community, and 
the commercializing of some religious institutions (1995: 324-6). Berger (1973) suggests 
that the economic independence of a society is a major factor driving secularization. 
Differentiation in social structure and privatization of religion are also on his list. 
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Using ‘secular’ and ‘Muslim’ as adjectives in reference to a nation-state is 
interesting in itself. The view is advocated by some Muslim scholars that Islam’s doctrines 
relate to all aspects of life, and it expects believers to fulfil certain deeds in their economic, 
social, and private lives (Daver, 1988). It is not only a belief system of doctrines, rituals 
and worship; it is, according to this view, as Mohammed Natsir has argued, “a ‘total’ 
system intended to regulate the whole of human life” (Hefner, 2000: 116). When we look 
at the Qur’an, it is argued, we see a wide range of rulings on both moral and judicial 
matters, from issues of belief, worship, hygiene, marriage and divorce, to interpersonal 
relations, inheritance, war and peace and more. Nevertheless, despite these claims, the 
majority of Muslim law is in fact personal law or laws relating to ritual observance and 
purity and pollution, rather than laws relating to state governance. 
Davutoğlu is a prominent scholar claiming that Islam and secularism are 
incompatible because, according to him, the perceptions of existence, knowledge, and 
value must mesh with social, political, and economic institutionalization, otherwise the 
incoherence among them may cause a crisis of civilization. This is a common view in 
Turkey among some scholars, the argument being that the relationship between Islam and 
Turkey is existential. Kara (1993), for instance, suggests that laicism or secularism does 
not consist of separation between religion and state. The separation is only a political result 
of it, and it causes a replacement of religion by science, so they are definitely not 
compatible with each other. Asserting the idea that Islam has its own value system, Ismail 
R. Al Faruqi (1982) is another outstanding scholar dealing with the principles of Islam in 
history, knowledge, metaphysics, morality, social order, community (umma), family, 
political order, economic order, the world order, and aesthetics. He bases his ideas on the 
core belief of Islam: tawhid (the oneness of God). 
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However, there are those who argue that nothing in Islam is incompatible with 
modernity. Fazlur Rahman (1979) and Tariq Ramadan (2009) are well-known scholars 
among the defenders of this idea. Ramadan advocates the idea of the compatibility of Islam 
and modernity saying, “Nothing in Islam is opposed to modernity and we can firmly state 
that the Muslim thinkers and ‘ulama (savants) who are opposed to this notion and to the 
idea of change and evolution that it covers often confuse it with the model which is current 
in the West. Clearly, they confuse modernity with Westernization” (2009: 307). He gives 
some examples of modernity such as individual engagement, social reform, progress, and 
well-being; and suggests again that they are not opposed to Islam. On the contrary, 
according to Ramadan, they are the natural result of the principles of Islamic jurisprudence 
(Usul al-Fiqh). 
It may be considered that there is ambiguity in the philosophical and theological 
discussions of these scholars in terms of their definition of essential notions of the 
relationship between Islam and modernity or secularity. For example, what scholars mean 
by modernity, modernization and secularization is quite subjective and they generally do 
not explain their understandings in detail. Similarly, they need to explain which aspects of 
Islam and secularization they are comparing. It can be argued that almost all Muslim 
scholars would accept that secularization in consciousness and in the understanding of 
existential issues of life and death, as well as in the system of moral values, are not 
compromised by Islam. Nevertheless, there would be some controversies in cultural, 
political, economic, and legal areas. 
The reform and renewal in Islamic thought and the possibility of change in the 
Islamic legal system has provoked controversy. Islam has a legal system and there are a 
great number of legal rulings in the Qur’an and in the sayings of the Prophet. Whether 
these should be regarded as immutable or not, is one of the most challenging questions for 
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Muslim scholars (Rahman, 1979; Karaman, 2002, 2003; Qadhi, 2003; Güngör, 2005; 
Kamali, 2010).  
Protecting Islamic belief and acts of worship from innovations (bid‘ah), and 
implementing its main principles and values in new circumstances in worldly transactions 
have been found necessary by Muslim scholars. These two concerns have been the main 
issues in the history of Islamic thought and are called tajdid (renewal). Tajdid is generally 
defined as the struggle to revitalize Islamic faith and practice (Çelik, 2012). 
Renewal movements in the classical and modern period of Islamic history have three 
common issues which have become the concerns of the ulama. The first issue is returning 
to the basic sources of Islam, the Qur’an and the Sunnah of the Prophet, and seeing them as 
the main authorities for Islamic belief and practice. As a result the main doctrines, 
principles, and values are derived from these sources and applied to new conditions in all 
times and places (ijtihad). Rejecting alien ideas and customs which are against Islamic 
values and principles is another common subject of renewal movements. This rejection 
implies reaffirmation of the authenticity of the Islamic message. However, protecting the 
Islamic message has been attempted in different ways, by intellectual and political 
struggle, for example, depending on where the threats came from. Al-Ghazali and Ibn 
Taymiyya are the best-known scholars who struggled to save the purity of the Islamic 
message (Çelik, 2012). 
The differences between renewal movements are mainly dependant on the 
circumstances they encounter in their time and place. For instance, John L. Esposito 
explains the main differences in character of the classical modern movements thus: “While 
premodern revivalist movements were primarily internally motivated, Islamic modernism 
was a response both to continued internal weakness and to the external political and 
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religiocultural threat of colonialism. Much of the Muslim world faced a powerful new 
threat –European colonialism” (1991: 124). 
The legal aspect is significant in terms of the relation between Islam and secularism 
because one of the main questions is one of the sacredness and historicity of the legal 
system and legal rulings. While some scholars argue that the important thing about the 
rulings of the Qur’an is the values and principles which lie behind them, the majority think 
that all the rulings of the Qur’an and Sunna are divine and hence immutable; we cannot 
make any change in them. This includes marriage, divorce, inheritance, and penal law. 
This disagreement is a cause of great dissention among Muslims. It is impossible for the 
defenders of the second view to be satisfied under a secular state and legal system (Çelik, 
2012). 
The most problematic issue in this debate is which part of the Shari‘ah is mutable 
and which part is immutable. There is unanimous agreement on the distinction between 
acts of worship (‘ibadat) and worldly transactions (mu‘amalat). It is believed that acts of 
worship cannot be changed by reference to personal opinion, because while the reasons for 
worldly transactions are known through experience, the reasons behind acts of worship are 
known only through divine revelation (Omar, 1998). However, there are big debates on the 
rulings stated clearly in the Qur’an and Sunna. For example, although the penalties 
declared by the Qur’an (Hudud) are seen as immutable by the majority of Muslim scholars, 
some modern scholars claim their mutability (Rahman, 1979; Kamali, 2010).  
These problems have been discussed until now with the notions and realities of the 
Middle Ages, because people rejected the realities of modern times by equating them with 
atheism. They did not think of living Islam in secular Turkey in real terms, and they 
suppressed serious problems evident in applying Islam to a modern state. For instance, 
when we look to Islam for answers concerning modern economic problems, it is very 
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difficult to find them in Islamic texts and books. In my view, as seen in the following 
empirical chapters, this condition will change in the near future because, with religiously 
observant people having been in power since 2002 in Turkey, they have started to embrace 
the Turkish state with its secular features, and are now seeking solutions in order to live 
Islam in Turkey in the ‘real world’, that is, the contemporary world. The AKP government 
has the power to change the constitution, to choose a new president of the republic directly. 
While religiously observant people were choosing to be conservative in order to protect 
their values and lifestyles against an authoritarian state, they are now facing secularity in 
their private and public lives. My research is thus timely; drawing on new empirical data in 
which, during the fieldwork, I spoke to the new generation of young Turkish people and 
asked them questions about their understandings, perceptions, ideas, and problems about 
the relationship between Islam and secularity that are explored from the perspective of 
Muslim university students both religiously observant and non-observant. 
 
2.5 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has summarized and synthesised academic arguments and research 
concerning the relationship between religion and secularity. As the thesis concerns the 
relationship between Islam and secularity in its various aspects, related works and writings 
are brought together. The subject is considered from the points-of-view and experiences of 
Turkish university students. There being very few comparable studies to the present one, in 
order to establish a sufficient framework, the attempt is made to consider related literature 
in perspective. Though this is not a study in political science, the policies of both the 
Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic intersect in the experiences that are lived by 
university students. Consequently, the arguments discussed in this chapter are directly 
related to the issues that are discussed in the following chapters. 
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Religiously observant students are active in education, in organizing religious 
groups and social events. According to some studies, political activities among Turkish 
youth dates back to the time of the Ottoman Empire, in the nineteenth century. Both the 
Empire and the Republic aimed to modernize the country, beginning with the students. 
There has been a change in the style of activism of university students in the last few 
decades; this is detailed in Chapters Four and Six, including interviews and observations 
made in Turkey. 
A variety of methodologies are used by sociologists and anthropologists in 
discussing the secularization thesis. A definition is the first thing sought. There are 
different definitions even for Western experiences. Most scholars approach the issue from 
one angle. Some approach it politically, some philosophically, some sociologically, and so 
on. Each country has its own experience of religion and secularization. For Muslim 
countries, it is very difficult to compare Turkey with Iran or Saudi Arabia, for instance. In 
order both to examine the secularization thesis with regard to Turkey and to understand the 
place of religion in Turkish society, there are a limited number of quantitative sociological 
studies. According to these and to some scholars, as was found in my research, even many 
politically secularist Turkish people identify themselves as religiously observant. This 
necessitates developing a new definition of the secularization and Islamization of Turkish 
society. 
This study shows that there is a wide range of Islamic groups and understandings 
among Turkish people, beyond the well-known sects and beliefs, like Sunnis and Alevis. 
These groups are discussed in this chapter and Chapter Six. 
Among the struggles of religiously observant people, there are those in the philosophical 
area as well. The first question in this area is the compatibility of Islam and secularity. The 
answers vary among scholars. Traditionalist scholars, for instance Hayrettin Karaman, 
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argue that Islam is a whole system and cannot be divided into religious and secular, nor 
modified to accommodate new secular circumstances (Karaman, 2007). Other scholars, for 
instance Ali Bardakoglu, divide Islamic rulings and principles into two parts: ‘ibadat 
(rituals and modes of worship) and mu‘amalat (worldly transactions) (Karaman, 2007). 
Modernist scholars generally suggest that religion is concerned with the first, and not the 
second. Some scholars, while agreeing with this division, do not accept fully the view of 
modernist scholars. These scholars see Islam as an efficacious religion in all areas of life. 
Nevertheless, the principles of Islamic jurisprudence allow for changes to the mu‘amelat 
according to new circumstances, on condition that the changes are not contrary to basic 
Islamic values and principles. The views and reactions of religious university students on 
this, are presented and analysed in Chapters Six and Seven. 
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CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
For a sociological study, the question of people’s perceptions, desires and narratives are 
equally as important as investigating what religion and secularity is. Sociology is not 
simply an exercise in collecting data on a particular topic. It is also an effort to find out 
why and how things occur (Giddens, 2008; Fuller, 2002). Weber describes sociology as a 
“science which attempts the interpretive understanding of social action in order to arrive at 
a causal explanation of its cause and effects” (1947: 88).  
Because my study is concerned to interpret the meaning and significance of social 
action, I drew on qualitative research methods rather than quantitative. This was more 
relevant for my work because in qualitative research, the point of view of participants and 
their experiences are more important than statistics. Such research also requires that the 
relationship between researcher and research participants be closer in order to deeply 
understand their views on a range of topics, in a variety of contexts. Considering the 
actions of participants, the social settings in which they live and operate, and the context of 
particular activities are all crucial variables. For this reason, this method is unstructured 
and the theory used for it is inductive. Investigating people in their natural context to get 
reliable data about them is a major principle of qualitative research (Halfpenny 1979; 
Bryman, 2008). 
Bryman gives three main features of this strategy. For him, qualitative research 
“predominantly emphasizes an inductive approach to the relationship between theory and 
research, in which the emphasis is placed on the generation of theories.” This is an 
approach that “has rejected the practices and norms of the natural scientific model and of 
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positivism in particular, in preference for an emphasis on the ways in which individuals 
interpret their social world; and embodies a view of social reality as a constantly shifting 
emergent property of individuals’ creation” (2008: 22).  
 
3.2 QUALITATIVE INTERVIEWS 
In-depth interviewing, which includes asking open-ended questions, listening, recording, 
analysing and interpreting the answers, are one of the main data gathering techniques in 
qualitative research. Through this technique, the researcher aims to get a deep 
understanding of the views and ideas of the interviewees, and also their relationships, 
perceptions and evaluations. Qualitative interviews have some characteristics: For 
instance, the approach, in qualitative research is much less structured compared to 
quantitative research; rather than researchers’ interests, the interviewees’ points-of-view 
are much more important; in terms of both times and structures, qualitative interviews are 
flexible (Bryman, 2008; Kümbetoğlu, 2008). 
There are some principles in qualitative interviewing which I respected in my 
work: interviewees should be informed precisely about all the relevant details of the 
research project and the researcher should get their permission; questions should be 
suitable for the interviewees in respect of their experiences, conditions and activities; they 
should be sensitive to the interviewees’ needs, rights and sensitivities; they should focus on 
the research questions; the array of the questions should be organized in a reasonable way 
to be able to get accurate data (Kümbetoğlu, 2008: 84-94). 
I conducted semi-structured interviews. In this type of interview questions are 
prepared in a general form for the interview guide. Sequences and the frame might change 
and vary in the process. In addition, questions are generally asked in an open-ended style. 
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As Willig indicates, “The semi-structured interview provides an opportunity for the 
researcher to hear the participant talk about a particular aspect of their life or experience. 
The questions asked by the researcher function as triggers that encourage the participant to 
talk” (2001: 22). 
According to Patton, there are six kinds of question groups in qualitative 
interviewing: demographic questions (date and place of birth, education, marital status); 
experience questions (housework, daily affairs); opinion questions (worldviews, faiths, 
ideals, etc.); questions aimed at understanding participants’ feelings about different affairs 
and problems; knowledge questions; and sensuous questions about what they saw, heard, 
experienced and so on (1992: 115-9). The question list of my study includes all of these 
various kinds of questions. I asked my informants about their age, place of birth, where 
they live, which university and faculty they study in. I wanted them to talk about their 
daily lives, the places they generally visit, and whether they celebrate some particular days, 
like religious days, birthdays, and the new year. The place of religion in their lives, their 
good and bad experiences related to religion, whether they practice certain religious rituals, 
whether they drink alcohol, if they attended a Qur’an course, their relationship and views 
about religious groups in Turkey and about Muslim scholars. Related to secularity and 
particularly secularism as a state ideology of the Turkish Republic, I asked them if they 
experience a tension between religion and the secularist state, whether they have any 
difficulty when they want to practise their religion, their views about the future of Islam 
and secularism in Turkey, and whether they perceive a polarization in the society, 
particularly among young people, in relation to religion and secularity. I also asked them 
how they understand religiosity and what are the major factors that contributed to their 
religiosity in the case of religiously observant people. Women’s rights and their being 
visible in the society was another issue we talked during the interviews. Finally, I asked 
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some questions about their personal feelings and wishes, such as marriage, the 
organization of their wedding parties, their views on boyfriends and girlfriends, favourite 
authors, role models, and their favourite political parties and Islamic scholars. 
With the help of gatekeepers, after preparing an interview guide or form, I 
conducted interviews with forty-five university students in Istanbul. To meet university 
students, Istanbul was an ideal location in Turkey, due to the fact that it has taken in 
millions of immigrants, from all over the country. It has more than fifty universities and 
more than 500,000 university students. 
 
3.3 SAMPLING 
In qualitative research, the researcher engages in systematic or purposive sampling, rather 
than random sampling. Through this type of sampling, participants are selected from 
certain areas according their relevance to the research questions. Qualitative researchers do 
not study social realities in order to generalize the findings in a simple way. On the 
contrary, this kind of work is a struggle to discover and understand the people and their 
social context in detail. “The goal of purposive sampling is to sample cases/participants in 
a strategic way, so that those sampled are relevant to the research questions that are being 
posed. Very often, the researcher will want to sample in order to ensure that there is a good 
deal of variety in the resulting sample, so that sample members differ from each other in 
terms of key characteristics” (Bryman, 2008: 415). 
Considering that there is not just one type of Islamism and one type of secularism, I 
made a particular effort to find and meet with as wide a range as possible of religiously 
observant students associated with different Islamic movements, such as Nakşibendilik, 
Nurculuk, Milli Görüşçülük, Süleymancılık, visiting their places in Istanbul and getting the 
	   63 
help of gatekeepers who had friends in these groups. I made the same effort with secularist 
students, seeking to meet with a range of secularist students associated with different 
secular organizations and having different views, such as Ülkücüler, Aleviler, Kemalistler. 
Most Turkish young people are not associated with any group or movement on either of 
these two sides. As Turam argued, “they do not mobilize or organize collectively with any 
of these groups” (2008: 41). So I made the effort to meet with a reasonable number of 
these non-joiners for my study as well, in order that their views will not be overlooked or 
downplayed. In other words, I was particularly concerned to locate a wide-ranging sample 
of university students to interview, in order to best represent the society at large in the 
country in terms of different worldviews and political views. Nevertheless, although I 
aimed to give equal space in my study to both religiously observant and secularist students, 
students who identified themselves as religiously observant ended up contributing more 
than secularist ones to this study. This is because their background gave them more 
experience of the tension between religion and secularity, as they reflect upon the rulings 
and principles of their religion and try to practise them in a mostly secular context. Despite 
the fact that I conducted interviews with both religious and secular students equally, I 
needed to give more space to the views of religiously observant participants, rather than 
secular participants, in some chapters of the thesis. The Gezi Park chapter, Chapter Eight, 
was the exception because it was the secularist students who experienced the greatest 
tension between religion and secularity there, as they felt their secular lifestyle was under 
threat from the authoritarian attitude and policies of the Islamist or religiously observant 
Prime Minister. Perhaps it	   is worth mentioning once again how very difficult it is to 
describe a person as unequivocally religiously observant or not in Turkey. 
I tried to seek detailed answers to a number of specific questions that I mean to 
analyse in order to ascertain the range of similarities and differences between participants 
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on specific issues in society. I asked the details of students’ personal stories to ascertain if 
their backgrounds have influenced their ideas. Rather than structured and/or unstructured 
interviews, the semi-structured interview seemed the best method for achieving my aims, 
since it allows respondents to express complex thoughts while nevertheless providing a 
basis for comparison (Silverman, 2009).  
Since I planned to ask certain questions of all my participants and ask other, more 
specific questions according to individuals’ particular conditions, the semi-structured 
interview format was the most appropriate one. The chief advantage of this kind of 
interview is flexibility as compared with the entirely structured format using standardised 
and very specific questions (Bryman, 2008; Bell, 2005). 
In order to achieve purposive sampling properly, I also got the help of gatekeepers, 
asking them about the worldviews and political views of the informants, and their 
relationship with religious and secular organizations. 
During my fieldwork in Istanbul, I conducted, as mentioned, qualitative interviews with 
forty-five university students. Twenty-one of the interviewees were male students; and 
twenty-four were female. 
 
3.4 ACCESS 
I accessed my research participants or interviewees through gatekeepers, many of whom I 
already contacted before the fieldwork. The gatekeepers were the people who helped me as 
a researcher to meet possible participants and interviewees (See: Hammersley and 
Attkinson, 2003). The majority of the gatekeepers themselves studied at various Turkish 
universities, especially those in Istanbul. In addition, I contacted some other gatekeepers 
who promised to link me with student groups with various ideological tendencies and 
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worldviews, i.e. the liberal democrat Genç Siviller (Young Civillians), the Islamist 
Anadolu Gençlik (Anatolian Youth), and the secularist Atatürkçü Düşünce Derneği 
(Kemalist Thought Association). 
I asked the help of my informants to introduce me to some of their friends who 
were suitable interview subjects in terms of my research and sampling criteria. I met some 
of my informants, especially the Gezi Park protestors, in the places they were active in. 
When I spent two weeks in Gezi Park in June 2013, along with making observations, I 
visited all the tents and talked with the protestors about the objectives of the protests and 
so on.  
Another access method I used during my research was using social media 
effectively. I searched and followed some university students through the social media, 
Facebook and Twitter in particular. Telling them about my research and considering the 
ethical issues, I offered those who seemed the most suitable the possibility of being 
interviewed for my research. 
When I met the students, firstly, I asked their permission to interview them and 
observe the events they attended, to enable me to be a participant observer in these events. 
I started with observations that enabled me to have an overview of the field and this 
potentially helped in finding more relevant people to interview and useful questions to 
address. Then, in the next stage, I conducted the interviews.  
 
3.5 OBSERVATIONS 
To be able to understand social and cultural facts, conditions and processes, and also the 
meaning of the behaviour of my informants, only asking questions and listening to the 
answers is not sufficient on its own. As the subject of the thesis is closely related to the 
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current condition of Islamization and secularization of Turkish society, and the meanings 
of the views and reactions of the Turkish Muslim university students, I needed to make 
observations in order to understand the situation through their daily practices and their 
ways of socialization. In addition to interviews, observing the participants in their daily 
lives and in the events they attend was crucial for building a case study. “The most widely 
used strategy for humanistic field study is participant observation, a method by which 
researchers systematically observe people while joining in their routine activities. 
Researchers choose participant observation in order to gain an inside look at social life in 
settings ranging from nightclubs to religious seminaries” (Macionis and Plummer, 2012: 
76). However, I was not a full-time participant observer. Gold (1958) classifies the roles of 
the participant observers into four categories: complete participant, participant-as-observer, 
observer-as-participant, and complete observer. My situation was much more suitable for 
the third group. As an observer-as-participant, the researcher is mainly an interviewer. 
Although he or she makes some observations, these observations do not necessarily 
involve complete participation in participants’ lives. In this external observation, the 
researcher might not attend all the activities of groups and people, and the level of 
attendance might vary in time (Kümbetoğlu, 2008). 
In order to make observations and to conduct qualitative interviews, I visited 
Istanbul twice. My fieldworks took place from 18 March 2012 to 14 September 2012, and 
from 6 June 2013 to 24 June 2013.  
Where possible in my research, observations took place in the organizations of the 
participants, and the interviews were augmented as much as possible by observations 
achieved by attending communal or associational events in which the interviewees were 
involved. I attended meetings and events organized by all the groups studied – both 
religious and secular - in order to gain a deeper understanding of the place of religion and 
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secularity in the lifestyles and views of my research participants. In this respect, I attended 
some organizations, including religious meetings and conferences, with the participants 
that were organized by their schools, societies, or themselves.  
In Turkey, almost all universities organize spring festivals (Bahar şenlikleri) in 
April or May. During these festivals, universities organize markets, competitions, 
exhibitions, cultural and sports activities, and musical concerts of famous singers. I 
attended at four universities’ festivals and observed students and the details of the 
organizations convening the events, including whether there is alcohol drinking, the 
groupings formed, prayer rooms, whether female students wear headscarves, male-female 
displays of intimacy, the foods served, and the behaviour of the participants.  
I went to particular cafés during the fieldwork at At Pazarı Square in Fatih 
neighbourhood, which are well known in that the majority of the customers are religious 
university students. I also went to other places in Beyoğlu area that secularist and leftist 
university students frequently. When I went these places, I found an opportunity to spend 
time with the owners of the places and my participants for long periods. 
I visited the university campuses and student houses of some of my research 
participants and observed their daily lives in their places. During the Gezi Park protests in 
May and June 2013, I went to the park and spent two weeks in and outside it in order to 
make observations and to conduct interviews with the university students among both the 
protestors and the people who were against the protests. I took hundreds of photographs in 
Gezi Park and wrote down all the slogans in the area. 
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3.6 INSIDER AND OUTSIDER  
I had the good fortune to be able to undertake this study as both an insider and an outsider 
in the society. I am a born-and-bred Turkish citizen who lived in the country until the age 
of twenty-two years old, and am conversant with both the modern-day Turkish language 
and Ottoman Turkish. I have relatives, friends and acquaintances in Turkey from various 
backgrounds, including secularist Muslims, nationalist Muslims, practising, conservative 
and religiously observant Muslims. With this background, it was easy enough to find 
participants in my research, representative of the religious, social and ideological spectrum 
of Turkish society. There being various religious and secular groups in Turkey, an outsider 
would find it quite difficult to make the necessary contacts; and especially as people can be 
shy of advertising their views and affiliations, owing to long-standing state restrictions on 
social and religious organizations and long-standing factionalism in the society. To be able 
to identify people’s social groups, a researcher should have an appreciation of such signals 
as key words, phrases, and clothing styles. This requires one to have lived in the country 
for a long time as a native speaker and is crucial for a sociological study. This is important 
in both person-to-person interviews and observations, and in gathering data from the 
communications media. 
As a person who studied Islamic Studies at university including classical and 
modern Islamic thought at Master’s Degree, I am very familiar with the problems and 
tensions of contemporary Muslim societies, and particularly the Muslims of Turkey. With 
the advantage of this familiarity, I was able to find and ask relevant questions to my 
interlocutors. Because I am also a member of the society who experienced the condition of 
living between Islam and secularity, I had personally looked for answers to the questions 
related to this problem. 
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Having lived in Europe for twelve years now, I have developed something of an 
outsider’s perspective on my native land. Turkey has experienced dramatic social, 
economic and political changes in these last ten years and I have been following these 
developments, as mentioned, on visits back home, as well as in the Turkish and foreign 
media. This has given me a keenly concerned but at the same time a detached view of the 
situation in the country, free of partisan affiliations. This insider/outsider situation I 
perceive as enhancing for my proposed research. 
 
3.7 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
There were ethical issues involved in the research, especially as regards the protection of 
participants and interviewees from adverse consequences of their involvement, both during 
and after the research. An appropriate strategy for ensuring fully informed consent is the 
main ethical consideration. I used the following to ensure completing ethical principles: 
Participants were informed of all aspects of the research that might reasonably be 
expected to influence their willingness to participate. This information included, but not 
was limited to, the use of their contribution for the purposes of a doctoral thesis. All 
participants were provided with such information in a standard written form with the 
opportunity to provide or withhold their written consent. 
The investigation did not involve observing participants unawares. The 
confidentiality of all participants was maintained. It also did not involve the analysis of 
data that participants would not realise might be used by me for research purposes, e.g. 
confidential criminal, medical or financial records. Care was taken to avoid the disclosure 
of any confidential information to other participants. 
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I debriefed participants in order to ensure that they understood the nature of the 
research and to monitor possible misconceptions or negative effects. Participants’ 
confidentiality was safeguarded during and after the study. The data is stored securely on a 
password-protected computer. It is encoded. I will retain the data for at least five years. 
The longer-term arrangement for keeping the data is that they will be securely placed in a 
repository. All names given in the thesis are pseudonyms. 
I applied for and received ethical approval before going to the fieldwork from the 
university, included in Appendix Seven. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: SECULARISM AND ISLAMISM IN TURKEY 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter, based on my empirical study, I examine the relationship between religion 
and secularism as experienced by Turkish university students. Drawing on my 
interviewees’ responses, my aim is to explore whether Turkish society today remains 
polarized between secularists and Islamists. My aim also is to find an answer to the 
question of whether or not Kemalist secularist and Islamist projects have thrived or failed 
in terms of their goals. An analysis of students’ experiences regarding tensions and other 
difficulties they experience in practising their religion in the public sphere is another aim 
of this chapter. Finally, I will evaluate the findings of this chapter in terms of their 
compatibility with José Casanova’s theory of the ‘de-privatization’ of religion and its 
continued significant role in the public sphere. 
In order to elucidate these issues, first I summarise the literature regarding 
secularism and Islamism in Turkey. I then proceed to present the analyses of the responses 
of my interviewees with particular emphasis on their political thoughts and experiences 
about Islamism, the Islamic state, secularism, Kemalism, and the secular state. 
The chapter consists of seven sections, each of which covers an underlying political 
issue related to the tension between Islam and secularism.  
In the first section, I address the following questions: How do Turkish university 
students understand secularism and what kind of government do they prefer? As Muslim 
students, are they happy with a secular state?  
In the second section, I focus on the problems that religiously observant university students 
identify in their experiences of the education system of Turkey. I analyse their complaints 
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about the ideas that the secular Kemalist state has imposed on them, especially Turkishness 
and modernity; the problem of religious high school (İmam-Hatip schools) students in 
terms of entrance to the universities; religion lessons in public primary and secondary 
schools; and problems with places of worship in schools.  
In the third section, the headscarf ban imposed by the secular state is examined, in order to 
present some aspects of the tension university students experienced, and the views of the 
students about the issue. 
The fourth section considers the effects of state-imposed secularism on university 
students, including issues such as the changing meanings of religion, self-alienation, fear 
and hypocrisy in relation to a secularist state’s policies. 
The fifth section is on Islamism in Turkey and outlines the views of students with 
regard to applying Islamic rulings and principles to the Turkish state, whether these are 
tending towards the Islamization of the state or not, and what kind of ideals they have.  
The findings about the AKP’s role in Islamization and secularization of the country 
are analysed in the sixth section.  
The seventh section examines the views of university students desiring neither 
oppressive secularism nor oppressive Islamism but rather a synthesis of both, with freedom 
of expression for all religions, lifestyles and opinions. The expectations and demands of 
the students regarding this new “civil constitution” are analysed in terms of religiosity and 
secularity. 
Before moving into the research findings, it would be useful to remember the 
literature background of secularism and Islam in Turkey shortly. As I indicated in Chapter 
Two, secularism in Turkey has characteristics distinguishing it from other types of 
secularism, Anglo-Saxon style secularism and French style secularism, for instance. 
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Turkish secularism is not only based on the separation of religion and state, but also aims 
at modernisation of the social and cultural sphere by purifying these milieus of religious 
dogmas and superstitions (Daver, 1988). With its goal of ‘liberating’ the society from Islam 
through its positivist and modernist ideas, the state puts religion and religious institutions 
under its control. According to Karpat, this “violated the principle of secularism” (1959: 
288). However, the enemy of Turkish secularism has not been Islamic faith, but rather the 
political power of Muslim scholars (ulema), and superstitions (Daver, 1988). 
Keyman argues that elites of the state have used the secular state to control religion 
with the intention of delinking it from the Ottoman heritage (2007: 234). According to 
Subaşı (2004), Turkish modernism can be defined as the struggle to delegitimise the 
visibility of religion in the daily life of society. In the new social order of the republican 
period, Islamic institutions, scholars and leaders lost their previous power (Gökay and 
Aras, 2003). 
Contrary to the majority of writers, Berkes sees the new nation-state as a necessary 
result of both internal and external events. Using the terms modernization and secularism 
interchangeably, he argues that the issue is not only one of separating religion and state, 
but of modernization and being secure from sacralised tradition (2002: 19). In his view, the 
essential issue in secularism is withdrawing religion and the sacred from the areas of 
economics, politics, education, sex and knowledge (2002: 23). This view refers to the 
history of secularism in the republican period of Turkey. The governing elite has worked to 
secularize the country, focusing on these fields and making a great number of reforms. As 
discussed in Chapter One, clothing, the calendar, the alphabet, the judicial system, the 
education system and the religious education system all lost their Islamic character and 
adopted a Western identity (Zürcher, 2003). Compared to the other Muslim countries in the 
twentieth century, which embraced modern and unitary state law, “only the Turkish 
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Republic rejected the Shari‘a outright and declared an entirely secular legal system. Even 
advocating the application of Shari‘a became an offence in Turkish law” (Zubaida, 2003: 
158). 
Kuru (2009: 236) describes Turkish secularism as “assertive”, in line with 
Keyman’s point that “the state’s top-down act of creating a secular national identity by 
initiating strict political and institutional regulatory mechanisms on religious communities 
has been challenged by Islam and its powerful symbolic and cultural role in the 
constitution of societal relations and social identity formations of Turkish people” (2007: 
216). The challenges in the country have included, as mentioned, religious movements 
such as Nurculuk, Süleymancılık, Milli Görüş, and their activities; and also unofficial 
Qur’an courses both by these groups and individuals.  
 
4.2 DISCONTENT OF RELIGIOUSLY OBSERVANT STUDENTS WITH 
TURKISH SECULARISM 
The Turkish university students were seemingly unanimous in seeing secularism in Turkey 
as different from secularism in, for example, the United Kingdom, the USA, and France. 
The students were uncomfortable with Turkish secularism whilst not being opposed to 
secularism in itself. Even secularist students objected to the strictness and dominance of 
Turkish state-imposed secularism, but were inclined to see secularism as safeguarding 
religion. Adem identified himself as a secularist person, and argued that secularism was a 
good system, which protects religion:1 
I think that secularism is important. Secularism protects religion.  
How does it do it?  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The quotations of my informants are included without using quotation marks and not in italics. 
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The people who are in power can change in time. Secularism is necessary in a 
democratic state. If I live in an Islamic state, how could I live my life? How can I 
be “I”? Tayyip Erdoğan wants a religious generation (“dindar nesil”) that is 99 per 
cent of the population, but I do not want to be religious...  
How can secularism protect religion?  
Think about the possibility that if the rulers were Christians or Jews and if they 
wanted all people to live according to Christianity or Judaism, what would have 
been the situation in the country? If the state is not secular, you also cannot practice 
your religion. (Adem, Male, International Relations, 3rd year, 24/4/2012) 
A religiously observant student, Emre, did not believe that the state wants to “fight” their 
citizens and oppress them. He argued that secularism began with good intentions but has 
turned into a tragedy, with state and nation in some measure becoming separated.  
The aunt of my father told me that the people in the 1940s learned to read the 
Qur’an in stables because it was forbidden. But this society has learned it, although 
it was forbidden and the state oppressed religiously observant people. The Kemalist 
ideology is an elitist ideology that wants to change the society. An elitist ideology 
cannot be a state ideology. A state must understand the society so that it can prevail 
over society. On the other hand, the state cannot change society; the social changes 
should change the state. If the society does not want the change it will react strictly, 
like the Prime Minister Menderes issue. Adnan Menderes won the election in 1950 
as a result of the reaction of the people to the former governments. (Emre, Male, 
Computer Engineering, 4th year, 20/4/2012) 
According to Göle (1998), the Turkish modernisation project excluded traditional 
and native values, and saw Islamic law (Shari‘a) and Kurdish nationalism as threats to 
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Turkish nationalism. This view finds support in the last few decades of the political history 
of Turkey; during my fieldwork the most heated debates were on the Kurdish issue and 
Islamism. Can, a Kurdish religiously observant student, argued that the problem is the 
policies of the state. According to him, it was important to say that there is no serious 
conflict observable between citizens on these matters. 
I’ve got Kurdish, Armenian and Christian friends. They are not my enemies 
because of my religion. We share our breads. We share our money. It is not OK 
that my Kurdish friend is not allowed to speak his native language and has to deny 
his history. My girlfriend wears a headscarf, and therefore she has got problems. 
These problems are the results of a secular state. (Can, Male, Chemistry, 4th year, 
2/4/2012) 
Kudret was a religiously observant person studying law and being active in a 
religious group. He also worked for a Turkish newspaper. We met at a café in Fatih 
neighbourhood and agreed to conduct the interview in the building of the newspaper. He 
told me a lot of stories about the difficulties of being religiously observant student in 
secular schools. Kudret saw Kemalist secularism as having succeeded in some aspects but 
failed in others; in addition he blamed Kemalism for the people’s understanding of 
religiosity: 
I think that this project is broadly successful. You can measure the success by the 
extent to which people can show their religiosity in public or not. A judge who 
prays, a prosecutor who prays - These things are still not “normal”.  
Is Kemalism successful?  
Yes. You may not be religious. You may not participate in the Friday prayer 
publicly. But on the other side, Kemalism is not successful, because people are still 
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religiously observant and conservative parties are still in power. Leftist parties 
came to power only during “special regimes”, the society does not give them the 
power. The society is conservative, but not religious. It is an empty religiosity. It 
had become only a cultural Muslimhood. From this perspective, Kemalism is 
successful. All opportunities that enable this religious ascendency are excluded. 
Religious movements and orders (cemaat and tarikat) are declared as illegal, for 
instance. I know these because of my father; he is an imam [Muslim religious 
leader in a mosque]. I know that Kemalism wants to keep even the religious sphere 
under control. Until recently, it was so that “hutbe”s (khutbahs - sermons) were 
written centrally and that all over the country, both in the metropolis in the 
Sultanahmet Mosque, and in the village mosque the same hutbe has been recited. 
There is no sense and no function in this. The system of Diyanet is very 
problematic, not only the fact that the Alevis are marginalized, but also because of 
the fact that Sunni Islam itself is emptied [of any meaning]. It was founded not to 
teach the real religion. From this perspective, Kemalism has been very successful. 
(Kudret, Male, Law, 4th year, 11/4/2012) 
Most of the students interviewed did not see a contradiction between genuine 
secularism, as practised elsewhere, and Islam, considering oppressive Turkish secularism 
to be the cause of social problems. Bahar was a practising religiously observant student, 
who believed that Turkey was not a proper secular state.  
I am troubled by the secularism which is implemented in Turkey. Otherwise, there 
is no problem with normal secularism. If normal secularism was implemented in 
the country, anybody could do what he wants, could wear what he wants, could 
study and work in public offices. If you still have problems when you want to pray 
in public places or in universities, if one is spied upon and blacklisted when you 
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visit a mosque, then there is no secularism in this country. If there were the right 
[sort of] secularism, then we would not have these problems. (Bahar, Female, 
Philosophy, 4th year, 30/3/2012) 
Ali was a student who worked for a student society of the Milli Görüş movement, 
which sprang from the former Islamist Welfare Party (Refah Partisi) that, in turn, can be 
seen as the origins of the present ruling party, the AKP. Ali was the head of the society in 
one of the campuses of Istanbul University. Although he was a political Islamist and 
activist in a political Islamist movement, he believed in the compatibility of Islam and 
secularism in Turkey: 
In the future Islam will prevail in Turkey inshallah [God willing]. Secularism can 
stay, but it depends on how you understand and how you implement secularism... 
(Ali, Male, Electronic Engineering, 2nd year, 10/4/2012) 
For “genuine” secularism, students generally referred to European examples or to 
the constitution which defines secularism as freedom for all to choose and declare any 
faith. Contrary to the constitution, people who were especially religious are apt to 
experience some difficulties, even finding themselves blacklisted in certain areas of life if 
they practised their faith with any degree of ostentation, by wearing a headscarf or going to 
a private school with strong religious connections, like having	   financial	   or	   organic	  relationship	  with	  religious	  NGO’s,	  groups,	  or	  movements. 
There are still exclusions because of religion. The best examples are the women 
who wear headscarves. These people could have not been faced these problems, 
and some people could not be blacklisted due to praying five time a day. We are 
not admitted to graduate programmes at the Istanbul Technical University [a state 
university] because we are from the Fatih University [a private university founded 
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by religiously observant people]. It does not matter if you have a very good 
academic record, if you can speak very good English, if your scores are very high. 
You will not be accepted. If there was a secular state, then all people could study 
wearing a headscarf, then there would be no exclusion. There is still exclusion and 
blacklisting in Turkey. (Bahar, Female, Philosophy, 2nd year, 30/3/2012) 
 
4.3 THE CONFLICTS BETWEEN THE TURKISH SECULARIST STATE AND 
RELIGIOUSLY OBSERVANT UNIVERSITY STUDENTS 
Vergin (2003), referring to Durkheim, argues that formal education is the chief pillar of a 
nation-state and of secularism, and that the governing elite of the Turkish republic realized 
from the start the significance of the education system. As a result, they made crucial and 
dramatic changes in this area by closing all religious schools, establishing in law the 
unification of education (Tevhid-i Tedrisat Kanunu), banning the Arabic alphabet and 
replacing it with a modified Roman alphabet, as well as other changes. Some changes 
which may be seen as contrary to Islamic values and Turkish culture, have produced 
difficulties within society.  
Faruk was a religiously observant student who studied in secular public schools. He 
told about his experiences about the secularist and western ideology of public schools in 
Turkey, giving examples from his primary school teachers, which, although they are 
individual cases, can be considered as evidences presenting the implementation of state-
imposed secularism. 
I remember my elementary school years. We had a picnic with our teachers. Our 
teachers did drink alcohol. Beer, I remember. We had a teacher in the third grade. 
He told us that there is no God. “We only believe in God, because we imagine that 
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He is there. But He does not exist. You cannot see Him.” I remember it very well. 
It was very surprising and strange for us... We had, for example, a literature 
teacher, Muhittin. He was old. One day he came and wrote on the chalkboard, 
“Arap” [Arab]. He said, we should read it reversed: “Para” [money in Turkish]. He 
said that the most important thing for the Arabs is money. He tried to talk about the 
“beautiful West”. He said that the family structure is very good in the West. Better 
than ours. The reason is development and scientific studies, he said. (Faruk, Male, 
International Relations, 3rd year, 23/3/2012) 
Even a secularist student, Adem, declared that his distance from religion was the result of 
the Kemalist education system: 
When did develop your attitudes towards religion, in the university years?  
Not at university. I had these thoughts before. But at university I voiced my opinion 
more. I was never religiously observant. I hated those people who are religiously 
observant. I think this is because of Kemalism. Our teacher was a Kemalist... 
(Adem, Male, International Relations, 3rd year, 24/4/2012) 
Under these circumstances, religiously observant students struggled to protect their 
religious and traditional understandings and lifestyles. Buse, a religiously observant 
student in her final year, thanked God for being able to keep her “identity”:  
And, elhamdülillah (thank God), we have protected our identities. (Buse, Female, 
Theology, 4th year, 27/8/2012) 
The desire to preserve their lifestyle, as I will explore further later in Chapter 
Seven, produced some ‘alternative solutions’. According to a World Values Survey in 
2007, between leaving primary school and leaving university, the number of students who 
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identified themselves as religiously observant declined dramatically from 92 per cent to 59 
per cent (Kaymakcan, 2012).  
Henkel (2005) analyses the role of the five daily prayers (in Arabic salat, in Turkish 
namaz) in the lifestyle of Muslims. As he declares, “together with the Muslim headscarf, it 
is also the most visible and perhaps most provocative aspect of everyday Muslim religious 
practice in Turkey” (2005: 487). In spite of the fact that praying five times a day in a 
particular way is one of the essential and compulsory (farz) rituals of Islam, there is a 
difficulty posed by the lack of prayer rooms (mescid) in schools and at some universities. 
Kudret mentioned about his own experiences related to this issue:  
A lecture took place exactly at the time of the Friday prayer at the university. We 
were there in the first hour, but in the second, we went to the mosque. The 
professor of course realized this. The first hour was full, the second hour half were 
missing. He asked where we were. After the response he said, “You can repeat the 
Friday prayer, but not my lecture." He is a professor, but his knowledge and 
relationship with religion is weak. He does not know even that you cannot repeat 
the Friday prayer. (Kudret, Male, Law, 4th year, 11/4/2012) 
Are there any problems that you have experienced as a Muslim?  
Actually, no. As a man, I have no problems. But... Actually, yes. The prayer times. 
You have lectures in the prayer times. The noon prayer is at 12:00 o’clock. The 
afternoon prayer is at 14:30 o’clock. So you have 2.5 hours for the noon prayer. If 
you have lectures at this time, then it is very difficult. That's a problem. In the 
lectures, you can join the lecture late. But if one is a civil servant? That would be 
impossible. (Muharrem, Male, Mathematics, 4th year, 1/4/2012) 
	   82 
In the curriculum of the Turkish education system, there is only one lesson a week 
– Din Kültürü ve Ahlak Bilgisi (Culture of Religion and Knowledge of Morality) –on 
religion in primary and secondary schools; this was unsatisfactory for religiously observant 
people in terms of both the time allotted and the content. At the time I was conducting my 
fieldwork, the governing party was proposing two more elective courses on religion to be 
added to the curriculum; one on the life of the Prophet Muhammad (siyer), and the other 
on the Qur’an.  
Do you think that the religion lessons are sufficient?  
No, they are not sufficient. If we could learn religion through only religious 
lessons, we’re toast! It is quite softened and unsatisfactory. Someone who wants to 
pray, who wants to read the Qur’an, must be able to read the Arabic letters. But that 
is not taught in schools. To understand the meaning of the verses which are recited 
during prayers is significant, but they are not taught as well. Religion lessons are so 
superficial. It is only, as the name implies, “religious culture and moral 
knowledge”.  
What kind of Muslim is it that is being raised through these lessons?  
Someone who knows something about religion, morality and the culture, he has got 
just cultural religious knowledge. If you use the word culture, you are emptying 
religion. Culture is something for the museum. Something you look at and analyse 
from a distance. We look at religion from a distance in those lectures. We cannot 
look at it as believing and practising Muslims. Of course, they are beneficial to 
some extent, but definitely unsatisfactory. (Berna, Female, Sociology, 3rd year, 
10/12/2012) 
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The most visible Islamic symbol and one of the most problematic issues dividing 
Turkish secularism and Islam is the headscarf. As women became active in the public 
sphere, both working and studying, problems occurred, especially after the adoption of the 
1982 constitution (Gallala, 2006). Although the AKP (Justice and Development Party), 
which has a conservative and religious identity, came to power in 2002, matters were not 
resolved during my fieldwork. Almost every student I met had an account of his or her 
own, or of a relative’s who had suffered on account of the headscarf ban. Buse was one 
such example: 
We all learned English in the preparatory year and had intensive English classes. 
Once a day a teacher came in and went out again immediately, because two friends 
and I were sitting with headscarves in the classroom. He came back and said that 
we cannot attend his class with these clothes and that we have to leave the 
classroom. It was the first time I was expelled. It was a very bad day. I can never 
forget that day. In addition, I really love English and my English was very good 
when I graduated from the primary school. I was expecting to improve very much 
at the high school. In the first two months, I followed the lessons at the door.  
At the door, in the classroom?  
No, outside the door. I could not go into the classroom because of my headscarf. I 
could hear the teacher's voice behind the closed door. In addition to that I was 
noted down as absent. I was constantly sent to disciplinary punishment. We were 
three girls. Then the father of a friend took her from the school because she was 
very emotional. The other bought a wig. I was the only one in the school. Ablalar 
[elder sisters] supported me during this time. With some, I still have contact and I 
respect them. I do not judge anyone by why she wears the headscarf or why not. I 
have no right to do it. I had my own test [imtihan]. Most of the time I was hiding in 
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the toilets. There were the Turkish national anthems on Mondays. I always came so 
late, but on Fridays? We usually hid in the toilets or laboratories in order not to 
participate in this ceremony on Fridays. But the school board started to close the 
toilets. If there was nothing important in the lesson, I hid myself in the toilet in the 
last lesson. The caretaker unlocked me, after the ceremony ended. He helped me so 
much. I still pray for him. (Buse, Female, Theology, 4th year, 28/4/2012) 
While some students insisted on not taking off their headscarves, or went abroad to 
study, others found a way round the ban on headscarves in school by, for example, wearing 
a hat over their headscarf or by wearing a wig so as not to show their real hair. Fatma was 
one of the students who wore hat: 
I have experienced the headscarf problem personally in high school, and even now.  
Did you wear a headscarf in high school?  
No. I took off the headscarf in school. At university I wore a hat. That was stupid.  
Until recently?  
Yes. For two years. One year in the preparation class and then one year at the 
faculty of architecture.  
Did you wear the hat on top of the headscarf?  
Yes. Totally stupid. But now the situation is better. (Fatma, Female, Architecture, 
3rd year, 2/4/2012) 
My sister graduated from İmam-Hatip high school, and she came up with similar 
problems. She didn’t take the matriculation exam after she graduated from the high 
school, on the grounds that after taking the exam she would have to study in the 
university with the ban on the headscarf, and would have to take off her headscarf 
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otherwise she couldn’t study in the desired department of the university. She didn’t 
take the exam for two years, and then she made a decision to take it. She had to 
take her headscarf off as a solution, and then she took the exam. She studied at the 
Theology Faculty but even if you study in such a religious school, it is prohibited to 
wear a headscarf. She studied taking off her headscarf and using a wig. But now 
she cannot be a teacher... (Kudret, Male, Law, 4th year, 11/4/2012) 
While my research was in progress, the headscarf ban was lifted at universities, from June 
2010, but it was still in force at primary and secondary schools. 
In 1989, a Constitutional Court (Anayasa Mahkemesi) ruling became the basis of 
the current headscarf ban. The ruling meant that Islamic veiling in public institutions, 
especially universities, was prohibited. Since then, especially because of its visibility, the 
headscarf has become a symbol of the pressure of the Turkish secularist state on religiously 
observant people, and it has also been regarded as a political symbol by secularists 
(Saktanber and Çorbacioğlu, 2008: 519). In Chapter Seven, I examine the separation 
between religiously observant and secularist people in terms of discourse and language. An 
aspect of this division is the headscarf issue and the discourse of the two sides is very clear. 
While Islamist activists and media prefer the word “başörtüsü” for headscarf, secularist 
people and the media have generally used “türban” until quite recently. Galip was head of 
the Istanbul youth branch of Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (CHP) (Republican People’s Party); 
he argued that they do not oppose the term başörtüsü, but were against using the word 
türban because of its “political symbolism.” 
It seems that the CHP supporters go against the headscarf?  
No, I cannot agree with that. It is presented to the society like that. In Turkey, there 
is a headscarf fact. The CHP supporters have a problem with the “turban”, which 
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acts as a political symbol, not with people wearing a “headscarf”. In Anatolia, the 
women, who are 60-70 years old women wear headscarves. You can see their hair 
easily. You must distinguish the headscarf and turban. No one says ‘no’ to the 
headscarf. The turban is a cover: you can’t see the hair. The Islamists wear the 
turban as a political symbol. The turban is a French word. It is something that is not 
ours.  
You say symbol? For what is this symbol used?  
To show herself.  
Herself? Their political background?  
Yes, of course. This is a form of politicization. Politicization is made through 
symbols. Symbols have meanings actually. (Galip, Male, Radio Art and TV, 4th 
year, 30/3/2012) 
The aspects of the secularist and Kemalist state, which university students typically 
were troubled by, were not limited to the issues above. Both secularist and religiously 
observant students were sensitive to the problems of ethnic, denominational and religious 
minorities: the Kurds, and Islamic and non-Muslim foundations (vakıflar). As a religiously 
observant student, Hakan complained about the situation of ethnic and religious minority 
rights: 
What has been experienced? If I summarize it according to my perception of 
religion: In this country, minorities have been deprived of their citizenship rights. 
Armenians, Kurds, Alevis... They have been disregarded completely. Things 
happened which look like genocide. Their places of worship, mosques, were 
closed. The values of the people were disrespected. The headscarf was banned. The 
right of getting public education has been taken from religiously observant people. 
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The worship practices of minorities, the foundations - everything was confiscated. 
The state has taken over everything. The secular state has suppressed everything 
that did not fit in their ideology. The system is a problem from start to finish. 
(Hakan, Male, Theology, 4th year, 2/4/2012) 
Sema is an interesting example, because she was a student who experienced a sense 
of multiple victimhood. Because she had suffered as a woman, as Kurdish, for being 
religious, and for studying at a religious secondary school, İmam-Hatip Lisesi. Although 
she covered her head at primary and secondary schools, she had to give this up when 
attending university because of the headscarf ban. She could not go to university at the due 
time owing to restrictions on the intake from religious İmam-Hatip schools. She had social 
and political problems because of her Kurdishness. She complained that the secularist and 
Kemalist policies of the state wasted and destroyed at least one generation. 
The headscarf ban, the Kurdish issue, women's rights, İmam-Hatip high school 
problem... I have had to deal with all these problems and I could not enjoy my life 
to the full. I have been exposed to psychological violence. I'm even in such a 
defensive position that if someone confronts me, I say, jokingly: “If you attack me, 
it would mean you commit violence against a woman, a Kurd, and a religious 
person; and you would commit a treble crime.” (Sema, Female, Photography, 2nd 
year, 25/3/2012) 
 
4.4 THE EFFECTS OF TURKISH SECULARISM ON STUDENTS 
In this section, I review the effects of Turkish style secularism with regard to university 
students through their statements made during interviews. One of the problems I 
encountered was ambiguity. Almost all the religiously observant students with whom I 
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spoke were uncertain as to whether they want a completely Islamic state or a genuinely 
secular state. Banning headscarves at primary schools and civil institutions; upholding 
Islamic law (Shari‘a law); media censorship; religious education by the state educational 
system; and the institution of the Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı (Directorate of Religious 
Affairs) were all matters that cause ambiguity. It was clear to me that they were doubtful 
and uncertain about these issues. I asked the interviewees whether, if Turkey was an 
Islamic state, they would like censorship of, for instance, television programmes deemed 
un-Islamic. Ali’s answer reflected well the general ambiguity: 
If it was a Muslim country, then the secular media could perhaps try to act 
oppositionally, but they would have to abide by certain rules. You could not, for 
example, publish images of women on the second page of the newspaper. 
Censorship is necessary, but I am not sure, I do not know. Can people freely find 
the right way? Is that better? Or censorship? Or if people are forced from above... 
(Ali, Male, Electronic Engineering, 2nd year, 10/4/2012) 
Muharrem was a student who was working for one of the most prominent Islamic 
groups.  Devoting his evenings and weekends to group his aim was to educate students in 
an Islamic way. The group wanted Turkey to be more liberal and respectful to Islam and 
Muslims. In spite of this fact, he was not decided whether the headscarf ban was right or 
wrong, whether secularism should change, and whether an Islamic system should be 
adopted by the country: 
The headscarf is a real problem. You have to deal with this problem from the age of 
puberty. You wear a headscarf, but cannot then continue your education, which is 
also a religious obligation. That's a problem. But I am confused regarding it as 
well. I do not know if it is good if the headscarf is allowed everywhere. If it was up 
to me, secularism is a good system and I would like it to continue, and I do not 
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want a religious society. I saw someone at the university entrance exam of my 
sisters with a headscarf. My sisters do not wear a headscarf. This girl could not 
really participate with her headscarf. I do not really know if I want that the 
headscarf to be everywhere. I realized that I want the headscarf in schools, but not 
in public institutions. Maybe I’ve got prejudices and a wrong perception, like the 
fact that it is an out-dated cloth. I do not know. (Muharrem, Male, Mathematics, 4th 
year, 1/4/2012) 
I met with a theology faculty student, also experiencing the same ambiguity with 
secularism. At the time, she was leading a group working towards a civil constitution in 
Turkey, preparing an outline proposal to submit to the government. She argued that the 
main problem was trying to adopt a type of a secularism of foreign origin, not suitable for 
Turkish society. As a consequence, she said, Turks were living in an everlasting conflict 
bringing about disintegration in their lives: 
From a general point of view, secularism is a dress that does not fit us. We are 
forced to dress in it, but the fact is that it does not fit. Therefore we do not feel well. 
This leads to dilemma and conflict in people’s own rights. Secularism does not fit 
these people. People are in a bind; you have to fight with yourself. I experience it 
too. I cannot say, for example, with a clear conscience that I want an Islamic 
constitution in Turkey. I feel it is not good. As a result of the imposition of 
secularism, we always have to make the choice between the religious and the 
irreligious in life. This is the consequence of secularism in Turkey. (Hale, Female, 
Theology, 3rd year, 1/5/2012) 
Buse argued that the Republican People’s Party (CHP) and some of the Nationalist 
Movement Party (MHP) grassroots, who are secularists, represent the “success” of the 
secularist state policies of Turkey: 
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There's a part where Kemalism is very successful: the supporters of the CHP. 30 
per cent of the population wants secularism in all places and in all spheres of life. 
(Buse, Female, Theology, 4th year, 28/4/2012) 
Through the education system, the state has shaped the point of view and attitude of 
people towards ‘the other’. But the system is not even-handed in its treatment, even of 
Islamic sects, much less of other religions. The state does not behave equally towards all 
ethnicities and cultures. As Casanova argues, “ultimately the project of constructing such a 
(secular) nation-state from above is likely to fail because it is too secular for the Islamists, 
too Sunni for the Alevis and too Turkish for the Kurds”, and moreover, “a Turkish state in 
which the collective identities and interests of these groups cannot find public 
representation cannot be a truly representative democratic state, even if it is founded on 
modern secular constitutional principles” (2001: 1064-5). One of the results of this has 
been, as two coordinators of prominent Islamic institutions conceded, that religiously 
observant people generally have not been aware of and sensitive regarding the problems of 
‘the other’, for instance, Kurds (Uşşak, 2011; Aktay, 2013). Hale was a theology faculty 
student and she complained about the statist attitudes of religiously minded people, arguing 
that they have been influenced by the state ideology and education: 
The Theology faculties are another case of its own. There are many religiously 
observant people who are statists. I think we religiously observant people also live 
with a Stockholm syndrome. When I talk about the fact that it is wrong to say: “Ne 
mutlu Türküm diyene! (How happy is the person who says I am a Turk) [Mustafa 
Kemal Ataturk’s statement. This is recited by all Turkish primary school students 
every morning], then there are many among the religiously observant people who 
argue that this is a sign of tolerance, that all ethnic minorities are included in 
Turkishness. I definitely do not agree. In Turkey, there are many conflicts of 
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identity. Defending the opposite means burying your head in the sand. (Hale, 
Female, Theology, 3rd year, 1/5/2012) 
A student of law also argued that the secularist system forms the attitudes and 
views of the people so that they do not even wish for, much less struggle for, change in 
society: 
The system constructs the people year on year, from primary school to university. It 
shapes the people. As a result, there is no consciousness of a desire to change 
anything, for example the legal system. Nobody says that he studied law and at the 
same time wants to acquire knowledge of Islamic law and then wants to change the 
system.  
You think that the education system causes that?  
Yes, of course. It shapes the minds of the people. (Kudret, Male, Law, 4th year, 
11/4/2012) 
For Yahya, excluding religious principles and symbols from the public sphere has 
led religiously observant people to become introverted and illiterate: 
(In state secularism) There were damages in terms of two points. On the one hand, 
it damaged democracy. On the other hand, conservative people were kept away 
from education. They have turned in upon themselves. The girls have not been sent 
to school. They were treated as second or third class citizens. This caused the 
“negro” Turks. (Yahya, Male, Biology, 4th year, 27/3/2012) 
In the Islamic literature there is a particular term for an act done in the face of 
danger or oppression: takiyye, often translated as “dissimulation.” In such a situation, 
people may hide their faith and thoughts (Ruthven and Nanji, 2004: 203). This tactic was 
employed especially by some Shi‘ites, starting when they were faced with Sunni 
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oppression in past centuries. However, it became common later in some countries, 
especially when there was no freedom of belief and speech. Aydın (2009) argues that a 
significant number of people today still apply the principle of takiyye, owing to a deficit of 
democracy and liberal political atmosphere in their country. According to him, there are 
some issues that cannot be thought and discussed in Turkey and this gives rise to 
dissimulation. This is not unique to Turkey. On the contrary, this state of affairs exists in all 
Islamic countries in varying degrees. If there is no adequate defence of human rights, 
freedom of speech, liberty of conscience, but instead, despotism, with oppression by force 
of arms, he argues, takiyye is an appropriate ethics in politics. Especially among religiously 
observant students, dissimulating their worldviews, their being members of Islamic groups, 
their worshipping and articulating opinions on some issues, was quite common. Berna’s 
statements below reflect this situation very well: 
Are there problems in your everyday life in terms of practising your religion, 
except the prayer time and location problems? Or do you think that everyone can 
live out his or her religion, as he or she wants?  
I think you have to be brave if you want to practise your religion. Whoever wants 
to, can live his religion. But I also see what my friends, who wear headscarves, 
experience. There are people who ridicule and despise them. There are places they 
cannot enter. The families do not want their daughters to wear headscarves. My 
family would say no, if I would want to wear headscarf. They worried so much 
when I mentioned it once. They say that you can pray, but do not wear a headscarf, 
you should live your youth, and then cover your head when you get old. They are 
anxious of my being excluded from the society, being marked or blacklisted, and 
being blocked in my career and social life. It is normal. This is common among 
families in Turkey. Now, I can go in and out of all environments, and nobody can 
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know what I believe and what I actually am. First, the career, then the headscarf. 
Because with the headscarf a career is difficult. Prove yourself, get your career, and 
then you can wear the headscarf.  
You do not wear a headscarf for this reason?  
Yes. The family is important. For my family it is not normal for a young girl to 
wear a headscarf, only after having a career or after getting married.  
What is it about the exclusion from society? To government agencies, it is obvious, 
but in the social community?  
There are many people who approach women with headscarves with great 
prejudice, and who think that they are close-minded. I do not judge these people. 
This is normal in this society. There are people who have enjoyed a very high 
education. They have got books at their homes like Mesnevi, Mukaddime. Some of 
them think that there is no headscarf in Islam. There are people who snipe at girls 
with headscarves in a bus and say: “We are believers, but we do not cover our 
heads like a spider!” There are many intolerant people... But it will change for the 
better in time. Most of them are over fifty years old. Young people are better. I 
have hope. The biggest problem is in universities and workplaces. Secularist people 
often think that I think like them, just because I do not wear a headscarf and that’s 
why they tell me what they think.  
You hide the fact that you pray, fast, do not you?  
No, I do not conceal it. But I do not tell anyone, unless I am asked. That should be 
so. (Berna, Female, Sociology, 3rd year, 10/12/2012) 
Yahya affirmed the argument of Aydın (2009) about dissimulation or takiyye of religiously 
observant Muslims: 
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Is there any tension due to the secular state and secular social life?  
Yes, there are tensions. These tensions, these fears are especially in our 
subconscious, because the problems that happened in the past might come again.  
What does cause this fear?  
There are people who conceal, hide themselves. These people do not show that they 
are religious. They are turning in upon themselves because of the fact that there are 
attacks against religion and religiously observant people in Turkey. (Yahya, Male, 
Biology, 4th year, 27/3/2012) 
In the political arena, the term takiyye was discussed regarding the governing 
Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP). The party was founded in 2001 by defectors from the 
political Islamist Refah Partisi (the Welfare Party of Necmettin Erbakan). In spite of its 
religious roots, its moderate attitude to the so-called “adultery crisis” and the headscarf 
issue, and its serious efforts to gain admission for Turkey into the European Union (EU), 
suspicions remain that they are hiding their true intentions (takiyye) and have a hidden 
agenda (Çarkoğlu and Toprak, 2007; Duran, 2008; Yavuz, 2009). Religiously observant 
people too, like the AKP, are seen as combining democracy and silence. However, it is 
difficult to know whether it is because they have embraced the secularism and democracy 
or because of some worries. Buse mentioned the attitudes of religiously minded people 
about the political issues: 
The society says: Be quiet! You live your religion in some form anyway. Be 
content. When we asked for the new civilian constitution, we got those reactions.  
From religiously observant people?  
Yes. They believe that they are now doing well and you should accept it. But that is 
our right, in my opinion. (Buse, Female, Theology, 4th year, 28/4/2012) 
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Although the AKP government has been in power for more than ten years, 
according to a student, Fatma, direct or indirect ‘secular’ oppression still continues at a 
certain level in public life: 
The professors at the universities, for example. They exclude us because we are 
wearing headscarves. They criticise everything we do. Twice as much, because we 
wear headscarves. Therefore, we are not supported through the career to be at the 
university.  
Is it that obvious?  
Yes. There are some professors who address it directly. But when you have a 
course with this professor, then the whole day goes badly. You think that you are 
striving for nothing. And there is also still the case that the faculty of architecture 
“belongs” to the Kemalist leftists. You have the feeling like you have to prove 
yourself to them. “Look, I can do it, too!” That isn’t nice.  
Is there a fear, that they could prevent your success?  
Sometimes, I do not know. Maybe.  
What percentage of the professors is like that?  
So mostly the older professors are like that. The new professors are not the 
problem.  
Do you have this problem also with the students?  
No. You notice something, but they say nothing to your face. (Fatma, Female, 
Architecture, 3rd year, 2/4/2012) 
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4.5 ISLAMISM IN TURKEY 
“Islamism” has different connotations from “Muslimhood”. The word “Muslim” and 
“Islamist” are not synonymous. While “Muslim” implies a religious identity, “Islamist” 
denotes a distinctive social and political consciousness and agenda (Göle, 1997). Although 
some theologians behind the Muslimhood model object to these definitions (White, 2012), 
the term “Islamism” is generally used to include its socio-political connotations. However, 
the term does vary in meaning from country to country and from one Islamic movement to 
another. Sunni and Shiite sects, for instance, have very different principles in the political 
area. This is reflected in the political agenda of the revivalist movements in each sect. 
Likewise Islamic or Islamist movements vary from country to country. Because of their 
relationship with politics, these religious movements embrace different agendas according 
to the particular conditions – the particular problems internal and external – of each 
Muslim country. Another factor is the nature of their relationship with modernity (Berger, 
1999). As Fuller argues, there are different kinds of Islamists, being “either radical or 
moderate, political or apolitical, violent or quietist, traditional or modernist, democratic or 
authoritarian” (2002: 49). 
As regards Turkey, the country is home to groups, movements and individuals with 
a great variety of Islamic views. At the time of the Ottoman Empire there were various 
Islamic institutions and groups in Turkey, notably the dervish orders (tarikat), and new 
Islamist movements appeared after the abolition of the caliphate (hilafet) in 1924 by 
Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (Sayyid, 1997). The abolition of the caliphate created a religious 
and political hiatus in the Islamic world when it came to legitimate authority, and as a 
result, even though the secularist state oppressed Islamic movements, they went 
underground until democracy emerged in the country in 1950. After that time, some 
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Muslims used the democratic system and opposed the secularist Kemalist system through 
party politics. Toprak says “Overtly religious people were not accepted into the political, 
social, or intellectual elite circles. The republic marginalized them, caricaturized them as 
fanatics, and considered them uncivilized. It was these marginalized groups that later 
formed the backbone of political Islam” (Toprak, 2005: 32). Göle argues that political 
Islam in Turkey has been resisting the secular, nationalist, authoritarian and exclusionist 
politics of the state (2012: 16). Islamic party oppositions and movements in Turkey have 
not worked only in the political sphere. As Kuru indicates, “… there are various identities 
(Sunni and Alevi), associations (the Diyanet, tarikats, and movements), and political views 
among Muslims in Turkey that make an establishment of one single interpretation of Islam 
almost impossible” (2009: 241). Bulaç (2011) classifies Muslimhood in Turkey into three 
interacting categories: political Muslimhood, social Muslimhood, and intellectual 
Muslimhood. In this part of the thesis, I focus on political Muslimhood and the current 
condition of political Islam and Islamism in Turkey. 
Islamism or political Islam in Turkey is a new term that promotes the political, 
social, economic and judicial parts of Islam, as a result of the necessities of the time and 
contextual conditions. According to Kentel (2011) Islamic movements have passed 
through four stages, and each stage has different features. The first stage is “coherence” or 
“modernism”. This was towards the end of the Ottoman Empire. In that period, the Islamist 
movement struggled to save the Empire from the modern West. The approach attempted at 
that time was to take technology from the West, but to preserve Islamic culture. The 
second stage Kentel terms “withdrawing” and involved inclining to Sufism (Tasavvuf).  
The third stage was “articulation”, which involved the adoption of rightist politics, 
following the initial emergence of democracy in 1950. And the fourth stage was 
“purification”. This period started after 1960 and lasted until the 28 February military 
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intervention in 1997. In that period the Islamist movement was in conflict with 
modernization and Westernisation. Its aim was to capture the modern secular state. 
However, the 28th February military intervention changed dramatically both the state’s and 
the Islamist movement’s destiny. The Justice and Development Party (AKP) won the 
election in 2002 with a victory, and the party also won the following two elections by still 
greater margins. The AKP today remains in power in Turkey and this has been seen by 
both Turkish and Western media as a victory for Islamists against secularism (Toprak and 
Uslu, 2009).  
In this part, I analyse the condition of Islamism in Turkey, especially among young 
people, using the interviews I conducted with university students. 
Along with other diversities in the country, the main polarisation has been between 
secularists and Islamists. Islamization, Göle argues, “can be seen as a counter-attack 
against the principles of the Kemalist project of modernization and the vested interests of 
the Westernized elites. The concept of an Islamist elite is itself antithetical to secular elites 
who see it as anachronistic” (1997: 57). Both secularist and religiously observant students 
accepted this. The head of the Istanbul youth branch of Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (CHP) 
(Republican People’s Party) told me: 
In Turkey, the Islamists have a certain potential votes, 8 per cent, 9 per cent, 
maximum 15 per cent. Not 45-50 per cent. But at the moment there are two sides. 
Either you belong to one side or to the other. There is not another side out of these 
in Turkey, only one party, the nationalist MHP (the Nationalist Movement Party), 
but in reality, it does not exist. The MHP has passed the election threshold by 
means of the CHP. The secularist CHP (the Republican People’s Party) has 
supported the MHP because they hoped to form a coalition government if the MHP 
was elected. (Galip, Male, Radio Art and TV, 4th year, 30/3/2012) 
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Although the definitions of the terms “Muslimhood” and “Islamism” underline the 
political aspect of Islamism, Islamists generally do not accept such definitions. For them, 
“Muslimhood” already involves the features of Islamism, and every Muslim is already an 
Islamist, both necessarily and naturally (Bulaç, 2012b). Emre was an activist and manager 
for Anadolu Platformu, a religious society. He thinks like Bulaç: 
We have to discuss religiosity, of course. What is religiosity? Egypt is a religious 
society, but how far does this country have the characteristics of a Muslim society? 
A Muslim is not just someone who prays and worships to Allah. A Muslim is one 
who defends right against wrong. He is not someone who just rebels against 
tyrants. He prays and performs his worship regularly at the same time. This balance 
is important.  
So political and social awareness is important?  
Exactly. Therefore, we do not use the word conservative in our society, Anadolu 
Platformu (The Anatolian Platform). Anadolu Platformu is not a conservative 
movement.  
What is it then?  
It is a Muslim movement. Only ‘Muslim’. We define ourselves as a Muslim student 
movement. Turkish society, in my opinion, is not a religious society. The actual 
religious are only 10 per cent. Maybe even less. Among students, the percentage is 
lower. It must be said also, that the proportion is rising; not a linear increase, but an 
increase. (Emre, Male, Computer Engineering, 4th year, 20/4/2012) 
An Islamic consciousness among religiously observant students was easily 
observed. However, their major dislike was not that they lived in a secular country, but 
rather, in a secularist-Kemalist country. Although in principle they wished Turkey to be an 
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Islamic country, they did not actually believe this possible. For many, like for religiously 
observant students, Sema and Faruk, that was a utopia: 
What do you think about an Islamic state, Islamic education system and the Shari‘a 
law?  
These are utopias. I do not think such things are possible. The so-called Islamic 
countries are not like that. Is there any country where you can say, there exists 
Islam, as presented in the Qur’an? How can that be possible in Turkey? Very 
difficult. Impossible. But if the state wants to encourage Islam, then it can stop the 
discrimination against the İmam-Hatip high schools... (Sema, Female, 
Photography, 4th year, 25/3/2012) 
Of course the current law bothers me. There are injustices. We have not got a good 
judicial system. Ours is an aggregated system, with the desire to understanding the 
West. There must be an Islamic approach, in the sense of justice. For example, the 
hand of the thief must thereby cut off. That is the Islamic jurisprudence. The key 
criterion is the Qur’an in Islam, isn’t it?  
You want Turkey to be like that, then?  
Perhaps this is our utopia. (Faruk, Male, International Relations, 3rd year, 
23/3/2012) 
Among my interviewees, only one student declared that he wished for Turkey to be 
an Islamic country. Others spoke about wanting liberty for all religions and some of them 
wanted trials to be conducted according to Islamic law. If it were to be allowed in England, 
despite its secular and Christian character, it might be regarded by such students as an ideal 
country: 
Does it bother you to live under the rule of a secular state?  
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Of course. I am a Muslim. I want to live according to Islam. I should live in a 
country where there is Islamic jurisprudence. Even England has Shari‘a courts, for 
instance. A Muslim can choose to be judged in accordance with Shari‘a. But it is 
not possible in Turkey. Some people exploit secularism. It depends on how you 
define secularism. Of course, there are rights of non-Muslims in Islamic law, yes. 
But in a country where 99 per cent of the population are Muslims, it is 
incomprehensible to implement secularism… Nevertheless, we do not need an 
Islamic intervention like in Iran. (Buse, Female, Theology, 4th year, 28/4/2012) 
In order to observe Islamic rulings and live by Islamic values in their daily lives, 
religiously observant Muslims demand a change in Turkey. Details of the desired change 
vary from group to group, but the shared desire is to live in a liberal, social, and 
democratic country. Rather than a revolution, as in Iran in 1979, they want change in 
response to the demands of the citizens.  
Buse was one of the active members of Anadolu Platformu. She declared that 
Anadolu Platformu (The Anatolia Platform) was founded in order to practise Islam both in 
Turkey and in the world. In the best way, according to Islam and the Prophet. I asked her 
about how an Islamic state would be accomplished; through a revolution or democratic 
politics: 
If the goal is an Islamic state, how will it be accomplished? With a revolution, a 
political party?  
Why not a revolution? (That would be) quite possible. It should develop in a 
political party first. The path of the revolution is not necessarily political. Another 
way is a social one. In my view, revolution should be from within, and bottom to 
top. Society needs to be educated. If the society and politics go together, it would 
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be better. Not a revolution like in Iran. In 2001, a kind of revolution or a change 
already happened. Especially the military has changed recently, I think. (Buse, 
Female, Theology, 4th year, 28/4/2012) 
In addition to the demand for democracy in the country, religiously observant 
people were also concerned about public life. Especially after the AKP came to power, 
some religiously observant people put their discontent into words publicly, in newspapers, 
and social media. The last time religious or Islamist people were in power was during the 
Ottoman Empire. Even then there were many discussions and much conflict about 
Islamization and Westernization of both the state and the society. And there were changes 
in the country’s politics, economy and education. These changes affected the culture and 
lifestyle of society. Now, after nearly a century, religiously observant people had the 
possibility of changing some conditions in the country again, from the women in state 
service to the sale of alcoholic drinks, from building mosques to allowing or prohibiting 
Alevi places of worship (Cemevi), and even the constitution of the state. Nevertheless, 
coming from the periphery to the centre – leaving the opposition and coming to power - 
was not an easy situation for religiously observant people to get accustomed to. 
Ambiguities and contradictions were easily discerned in the views and statements of 
religiously observant people.  
In my interviews, I asked the students if they would like to change anything in the 
country in terms of Islamization. There were various uncertainties in their answers. For 
example, Birol was a religiously observant student who wanted to practise his religion by 
observing the rules of Islam. He did not want to see around him any woman dressing 
defiantly against Islamic principles. He wanted the city to be organized like it was in the 
time of the Ottoman Empire. 
	   103 
If we lived under a Shari‘a system, secularists would live in a neighbourhood and 
religiously observant people in (an)other, Jews in another district. I would not see 
these people. Everyone could live at will. I think that would be nice. It is a question 
that has concerned me (for) one and a half years... I would like to ask Hayrettin 
Karaman Hoca: How about if we live in a Shari‘a system? What would happen to 
women who wanted to wear (a) mini skirt? Would we allow that? Would we allow 
people to visit pubs? I want to ask these questions. I am not sure, but I think we 
would allow them. If people want to go to a pub, then they should be able to go. If 
they want to wear a mini skirt, then they should. Ultimately, I will not see them if I 
live in another neighbourhood. However it seems impossible in the current system. 
It is utopian. So I know I have no right to judge other people because they wear a 
mini skirt or drink alcohol. But I do not like it. I think that Professor Hayrettin 
Karaman also has similar thoughts. I think that would be a beautiful way in order 
not to oppress each other. (Birol, Male, Sociology, 2nd year, 27/4/2012) 
In the time of the Ottoman Empire, a city quarter (mahalle) was not only an 
administrative unit but also a community (gemeinschaft). A mahalle contained its own 
primary school, mosque, institutions for birthday celebrations and marriage ceremonies, as 
well as Islamic institutions for moral control of the neighbourhood residents. In these 
institutions, the separation between men and women was strictly maintained. Mardin 
developed a thesis that the secularizing reforms of the Republic “are linked by the 
underlying common denominator of the liberation of the individual from the collective 
constraints of the Muslim community” (1981: 213-4). That kind of city plan with its 
system for overseeing the morals of the population is still desired by some religiously 
observant people. Here is an article related to this subject written by a very well known 
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Muslim scholar in Turkey, Hayrettin Karaman, whom Birol mentioned in his response. 
Karaman addresses his recommendations to Muslims living in a secular society. 
A Muslim would like to live, as far as the circumstances permit, in a society where 
the Islamic rulings and moral views are respected. Also, if possible, a Muslim is 
obliged to prevent and intervene, under certain circumstances, people who are 
immoral. People who do not believe in Islam have the right to live the way they 
want. But if this lifestyle affects Muslim life in the application, morality and piety, 
then Islam compels these people to have a space, which is assigned, in which they 
can live however they want. If a Muslim does not have the opportunity to live as 
outlined above, but lives in a multi-religious, multi-cultural and multi-ethical 
society, how should he act then? As the circumstances (allowing) for intervention 
are not given, he cannot do so. If circumstances do not allow that he relocates, he 
cannot do this too. What remains is to live with these people together. We live in 
apartments, streets, neighbourhoods together with homosexuals, alcoholics, 
fornicators, almost-naked people, and people who hate Muslims. What should be 
the attitude of Muslims in their hearts and externally? Let's start with the inner 
attitude: a Muslim can never accept such behaviour; he or she would try to prevent 
it. But he has no way to prevent it. He keeps his inner desire to prevent them (these 
anti-Islamic modes of behaviour), if possible. As external adjustment, Muslims 
should avoid the acts that might legitimize the behaviours of people who act against 
religion, morality and tradition. They should at least deny their smiles to them 
when they witness such acts. I do not prefer to use the word “tolerance” [hoşgörü] 
for the behaviour that is exhibited by Muslims who have to live in pluralistic 
societies; I prefer the word “endurance” (tahammül). I know that some people will 
react to this article and call it discriminatory, separatist, and harmful to unity and 
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solidarity. However, a Muslim person should be aware of the differences between 
him or her and the “others”. The major danger in terms of religiosity would be the 
disappearance of this awareness. Tolerating diversities, as the demands of the 
circumstances, and respecting rights and liberties, are different from tolerating 
unpleasantness. (Karaman, 2011). 
Inspired by these ideas, although the more religious were inclined to favour the 
separation of social groups by locality, there are uncertainties in their minds regarding the 
new situation in Turkish society. There was the question of how to define a secular or a 
religiously observant Muslim. Separation was relatively easy at the time of the Ottoman 
Empire because there was social agreement and harmony in terms of appearance, of 
clothing at least. Now, as I will indicate in the following chapters, it is very difficult to 
recognise a person as religiously observant or secularist by their appearance, generally.  
There is Çamlıca where religiously observant people reside, Çarşamba likewise, or 
Başakşehir, I mean districts where mostly religiously observant people live, they 
even constitute buildings complexes...  
True but more than a district, something like a city for example; something larger, I 
mean. For example, there is the schools’ side of it. That’s the thing: a system that I 
am not able to formulate at the moment, which would provide me with 
encountering Muslim people at school, when I come home there are Muslim people 
and where I reside, seeing Muslim people. This probably requires the state being a 
Shari‘a regime, but even if it would be, people who want to live as they want to 
live should be left alone.  
Is that possible then?  
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No it is not. How could it be? Like someone would want to attend Boğaziçi 
University and you would say “no you can’t”... I am constantly giving the mini 
skirt example but this is just a cliché. When I see people wearing mini skirts around 
me, I do not mean, going and telling them by dressing like this you first and 
foremost are tyrannizing yourself. Rather than that I do not want to look at them, 
she is tyrannizing me also but that is another matter. I mean, I also do not want to 
see them, that is to say. Why should I take another test upon myself? She should 
not be around me. (Birol, Male, Sociology, 2nd year, 27/4/2012) 
A religiously observant student, who defined himself as “radical Islamist”, 
complained about the same problem: 
What disturbs me most is that I cannot walk down the street comfortably. No 
matter where we go, there is "haram" everywhere, [women, especially those who 
do not wear a headscarf] even if you are in Fatih [a neighbourhood that is well-
known with its religious population]. I cannot raise my head in the street in order 
not to look at haram. Supposedly 99 per cent population of the country is Muslim. 
But you cannot walk with a clear conscience in the streets. This is one of the 
biggest problems. (Mahmut, Male, International Relations, 2nd year, 24/4/2012) 
Another area of ambiguity was Islamic law (shari‘a). It was generally accepted that 
Islam is not compatible with a completely secular state and society, because religion does 
not only consist of a set of rituals and worship; its principles, values and rulings cover all 
aspects of life. Berna was one of the religiously observant students believing the 
incompatibility of Islam and secularism:  
Islam is not suitable for secularism. This religion encompasses all areas of life. It 
has rulings regarding political and social lives. There is Islamic law. Your 
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relationship to the state is determined. Your personal relationships are governed. 
We cannot say that we accept some rules and we do not accept the others. Religion 
is a package, and you cannot disintegrate it.  
Can you actualise it, for example, Islamic law?  
It was implemented in the time of the Prophet. So it's possible. Otherwise God 
would not have sent it. But I do not think it would be possible today. Circumstances 
do not permit. This cannot be done through a revolution simply from the top. 
Indeed, there are many people who are against Shari‘a law. It is possible to make 
arrangements according to the demands of the people. It does not have to be 
necessarily congruent with religion. It is enough if it is not contrary to religion, and 
if it gives me the opportunity to practise my religion.  
Is it the ideal or what is sufficient at the moment?  
For now, it is the ideal. Let people practise their beliefs freely and comfortably 
first.  
Later?  
Everything should develop naturally. We should have respect for freedom of belief. 
A religious state is the dream of many, and the nightmare of some others. It bothers 
me that everything is politicized. The power struggle. That's not nice. Mutual 
acceptance and respect are necessary. This is missing on both sides.  
But you spoke of Islamic law. This has implications for the constitution. For this to 
take place, it needs to be implemented politically, or not so?  
There is politics in the nature of Islam. Yes. We cannot deny it. It is not for me to 
say I do not want Shari‘a. A Muslim cannot say that. Today, Shari‘a is the ideal. 
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But people tend to interpret everything differently, and to be speculative. (Berna, 
Female, Sociology, 3rd year, 10/12/2012) 
Although religiously observant students believed that Islamic principles should be 
implemented in the country, they were not certain of the feasibility of this in the immediate 
term or, indeed, ever. The same student, Berna, explained the difficulties and the reasons 
behind them. 
I do not believe that we can build a reliable Shari‘a system. Freedom is not 
necessary only for pious people, but for all people. That's the ideal, but I do not 
think that would happen wholesomely. It has the potential to become a tyranny. 
The conditions have changed. Not a local world, but a global world.  
Do you not trust Erdoğan, for example?  
No. Because everything in a globalized world is under too much influence (from 
outside). The price of bread is determined by conditions in the United States. In this 
capitalist world, everything is based on (material) benefits. We cannot just set up a 
Shari‘a state and act upon Islamic values easily. There are certain power relations 
in the world. We can implement the Shari‘a as long as it would serve some 
powers… Policy implies benefit ratios. The global conditions needs to be changed 
first. All people think about money. I do not believe in idealistic, pure changes. But 
the Qur’an tells me to believe in it. It happened before.  
What can one say in conclusion? What are the limitations in Turkey which prevent 
the implementation of the Islamic law?  
I’m worried about its implementation because it might be exploitive for some and 
victimizing for some. Diversity is an obstacle. The prejudice in the minds of people 
is an obstacle. There are alternative values for some people to the religious values. 
	   109 
We think in a modern way. We have a modern education. We have some pictures 
in our minds when we think of the Shari‘a; it is a monster for many people. It is old 
and dark. People are scared. (Berna, Female, Sociology, 3rd year, 10/12/2012) 
In order to see the current condition of Islamism in Turkey we need to look at the 
role the “conservative democrat” AKP has been playing in power. 
 
4.6 THE AKP’S ROLE ON ISLAMIZATION AND SECULARIZATION 
The AKP (Justice and Development Party) had great success in the 2002 elections in 
Turkey. The election was very significant for the history of secularism in the country. A 
military intervention took place on 28 February 1997, which had a negative impact on 
religiously observant people and institutions. In February 1997, the military members of 
Milli Güvenlik Kurulu (the National Security Council) presented an ultimatum and, as a 
result, the Refah Partisi (the Welfare Party) and the Doğru Yol Partisi (True Path Party) 
coalition governments resigned. The main target of the ultimatum was “irtica” (‘reaction’), 
which the military officers saw as “Islamizing tendencies” in government agencies. The 28 
February military intervention (known as ‘28 Şubat’), in Silverstein’s words, “came to be 
used as a euphemism for the beginning of a crackdown led by the military against ‘political 
Islam’” (2011: 106). The following are only a few examples of the actions of the military 
intervention leaders: a strict headscarf ban was instituted in all universities; compulsory 
primary school education was extended from five year to eight years, thus making it almost 
impossible for a child to attend religious high schools, İmam-Hatip Schools; a great 
number of Qur’an courses were shut down; and Sufi orders (tarikat) were abolished. The 
current President of Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, was at that time mayor of Istanbul; he 
was given a prison sentence and banned from politics forever for reading publicly a 
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nationalist poet whose work nevertheless included Islamic words. In spite of these 
obstacles, Erdoğan and his party later achieved great success in parliamentary elections, 
winning 34.26 per cent of votes in 2002, 46.58 per cent in 2007, and 49.83 per cent in 
2011. This is read by some as a success story for Turkish democracy (Toprak, 2005), and 
by others as a victory for Islamism against secularism (Toprak and Uslu, 2009).  
Secularist participants tended to see the success of the AKP as a victory for 
political Islam, with a suspicion that the party’s primary goal is the destruction of the 
secular Turkish republic. Galip, as a secularist student, complained about the government 
arguing that they are trying to destroy the secularist state: 
Because, for example, what is the goal of the Islamic groups and the external 
powers in Turkey? To weaken this system! They work for it. That’s why the 
secularist journalists are silenced in various ways. Therefore, there are journalists 
who are in prison now. Therefore, some members of the military are in jail. It is 
trying to minimize enlightened and secularist thinking. This means that the system 
is successful. That’s why they are trying to destroy it by force now. The power of 
Turkey is in the hands of some particular groups. It is in the hands of the people 
who are close to particular religious groups and beliefs. (Galip, Male, Radio Art 
and TV, 4th year, 30/3/2012) 
Another student, Can, argued that the process of liberation from oppressive regimes 
in the Muslim countries of North Africa, known as the Arab spring, actually started in 
Turkey in 2002 with the coming to power of the AKP. In his view, Kemalism is the 
authoritarian regime that was overturned.  
An “Arab spring” has been effective in Turkey. However, the spring came to 
Turkey between 2000 and 2002, when the AKP came to power. A dictatorship, 
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namely Kemalism and Mustafa Kemal went with the spring, and then the Arab 
spring started. (Can, Male, Chemistry, 4th year, 2/4/2012) 
In addition to the economic and political problems Turkey faced during the 28 
February period, one of the major reasons for supporting the AKP was its religious and 
social conservatism combined with a democratic programme (Toktamis and Celik, 2014). I 
talked with Bahar about this issue: 
Why has Turkey selected the AKP?  
In my opinion, because the AKP is Muslim. Because people want their values to be 
respected, and the AKP does it. The people have a need of respect for their religion, 
especially (in) Anatolia. Anatolia is the greatest power of Turkey. Anatolian people 
are more religiously observant and not like the people in Istanbul and other western 
cities. There can be people who are not religiously observant. But in Anatolia 
religion is needed. Anatolia expects that from the state. They say that the men at the 
head of the state have to understand us and act accordingly. Therefore, the AKP has 
been in power for twelve years. (Bahar, Female, Philosophy, 4th year, 30/3/2012) 
The student’s statement below revealed her satisfaction at seeing her expectations met by 
the government. 
The more women are “modern”, the more they perform in public life, for some 
people. I can be part of social life, but that was almost impossible 10-15 years ago. 
The women who wear a headscarf were not even accepted in some hospitals. For 
women, there is an extra exclusion from the society, because when you look at us, 
you can easily tell that we are religiously observant people. For example, I heard 
somebody saying to me, “What are you doing in Taksim?” There is already 
discrimination against women, and if you wear a headscarf, the discrimination 
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becomes much greater. In Turkey, a person can only be integrated into society 
when he or she becomes “modern”. With this appearance I have an extra position. I 
mean, it is not only men who exclude me from society, but women also who do not 
like Ottoman culture and Islam. We are so divided. But with the AKP government 
there can be found a great change. It (the headscarf) has been normalized. The 
supporters of the AKP live and practise their religion and show their religious 
identity as well. While veiled women were excluded before, ten years ago, it is not 
like that now. (Hale, Female, Theology, 3rd year, 1/5/2012) 
Nevertheless, the most problematic issue for religious women, the headscarf ban, 
has not been completely resolved; although the ban has been removed in universities, this 
has not yet the force of a constitutional amendment, and the ban still applies to those in 
public office. 
I think it is still a problem. Most of my friends are saying, thank God banning the 
headscarf does not happen anymore... But what I see is that none of us has any 
guarantee and if a problem comes up in future like, say, another government takes 
over, this issue is going to come up again, it still may and this still scares me, to be 
honest. I have this problem. (Fatma, Female, Architecture, 3rd year, 2/4/2012) 
The AKP’s role in the destiny of Islamization and secularization, and Islamism and 
secularism in Turkey, is one of the matters most frequently discussed by commentators 
both Turkish and foreign, and by sociologists, anthropologists and political scientists. Has 
the party caused a change in Islamism or secularism in Turkey? Has the struggle between 
the two sides finished in both the political arena and society? What is the future of Turkish 
secularism and Turkish Islamism? During my fieldwork, I observed that secularists were 
very concerned about the Islamization of the country and any change this would imply for 
their lifestyles. Some political decisions, some new laws in various spheres and the 
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statements of some religious politicians, have increased their fears. The Gezi Park protests, 
which will be presented and analysed in Chapter Eight, can be considered as the expression 
of these fears (Çelik, 2015). Those who were religiously observant, although generally 
pleased with the conservative government, criticize it over not recognising human rights, 
not having a new constitution, and the Kurdish issue. Some of those who criticize the 
government from the religious point-of-view argue that the party has been secularized and 
has embraced the principles of the Kemalist state.  
We can say that Kemalism has become successful in the last twelve years during 
the AKP government. Hakan Albayrak, an Islamist author, is not a person that I 
like, but he said something very nice: “Fortunately there is America (as a threat), 
fortunately there is Israel, otherwise religiously observant people would not have 
listened to our advice.” These threats encourage religiously observant people to 
conserve their values. Similarly there was also Kemalism as a threat, which caused 
mobilization of religiously observant people. However it has nearly disappeared 
now. Let's see what the Muslims are doing now. Twelve years have passed. 
Kemalism is succeeding now in doing what it wanted to do. (Can, Male, Chemistry, 
4th year, 2/4/2012) 
Religiously observant people have been integrated into the system through the AKP 
government. They have become statists of a secular state now. I am regretfully 
saying that. When you talk about a constitution, it would mean a regime. And when 
you talk about bringing in Islamic law, it would mean to change the regime of the 
state. If there is demand regarding it, I cannot do anything except think to myself 
(that nothing has been achieved). I do not think our society is ready for that. (Hale, 
Female, Theology, 3rd year, 1/5/2012) 
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The Islamists have been integrated into the system through the AKP... Therefore, 
Kemalism is successful. People have embraced the secular state. For example, the 
soldiers who died in the East of Turkey during the firefights against the Kurdish 
terrorist group, PKK, for example, are called “şehit” [martyrs]. (Osman, Male, 21, 
Sociology, 3rd year, 27/4/2012) 
Why did you criticize the AKP?  
The role of the AKP was to eliminate Ergenekon and Kemalism, and it succeeded 
in that. The Muslims should not have expectations from the AKP anymore. It is 
dangerous that Muslims are integrated into the system. I mean the Turkish 
Republic. Embracing the secular state, and especially the nation-state system... The 
headscarf is also a kind of bribe. “Now you can wear your headscarf and you can 
do with a headscarf everything you want, so get your nose out of my business!” 
they say. That kind of situation bothers me. The AKP provides this. They cause 
Muslims to be integrated to the system. (Osman, Male, Sociology, 3rd year, 
27/4/2012) 
I suggest that the demands of the Islamists regarding the judicial system and the 
state changed after the 28 February military intervention, and the AKP government has 
accelerated that process of change towards democratization during the first and second 
cabinets (November 2002 – June 2011), in particular. The AKP, being in power with 
almost 50 per cent of the vote, has changed the state’s view of Islam and religious 
institutions. It seems that there will be reconciliation between the two sides but with some 
concessions made to the secularists. 
In September 2011 the then Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, on a visit to 
Egypt made a number of comments worthy of note. In an interview with the TV channel 
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Dream, he surprisingly recommended the Egyptians to adopt a secular constitution. He 
said that secularism does not mean atheism and is not the enemy of religion. He urged 
them not to be worried about secularism and said he expected that the new regime would 
be secular and that the viewpoint of the Egyptians towards secularism would change after 
his speech. In Egypt, he declared, as the Muslim Prime Minister of a secular state, there is 
no conflict involved in his position (Egypt Independent, 2012). In the same month, the 
AKP organized a congress celebrating the tenth year of the party in power. In his speech 
there, Erdoğan said that his party “showed everybody that democracy can work very well 
in a country with a Muslim-majority population”, and thus Turkey was “an example for all 
Muslim countries.” Although these statements were criticized by Islamists both in Egypt 
and in Turkey, the majority of the Turkish population and the supporters of the AKP did 
not manifest any serious disapproval. On the contrary, when the then Prime Minister said, 
“We will raise a religious generation (‘dindar nesil’)”, religious media and activists did not 
greet the statement with any enthusiasm, arguing that this is not a proper function of the 
state, and that such activities ought properly to be carried out by NGOs (Akyol, 2012). 
This seems to demonstrate that the conception of the state and secularism is changing in 
Turkey, from authoritarian to liberal. 
I asked my participants their ideas about the future of secularism. Religiously 
observant students agreed on that the Turkish style of secularism would change. 
Due to the fact that secularism (in the radical Turkish sense) could not complete 
itself, I think, it will have disappeared soon. At least, it will soften; it will take a 
passive form. (Sema, Female, Photography, 4th year, 25/3/2012) 
What do you think about the future of secularism in Turkey?  
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I think secularism will continue in Turkey. I do not think the conservatives will 
take steps backward from secularism. The system will be softened in the hands of 
conservative, religiously observant people.  
What about Islamization of the state?  
I do not think so. The state will not be Islamized, but it will make peace with Islam. 
(Yahya, Male, Biology, 4th year, 27/3/2012) 
With regards to the abovementioned facts and conditions, Kuru (2013) describes 
the AKP and its policies as not been assertive and authoritarian, but adopting passive and 
moderate secularism; being not Islamist, but Muslim; being not radical, but pragmatic. 
 
4.7 ACCOMMODATIONISM WITH ISLAMIZATION AND SECULARIZATION 
According to surveys conducted by Çarkoğlu and Toprak, religiosity is becoming more 
widespread in Turkey at the same time as secularism and the secular state are becoming 
more universally accepted. The study indicates that the number of Muslim people who 
describe themselves as very religiously observant (dindar), increased between 1999 and 
2006 from 6 per cent to 13 per cent, and the percentage declaring their identities as 
primarily Muslim also increased from 36 per cent to 46 per cent. This increase is also seen 
in the approval ratings of religious political parties. Çarkoğlu and Toprak declare, “This 
cannot lead to the conclusion that the support for a secular system is on the decline. Both 
our 1999 and 2006 surveys show that Turkish people do not perceive secularism to be 
under threat and do not think that there is a real possibility of a Shari‘a-based religious 
regime in Turkey. Moreover, there is no finding in our study that indicates a rising support 
for a religious state” (2007: 13). According to their survey, the percentage of people who 
request an Islamic (Shari‘a) state dramatically declined between 1999 and 2006 from 21 
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per cent to 9 per cent. My findings from the interviews and observations support these 
results. The following quotations belong to religiously observant students from different 
groups:  
I think that Islamic law and secularism are applicable simultaneously. Because 
secularism means that state affairs should be separated from religion. The religious 
groups should be able to express their opinions, but should not go into state affairs. 
They should help with their thoughts, but not through interference. I support that. It 
was so in the Ottoman Empire. (Baran, Male, International Relations, 3rd year, 
24/4/2012) 
This secularism already exists in the Shari’a. (Ali, Male, 22, Electronic 
Engineering, 2nd year, 10/4/2012) 
Is it not important to apply the Islamic law then?  
Muslims should be sentenced within the legal system, whichever he or she chooses 
(it) to be. Christians within Christian law, the Jews within Jewish law, and seculars 
within a secular or liberal law; one should have a choice. We have seen, above all, 
a judicial system in the Madina model, rather than an Islamic state. And if 
something comes again, it should be justice, not an Islamic state. The state can have 
no religion. The religion of the state is justice. (Emre, Male, Computer 
Engineering, 4th year, 20/4/2012) 
Now, Turkey is a secular state, do you think it is problem, to live as a Muslim under 
a secular state?  
If it was to be applied properly secularism might not be a problem. Secularism 
makes trouble when it interferes with lives of individuals. If it is interfering with 
my life, with the community's life, this is not right. Secularism does not 
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require that, you know. Secularism is everyone's freedom to live their religion, 
so separation of the religious and governmental affairs, affairs of religion and the 
state shall be separate, there is no problem with that. But when it gets into the 
person's life and starts telling you: you must not pray, you must not wear hijab, so 
and so, then there is trouble. (Buse, Female, Theology, 4th year, 28/4/2012) 
Bulaç (2012a) says that there have been three Islamist generations in the history of 
Turkish Muslims. According to his chronological classification, the first Islamist 
generation was between 1850-1924; the second one was between 1950-2000; and the third 
generation started in the beginning of the 21st century and is still continuing. Bulaç argues 
that in the last period, although it maintains its liveliness in the intellectual area, the 
political form of Islamism has transformed into conservativeness and is also secularizing 
and Protestantizing in itself. As evidence for his argument, he cites embracing liberal 
philosophy and the individualization of religious life. In spite of the fact that I do not 
totally agree with his arguments, the differentiation between the generations may be 
observed very clearly. The expressions of the students below reflect well the distinction 
between two generations, theirs and their fathers’ generations of Islamists.  
If you ask, then none of us would say that we do not want the Shari‘a. We want it, 
but in a different way from our fathers’ generation. We never have a discourse 
expressing a demand of Shari‘a. Because the Islamic state is perceived as 
something formal. But my concern is not the form. Does anyone have an economic 
or social problem? My concern is to have a critical and oppositional attitude 
towards the mechanisms of cruelty... (Osman, Male, Sociology, 3rd year, 
27/4/2012) 
Not to have arrangements according to Islam, but in whichever country a person 
should be tried (in a court of law), (this should be) with the laws of other religion 
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and with compliance to a universalist constitution and universalist legal rules. As 
for me, anyone should be tried as they wish, according to the laws they wish, if this 
is what we call democracy this should be so.  
So are you saying that for a state governed by Islam, having this kind of order 
would be sufficient?  
I mean everyone should be tried in a court as they wish [according to the 
jurisprudential system they choose]. Everyone shall live as they wish. Everyone 
shall receive the education they wish. I think the majority of conservative people 
think also in this way, if we exclude the marginal radicals; radicals are a very small 
proportion of this, 30 per cent [of self-identifying Muslims] among the university 
youth. (Yahya, Male, Biology, 4th year, 27/3/2012) 
I think of the state as this, the state must have just a single task, like the work of 
people, at the end living together collectively is a hard task, the thing that will 
facilitate this living together is the state, like the state should provide us with that, 
this must be their first and only task. The state does not need to educate people by 
directing them, I think. It mustn’t do things like that, like the relations among 
people, like if someone infringes on the other's right it should defend the one whose 
right was violated. To protect, to provide justice. Yes, it must provide justice for 
sure.  
Islamic law, criminal law and so, is it necessary?  
Islamic law... When you say Islamic law, it is not the cliché of Afghanistan hand 
amputation, the person who lies shall be stoned, so and so, that is not what I 
understand from Islam, that is not justice. Yes it is sufficient if it provides justice. 
(Fatma, Female, Architecture, 3rd year, 2/4/2012) 
	   120 
We are not Iran. We have no Shari‘a, which I think we should not have anyway. 
More tolerance, synthesis...  
No Shari‘a?  
No, we should not have Shari‘a. Perhaps it was possible before. The society would 
have supported it. But the present society cannot tolerate Shari‘a. Definitely not. 
(Bahar, Female, Philosophy, 4th year, 30/3/2012) 
Even though they had some concerns about their lifestyles in the new period of the 
country, secularist students spoke of being generally satisfied due to the fact that Turkey is 
much more liberal compared to the other Muslim countries. Galip mentioned his own 
experiences in Tunisia and said people could live their lifestyles freely in Turkey, arguing 
this was the success of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk: 
In Turkey, it is not like in the other Muslim countries. You can comfortably drink 
alcohol in Turkey during Ramadan in Taksim, Nişantaşı, Yeşilköy, and so on. No 
one interferes. Of course there are some radical youth, but such a thing is not 
possible in Turkey.  
Is this the success of Ataturk?  
Yes, of course. (Galip, Male, Radio Art and TV, 4th year, 30/3/2012) 
With respect to Islamism and political Islam, I asked some questions to the students 
about Islamic (Shari‘a) law. It emerged that religiously observant students neither hope for 
an Islamic state nor Islamic law in Turkey, as these answers indicate: 
Should it be implemented in Turkey soon or later?  
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Of course, but efforts are not for it, because there is not a society you can 
implement the Shari‘a on. I do not have such a divine struggle. Maybe twenty 
years later, but not now… (Osman, Male, Sociology, 3rd year, 27/4/2012) 
Do not Muslims have concerns about Islamization of the legal and education 
system?  
Well. I do not think that the people under 40 years old have those kinds of 
concerns.  
The students?  
No. I do not think so. (Yahya, Male, Biology, 4th year, 27/3/2012) 
No Shari‘a?  
No, no Shari‘a! What is the Shari‘a? I think that the Shari’a is strict and rule-
based. Maybe that could be before, because people were suitable for it. But now, 
there is modernity or understanding of modernity. People have changed their ways 
of dressing and thoughts; they have started to be more liberal. If the Shari‘a comes 
no one can follow it. Everybody’s life would be restricted with so many orders and 
prohibitions. Nobody can afford it, me as well…  
Do you think, Shari‘a means that the religious laws are implemented more toughly?  
Yes. Have you ever been to Iran, for instance? All tourists must wear headscarves. I 
think that's wrong. It gets reactions. For example, people cover their heads, but 
have night parties in their houses. The present society is not suitable for Shari‘a. 
Later?  
Impossible. (Bahar, Female, Philosophy, 4th year, 30/3/2012) 
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The accommodation between Islam and the secular state is seen in the works of a 
new constitution. In 2011, all the political parties (AKP, CHP, MHP, BDP) in parliament, 
representing 95 per cent of the whole population, agreed on working for a new constitution 
and establishing a specific committee for it. Along with secularism, there were some other 
crucial problems which were expected to be solved in the new constitution, including the 
Kurdish issue, reforming civil-military relations, and women rights. Various NGOs, 
societies, and other institutions have worked on preparing a constitution draft and 
presenting it to the Grand National Assembly (Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi). Among my 
interviewees, four of them, particularly Emre and Bahar, were very active on this issue.  
Can you tell me about the brochures and signatures related to the new 
constitution?  
We and our past generations have some demands. First, full independence. Second, 
the state is for the people, not the other way round. Third, this oligarchical 
bureaucracy must change. Fourth, the state has a problem with religion. This must 
stop. Why does a state have a problem with religion and why does it struggle to 
transform it? The other matter is about the military. The military should stay away 
from politics. We want a strong military, because we believe that any country that 
does not have strong military would be destroyed. But the military should know its 
place. Sixth, we (in this region) are not enemies. We want to live in peace in our 
region. The Arabs are not our enemies, the Greeks are not our enemies, and the 
Armenians are not our enemies. We are people who lived together in historically. 
Arabs and Kurds are not minorities. They are the essential elements of this nation. 
Seventh is the dignity of human beings. You have to protect the freedom of people. 
A state is only a state when it protects the freedom of people. We always wanted 
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these, and we have a great opportunity now with the new constitution. (Emre, Male, 
Computer Engineering, 4th year, 20/4/2012) 
What was your starting point?  
I do not believe in formulae like human rights, but unfortunately we had to base all 
our constitutional work on human rights. There is the Kemalist ideology in Turkey 
and the current constitution is completely based upon it. We had to find an 
equivalent word for it, a word that is recognized throughout the world. The 
constitution which we have prepared has focused on human rights and freedom of 
the individual.  
There is nothing regarding religion?  
There is...  
Is it just in terms of freedom?  
Yes.  (Hale, Female, Theology, 3rd year, 1/5/2012) 
The Abant Platform, an annual gathering, is one of the major significant events in 
which Islamists and secularists in particular, alongside various identity groups, sects and 
belief groups get together in order to discuss the main issues of the country and to make a 
declaration to the society, particularly to the policy makers. The sponsor of the platform is 
the Gülen Movement, also known as Hizmet Movement, which is the biggest faith-based 
organization of the country. Some of my informants belonged to this movement and 
followed declarations of the Abant Platform. Since 1998, the platform has brought together 
intellectuals, politicians and representatives from different ideologies and beliefs, every 
year several times in the mountain town of Abant, in Bolu. The topic of the year 2013 was 
the new constitution. In the final declaration of the three-day-long meeting, the following 
articles are closely related to Islam and secularism: 
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“The state should be in equal distance from all religions and sects. The status of the 
Directorate of the Religious Affairs should therefore be re-defined.” “Turkey’s 
multicultural reality, including but not limited to different sects, religions, and 
ethnicities, should be officially acknowledged.” “The state should be in equi-
distance to all beliefs and non-beliefs.” “The educational curriculum should reflect 
the above-mentioned points.” (Abant, 2013) 
 
4.8 CONCLUSION 
In this chapter I have focused on the political aspect of the main subject of the thesis, 
which is Turkish university students’ understandings of the tensions and struggles between 
religion and secularism.  
As the literature review in Chapter Two showed, although it has some similarities, 
secularism in Turkey differs from its counterparts elsewhere. My research has found that 
university student participants, both religiously observant and non-observant, are not 
generally opposed to having secularism as a state ideology; rather, they are opposed to its 
Turkish form, which is strict, authoritarian and anti-religious. Otherwise, they believe that 
secularism can safeguard religions and religious activities in a country. The complaints are 
of unjust policies, and the desire is for what is conceived of as a genuinely secular and 
democratic state. 
There are some particular tensions and conflicts experienced by university students 
with the secularist Turkish state, expressed as ambiguity in their attitudes to change. The 
following issues were identified by the students as problematic: anti-religion propaganda in 
the education system by some teachers and lecturers; difficulties practising their religion 
(lack of facilities, tools, and the study schedule); inadequacy of school religion lessons; 
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problems for women wearing the headscarf at school and university, in the workplace and 
in public spaces; unjust policies concerning ethnic, denominational and religious minorities 
such as the Kurds, Alevis and non-Muslim foundations; and some obstacles put in the way 
of students of İmam-Hatip religious high schools gaining entrance to universities. 
The fieldwork identified some effects of Turkish secularism on university students. 
One is ambiguity in the minds of the research participants. They tended to be uncertain on 
certain political issues, and in particular on matters such as: the banning of the wearing of 
the traditional headscarf by women at public schools and civil institutions; the upholding 
of Islamic law; media censorship; religious education by the state educational system; and 
the institution of the Diyanet, the Directorate of Religious Affairs. Some religiously 
observant students objected to see women in public places dressed in a way contrary to 
Islamic principles and rulings, and would have liked, in these matters, to return society to 
the status quo ante of the Ottoman Empire. However, they were not sure what the solution 
would be, and how Muslims could practise their religion in the new social circumstances. 
Another effect on religiously observant students was the need to hide their religious 
identity and activities, to avoid probable problems at school and, later, at work. The reason 
for hiding their religious connections varied depending on the student’s sex, occupations, 
and future expectations.  
In the political area, a polarization was observed between secularists and political 
Islamists. The percentage of political Islamist university students among the research 
participants who wanted to bring Shari‘a to the country was very low. Although religiously 
observant students believed that Islamic principles should be implemented, they were not 
certain of the feasibility of this in the immediate term or, indeed, ever. At election time, 
however, religiously observant people are concerned about the religiosity of politicians and 
still more so the policies of political parties regarding religion. 
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The AKP’s role in the Islamization and secularization of the country has been much 
debated in Turkey. Secularist students worried that the country was gradually Islamizing 
with the AKP in power. Some students asserted that the Arab Spring came to Turkey when 
the AKP came to power and overturned Mustafa Kemal’s regime. There have been 
significant changes in the last decade, on both the religious and secular sides of society. 
With the new conservative or Islamist government, religiously observant people have 
entered the upper echelon of the state, and have established peace to a degree within the 
secular system and the secular tools of the state. The system has made peace with Islam 
and religiously observant people. On the other hand, especially since the Gezi Park 
protests, which will be presented and analysed in Chapter Eight, there has been a 
significant and growing tension between conservative-religious government and the people 
embracing secular lifestyle and those who opponents. 
While there still are tensions between religiously observant and non-observant 
people, as discussed in Chapter Five, there is also convergence, interaction and 
accommodation, particularly among university students. The participants generally were 
most concerned about problems such as democracy, injustice, inequality, the economy, and 
liberation for all ethnic and religious groups.  
All these findings clearly support Casanova’s idea of the non-privatization of 
religion, discussed in Chapter One. According to Casanova, “we should expect religion and 
morality to remain and even to become more contentious public issues in democratic 
politics”	   (2007: 22). The findings of this research show significant negotiation in the 
political area between religious and secular proponents in Turkey. As secularist students 
negotiate religion and secularism and accept the existence of religion and the appearance 
of religious symbols in the public sphere	  –	  seeing this as inevitable in a democratic country	  
– religiously observant students negotiate the secular spaces of the public sphere and 
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religiosity, and accept the validity and necessity of secular democratic principles in the 
political sphere through a reinterpretation of the terms “Islamic”	  and Islamic politics. Only 
radical Islamist students see a deep-rooted contradiction in the politics of the public sphere 
between democracy and Islam. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: RELIGIOSITY AND SECULARITY 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter examines religiosity, religiousness and secularity as understood and perceived 
by my participants. These words and their equivalents in other languages have a variety of 
meanings dependent on the person, country, culture and religious denomination, so that 
studying a particular religion and its adherents, and generalizing the findings to all 
religions and people would be misleading. Therefore, rather than totally accepting and 
implementing the findings and interpretations of other religions and religiosities, it was 
necessary to do research specifically on Islam in Turkey.	  
Endeavouring to explore the religiosity of Turkish university students, I put certain 
specific questions to them and observed them going about their daily lives. 
My second aim is to examine the “secularization thesis” as applied to the university 
students of Turkey. Secularization has been a crucial topic of debate in sociology. Indeed as 
the literature below indicates, the main ideas answered in the theory have been debated for 
many decades. In order to decide whether a secularization process is occurring in a country 
or not, we need first to know the characteristics of the religion we are talking about and its 
adherents. Measuring religiosity and secularization is also in itself a significant problem. I 
have chosen to approach this issue by considering the beliefs and values held by Turkish 
university students, rather than by examining the percentage of them attending prayers at 
mosques, for instance. 
Following Casanova’s suggestion that we need to discover new forms of religion 
and religiosity at three different levels of analysis, the individual level, the group level, and 
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the societal level (2006: 17), in this chapter I explore the kinds of religiosity and 
secularism defined and practised by Turkish university students at the individual level.  
To elucidate these issues, I first briefly outline the main ideas and arguments in the 
literature on secularization. Religiosity and secularity in general, and particularly in 
Turkey, will be the main focus here. I then analyse the statements of my interviewees in 
respect of their thoughts and experiences with regard to religion. 
Five sections each approach the main subject from a different angle. The first 
section concerns the perceptions of university students in Istanbul with regard to 
religiosity. I analyse their answers to my interview questions, for example, about how they 
understand religion and religiosity, the meaning of religion in their private and public lives, 
and how they recognize the characteristics of a religious person. I explore the place of 
religion in their worldview and also in their daily lives. In this section, I also interrogate 
whether, and to what extent, religion, for the students, is a lifestyle that impacts on every 
aspect of life.  
In the second section of the chapter, I examine the main factors affecting religiosity 
and secularity amongst the students. After considering the accounts of my participants 
about their religiousness or secularity, I analyse their statements in order to reveal the 
factors that led them to their current worldviews and lifestyles. 
The third section concerns the difficulties religious young people experience in 
holding on to their religious values and carrying out their religious obligations.  
In Turkey, as a result of rationalization and Islamic revivalist movements, there has 
been a tendency to separate religion and culture. This is seen markedly among educated 
people, and especially university students. The main feature of the rationalization is the 
separation of traditional religion from rational religion, and the practise of a “genuine” 
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religion defined by primary Islamic sources, the Qur’an and the Sunna of the Prophet, 
rather than basing itself upon tradition as lived by uneducated and conservative people. In 
the fourth section of this chapter, I indicate the objections of university students to not 
using one’s intelligence, and to the formalistic religiosity (i.e., giving importance to the 
forms of the rituals rather than their meanings) by practising Muslims, in Turkey. 
And finally, the fifth section looks at secularity amongst Turkish people in general 
and university students in particular. With the help of the literature, I analyse the views of 
my participants and other comments of students with regard to secularity in society and 
what they see as the main factors leading the society to secularity, such as a modern 
lifestyle, the AKP government, and capitalism. 
In the sociological literature, secularization has occupied a significant place in the 
debate about religiosity and secularity. Secularization theory is generally referred back to 
the 1950s and 1960s. However, it can be traced much further back to Enlightenment at the 
beginning of the 1600s. Max Weber first used the term “secularization” in 1910. The 
“disenchantment of the world” is a phrase that was used by Weber to express the 
devaluation of mystical ideas and practices (Weber, 2002). This is an essential feature of 
secularization. The elementary idea of the classical theory is that modernization and 
rationalization necessarily lead to a decline in the importance of religion in the minds of 
individuals and in its place in society. According to this thesis, as a society becomes 
modern so it becomes more secular. However, while it is accepted that modernization has 
some secularizing effects in some parts of societies, the crucial question is whether 
modernity necessitates secularization or not. Some social scientists have long argued that 
for moderns, God is dead, hence religion will diminish and disappear, but continuing 
religiosity even in modern cities has proved a challenge to this prediction, and thus, this 
argument has been criticised since the 1980s (Schultz, 2006).  
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One of the first definitions of secularization is the separation of church and state. In 
the nineteenth century, the state and universities freed themselves from the control of 
religious institutions. This may be referred to as institutional secularization (Sommerville, 
1998). As discussed in the previous chapter, this meaning of secularization has been part of 
state ideology of Turkey, using the terms secularism or laicism. But secularization is not 
used only with this political or governmental connotation; individual religious disbelief is 
another meaning of the term since the late nineteenth century. According to this meaning, 
secularization implies a decline in religious practices in parallel with modernization. 
Secularization was a generally accepted theory in the 1960s. However, two 
different views have emerged since then. Some have defended the theory in its entirety 
(Wallace, 1966), while others have preferred to approach the issue more circumspectly. 
The main reason for their caution has been the continuing religiosity of many individuals 
even in modernized cities and among many educated people. Peter Berger is a well-known 
scholar taking this side in the debate. Although he was numbered among the prominent 
scholars who advocated secularization theory in the 1960s, he later changed his view and 
concluded that historians and social scientists were mistaken on this issue. He argues, “To 
be sure, modernization has had some secularizing effects, more in some places than in 
others. But it has also provoked powerful movements of counter-secularization. Also, 
secularization on the societal level is not necessarily linked to secularization on the level of 
individual consciousness” (1999: 2-3). It should be taken into consideration that many of 
the critics of secularization theory are not referring to institutional secularization but to the 
beliefs of individuals and their practices. 
A close examination of the literature reveals some complications and ambiguities in 
respect to religiosity and secularity. There are different kinds of secularization, including 
individual, cultural, social, institutional, and philosophical. Unless we are aware of which 
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meaning is intended in each piece of research, it can lead to ambiguity and mistaken 
evaluation. This kind of ambiguity is also seen in the debates within Turkey concerning 
secularism. While some politicians and academics argue that secularism means the 
separation of state and religion, others argue that it comprises social and cultural 
secularization as well. As was seen in the previous chapter, religiously observant students 
generally accept institutional secularization; they tend to oppose individual, cultural and 
social forms of secularization. This chapter seeks to clarify the meanings of the term for 
the present-day, in order to establish the current theory of the field. 
Different meanings and new religious revivalist movements in modern societies 
necessitate formulating new theories and new methodologies, such as “American 
exceptionalism” (Lipset, 1996), or “European exception” (Norris and Inglehart, 2011). In 
Turkey, the impact of religious movements is becoming more evident especially in 
modernized cities and among educated people. These movements vary from 
fundamentalist groups to moderate movements and Sufi orders. And while some of them 
accept various kinds of secularization, others strictly oppose any such separations. In order 
to understand religiosity and secularity we need to research further into current trends in 
order to develop new approaches and theories, in light of the situation in Turkey regarding 
Islam and Turkish people. 
 
5.2 UNDERSTANDING RELIGION AND RELIGIOSITY 
In order to examine the state of religiosity among Turkish university students, I prepared a 
list of questions to ask research participants. I asked the students how they understood 
religion and religiosity, about the place of religion in their lives, how they identified 
religiously observant person, and how they experience a religiosity in their daily lives. 
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In their responses the students touched on different aspects of religion and religiosity. 
However, the common point they appeared to share was that religiosity is not composed 
only of worshipping and praying, even though worship is important in Islamic belief. 
Being religiously observant [dindar] is truly living your life according to religion, 
to the laws of God. First of all you will perform the five daily prayers, do the 
fasting, pay attention to everything you say. And only after doing these, at least, 
you will be able to say: “I am religious”. Without following these, not performing 
the prayers but still saying I am religiously observant, how come? No deal. You 
should have faith but also we need to see the application of this faith. Speaking of 
application, I mean the worshipping and speaking appropriately when you talk, not 
insulting, not lying to anyone... (Buse, Female, Theology, 4th year, 28/4/2012) 
A Muslim is not just someone who performs the prayers and worships. A Muslim 
at the same time is someone who has the ability to say, ‘stop!’ to the wrongs, to 
correct wrongdoings. But a Muslim is not only an objecting and rebelling person, 
but also one who prays and does not neglect worship. This balance is crucial. 
(Emre, Male, Computer engineering, 4th year, 20/4/2012) 
A religious person, I think, should embrace every part of the religion so that at 
every step they take, even every word they speak, God should come out of their 
mouths. Okay, I am performing the prayers and fasting, these are among the 
practices everyone should follow anyway. If we accept Islam we must do this 
anyway. I think one should live religion with love and enthusiasm. Coming from 
across, we should see the love for God from three or four meters away. How would 
you recognize belief? You know, I can’t define it, I can’t put it into a word, but 
there are some people, when you look at their faces you feel relief, something 
reflected in their faces, things like the spirit of mercy. Some people can remind you 
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of God the moment you see them... (Bahar, Female, Philosophy, 4th year, 
30/3/2012) 
Ethics assumes a significant place in the statements of students. This is also seen in 
the current religious literature in Turkey. My impression is, based on my own 
observations, that there was not so much emphasis on ethics in both the religious literature 
and preaching ten to fifteen years ago. This emphasis increased gradually, especially in the 
last ten years. I argue that this is closely related to a development that concerns the AKP 
party, in power since 2002. The founders of this party have Islamic roots, and members of 
the party are mostly religiously observant people. Since it came to power, religiously 
observant people have felt more comfortable with politics and started to think about other 
issues. Those who are religiously observant have realized that political power and rising 
wealth are not enough to ensure the widespread practice of religion. In my fieldwork in 
Turkey, I often encountered complaints about ethical problems experienced by religiously 
observant people in the media, literature, and private conversations. Kırbaşoğlu was one of 
the first Turkish theologians to voice these complaints. He criticized the books “İlmihal” [a 
concise manuals of Islamic faith, worship, and ethics], which are the most commonly 
available books in Turkey, frequently used to seek basic Islamic information. He discusses 
these books in terms of what kind of religiosity they present to society. According to his 
research, the common feature of the “ilmihal” is the argument that there are only five 
pillars in Islam. These five pillars are praying five times a day (namaz), fasting in 
Ramadan (oruç), practicing charity (zekat), going on a pilgrimage to Mecca (hac), and 
reciting the “kelime-i şehadet.” According to him, this kind of understanding restricts 
religion and religiosity to a confined space. Kırbaşoğlu also argues that these books create 
a “narrow, formalistic, mechanical, deficient, false, male-dominated, and 
psychopathological religiosity” (2002: 109-124). Presumably as a result of their familiarity 
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with the writings and discourses of religious writers and opinion-leaders, all my 
interviewees pointed out the incorrectness of focusing only on worship, and ignoring ethics 
(ahlak). 
The following statements are the answers of some participants to the question about 
the definition of a religiously observant person: 
A religiously observant person, I suppose, must be the person following religious 
rules and responsibilities. Who fears God and feels mercy. S/he looks at the ground 
when walking, aware of sins they committed, seeking a refuge for forgiveness, 
because they know these sins might be a shield, a wall blocking the connection 
between God and His servant, fearing that, neither too fearful nor too hopeful, in-
between... So let’s say: One who has a heart. Okay, you could say, what about an 
atheist person? But I think mercy of a person who surrenders to God is nowhere 
near the same. (Sema, Female, Photography, 2nd year, 25/3/2012) 
A religiously observant person is not a religionist [dinci]. They do not market God, 
do not sell God. A religiously observant person follows his or her individual 
responsibilities. An individual’s responsibility is towards himself or herself first of 
all. From a scholarly perspective, they need both to master the texts in religion and 
do things in positive (modern) sciences. To me, both are the same; I do not separate 
the two. They have to have a consciousness of responsibility firstly to themself, 
then to their family, then to the society, and then to the environment. These are in 
the sense of economics, social, scholarly knowledge, and in the sense of 
recognizing the fundamental rights and freedoms of subjects, not spoiling the 
environment and protecting the existing world. And at the same time this 
individual, who defends the rights of the oppressed ones in the existing world, and 
observes fundamental religious rituals, not as artificial actions, but performing 
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them to be fulfilled, viewing their religious sanctuaries not simply as mosques but 
places to bring God earth and provide His name to be cited in every field. (Hakan, 
Male, Theology, 4th year, 2/4/2012) 
What is religiousness to me? So, one should have a standing in life, one should 
have a position in this life. What kind of a standing up, like the cliché here, 
speaking normally, if I say, like standing against injustices, such a normal stance 
they should take, I mean, to be honest. To me, honesty is more important than 
everything, than most things. Even when I say, “I am fine” to someone who asks 
me, I feel bad, if I wasn’t fine but I said I was. I mean, it gives discomfort to me. 
(Fatma, Female, Architecture, 3rd year, 2/4/2012) 
In Islamic belief, the calling to Islam (tebliğ) and representing it to others (temsil), 
have a significant place, and among some Turkish religiously observant people I observed 
an awareness of this a number of times. Women wearing headscarves in particular, because 
of their visibility, feel themselves responsible for representing Islam to both non-observant 
Muslims and non-Muslims. 
When you said “religiously observant” the first feature that came to my mind was 
that they should be very careful about how they reflect the religion, they should be 
very careful about how they represent, I think. This is crucial. Because, OK, you 
may be a person believing in Islam and living Islam. But there are many people out 
there who will be affected by this. Many people who will be affected by your 
attitudes and you may, like, induce them to get interested in Islam or drift away 
from Islam. Because of that, how you appear from the outside in an Islamic sense is 
so important to me. I mean you need to be very careful about this. You need to be 
very careful about not harming Islam. You are not going to harm Islam. Your 
intention will be that. I think so. Muslims should live Islam themselves, and also 
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not spoil people’s perceptions of Islam. (Ferda, Female, Philosophy, 4th year, 
26/3/2012) 
However, this awareness of how you represent Islam has started to give way to 
pluralism and individualism. Individualism manifests itself in a variety of ways. One is in 
people’s subjectivity. Hale is a student at the Theology Faculty in Istanbul. Although she 
wears a headscarf and practises her religious duties, she does not describe herself as 
religiously observant person. She believes in pluralism in religious life, and says that she 
does not judge others by appearance and practices.  
I am not a religiously observant [dindar] person. I am a Muslim practising her 
religion. Not religiously observant. 
Isn’t someone who practises his or her religion, religiously observant?  
I do not think so. Everyone has their way of living their religion. Like, for anyone 
who has religious faith, with some ways in which this becomes apparent, there is an 
area that appears in this person’s social life. I, for instance, by wearing a headscarf, 
performing prayers, fasting, I fulfil some rituals of my religion… So, I do not think 
a definition as “The person performing the five daily prayers is religiously 
observant” to be right. Ok, I accept there are fundamental rules of religion that 
needs to be fulfilled. But there are orders listed as “rules of Islam”, that I oppose. 
All the obligations of Islam are “musts,” they need to be fulfilled. No. Can we say, 
here, these must be performed more? I think we can’t. Hence, this is why I do not 
say Ones performing those are more religious... Yes there is a God who sent me to 
this world and what happens to me should be His will on my life. So, in this sense I 
can see myself as a person of faith than those. Of course no one can be perfect. 
None of us is a Prophet. But unless they perform something people are not regarded 
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as religiously observant. Hence the word religious is troublesome. Because 
everyone lives a different aspect of their religion. (Hale, Female, Theology, 3rd 
year, 1/5/2012) 
In this kind of pluralist view, the nature of the religiosity experienced by the 
students is influential. In this view religiosity does not consist in holding to unvarying 
attitudes and beliefs but may change according to the social environment, personal spiritual 
condition, practices in daily life, and personal experiences.  
Yahya likened his experience of religiosity to phases of love. Even though he 
identified himself as a religiously observant Muslim, his understanding of religiosity had 
changed over the years. 
If I start from the beginning, religion has always been at the centre of my life. But 
its significance has been increasing or decreasing from one period to another 
period. Everything would be shaped according to it or I was learning whatever is 
necessary to be learned regarding religion. It is a first excitement, a love... Like 
primary, secondary school times. A learning period from seven to fifteen or sixteen 
years old. Then, after learning, the period of helping other people during high 
school, or giving them something, to ones who hadn’t learned yet. Surely, at this 
point, the excitement (of religion) is transforming further. At first, learning, now 
teaching, at high school teaching, and then I reach to an even more distinct 
maturity. And when I reach maturity, there is an important point of this period, it is 
a time when love, if we call it love, when it closes or ceases.  
When is that?  
The university period. You continue to give at the university period too, you add on 
something but after a point it is a period of satiety, already, an exhaustion period. A 
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distance arising when it is no longer at the centre of your life. It is yet at the centre 
but there is a distance. A bit more like “we know, I know these” period. It can’t be 
called this kind of period at this time, but close to it. Now is a period that it is 
individualizing, or rather, like stopping telling others things, and a living-with-
yourself-period, this is now.  
Living with yourself, is it? Do you mean like you decide for yourself? What is it?  
In a sense of living, like, before you worry about others and how they should live it 
too, worrying to save others too. But now I do not have this worry. Now, more like, 
I shall live myself. It is everyone’s individualization period. (Yahya, Male, 
Biology, 4th year, 27/3/2012) 
When I asked about the place of religion in their lives, without exception all the 
religiously observant students among my interviewees stated that religion is “at the centre” 
of their lives. According to them, religion and religiosity influenced all parts of their lives. 
On this basis, I conclude that religiosity is a lifestyle in Turkey, not only a set of beliefs or 
the practising of religious rituals at certain times.  
Religiously observant person is someone who does the requirements of religion, 
not being contented with rituals. Being religious should be shaping one’s life 
according to religion. (Ebru, Female, Theology, 4th year, 27/8/2012) 
Religiously observant, like when building their life at work, when living, when 
going out on the street, like thinking how to dress according to what my religion 
says to me, in the simplest terms, an individual trying to build their life according 
the religious rules and prohibitions, this is being religiously observant, yeah. To 
live everything, their social lives and individual lives, by giving priority to religious 
rules and prohibitions. (Kudret, Male, Law, 4th year, 11/4/2012) 
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There has never been suppression. Like religion is the main criterion directing our 
lives. Like our evaluations are all according to religion. I experience this even more 
and more. Not like confronting religion or, like, religion contradicting with our 
ideas, but our ideas being shaped according to religion. (Ali, Male, 22, Electronic 
Engineering, 2nd year, 10/4/2012) 
Birol criticized one of the meanings of secularization: differentiation of various 
areas of the social system. He argued that Kemalist secularism wants them to practise 
religion in certain places but not in others, and that he could not live religion like that. This 
aspect of religion among the new Turkish generation poses greater challenge to Turkish 
secularism. 
Religion is at the whole of my life, that is. At least in theory it is, it should be like 
that. I mean, even if I am not able to put it in to practise every moment of the day, I 
can admit with a clear conscience that it should be this way. And, actually, I 
sometimes hesitate to say “religion” too. Because when religion is said, I see it like 
there is an institution you can look at from outside, like you can put across and 
sense it as a rattle. Whereas my whole self is actually religious. If I accept the 
orders of God, I try to reconcile every particle of my life with it. I do not try to 
separate it from myself. How can I say, I do not like to bind it to the garden before 
getting home, like the Kemalist people. No, it is something I can do like that. 
Hence, I can’t put religion aside at any time. It sounds like something, like 
something you buy and sell. And, what religion means is having a life style I think. 
Hence everyone has a life style. (Birol, Male, Sociology, 2nd year, 27/4/2012) 
Berna described well how religiosity affected her way of thinking and way of living: 
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Your point of view about religion gradually changes your way of thinking, your 
approach. Actually it spreads into your life.  
What kind of life is it directing to?  
To become a more tactful and thoughtful person. You think on the righteousness of 
your actions by means of religion. Even of your thoughts. Then everything starts to 
be sifted through a very thin sieve. Then, if I do things putting aside that sieve, my 
conscience is not clear. (Berna, Female, Sociology, 3rd year, 10/12/2012) 
The students challenged both Kemalist secularism and the traditionalist religion of 
the previous generation. They wanted to live their religious values and principles in their 
lives without rejecting a modern lifestyle. This is the great change in Turkish society. For 
decades, religiously observant and non-observant people were easily distinguished through 
their clothing, haircuts, the music they listened to, and the places they frequented. 
Although this is still true to some extent, distinguishing between them is difficult more 
than ever. Religiously observant people who want to practise religion in all areas of 
modern life, try to arrive at an accommodation. Kübra defined this as the struggle “to 
generate a practicable religion.” 
Religion should be within our lives because my dad used to talk of: “a religion 
which has not been able to be lived”. We think that we produced a practicable 
religion. Like, when you look at traditional religion, wearing jeans is a sin, this 
kind of judging. I do not think this is a liveable religion. Like going to the place of 
our charity (vakıf), teaching things to a couple of students there, talking about a 
couple of concepts, that is all part of religion I think, this is part of our lives, I 
think. Otherwise merely to pray, fast, perform obligations (farz) of Islam, so and 
so, I do not believe it is that. Other than that, thank God, we perform the prayers 
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with headscarves on our heads so and so but Islam does not merely consist of these. 
Religion does not consist of these. Like you say “those activities you do.” We see 
those activities the things brought by religion. Otherwise why would I spend all my 
day (for Islam)? I could get a job and make money. (Kübra, Female, Philosophy, 1st 
year, 20/4/2012) 
 
5.3 THE MAIN FACTORS AFFECTING RELIGIOSITY 
In order to understand in greater depth the situation of secularity and religiosity in Turkish 
society, to know the factor, which influence a religious lifestyle in a positive way, is 
crucial. The first factor that surfaces immediately is family. When I asked my 
interviewees, I realized that religiously observant students have religiously observant 
parents, and secularist students have secularist parents. Where one parent is religiously 
observant and one secularist, students generally choose the lifestyle of the more influential 
parent. However, we cannot assert that they completely copy the lifestyles of their parents. 
Rather, they adapt this lifestyle to their new conditions. Osman, even though he admitted 
that his understanding of Islamism is different from the Islamist generation of his father, 
explained the roots of his religiosity and Islamism: 
Family conditions, affects of the environment, and so on, it shapes everything 
around these. I have always performed my prayers and fasted, there hasn’t been any 
period I neglected. I mean, almost since the stage of primary school, starting before 
adolescence I have prayed and fasted. On the other hand, having heard, since 
secondary school, that Islam had a political language also affected me. I mean in 
my family I was familiar with talks on “hicret” (immigration) to Canada during the 
28 February period, and the talk that Atatürk was known as a bad person in our 
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country. My mom not being able to go to school because of the headscarf 
(başörtüsü) ban, so I have concerns, thoughts about those things. Like it was said 
that we did need to pray (dua) for Chechnya, we watched the footage and so, these 
meant something to us. In high school also, we published a magazine as a 
continuation of this mood. 3-4 issues only, but it was released... Cumhuriyet 
newspaper wrote a report about us. It was about the students fleeing to Friday 
prayer. (Osman, Male, Sociology, 3rd year, 27/4/2012) 
The fact that they generally followed their parents did not mean that students 
suffered oppression in their families. None of the students remarked on any kind of social 
pressure regarding their religious or secular lives, e.g. wearing a headscarf, and starting to 
pray five times a day. Two of my participants were the daughters of the most influential 
theologians in Turkey, and both of them said that their fathers did not even force them to 
learn to read the Qur’an or cover their heads. 
My dad did not tell us to wear the headscarf either. I myself told him that I was 
going to wear headscarf, he was surprised like “are you serious?” and so. (Fatma, 
Female, Architecture, 3rd year, 2/4/2012) 
Formal religious education in Turkey is possible, with religion lessons in schools 
two hours a week and Qur’an courses in mosques. Both are seen as insufficient for a 
proper understanding of and education in religion. While they make a contribution to 
people’s instruction in religion, according to my interviews and observations, they do not 
play a significant role in the religiosity of the students, providing only basic information. 
Berna summarized well the condition of these two institutions: 
Quran courses were actually very strict. It felt very hard when I was little, [they 
are] not very lovely places. (Berna, Female, Sociology, 3rd year, 10/12/2012) 
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Do not you regard the religion courses at school as an education in religion? 
An insufficient education it is. If we try to learn religion with merely that 
education, we are toast. Quite softened. Many parts of the religion do no take place 
in those lesson and textbooks. Insufficient. For example, who will perform prayers, 
who will recite Quran... They need to be able to read the Arabic alphabet, need to 
know a bit of “tecvid,” etc. The meaning of the “surahs” are important. But today 
these are not given at schools. This is a fundamental point. Apart from that, it is a 
very superficial course on “Religious culture and knowledge of ethics”. (Berna, 
Female, Sociology, 3rd year, 10/12/2012) 
Kudret, criticized the formal religious education system both in schools and 
mosques, and saw it as a success for the Kemalist regime: 
The current religion course at schools is actually a “culture of religion” course, like, 
there a culture which is being conveyed. Totally superficial and shallow things. So 
it is not religion that is being taught there. Like there is this and that in religion. Or 
else, there is nothing on “a religious obligation that needs to be done”. So there is 
no teaching at the current İmam-Hatip schools too, though the Quran, “siyer”, 
“kelam”, “fıkıh” courses, these still exist but in these there isn’t like the core of the 
religion, the spirit of it. Religion is a living thing, a dynamic thing. Religion is 
faith; it tells you of the afterlife, a world you can’t see at the time being, builds on 
that, besides the current life we are living. But in these activities run by the state, 
you can’t find this [spiritual] side of it. Merely the “world as it” exists. Religion 
also has an aspect regarding this world. The other aspect is not told. My dad is an 
imam for instance. Like, in our district there are people who are not performing the 
prayers. He does not think, like, I should tell this to these people, like prayers 
(namaz) is my obligation, God orders this. Because the system has never expected 
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this from him; on the contrary, it has punished the ones being like this (for 
interfering). “None of your business” it has said, “do your duty, lead the prayers, 
call to the prayers (ezan), get off to your home!”. Therefore the Kemalist system is 
very successful in that sense. There are thousand of sanctuaries in Turkey, there are 
mosques in every village and every district, but these stand at a position totally out 
of life. They have very limited effect on society because officials of religion do not 
have that kind of mission. They have not undertaken this kind of mission. Religion 
appoints him, God has appointed him with this mission, but the ones who follow 
this mission have been punished. Hence, it has totally transformed into an official 
service. I think the success of the Kemalist regime is that. (Kudret, Male, Law, 4th 
year, 11/4/2012) 
Hale made a similar criticism of the Theology faculties providing the highest level 
of formal religious education in Turkey. 
With the theology (ilahiyat) education I received I was enlightened by means of 
religion. Truly, after coming to this school my scope has been widened in various 
fields but I couldn’t find in myself that thing in my past, that pure faith. Like I 
realised that at the times I used to not question anything actually I did more in 
terms of worship and rituals. We address their foundation together with the 
Republic, since they are faculties the government has set up aiming to control, 
certainly they are integrated into the system. Also because it has a rationalist side; 
actually, it is not a place that I would say I am truly learning my religion. Besides, 
after the ‘28 February’ period, there is an entirely state shambolic break-down in 
theology faculties, absenteeism of the lecturers, a retreat. Because of that the 
students are likewise. (Hale, Female, Theology, 3rd year, 1/5/2012) 
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These aforementioned issues regarding public institutions led people to seek 
alternative, informal religious education in the institutions and organizations of religious 
groups: Qur’an courses, religious conversations, meetings, and camps. Despite the fact that 
religious movements and Sufi orders had been banned since the beginning of the Turkish 
republic, they still continued with their activities in informal ways or by camouflaging 
their organizations. Yahya argued that students who practise religious principles in their 
lives are mostly involved with a religious group. 
Unless they are involved with a religious group (cemaat) the university students do 
not have concerns about living their religion. There is God, there is the Prophet or 
so and so, like there are the fundamentals, they know these. Further, beyond that, 
there is nothing. If they are not involved with a certain religious group generally 
there is no worshipping either. Over 90 per cent do not bother. Maybe they attend 
Friday prayers, perform their fasting with deficiencies. Probably they give 
importance to religious holidays. As well, something just originates from their 
family, from society. (Yahya, Male, Biology, 4th year, 27/3/2012) 
However, some people did not attend religious groups for a variety of reasons. Hale 
complained about the banning of Islamic ‘monasteries’ or ‘lodges’ (Tekke ve Zaviyeler) in 
1925. She spoke of “spiritual emptiness”. As with the aforementioned arguments of 
Kırbaşoğlu (2002), she believed this spiritual emptiness created false religiosity and ethical 
problems in society. 
Actually since dervish lodges (tekke) were closed, which were places that people 
could live their religion the best, people feel emptied of spirituality. What is it like 
in Turkey? Like we are Muslims but why do people like that? They go on the 
pilgrimage (hac) but why do they commit fraud? Also, from Europe’s perspective, 
Islamic religion, Muslims, are viewed as very unpleasant. If we address Turkey, the 
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reason for that is deprivation of peoples’ areas where they can live their religion, 
where they would learn their religion; there arises a deficiency in term of religion. 
I, for instance, know a student at the theology faculty. I myself am receiving totally 
religious-related sciences at school. But I haven’t learned things that would appeal 
to my heart, like would improve me morally. There is not a place I could do this 
outside the school either. (Hale, Female, Theology, 3rd year, 1/5/2012) 
 
5.4 THE CHALLENGE OF RELIGIOSITY IN A SECULAR ENVIRONMENT 
According to my observantion and interviews, it seems that being religiously observant, 
conserving the values and principles of religion, and practising religious duties in daily 
life, are not without their difficulties in a secular state and a secular social environment like 
Turkey. Praying (salat or namaz) five times a day has rules which present some 
difficulties. Prayer times vary from day to day in accordance with the movements of the 
sun. Before praying, the worshiper has to meet six conditions: confidence about the time of 
worship (vakit); facing Mecca (kıble); covering certain parts of the body (setr-i avret); 
cleaning clothes, body and place of prostration (necasetten taharet); ritual purity by 
performing ablutions, namely, washing certain parts of the body in a certain way (hadesten 
taharet); and intention (niyet). Day time prayers cause particular disruption because of the 
need to take a break from school or work. The performance of salat takes about ten 
minutes, and suitable facilities are required for washing hands, face, arms, and feet, 
together with a ‘clean’ place to pray, and so on. Performing salat or namaz, as Henkel 
argues, “together with the Muslim headscarf, it is also the most visible and perhaps most 
provocative aspect of everyday Muslim religious practice in Turkey” (2005: 487). As I 
said in the previous chapter, religiously observant students had major problems performing 
these religious duties in public institutions, like schools and student hostels, and they 
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worried about the situation in their workplaces after graduation, especially because of the 
visible elements of their religiosity. The difficulties were not confined only to prayers, but 
included food, drink, economic and social life. 
How seriously are people taking their religious duties as far as you are concerned?  
As far as I am concerned they are not, I mean even if they do how much can they? 
Religiously observant people, for example, should consume totally clean products, 
halal products, they shouldn’t use products that are not religiously appropriate or 
suspicious. They shouldn’t charge interest (faiz), when involved trade, they should 
be careful about products containing alcohol or pork-derived products. They 
shouldn’t trade those. And I do not know to what extent they can be sensitive about 
these things. But they do not pay attention, importance is not given. (Ali, Male, 
Electronic Engineering, 2nd year, 10/4/2012) 
There shouldn’t be interest (faiz) and usury, in economical life; interest or the 
things that religion forbids shouldn’t contaminate income. So it is very mixed up. 
At some points in peoples’ life, religion is very dominant, and at others it is not. 
Like there are people putting religion at the very centre, going on pilgrimage, and 
depositing their retirement allowance to interest, consuming the money from 
interest. I mean there are people with weird understandings like that. (Yahya, Male, 
Biology, 4th year, 27/3/2012) 
Living under a secular state affects the whole life. The whole of it, like most of it. 
(Birol, Male, Sociology, 2nd year, 27/4/2012) 
With a religious perspective we should not watch anything on TV then. It is not 
something we can do [avoid doing]. (Bahar, Female, Philosophy, 4th year, 
30/3/2012) 
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Society lives a traditional form of religiosity. That’s religion for them. They 
already live a secular life compulsorily, because we are in such a secular world. 
They continue their life in this world. If they have a choice, perhaps they would 
reject this secular lifestyle and prefer a more religious life. (Fatma, Female, 
Architecture, 3rd year, 2/4/2012) 
As I mentioned in the former section, religiosity was seen as a lifestyle by Turkish 
students, and necessitated comprehensiveness and consistency in their lives. According to 
my interviewees, a secular or secularist environment limits the possibility of consistency, 
and this causes tension in their minds. Sema covered her hair for a long period, and when 
she went to work for a company that operates with secular principles, i.e. wearing a 
headscarf was not allowed. She tried to hide her headscarf in various ways but finally gave 
up wearing it three years ago. She said that he made this decision to be consistent, and her 
situation as being between a rock and a hard place. 
Bahar explained the tension she and Turkish society experience as being in a 
complicated condition. According to her, society is between religiosity and secularity, 
between East and West, between Turkish Muslim culture and Western culture. She 
highlighted the cultural and social tensions rather than practical problems: 
Is Turkish society secular or religious, what do you think?  
In the middle.  
What do you mean by the middle?  
Passing oneself off as religious and trying to be secular, hanging in the middle.  
Then, what kind of hanging in the middle?  
Either by means of the way they are brought up, I mean the cultural way of 
bringing up, an attempt was made to bring us up as religious. If you ask someone in 
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the street to recite “Sübhaneke” they might be able to do it, they can recite 
“Besmele” at least, but despite that a true religiousness is out of question. Maybe it 
can be found among older people. Because we are trying to become modern, to 
become westernized. We have an intention, like, to enter the EU, we are trying to 
behave like Europeans. We aspire their wrong sides. We do not take on, say, the 
education of the west. We are taking on the way they dress. We are taking or their 
opinions but not being able to apply them because our cultural backgrounds are 
different. Then, cultural conflict occurs, the individual can’t find their own 
character; they say, “I am a westerner”, neither “I am an easterner” nor “Muslim”. 
Turkey is very much in the middle, neither of the East nor the West, a transition 
country in the middle; we are at a state of transition in every sense, trying to be 
secular. Society wants religion but we are not able to separate religion from state 
affairs no matter what, because our governor is a conservative person, and the party 
governing us is a conservative one. If a non-conservative party would come to 
power then the people who want religious freedom won’t be able to live freely, 
there will be restrictions on everything... So as a country we are not one that has 
found its character. (Bahar, Female, Philosophy, 4th year, 30/3/2012) 
The tensions and the complexities Bahar and others portrayed above have 
consequences in various areas of society. Considering the answers given by the research 
participants, the main conclusion can be described as a contradiction. Both religiously 
observant students and secularist students complained about this. A secularist student, for 
instance, complained about the “neglects” and “contradictions” of the religious 
government and religious businessmen: 
There are genetically modified organisms (GMO). They damage the human body, 
do not they? The hormonal balance is damaged by these foods. That must be 
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prohibited by the religion, too. Why is it not? Religious businessmen own the 
companies that produce these foods. Why do they not see this? Because there is 
money there. Today most of the cigarette companies belong to religiously 
observant people. Why does nobody say that cigarettes are not allowed in Islam? 
Drugs can be bought everywhere in public. Why does not the government take 
action against it? It is not difficult. But today they arrest the head of the Turkish 
Armed Forces as a terrorist. But drugs, illegal money, etc., are they not sins? If you 
see these religiously observant people, then you might probably dislike religion. 
(Galip, Male, Radio Art and TV, 4th year, 30/3/2012) 
It was interesting that the same secularist student criticized religiously observant students 
as well, for their inconsistency between what they say and what they do: 
There is a university founded by a religious group. There are such teenager girls 
there who wear skinny jeans, tight. Wearing high heels. They wear headscarves. 
Where is it then, where is Islam? Wear a headscarf, do not reveal your body! The 
whole body is up front. You reveal yourself wholly. But cover your head... Like 
shoes with heels... Carrying a Louis Vuitton in your hand. Today, a Luton purse 
starts from around five thousand dollars. With the full make-up on your face, 
headscarf on your head... If this is not a symbol, what is it then? Not a headscarf, a 
turban. Pardon me. Now that we are doing this for religion then we should cover all 
parts of the body. Now that she is covering her head. She has that kind of faith... 
That high heels and so, is not contradictory to religion, I think. But, when speaking 
about purses etc. what I am trying to say is that... If we look from their perspective, 
wondering around on the street wearing tight jeans, revealing the lines of their 
bodies, putting on full make-up, and when they wear a turban on the head, what 
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they are saying does not fit religiousness. It is not consistent. So, totally incoherent. 
(Galip, Male, Radio Art and TV, 4th year, 30/3/2012) 
A student who identified himself as “Islamist” complained about some religious 
businessmen and mentioned the contradictions in their ways of being Muslims: 
There are people I know personally. There are religious employees, factory owners, 
and because it does not fit with their interest, which is to make extra money, they 
obstruct labour unions. Yes they can make charities with the money they earn, but 
there is also a secular side to that. They do not want their labourers to join unions, 
they do not want it. But when you mention to that person about how the system 
operates, how the government runs, capitalism, anti-capitalist systems, etc. then 
you are perveived as dull, like you are left-wing or so... (Osman, Male, Sociology, 
3rd year, 27/4/2012) 
Bahar’s story about her musical interest and works, is another interesting example 
related to this subject. She was accepted by a private university founded by religiously 
observant people on a full scholarship. The reason for her acceptance was her musical 
talent. However, she had various troubles with some religious friends for exactly the same 
reason. She differentiated between religiously observant and conservative-religiously 
observant people. This is a significant example in terms of seeing the varieties in the 
religious population of Turkey. 
Because I played the zither (kanun) I was troubled by people who, I thought, were 
conservative people, I even almost quit music... I was about to fall off the cliff... 
My second year at the university, then I had to take radical decisions... I was 
accepted to the university with a music scholarship. This is a conservative 
university in the end. The University accepted me for free because I played the 
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kanun, but even though I lived in the area of a religious group, because of a few 
people with minds in a box (close-minded) I went through many troubles...  
Minds in a box?  
Yes, this is how I call them, moreover, a sealed box with tapes, we shall not open it 
no matter what. They have certain “truths” and mustn’t get out of these. Like the 
ones with blinkers can see the front maybe. The ones in this box can’t see 
anywhere. They put many obstacles in my way, many prohibitions were imposed 
me. The first few months were all right; in the third or fourth months they started to 
pick on, first by words, then the actions came. Like each term they would transfer 
me to another place, I had to move each term. They made me live the life of an 
exile, but the strange thing is that even though they wouldn’t let me play at home, 
they called me in for every event, like, come and play. Every day people I didn’t 
know would give me a lift to programmes.  
Were the people who prevented you from playing arranging these events?  
Yes, the ones who prevented me were arranging the events. Those people were 
living contradictions and conflicts in themselves. (Bahar, Female, Philosophy, 4th 
year, 30/3/2012) 
 
5.5 OPPOSITION TO TRADITIONALIST AND FORMALIST RELIGIOSITY 
From a sociological point of view, religiosity and secularity are very difficult phenomena 
to measure (Smelser, 1995). A number of measures have been proposed by reaearchers in 
different countries. However, there is no consensus within sociology on an objective 
method. Some methods may determine the percentage of people undertaking religious 
duties, but piety and religiosity do not consist only of rituals. Feeling beliefs and values 
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must be taken into account, and these may change depending on various factors. Levels of 
attendance at prayers do not necessarily reflect the degree of someone’s belief and 
religious feelings. As Giddens argues, “Many who have religious beliefs do not regularly 
attend services or take part in public ceremonies; conversely, regularity of such attendance 
or participation does not always imply the holding of strong religious views – people may 
attend out of habit or because it is expected of them in their community. As in the other 
dimensions of secularization, we need an accurate understanding of the past to see how far 
religiosity has declined today…” (2008: 555). Among my interviewees, some students who 
were active in religious groups and organizations were not praying regularly five times a 
day. Some others, even though they were praying five times a day, were going to mosques 
only occasionally. In addition to this, there is a great difference in the understanding of 
religion between this generation of Turkish students and the previous generation. Students 
I met in Istanbul criticised the religious understanding and practise of many Turkish people 
calling them “cultural” or “traditional” religiosity. They preferred a rational religiosity, 
questioning traditional religious understanding, and referring back to the original sources 
of the religion, namely the Qur’an and the Sunna (the sayings and practices of the Prophet 
Muhammad). 
Actually we could say, like, I have re-built my religion in the last five-six years. I 
see that before I had faith in what I saw of relatives and people around me. In the 
recent five–six years, by questioning, certainly not like an atheist questioning, but 
questioning, what religion wants from me, by looking into it again, what is being 
told, what I really should do, by questioning the problems in the natural flow of 
life, first I tried to question with the mind... Right now, at the most important point 
of my life... A cliché response it is but I say “La ilahe illallah (There is no God but 
Allah)” and do not recognize any other authority... Actually let me put it like this. I 
	   155 
am the atheist of this society’s religion but I am a Muslim. I am saying for you to 
understand. I am an atheist of the religion of tradition, but globally, in the universal 
sense, and as long as they are true, yes I am Muslim. It could be defined like that. 
(Can, Male, Chemistry, 4th year, 2/4/2012) 
In that sense, then what is being a cultural Muslim, a cultural religiousness? 
Being a cultural Muslim... Like it is said 99 per cent of Turkey’s population is 
Muslim, this already is a monotonous statement, but there isn’t religiousness in the 
sense that I described. Like anyone who says they are Muslim is a Muslim. Most of 
the men perform Friday prayers (Cuma namazı) or attend to Eid Prayers (bayram 
namazı) once or twice a year. You can’t find a place in the mosques during the Eid 
Prayers, people are spilling into the streets, but you see, it is the Eid prayer. Five 
daily prayers are also obligatory (farz). God ordered them too but it is a culture, I 
mean Friday prayers, it is a ritual. It is a tradition so it [the Friday prayer] is 
attended to, but the five daily prayers, which are no different as far as rules are 
concerned, are not performed. They are also obligatory, God ordered this too, but it 
is a culture, and not attended to. (Kudret, Male, Law, 4th year, 11/4/2012) 
I started to work on, like, reading the revelation, receiving the messages of the 
revelation. And frankly with that first versus (ayet) I read, my life standards started 
to change dramatically... And together with that my interpretation was built up 
wholly on a revelation perception. After that I passed onto the phenomenon of 
Quran-centred life. I mean at certain points I read other parts on hadith and Sunna 
(the sayings and practices of the Prophet Muhammad). I resided on a wholly 
Qur’an centred phenomenon. I mean, I reached to a perception where in the eyes of 
society they could call me a deviant, like they could call me an infidel. 
Elhamdulillah (Thank Allah). (Hakan, Male, Theology, 4th year, 2/4/2012) 
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Kübra identified herself as an Islamist activist. She criticized the earlier generation 
of Islamists and saw the secularization problem of Turkish society as stemming from the 
actions of traditional Islamists. She said that it is a matter of action-reaction, and that if 
there was any problematic side in the secularity of the society, it was Muslims themselves, 
not secularists. 
One time, even wearing jeans was argued against. Those important men sat down 
and wrote books on this. Like should a girl wear jeans? Is that it, is Islam this? 
Should we discuss this? Should Muslims as an “ümmet” (Muslim community, 
ummah) stop and discuss whether the girls should or should not wear jeans? There 
were times that these issues were discussed a lot, extravagantly too much. To a 
point where the girls would exaggerate and reach to the opposite, and there were 
the jeans, and tight-leggings and everything. Like people are not wearing jeans but 
shorts... I think it has an effect; yes this has been a reaction to it. (Kübra, Female, 
Philosophy, 1st year, 20/4/2012) 
There was a great propensity among the students to separate religion from tradition 
and culture. Many sought with their own terms, the “pure”, “genuine” (gerçek) religion, 
and practised it without dependence on external authority. This independence and 
individuality was not universally seen among religiously observant students, however, and 
some belonged to Sufi religious orders (tarikat). In Sufi orders there is a strict hierarchy 
and a culture of obedience (itaat and teslimiyet) to leaders. Although they give importance 
to rationality in some matters, there is not the same degree of independence of thought and 
individualism as among those students considered “Islamist” who are not members of a 
Sufi order. This may be observed in the issues they complained and felt uncomfortable 
with. Osman was one of the students who identified him as Islamist student and he 
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complained about the lack of awareness of other religiously observant students with regard 
to political, social and gender issues. 
What they realize is Israel, USA, “Mavi Marmara” ship [about the interception by 
Israel on its way to Gaza] and so on... But the things around us, within our close 
circle, the oppressions we produce just here, are overlooked. For example Muslims 
need to accept that we can’t accept the nation-state concept. About women, they 
should accept women as active subjects or actors. There are things that also 
happened in the past like: Protests are organized against headscarf ban in public 
places but it is not often asked women how they shall operate. It is organized and 
done over something directly belonging to a woman. Muslims need to realize and 
think about the injustice in the country and in the world. (Osman, Male, Sociology, 
3rd year, 27/4/2012) 
Along with criticism of traditional religion, all religious and secularist students 
were opposed to a formalist (şekilci) understanding of religiosity. The new generation 
considered wearing the headscarf or living in a house belonging to a religious organization 
as no longer to be taken as indicators of religiosity. Some even argue that praying five 
times a day is not as important as ethics. 
Especially, like, in recent years, in our school for instance, there are many friends 
who think this way. I know many friends of mine wearing the headscarf but who 
are very distant from religion and doing things contrary to the religion. I do not 
wear headscarf but I see myself as more religiously observant. You know, there is a 
thought like, if one wears headscarf she is religiously observant, performs the 
prayers, fasts, pays attention to her position with men. It is not like that. There are 
also ones who are around me behaving inappropriately, ones who are religiously 
observant but careless, and also ones who are very careful. Like a woman with 
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headscarf might very comfortably walk hugging her boyfriend at the university. 
(Kudret, Male, Law, 4th year, 11/4/2012) 
So when you say ethics (ahlak), to me it feels like it is included in worshipping. 
Like a bit one within the other... Like I think those rituals can be much more 
flexible. But I think honesty should not be compromised no matter what... I do not 
pray five times every day. I will be honest on that, I do not pray five times every 
day. (Fatma, Female, Architecture, 3rd year, 2/4/2012) 
Is it like people who belong to religious groups are religiously observant?  
No! It is not like the ones involved in religious groups are strictly following all 
religious orders. Even if they wear a headscarf... For example, there is someone in 
my class. She is not even aware of the ‘p’ of the prayers if you would ask, does not 
do a thing, but wears a headscarf. She is okay with wearing nail polish and coming 
to school! We are trying to live the religion symbolically. Among the youngsters 
religion is lived symbolically. Hypothetically speaking her parents are 
conservative, they made her wear a headscarf when the kid was young, and now to 
quit disturbs her conscience. Again hypothetically something called a shawl (şal) 
came up, a cover in between a headscarf and a non-headscarf; she is able to do 
what she wants and able to do what her parents want. As she must cover certain 
parts, but she does not, she wears tight leggings, tries to reveal herself more. But 
when you look she symbolically wears the headscarf. (Bahar, Female, Philosophy, 
4th year, 30/3/2012) 
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5.6 PERCEPTIONS OF SECULARITY AMONG STUDENTS AND THEIR 
CAUSES 
As with religiosity, there was among students no accepted, objective definition and 
understanding of secularity. For some it meant not practising religious duties and abiding 
by religious principles, for others it means not having a political consciousness regarding 
an Islamic state. The meanings were closely related to the meanings of religiosity in their 
minds. Consequently, these two terms were used as antonyms. In the sociology of religion, 
the decline in the power and popularity of religion is called the “secularization paradigm”; 
in this section, I examine this paradigm in Turkish society through the statements of 
Turkish university students. 
In line with the definition of scholars of sociology, the students did not define 
secularity or secularization in relation only to the following of religious rules. For example, 
the definitions below approach the term in terms of a sense of social responsibility. They 
do not ignore the significance of worship, such as praying five times a day, or fasting 
during the month of Ramadan. However, young people emphasized the meaning of prayers 
rather than their forms. 
Those who say, “Let sleeping dogs lie,” they are secularist, namely selfish people. 
Even if they pray five times a day, and go on pilgrimage. It is not important, if they 
sacrifice hundred camels, they are still secular, because they would definitely do it 
for self-interest. This society is unfortunately just like that. (Can, Male, Chemistry, 
4th year, 2/4/2012) 
A secular person is somebody who has got a problem because he or she has neither 
ideology, nor knowledge about theology. They isolate religion in the private sphere 
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only. They say, “God is in the heavens above; he cannot come down into my life.” 
Religion has no place in business, law, and so on. (Hakan, Male, Theology, 4th 
year, 2/4/2012) 
When I asked my interviewees about the situation of religiosity in Turkish society 
and among Turkish university students in particular, they were generally pessimistic in 
their opinions.  
Turkish society, if you ask my opinion, is not religiously observant. There are not 
more than 10 per cent religiously observant people in Turkey, from my point of 
view. Maybe less than 10 per cent. This proportion is even lower among university 
students. But these low proportions tend to increase. That must be said, too. Not 
linear, but it is increasing. (Emre, Male, Computer Engineering, 4th year, 
20/4/2012) 
What is the proportion of religiously observant people in the universities, what do 
you think?  
Forty per cent maybe, I do not know, maybe thirty per cent. (Buse, Female, 
Theology, 4th year, 28/4/2012) 
There is not a big place for religion in the lives of Turkish young people. Young 
people who are involved in social sciences are interested in religion. They are a 
little bit aware of the necessity of religion. Apart from them the youth are not 
attached to religion. They do not think about what religion says about anything. 
When you go out into the streets, you can easily see what people are really 
concerned about. (Ferda, Female, Philosophy, 4th year, 26/3/2012) 
A religiously observant student, who described himself as “radical Islamist”, with a 
very narrow definition of religiosity, claimed that part of society was not even Muslim: 
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I have not made a decision about this issue yet. However, I already think that 40 
per cent of the population is not even Muslim. (Mahmut, Male, International 
Relations, 2nd year, 24/4/2012) 
Intention (niyet) has a crucial place in Islamic belief. It takes precedence even over 
practice. Because of this, students highlighted the importance of their good intentions and 
believed themselves to be religiously observant even if they drank alcohol and, in the case 
of women, left their hair uncovered. Galip was a secularist student who was head of the 
youth branch of the secularist party, CHP, in Istanbul. Although he drank alcohol and did 
not see a problem in having intimate relations with his girlfriend, and, in addition, did not 
fast or pray, he still asserted his religiosity: 
There is a God, I believe. I believe in the Prophet and that he is the Messenger of 
God... I practise the religion I believe in.  
So, you are a kind of religiously observant person, are not you? 
I am religious in terms of the principles I believe in, but not in terms of the imposed 
way of religion. I do not practise the religion that is presented by the Islamists. 
Because I do not think that they are right. They are irrational. I look at the religion 
from the point-of-view of rationality. (Galip, Male, Radio Art and TV, 4th year, 
30/3/2012) 
Bahar was another example, who did not wear the headscarf, but did practise the 
other duties of Islam. She did not claim that the headscarf was unnecessary; she accepted 
its place in Islam and was critical of herself and other young Muslims. According to her, 
religiosity necessitated a religious lifestyle, but young people, although they believed in 
Islamic values and principles, deferred practising their religion until their old age. 
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We, the youth people, live as if we will never die. Okay, there is a religion, but at 
the same time you have to pray, you have to fast. Yes, we can perform all these 
obligations, but they never come to mind when we are young. We can die any time, 
both when we are children and when we are young adults. But youth only want to 
enjoy their lives to the full. Let me go to Taksim, let me drink alcohol, let me take 
drugs, and smoke, and then let me ask God for forgiveness. The youth want to take 
pleasure immediately. If they lived according to religion properly, by which I mean 
obeying the rules, praying five times a day etc., it would impose restrictions on 
their lives. Therefore, they postpone these duties until old age. If a prayer time and 
work time clash, for instance, they can easily say that I can pray later, let me do my 
work first. Therefore, religion plays second fiddle now. I also do not obey all the 
religious duties. Yes, I really want to do so, but I do not either. (Bahar, Female, 
Philosophy, 4th year, 30/3/2012) 
Yahya claimed that conservativeness and religiousness are used interchangeably 
and wrongly. He said that Turkish society might be seen as religious, but it is actually 
conservative. Some forms of religion and culture were the same or similar, and this caused 
ambiguity in evaluating the condition of society in terms of religiosity and secularity. He 
gave the following example to differentiate these two social states: 
I cannot say that Turkish society is religious. But they [members of the society] are 
conservative. I mean they are conservative in terms of culture, not religion.  
What is conservativeness in terms of religion?  
I mean the whole lifestyle; oneself, children, and everything are according to 
religion… Religiosity is a different thing. Conservativeness is a more cultural 
thing. Therefore a conservative mother can give her daughter permission to go 
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everywhere including the places unsuitable for religion. There is this kind of 
difference between religiosity and cultural conservativeness. A religious family 
would not want to allow their daughters such free-doing laxity. (Yahya, Male, 
Biology, 4th year, 27/3/2012) 
Hale argued that tradition and culture intermingle with religion in Turkey, and 
modernity, being opposite to tradition, is an important threat to religion. She blamed 
modernity and Westernization for the secularization process in Turkish society. In fact, 
Westernization has always had a central place in the debate on secularization among 
Turkish intellectuals. The poet of the Turkish national anthem, Mehmed Akif Ersoy (1873-
1936) is well known in this debate for his verse: “Take the science of the West, take its art” 
[Alınız ilmini Garb’ın, alınız san’atını] (2006: 170). He defended taking the ‘positive’ 
things that the West had to offer, such as technology and science, while rejecting the 
‘negative or harmful’ things, such as Western moral values and social structures. The 
Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan criticized the republican period of Turkey in 2008 
saying, “We should have taken the science and art of the West; however, we took their 
immoralities that are contrary to our own values” (Hürriyet, 2008) Hale had similar 
arguments when she criticized society with regard to secularization: 
In my opinion the opposite of tradition is modernism, because it was like this in 
Europe. They built modernity by not refusing their tradition. We are going to do 
this, too. We are becoming more and more modern; we are integrated into the 
modern world, and therefore the youth get further away from religion, because they 
become distanced from tradition. There is not a huge gap between Islam and 
Turkish tradition; on the contrary, they are interwoven. Therefore I see modernity 
as a threat for Islam. We tried to read the world though Europe for many years, 
because we saw Europe as the standard of modernity. We thought that as our 
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clothing and lifestyle were like those of Europeans, so we would be modern like 
them. This influences even our housewares. In actual fact, when we move away 
from out tradition and culture, we actually experience depersonalization. (Hale, 
Female, Theology, 3rd year, 1/5/2012) 
Secularist people were generally considered by some of the students to be 
responsible for the negative sides of modernity and secularity, especially the supporters of 
the secularist and Kemalist political party, CHP. However, like religiously observant 
people, my secularist informants have changed their ideas and attitudes towards Islam and 
Turkish culture. Galip’s ideas about Westernization is an good example of this change: 
The country should not be closed-minded. We should not revolt against the West. 
But we should not take the West as the only way; on the contrary, it is 
enlightenment, and the source of thoughts and reforms. This does not mean that we 
should imitate European countries such as Greece and Bulgaria. I mean, let us take 
the thought of the enlightenment. (Galip, Male, Radio Art and TV, 4th year, 
30/3/2012) 
For a long period, I have read most of the newspapers and magazines published in 
Turkey. One of the interesting things that caught my attention has been the theologians 
who write columns at least once a week. Almost all newspapers have a theologian writing 
on religious issues and providing answers to readers’ problems. Only extreme secularist 
newspapers lack this kind of column; mainstream secularist newspapers include one. In my 
view, this is another example of the change in secularism in Turkish society. 
There was a consensus among religiously observant students that Turkey was 
undergoing a secularization process. Different people saw different factors behind this 
process, depending on which were the most important areas of secularization for them. 
	   165 
Some students, for example, complained about the economic sphere, arguing that 
religiously observant Muslims are secularized through devices such as Islamic banking. 
This is the kind of banking known as participation banking [katılım bankacılığı] or interest 
free banking [faizsiz bankacılık] in Turkey. Bank Asya, Al Baraka Turk, and Ihlas Finans 
are examples of Islamic banks, which were established as alternatives to secular or un-
Islamic banks. Religiously observant people seek to avoid secular banks, not wishing to be 
involved in any way with any means of levying interest payment on a loan, loan interest 
being regarded as a sin in Islam. Because of this, the boards of management of these 
Islamic institutions receive fatwas from Islamic law scholars, such as Hayrettin Karaman 
(2010), about the legitimacy of the implementations of their banks. Some students I spoke 
to were, nevertheless, not certain about the alternative banks being Islamic, and were of the 
opinion that these institutions have a secularizing influence. 
The sensitivity to interest (faiz) has unfortunately decreased nowadays. I should 
add the contribution of “participation banks” to this situation. Because some 
Islamic scholars, Hayrettin Karaman for example, drawing an analogy to the time 
of the Prophet (Asr-ı Saadet) have said that if you buy a house or car, you can get a 
bank loan. Receiving bank credit has become normal nowadays. Cultural Muslims 
do not care about this issue and they do not approach it critically. They only say, “I 
am Muslim, I am religiously observant”, but they do not design all parts of their 
lives according to religion. They do not practice religion. (Kudret, Male, Law, 4th 
year, 11/4/2012) 
Religiously observant-conservative people have sensitivity about not taking interest 
(faiz). They do not want to get any money forbidden by religion (haram). There is 
such a reality in economic life. There are numerous religiously observant people 
questioning bank credits who believe that even the stock market is forbidden by 
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religion. However, there are also religiously observant people who break with this 
view. The main contributing factor for this is the Islamic or participation banks. 
(Yahya, Male, Biology, 4th year, 27/3/2012) 
The following long conversation summarizes the problem well. Kudret was a law 
student and a religiously observant person: 
The system of interest is an alien system but you can be out of the system, if you 
want.  
Can you?   
Of course, if you do not use a credit card, and do not get in contact with banks, you 
can stay out of this system. But if you say, I want to buy a house, I want to buy a 
car, and I must get a bank loan, then you will be involved in the system. I do not 
use credit cards. The only relation I have got with banks is that I take out my wages 
from my bank. But if you are a merchant, it is impossible to stay out of the system.  
How is it impossible?  
You make your payments, your exchanges etc., everything must be done through 
the banks. I am not a businessman. So I can be out of the system. 
What is the problem if I have to use banks for my business, if I do not get interest 
directly?  
The cash flow occurs through the banks. Your money remains in the bank until you 
take it out. They use your money; they sell your money with interest, even if you 
open an account with no interest. So you feed the system even indirectly. You aid 
and abet it.  
And that is why I am accountable for it?  
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Of course, that is why I take out my wages immediately so that they cannot use my 
money. Under these circumstances, many people see the Islamic-participation 
banks as a mediate formula (ara formül).  
Is it certain that they are suitable for Islam?  
Participation banks say that we do not use your money for interest. We operate 
your money buying and selling something, doing businesses etc. We use the market 
profit. But it is a problematic issue if this system is Islamic or not. A number of 
Islamic scholars say that you should not be even in the shadows of banks, and that 
you should go into a bank with your left foot first, and go out with your right foot 
first. Even though these are participation or Islamic banks, they get involved in the 
secular or un-Islamic system one way or another. Some Islamic scholars, like 
Hayrettin Karaman, have given fatwas saying that participation banks are 
acceptable in Islam, and that there is no any problem if you use them. But how can 
Karaman say that without knowing business life? Abu Hanifa could say it, because 
he was one of the greatest Muslim scholars and a businessman at the same time. He 
knew the system. Maybe the bankers persuaded the scholars to give fatwa with 
some documents, but I have never seen any participation bank really buying or 
selling something. The commerce is only on paper. How can it accord with 
commerce? These are technical issues, I do not know. However, I cannot say I am a 
customer even though it is a participation bank.  
At least, they do not misuse your money, do they?  
Yes, but it can always be interpreted (tevil) inch-by-inch. (Kudret, Male, Law, 4th 
year, 11/4/2012) 
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Another significant factor behind the secularization process in Turkish society is 
the new political conditions following the coming to power of the AKP. The religiously 
observant people have increasingly come to the fore among the elites of the country. Now 
they are powerful and have voice in the education system, foreign affairs, and the media. 
Students called this “a relaxation period” and they were worried about its effects on 
secularization. For them, Islamization might cause or accelerate the secularization process. 
Before the AKP, religiously observant people were in the opposition and were careful to 
preserve their religious values and culture in almost all areas. With the AKP established in 
power, religiously observant people have embraced and acquired the secular democratic 
system in its totally. Mahmut was the student who identified him as radical Islamist and he 
believed that democratic system was against Islam. According to him, his father had the 
same belief before, but he changed his mind and attitude after AKP. 
My father was against democracy for years until the AKP came to power. Many 
people have changed their attitudes towards democracy with the AKP. The people 
who did not go to polls and did not embrace the democratic system have started to 
embrace it. Among them there are members of parliament now. Some of them are 
friends of my father. That’s why I know them. (Mahmut, Male, International 
Relations, 2nd year, 24/4/2012) 
Cihan Tuğal said in one of his books, Pasif Devrim (Passive Revolution), that in 
Turkey, Islamization and secularisation advance at the same time. Now in Turkey, 
you can pray freely, you can organize religious conversations (sohbet), and the 
problem of the headscarf is actually solved. When we perceive Islam consisting of 
just these issues, we can get luxury cars and houses that make us forget God. And 
we do not understand that these are produced by bad people who encourage 
consumption culture. Our problems were only the headscarf issue and Kemalism, 
	   169 
and nobody dictates to us now. Whereas they are not the real problems, the real 
problem is various persecutions all over the world. There is still the Kurdish 
problem, for instance, and you do not even think about it. (Osman, Male, 
Sociology, 3rd year, 27/4/2012) 
In some periods, like 28 February, people were not allowed to practice their 
ideologies and religions. However, they embrace banned things much more than 
before. The new religious generation of Turkey never experienced any problem 
with governments and never paid any price for their beliefs. This has caused a 
sense of comfort and not appreciating religious principles among youth. If you go 
to Fatih University, a private university founded by the followers of a religious 
group, you can easily observe the examples of these people.  
What do you mean with sense of comfort?  
I mean those who look veiled, but do not observe the principles of being covered 
(tesettür). (Kübra, Female, Philosophy, 1st year, 20/4/2012) 
 
5.7 CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, religiosity, religiousness and secularity are discussed as perceived and 
experienced by Turkish university students. After summarizing and reviewing the 
literature, the responses of my research participants were analysed by theme, and organised 
into sections. 
In the understanding of the students, religiosity does not consist only of worship 
and prayer but also of ethics or morality (ahlak) in every sphere of public as well as private 
life. 
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Today’s religiously observant students, in contrast to the previous generation, place 
emphasis on embodying religion in their lives and activities (temsil), rather than limiting it 
to an Islamic lifestyle and obedience to Islamic rulings (tebliğ). 
As Casanova argues, modern people have the opportunity to get to know various 
systems of meaning and to choose among them. This widespread access to knowledge is 
new as this opportunity was only available to elites before, while now it can be generalized 
to the entire population. Casanova explains this condition further saying that “what is 
certainly new in our global age is the simultaneous presence and availability of all world 
religions and all cultural systems, from the most “primitive” to the most “modern,” often 
detached from their temporal and spatial contexts, ready for flexible or fundamentalist 
individual appropriation” (Casanova, 2006: 18).  
This situation is the same when it comes to the different interpretations and 
understandings of religiosity and secularity. Religiousness had, we have seen, various 
meanings and perceptions among the research participants. For instance, a student who is 
very active in a secularist party and drinks alcohol might, according to their own 
perception of religion, can identify him or herself as religious. While a student who 
performs the daily religious practices and wears the headscarf, can declare she does not 
regard herself as religiously observant. The students generally agree that religiosity is not a 
constant feeling. On the contrary it can change from time to time and from context to 
context, and this is a challenge from God (imtihan), namely endeavouring to keep religious 
feeling and thinking alive all the time. 
On the basis of the statements of my research participants, it is apparent that 
religion or religiousness is seen as involving every aspect of life. They reject the Kemalist 
ideology that aims at restricting religion to the areas of belief and worship only. 
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The students also objected to their parents’ and grandparents’ understanding of 
religion, arguing that traditional religiousness concentrates on the form of religious rituals 
and rulings rather than the meaning and soul of them, while neglecting rational and critical 
thinking. They typically held to the view that they did not have to follow mere culture 
arising from historical circumstances, but rather follow the religious principles and rulings, 
creating their own way of living.  
Of all the factors affecting the religiousness and secularity of the university 
students, family background was found to be the most important. All students encountered 
in Istanbul in the course of this research, embrace in essence the lifestyles of their parents, 
albeit with relatively minor divergences. This does not generally stem from parental 
pressure to conform, but it nevertheless seems universally, or almost, the reality. Students 
embrace the worldviews of their parents while generally critically appraising them to 
create their own perceptions and lifestyles. They see formal religious education in schools, 
even the religious high schools and the theology faculties at universities, as an insufficient 
basis for their religious lives. This leads them to attend unofficial Qur’an courses and 
various religious events organized by religious groups and movements. 
Performing worship of salat or namaz fives times a day and performing ablutions 
before each namaz are the biggest difficulties students encounter in the daily round of 
carrying out their religious practices, as discussed in detail elsewhere. In some cases and 
contexts, secular environments might limit the consistency of religious observance, thus 
causing tension in the minds and social relations of religiously observant students. 
Marginalization of the religiously observant people by some secularist people is another 
cause of tension. This problem might occur both directly and indirectly. 
Secularism was not an acceptable process for religiously observant students, 
especially to the extent that it means Westernization, anti-religiosity, being against Turkish 
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culture and tradition. Even secularist students are opposed to Westernization. Almost all 
students consented to political and institutional secularization, though concerned at being 
unable to practise adequately the religious principles in the areas of economics and 
education, and in their private lives, and this fact shows that the linear modernization 
theory of the privatization of religion is not grasped as valid by the university student 
participants.  
All these findings support what Casanova (1994) suggests about the term 
‘secularization’. According to him, in order to analyse secularization properly, we need to 
distinguish between three meanings of the term: a decline of religious beliefs and practices; 
the privatization of religion; and differentiation of the secular sphere from religious 
institutions and norms. He adds, “If the premise is correct, it should follow from the 
analytical distinction that the fruitless secularization debate can end only when sociologists 
of religion begin to examine and test the validity of each of the three propositions 
independently of each other” (1994: 211). Taking into account these three meanings, the 
third connotation seems more suitable for my research participants as they accept the 
secular democratic political system, while they do not accept the pressure to follow (or 
suppress) a religious lifestyle in the public sphere. Thus, as Casanova suggest, the classical 
linear modernization theory of secularization is no longer applies to the relationship 
between religiosity and secularity in a society, and we need to develop new approaches to 
probe this relationship in all its complexity.  
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CHAPTER SIX: RELIGIOUS GROUPS 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
Depending on their interests and needs, most of the religiously observant Turkish people 
encounter at least one religious group in their political, public or private lives. Religious 
groups are generally either tarikat (religious or Sufi orders) or cemaat (religious 
communities). Tarikat groups focus on Sufism and the spiritual aspect of religion; 
Nakşibendilik, Mevlevilik, and Kadirilik are the most well known of these groups in 
Turkey. Cemaat groups are especially concerned with politics, education, relief of distress 
and other social matters. Nurculuk, Gülen or Hizmet movements, Milli Görüş movement, 
and Süleymancılık are the foremost examples of this kind of group. Most cemaats arose 
originally from tarikats, particularly from the Nakşibendilik. Their field of interest is what 
assigns them to the tarikats. Both the tarikats and cemaats are referred to as religious 
groups or religious movements in this thesis. As the concern of my thesis is Islam and 
Muslim university students, I did not incorporate the other religions and their religious 
groups into my research. 
With all their varied characteristic interests, concerns and constituencies, the 
various religious groups have in common the aim of strengthening the religiosity of 
individuals, Islamizing society, and eliminating the barriers to the practice of religion in 
public and private. To further these objectives they employ various methods, establishing 
organizations and institutions such as student accommodation, political parties, local and 
international aid organizations, private schools and universities. 
Religious groups are one of the main features of religious life in Turkish society 
and particularly in the lives of university students, who generally encounter them at their 
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primary or secondary school. The connection becomes stronger or weaker at university, 
depending on personal experiences.  
In this chapter, I evaluate religion, religiosity and secularity at the group level. This 
chapter considers religious groups and their place in both the private and public lives of 
Turkish university students. After introducing the main targets for the activities of the 
various religious groups, I look at the issue from the point-of-view of the university 
students. Considering their views and experiences, I want to elucidate the perceptions 
university students have of Turkish religious groups, and the ways the groups affect their 
lives in terms of religiosity and secularity; how they influence the students’ political 
attitudes towards the secular Turkish state; the impact on the lifestyles of the students 
publicly and privately; and what students think of the religious groups for good and for ill. 
In order to achieve the objectives of my research, I used the findings of the in-depth 
interviews that I conducted with university students during my fieldwork in Istanbul. I also 
participated in some events organized by religious groups and observed some activities and 
events of both members of these religious groups and the university students they were in 
contact with. The Spring Festivals (Bahar Şenlikleri) were particularly helpful in allowing 
me to observe young people from both secular and religious groups/backgrounds. The type 
of leisure events pursued was another clue to understanding what religiously observant 
students prefer. These contexts and events enabled me to compare what was said in 
interviews with what I observed in such environments. The observations and conversations 
helped me to read and interpret my data. In this chapter I analyse the statements of the 
students, some of whom are members of religious groups; some with little or no sense of 
belonging to a group, who nevertheless for a variety of reasons live in a place associated 
with one of the religious groups; and other students not in contact with religious groups. 
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The chapter consists of four sections. The first section provides an outline of the 
major religious groups and their activities, particularly those activities organised for 
university students. Reference will be made to the literature, statements of interviewees, 
and my fieldwork observation notes.  
The second section concerns the targets of the religious groups with their activities, 
institutions, and organizations. Interviews with university representatives and student 
members of some religious groups, are analysed to explore their main aims, and social and 
political aspects of secularization and Islamization. 
The third section covers the effects of religious groups on university students. This 
has two aspects. One is about the perceptions of university students: how they see these 
groups and the advantages of the groups for the students. The other aspect is about the 
effects of the religious groups on the students in terms of their religiosity or secularity, and 
also in terms of their attitudes towards the secular state and society. 
And finally, the fourth section includes criticism of religious groups by students. 
This is noteworthy for criticism of the groups’ perceived opposition to some student 
freedoms. Strong feelings were expressed sometimes, based upon students’ own 
experiences and observations regarding sociological, political and theological issues. 
In the literature, there is a substantial body of theoretical and empirical research on 
social movements. Researchers describe the general characteristics of social movements in 
different ways, though despite differences of terminology, most such analyses highlight 
certain shared practices. When he describes the activities of social movements, Jasper, for 
instance, names the following characteristics: “conscious”; “organized”; “long-standing”; 
“particularistic”; and “non-institutionalized” (1997; 5). Some scholars make comparisons 
between new social movements and classical social movements, like feminism and 
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environmental movements, arguing that new social movements are more concerned about 
non-materialist issues like identity (Johnson, Larana, and Gusfield, 1999).  
Şimşek, after summarizing the characteristics of social movements, as set out by 
previous scholars, created a list incorporating those characteristics commonly seen by 
scholars and especially those seen as most important. He lists five characteristics of new 
social movements, and examines the four major current social movements in Turkey - 
Islamism, feminism, the Alevi movement, and Kurdish nationalism - on the basis of these. 
Very briefly, Şimşek’s analysis of the main characteristics of new social movements in 
Turkey found that Turkish “New social movements basically exhibit post-Marxist, post-
modernist and post-traditional tendencies; [they are] generally middle class based 
movements; post-material, identity-oriented initiatives; proactive and particularistic 
movements; [they] display relatively decentralized and less hierarchical modes of 
organization as well as new forms of action” (Şimşek, 2004: 115–6). 
Comparing Turkish religious groups with new social movements, Şimşek uses the 
term ‘Islamist’ for all Islamic religious groups indiscriminately. Another problem in his 
work on Islamic groups is that he considers only two examples, the Welfare Party (Refah 
Partisi, RP) and the Gülen movement. His answer to the question “Is Islamism a new 
social movement?” is ‘yes’ in some respects and ‘no’ in others. He argues that Islamism is 
a post-traditionalist and post-modernist movement, in that Islamic revivalists criticize and 
reinterpret the traditional understanding of Islam. It cannot be described as a post-Marxist 
movement because the leaders and members of Islamic groups are from the new middle 
class of Turkey. It may be objected, in this regard, that voters for the religious-based 
political parties, such as the Welfare Party (Refah Partisi) and the Justice and Development 
Party (the AKP), are predominantly lower class. Şimşek proposes that Islamist groups 
“demanded religious and cultural recognition in the public sphere and tried to create an 
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Islamic identity and way of life.” Islamism “started perhaps as a reactive movement 
against Kemalism and modernism, but later it gradually turned into a proactive social 
movement by raising diverse issues” (2004: 123–4). Finally, he argues that while Islamist 
movements are centralized organizations at the political level, they embrace democratic 
forms and activities at the civil society level, like religious-based NGOs. 
Göle draws attention to the differences between modernist Islamism in the 19th 
century, as outlined by Islamic reformers such as Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and Muhammad 
‘Abduh in Egypt, and the new generation of Islamists, like Ali Bulaç and İsmet Özel in 
Turkey. She argues that the older Islamist generation wanted to combine Islamic and 
modern values. As to contemporary Islamists, they are anti-modernists who seek to create 
an “Islamic alternative model” (1997: 54). She sees the conflict between secularists and 
Islamists, as a fight between elites and counter-elites, arguing that Islamization is a counter 
attack against the modernization project of Kemalism. However, Göle’s arguments and 
examples are limited to political Islam and Islamists. She makes no mention of other more 
a-political religious movements and their activities.  
Neyzi divides Turkish history into three periods in terms of the construction of 
youth in public discourse: 1923 to 1950, 1950 to 1980, and 1980 to the present. Her studies 
focus on discourses on youth, rather than their experiences and statements. Regarding 
Islamic movements and university students in the third period, she says that after the 
military coup in 1980, the state tried to create a synthesis between Islam and Turkish 
identity, known as “Turkish Islam.” In this context, religious lessons became compulsory 
in primary and secondary schools, and graduates of the İmam-Hatip schools (religious 
vocational high schools) were allowed to go to university. According to Neyzi, “What was 
intended as an attempt to forestall the rise of further extremism among youth resulted in 
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the emergence of a strong Islamist movement among university students in the 1980s and 
1990s” (2001: 422). 
In the literature, there are a limited numbers of studies that focus on the subject of 
Turkish religious groups in terms of their effects on university students. Studies from the 
viewpoint of Turkish university students are also very limited (White, 2011; Andy-Ar, 
2011; Avcı, 2012), and do not directly address the relationship between religious groups 
and university students. With this chapter of my thesis my aim is to make a contribution to 
fill this gap. 
 
6.2 A SHORT HISTORY OF ISLAMIC GROUPS AND THEIR ACTIVITIES 
The Sufi orders (tarikat) go back centuries in Islam. Then came the establishment of the 
Turkish Republic, and in 1925 all Sufi orders were dissolved and all local and central 
derwish lodges were closed by a law known as the Tekkeler ve Zaviyeler Kanunu. This was 
in order to secularize the Turkish state. The only exceptions to the legislation have been 
two rituals of two Sufi orders: The “Whirling Derwish” dance (Sema) of the Mevlevilik, 
founded by the well known Islamic scholar Mawlana Jalal al-Din al-Rumi (1207–1273); 
and the dhikr (or zikir) of the Istanbul Qadiriyya (or Kadirilik), founded by Syed Abdul-
Qader Gilani (1077–1166). Public performance of these rituals has been tolerated as 
cultural activities, rather than religious rituals (Ernst, 2004). 
From the beginning of the republican period, all kinds of Islamic groups lost their 
official status and power, and many of them their legal status. Although there are 
numerous Islamic groups and activities in Turkey, none of the activities had been 
performed openly since the beginning of the republic until recently. The groups were able 
to work only with the secular tools of the new country or go underground. Toprak declares, 
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“Overtly religiously observant people were not accepted into the political, social, or 
intellectual elite circles. The republic marginalized them, caricaturized them as fanatics, 
and considered them uncivilized. It was these marginalized groups that later formed the 
backbone of political Islam” (2005: 32). 
Enterprises undertaken by Islamic groups and individuals were suppressed by the 
state through military coups, and interventions of the constitutional court. Suppression 
began in the 1920s and 1930s (Gökay and Aras, 2003). Kara (2011b) argues that the 
military coups and the revival of Islamic movements were directly related in Turkey. 
Islamic groups and activities were pushed out of the public and political areas, and put 
under the control of Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı (the Directorate of Religious Affairs), 
founded in 1924 by Atatürk, to keep all religious institutions and events under its control 
through the Diyanet (Waardenburg, 2002). 
Another significant Kemalist reform was the Hilafetin Kaldırılması Kanunu (The 
abolition of the Caliphate) in 1924. The Caliphate was the political and religious 
presidency of the whole Muslim community (ümmet). Even though, by common consent, 
the caliphate did not perform its unifying function well in the last period of the Ottoman 
Empire, it remained powerful in some parts of the Empire. For this reason Sayyid (1997) 
and Göle (2012) argue that the abolition of the caliphate and the revival of the Islamic 
movements are closely related to one other. However, it would be a mistake to argue that 
the abolition of the caliphate was the only reason for the rise of the movements: even in the 
Ottoman Empire there was Islamic opposition to the state, and the caliphate nearly lost its 
political and religious power in Turkish society. 
The pressure on Islamic movements in Turkey caused a number of revolts against 
the political and ideological authority of the Kemalist secularist state. Islamic opposition 
and the polarization of secularists and Islamists were much stronger in the 1980s and 
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1990s because of the socio-economic and cultural characteristics of the period (Zürcher, 
2003; Toprak, 2005). To summarize the conditions of the post-1980 period of Turkey: in 
order to weaken leftist and violent movements, the state reinforced Islam in various ways. 
It demanded the creation of a synthesis of Turkish identity and Islam. The numbers of 
religiously based İmam-Hatip schools, Qur’an courses, and mosques dramatically 
increased and religious groups were allowed to act much more freely. Religion lessons 
were made compulsory even in secular primary and secondary schools. Turgut Özal (Prime 
Minister 1983–1989; President 1989–1993) opened the ranks of the state cadres to 
religiously observant citizens, and encouraged religiously observant businessmen to 
enhance their works. Religious TV and radio channels, newspapers, magazines and books 
were allowed in this period, and Islamic religious groups and their activities spread all over 
the country, especially through the agency of university students. Shankland explains this 
period saying that “there has been an accumulation of subtle changes in the role of Islam in 
public life that may be seen in all sorts of ways: in the expanding role of the Islamic 
brotherhoods; in modern, Ottoman-style mosques built in concrete springing up round the 
country; in the increasing prevalence of the call to prayer; and in the gradually growing 
role of religion in the civil service…” (2007: 360-1). In this period, as Şimşek says: “An 
important number of those young people served as ready votes for the Welfare Party 
(Refah Partisi, RP), which was extremely ambitious with its motto of Adil Düzen (just 
order). The rest of these young people participated in various religious movements and 
organizations such as that of Fethullah Gülen” (2004: 121). 
A centre for social research in Turkey, Andy-Ar, conducted research among 2,160 
people in twenty cities, in 2011, into the perception of Islamic religious groups by 
members of Turkish society. How religious groups are seen; how much trust there is of 
them; which groups and which leaders are widely known; the number of their members 
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and followers; distribution by political party of the members, were some of the main issues 
addressed in the research. According to this study, the best known and most popular and 
effective religious group was the Gülen movement. The others, in descending order of 
popularity, were found to be: Süleymancılar; Nur cemaati; Nakşibendiler; İsmailağa 
cemaati; Cübbeli Ahmet Hoca cemaati and Menzil cemaati. Interestingly, the Milli Görüş 
movement was not mentioned by respondents, though it is the basis of the Welfare Party 
(Refah Partisi) of Necmettin Erbakan (1926–2011), and the founders of the AKP, Recep 
Tayyip Erdoğan, Abdullah Gül, and Bülent Arınç, originally were involved with this 
movement (Shankland, 2007). In my view, this is due to the fact that, although the Milli 
Görüş movement is highly effective, because of its close relationship with politics it is 
seen as essentially political rather than religious. There is probably an additional factor in 
its lack of recognition as a religious movement, in that the 28 February military 
intervention in 1997 brought the movement to a standstill, and when Recep Tayyip 
Erdoğan and the AKP broke away from the Milli Görüş movement and Erbakan, and 
established the AKP, Erdoğan declared that “they have removed the shirt of Milli Görüş” 
(Yüksek, 2003). As Shankland says, “even though Erdoğan’s Justice and Development 
Party (JDP or ‘white’ Party) derives directly from Erbakan’s Welfare Party, it represents a 
division or wing of the Refah Party which sought a moderate presentation of Islam” (2007: 
361). 
Among the religious groups there is the phenomenon of group fractions within 
groups. So that, for example, the Gülen movement could originally be counted in the Nur 
cemaati, but went on to develop its own characteristics. Nakşibendilik, Süleymancılık and 
Milli Görüş all trod a similar path of fragmentation and sometimes nominal affiliation, and 
even the Nur cemaati originally developed from the Nakşibendilik, and indeed, every one 
of them has its ultimate origin in the Sufi orders or the Islamic brotherhoods (tarikat). As I 
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explained in the introduction, every group went on to dissociate itself from the others with 
its own ways of thinking, strategies, methods and other characteristics. In Berger’s phrase, 
“different religious movements differ in their relation to modernity” (1999: 7–8). Each 
Islamic group has its own approach to Islamic sources: the Qur’an and the Sunna, politics, 
modernity and religiosity. 
Of especial significance for the present research, the Andy-Ar study revealed 
substantially stronger support for religious groups among university students and post-
graduates than among the population at large, suggesting a greater personal involvement 
with the groups among university students and post-graduates. 
Öktem (2002) has remarked on how religious groups, despite state opposition, still 
continued to influence the political, economic and social life of the country, though often 
in technically illegal ways. According to the author, the most important groups were: 
Nakşibendilik; Kadirilik; Rıfailik; Nurculuk; Süleymancılık; Işıkçılık; Mevlevilik; 
Bektaşilik, and Alevilik. 
Nakşibendilik, founded by Muhammad Bahauddin Naqshband (1317–1389), is one 
of the most widespread and effective religious groups in Turkey. Öktem explains the 
fundamental principle of this Sufi order as: “the inner purification of the soul, which must 
be realized under the direction of a shaykh or chief abbot, called the Perfect Guide 
(murshid-i kamil)” (2002: 389). Compared to others, it gives more importance to the Sunni 
tradition, Islamic law, and politics. Two Prime Ministers of Turkey, Turgut Özal (1927–
1993) and Necmettin Erbakan (1926–2011) were members. Nakşibendilik has many 
publications and radio channels, and student residences in almost every city in Turkey. 
Nowadays there are numerous Nakşibendi groups in the country: Esad Coşan; Menzil 
cemaati; Mahmut Efendi cemaati, to name only a few. 
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Said Nursi (1876–1960) was one of the most influential Islamic scholar and leader 
in the history of the Turkish Republic. Active in politics until the age of forty, (he called 
this period “the first Said period”), he then changed his focus to engage in more purely 
intellectual activity. Most of his substantial literary oeuvre (Risale-i Nur Külliyatı), of 
more than six thousand pages, dates to this second period. It consists mostly of Qur’anic 
commentary and theological (Kelam) reflections. As with the Nakşibendi groups, there are 
many subgroups under the umbrella of the Nur movement. Yeni Asyacılar; Yeni Nesil 
grubu; Okuyucular; Yazıcılar, and Med-Zehra grubu are among them. These groups each 
have their publications, events, and student dormitories in which they provide residents 
with religious education informed by the Risale-i Nur Collection. Each of these groups 
interprets the thoughts of Said Nursi in different ways, and every group has a different 
understanding and approach to politics, religious propaganda (tebliğ), and the methods to 
be pursued in serving religion. 
Fethullah Gülen is an interpreter of the ideas of Said Nursi and has made 
significant contributions to the movement, establishing primary and secondary schools all 
over the country and indeed the world; as well as nursery schools, university preparation 
courses, universities, student residences and houses, NGOs, businessmen’s associations, 
newspapers, magazines, TV and radio channels, publishing companies, and charities. One 
of the distinguishing features of the Gülen movement is that the activities of the group are 
not limited to Turkey. Most of the activities are worldwide, in almost every country. The 
movement does not use an Islamic discourse in its works, including in the schools. The 
fundamental and guiding ideas of the movement are: interfaith and intercultural dialogue; 
tolerance (hoşgörü); understanding of others; and accepting everyone as they are (herkesi 
kendi konumunda kabul etmek). The Gülen movement is far more popular and effective 
than any other religious group in Turkey (Kömecoğlu, 2000). According to the Andy-Ar 
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research, 61 per cent of the Turkish population know of Fethullah Gülen; and the British 
‘The Guardian’ newspaper presented him as “Turkey’s most powerful man” (Butt, 2008). 
Apart from the above-mentioned religious groups, there are numerous groups and 
organizations in Turkey, both big and small. Like the groups above, almost all of them 
focus on educating students. Süleymancılık, which was founded by Süleyman Hilmi 
Tunahan (1888–1959), for instance, is quite effective in social and political life. This group 
has established more than a thousand student residences, and accommodates almost 
100,000 students, from secondary school to university (Öktem, 2002: 393). It is also well 
established in Europe, particularly with mosques and Qur’an courses. 
 
6.3 TARGETS OF THE RELIGIOUS GROUPS 
The purposes of Islamic religious groups have long been discussed in Turkey, both in the 
political domain and the social area. As we saw, the Turkish state saw them originally as a 
threat to its secularist and nationalist ideology and was worried about even small symbols 
that they displayed (Göle, 1998). The main concern of the secularists about religiously 
observant people has been the Shari‘a, Islamic law, or – another term used by the military 
and secularists – “irtica.” What is the real target of religious groups and individuals? Why 
so many events, organizations and institutions? Have they got a hidden agenda? Do they 
seeking to overthrow the secularist state and establish an Islamic one? Do they want to 
introduce the Shari‘a law into the country and force women to cover their heads? Do they 
want the country to go (irtica) back to the “Dark Ages”? Are they sincere in their 
declarations in favour of democracy and liberty? Do they really want the Republic? These 
questions have been often heard from secularists, secularist political parties, and 
government bodies. The wearing of headscarves, and involvement by religiously observant 
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people in politics, have been seen as signs of some hidden agenda. In order to prevent 
subversion, the state dissolved certain political parties: Milli Nizam Partisi in 1971; Milli 
Selamet Partisi in 1981; Refah Partisi in 1998; Fazilet Partisi in 2001; and attempted to 
dissolve the AKP in 2008. A few of the other harassments the religiously observant had to 
endure included a liability to be blacklisted by public institutions; the banning of the 
headscarves in universities; limitations put on Qur’an courses; and hindering students of 
the İmam-Hatip schools wanting to go to university. 
To this day there is real anxiety in Turkey about the influence that religious groups 
may have on primary, secondary and university pupils or students who are the main targets 
for their proselytising. Students’ families worry about the effect on their children’s lives, 
especially their careers, if they become involved with a religious group. For their part, 
religiously observant people, their groups and political parties feel they must struggle to 
prove that they are sincere in wanting an independent, powerful, liberal, democratic state, 
and are not hankering to introduce the Shari‘a into the country as state law. The remark by 
Erdoğan about removing his Milli Görüş shirt was a response to this suspicion. He wanted 
to let people know he had disavowed the introduction of an Islamic state and law, and was 
no longer involved with political Islam. 
In my fieldwork in Istanbul, some interviewees were active in religious groups, 
while others though not active, lived in one of the student residences of a religious group. 
In this thesis, I use the word ‘being active’ in the meaning that working in a religious 
group in the light of the principles of that group.  
I asked them about the aims of the religious groups as I was eager to get the view 
of the most significant actors, university students, who were both the main target group 
and the most active members of the religious groups. 
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It seems the primary aim of religious groups is keeping students out of secular 
spaces and social relations. 
We work to keep friends at university in a life that is apart from secular activities or 
to pull them a bit to this side, I mean the Islamic life. In that sense, actually, we 
could see the Milli Görüş movement as a movement to create awareness. Rather 
than a student chatting with a girl at school, them coming and chatting with us, 
talking about a prophetic hadith or a Qur’anic verse or even discussing a movie, our 
work, I would say, is at least to keep them away from these distractions. (Ali, Male, 
Electronic Engineering, 2nd year, 10/4/2012) 
The goal of being enabled to practise Islam in a perfect way was mentioned by all 
the religiously observant students. Different views were expressed as to how to achieve 
this aim. Some embraced an active approach and wanted to Islamize the state and the 
judicial system while others defended the idea that liberty need not conflict with practising 
the principles and values of Islam. 
The cause behind the foundation of the Anadolu Platformu society is, for Islam to 
be lived at its best in Turkey and worldwide. “To be lived at its best” meaning, 
certainly not to be against religion, against Islam, not to be in an environment 
against the Prophet. Surely alternatives or advantages and disadvantages will be 
brought forward, everybody will make free choices.  
Will he make a revolution, will there be a political party?  
Why not have an aim of a revolution? It might be. But first the need is to develop in 
a political party. I think an awareness should be raised in society. This is not taking 
down the state. Not a revolution like in Iran… (Buse, Female, Theology, 4th year, 
28/4/2012) 
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Educating proper Muslim individuals is a struggle that necessitates dedication and 
the giving of time, energy and money. As previously remarked, religious groups 
particularly focus on students in order to educate a new generation in religion and how to 
practise it in the modern world. 
We do not believe that anything will be done by remaining still. A constant struggle 
[is necessary] and we see the outcome, maybe it exhausts us though…  
What fruit?  
A Muslim society. A society with character. Muslim societies, many of them 
around. All of them are Muslim societies, but how much of a Muslim character 
they possess, is quite debatable.  
What do you mean by “with character”?  
A Muslim society with character, like they have a vision, have a passion. In general 
people who carry a concern for existence are people with character; essentially, 
what we are trying to make people gain is that concern. (Kübra, Female, 
Philosophy, 1st year, 20/4/2012) 
Some small groups are against receiving a secular education and going to 
university, particularly for female students. I found no student who was a member of such 
a group. The majority of religious groups, although they seek to establish their own 
schools and universities, do not seek to prevent students from going to public schools. 
However, they offer their own alternative education in their student residences, societies 
and other institutions. 
The very purpose of the Anadolu Students Association is to educate people with 
character.  
How “with character”?  
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As such; first, they will know their history, won’t deny their history; people who 
are devoted to their history but also equipped with the skill and virtue of criticising 
their past. Secondly, being a person who does not retreat from society, like not 
watching down from ivory towers, being within the society, being morally upright. 
We describe in morals with the boundaries God has drawn for us, for a Muslim. 
They should perform well in their jobs. That concept of “a young person of 
character” will be constituted by this, they shall be a young person who is good at 
their job. Together with this, their understanding of freedom will comprise not 
accepting the existing situation but imagining a better one that can be [is possible], 
such that there always is a better one than the existing one. While doing this, they 
will not sacrifice their humanity to any other thing (authority, power, money), a 
model of a young person with that kind of understanding, this is what we are trying 
to develop, a character model. Certainly this is one aspect of it. Together with that 
we started holding an alternative school project last year. We called it “Thought 
Academy”. Here we started holding lectures with the pioneers in their fields, to 
comprehend the issues brought forth to the era. There are 60 young people from 
universities who have been regularly attending the last year’s lectures. (Emre, 
Male, Computer Engineering, 4th year, 20/4/2012) 
What is taught by the groups ranges from peaceful democratic change, to violent 
revolution and the installation of a theocracy. 
Why have you undertaken an active duty at a religious group?  
I started university life living at a religious group house [cemaat evi]. Younger 
students come there.  They are helped with their school courses. Apart from that 
topics like morals, modesty, respect for parents, hygiene, are being discussed. If the 
kids or their families are religiously observant, if they have somewhat of a 
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tendency, prayers are performed with them. I observed such things. I mean there is 
such a system. A nice, good system, I said, I shall be part of this. This is how it 
started. I remember telling someone on duty at the religious group [cemaat]. “Big 
brother, I’d like to have students too”. We already live a life, we shall make use of 
it, make it conducive to goodnesses, to good things. There are values we believe in, 
a life style; we shall tell it, convey it, it shall be delivered through generations, a 
perception like that, it was. That does not have a political side but we shall tell 
them that this life style is a life we embrace, we believe in. Religiousness, worship, 
or success at life… If we look into secular aspects too, I will give lectures to kids, 
so they succeed in their courses, become the best in their classes; at the same time I 
will teach them the necessities of the religion, they should be religious, their faith 
in God should be strong and such goodness shall be. Furthermore my God that I 
believe in would be pleased with this too. Our Prophet whom we follow, of whom 
we say we are the Muslim community [ümmet], would like it too, that’s how I 
thought. That was the motivation behind my work.  
Was there also an aim that Turkish society would become more religious, more 
Islamic in a political sense too?  
Not quite. (Kudret, Male, Law, 4th year, 11/4/2012) 
Osman summarized well the change in the views of political Islamist adherents. His 
father is also an Islamist; however, the new Islamist generation do not talk about the same 
issues and do not give such importance to politics as their predecessors did. This change, 
based on my observations, occurred after the 28 February military intevention in 1997. The 
President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and the former President of the Turkish Republic 
Abdullah Gül departed ways with their political Islamist leader, Necmettin Erbakan, and 
founded the AKP (Justice and Development Party) in 2001. 
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What are the things that make you as you are?  
Independence is crucial, no dependence upon any superior. In general, kids of 
political Islamist families… In general you would come across books with names 
such as Seyyid Kutup, Ali Şeriati in the houses of these kids, they approach the 
issues in a critical way. While many Muslims in Turkey do not produce things on 
Kurdish politics, we work on this and the right form of conscientious objection 
[vicdani ret] about military service. For example, labour rights is an important 
issue. Thoughts, criticism regarding the capitalists system, are brought forward. 
Actually tearing off from tradition is not possible but “traditional”, how should I 
say, stereotyped understanding, can always be questioned. (Osman, Male, 
Sociology, 3rd year, 27/4/2012) 
 
6.4 THE FUNCTIONS OF RELIGIOUS GROUPS  
In my interviews, I asked the students about the impact of religious groups on their lives 
and on society in general. I asked respondents to base their answers on their own 
experiences and observations. According to them, religious movements create social 
surroundings suitable for practising religion and socializing at the same time.  
It is probably since high school that religion is central to my life. My dad would 
constantly warn me about this, reminding and giving something of a vision. Apart 
from that, after meeting with Anadolu Gençlik, I started to feel that [sense of 
religiosity] more intensely. I met with Anadolu Gençlik during my first year of 
high school. 
I suppose socialising there, the friendship and so on must have affected you very 
positively.  
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Having people sharing similar ideas affect one in a positive way. In fact, if I can 
put it this way, we are all almost the same. (Ali, Male, Electronic Engineering, 2nd 
year, 10/4/2012) 
If I did not live at the religious group house [cemaat evi] but on my own, I would 
feel a bit left out of things. After I started to live at my own house, I realised that 
actually, I had been able to tell everything about myself very comfortably while I 
were there. I am aware that there is no ease when I stay on my own elsewhere. And 
there was also quite sense of solidarity there. I suppose knowing that there are 
people thinking like you makes one happy. For instance, not having those people 
sharing my thoughts makes me a little sad and I tell myself that I should work 
harder and do something. (Ferda, Female, Philosophy, 4th year, 26/3/2012) 
Some religiously observant students state that, although they are not against them, they do 
not need to attend the events of a religious group: 
I am not bound to a religious group. Neither do I feel a lack of it. Because I do have 
a religious environment where I find myself, where I feel good. But if I did not, a 
religious group might be needed. (Ebru, Female, Theology, 4th year, 27/8/2012) 
Developing religiosity (dindarlık) and spirituality (maneviyat) are obviously the 
most significant aims and results achieved by the religious groups. This purpose is 
accomplished in two steps. One is removing secular elements, which are against religious 
principles, and the other is bringing in religious factors. Depending on their interests and 
needs, students highlight different advantages of being members of the groups. While for 
some students, male-female relationships are a prominent issue, for others, it can be 
practising Islamic rituals and strengthening their spirituality, political problems and so 
forth. 
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You know, Anadolu Gençlik constantly reminds us that we are Muslims, that we 
need to behave like a Muslim. Like, at school getting into contact with girls, talking 
to them or getting involved in inappropriate (uygunsuz) things or making cheesy 
jokes with girls... It somewhat prevents us from these kind of things. (Ali, Male, 
Electronic Engineering, 2nd year, 10/4/2012) 
In this era when materialism has made people its slaves, if I say the facilities 
provided for us at religious group houses are insufficient, I will have betrayed 
myself in terms of my character. In this path, which is opened in a material 
direction, windows opening to spirituality are offered to us. I became involved with 
a religious group with very different intentions in my mind. Surely, first I had 
materialism in my mind. While knowing it more closely I felt the gap, the absence 
of spirituality inside me. I understood that the unique place to fill this gap is the 
religious group. (Atiye, Female, Sociology, 4th year, 24/5/2012) 
The influence of religion is rising among youth. The end of the prohibition 
[prohibiting public religious organizations display] was effective in that. The 
atmosphere of the universities changed. Many prejudices were broken. We can also 
count the significance of the activities of religious NGOs, societies and so on 
towards youth. (Ebru, Female, Theology, 4th year, 27/8/2012) 
I didn’t perform my prayers truly. But later at high school, it became obligatory 
[farz] for me. Since we were used to hanging out with friends, to hanging around 
with them, I upset my family a bit. Certainly, my family wanted me to be 
religiously observant. My mom and granddad insisted a lot. But because of 
hedonistic desires, because hanging around was easy, I couldn’t warm up with 
prayers. But I started to go to the course of the religious group during the final year 
of high school. We met with the religious group, started to stay over at the elder 
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brothers, “abiler”. Certainly when we stayed with them we performed the five daily 
prayers. But we would neglect the dawn prayer for instance. After continuing with 
the religious group a while longer, I thoroughly got used to the prayers, I started to 
perform them. (Faruk, Male, International Relations, 3rd year, 23/3/2012) 
Islam gives particular importance to living and praying together, caring for the 
needy, encouraging people to act well, and avoid doing wrong (Emr-i bi’l-ma’ruf nehy-i 
ani’l-münker). The opposite of these deeds are regarded as sins. Religious groups, 
according to the students, provide the opportunity to practise these personal and social 
principles and responsibilities in the networks they create. The groups perform these 
activities in various ways, such as establishing student houses and residences (evler and 
yurtlar), organizing religious conversations (sohbet), and controlling the permitted times of 
coming and going. 
Maybe the best feature of a religious group is that: It clears the ego away. It affects 
the youth very positively in this way. (Can, Male, Chemistry, 4th year, 2/4/2012) 
During high school I attended religious conversations or meetings of a religious 
group once, twice a week. Certainly this keeps religious feeling alive, I mean to 
attend a religious conversation once a week, a fortnight, to listen, like advice on 
religious matters, receiving suggestions keeps that awareness more lively. (Kudret, 
Male, Law, 4th year, 11/4/2012) 
Almost all religiously observant people are somewhat involved in a tarikat or 
cemaat. If there were no cemaats, tarikats and other religious groups, the ratio of 
being religious might have fallen substantially. Because if a cemaat entity [group] 
does not form then the emotion of selfishness comes forward. I do not think this 
thing can be reached a hundred per cent on one’s own. Certainly, a cemaat 
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environment is needed. I consider it as a necessity of religion. (Buse, Female, 
Theology, 4th year, 28/4/2012) 
There surely would be some differences in my life if I had not met with the cemaat. 
For example I would be a person who would put his career first by all means. Now 
my priorities are different. Like, rather than saying I shall have a perfect career and 
the rest are irrelevant, I believe that I should have a good career but also, I should 
live my religion and do things to fulfil the demands of religion. This is my priority 
now. (Kudret, Male, Law, 4th year, 11/4/2012) 
I have many friends who are connected to the Gülen Movement. I surely know that 
people of this cemaat are struggling to protect the youth, to protect them from all 
the seemingly bad deeds. Like, for example, these might not always be things we 
are okay with. Sometimes I even might object. But at least you know their 
intention. For example I stayed at a dorm of these people. You were not allowed to 
enter the dorm after 9 p.m. If you were going to enter the dorm after that it was not 
welcomed. If you will do it, somehow, then you have a responsible big brother; you 
need to call him and tell him “I am at this place”. This is some kind of precaution 
as they think. I think it is a good thing. Apart from that they encourage the students 
staying there to pray. They constantly invite them to religious conversations 
[sohbet]. They mention God, the Prophet. I think these are very nice and not easy 
topics. Cemaats protect the university students against secularism by providing 
them with accommodation. I think cemaats, tarikats, are doing their best to call 
people to the path that they know to be right. They provide the youth at universities 
with these facilities. (Birol, Male, Sociology, 2nd year, 27/4/2012) 
Bahar, based on her own experiences and preferences, summarizes well the social 
control exercised by religious groups on students, female students in particular. Her story 
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reveals that conservatism (muhafazakarlık) has a different meaning in Turkish society than 
it has in the West. The term needs redefining to accommodate the significance of politics, 
culture and religion for Turkish people. Bahar, for instance, is a religiously observant 
female student. She is a musician, does not wear the headscarf, defends a secular 
democratic form of government, and embraces a moderate interpretation of religion. 
However, she wants to conserve her religiosity from, as she sees it, the ‘bad’ aspects of a 
secular society. 
I live at a religious group house [cemaat evi], because of my other occupation. I am 
kind of half-active.  
What would be different in your life if the cemaat wasn’t there?  
I wouldn’t want it not to be there, as of now.  
Why, is it for the accommodation?  
No, no, really not because of that; if it was that, my aunt lives nearby, I could stay 
with them. All my relatives are around here. I came here of my own will, to stay. I 
am kind of a person who puts comfort first, if there is no one to push me, I might 
not do some religious duties. Those kinds of places are somehow protected. Like, 
because you are a girl you have to somehow be protected from society. You are not 
able to be as comfortable as a male, there needs to be a protective factor from 
outside. The cemaat creates protectiveness over you. Since they push you, you are 
able to do things more easily.  
What do you mean by protectiveness?  
For instance, outside things that are described as forbidden [haram] by religion 
start to feel like normal after a point.  
For example?  
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For example, you start making gestures to boys as comfortably as if you are with 
girls. By religion you shouldn’t do such a thing but after a point it starts to feel 
normal for you. But if you are within the cemaat you shake this off, you say, I have 
done wrong, I should collect myself.  
Do they warn you or do you think of it yourself?  
Not warning but you constantly hear, constantly listen. People around you are 
really clean people. They really protect themselves from the society, or rather from 
sin [günah]. And since you see them, by their words and actions, you start to put 
yourself in order. Or, for instance, say you missed one prayer, your conscience 
happens to be restless because people around you are trying not to miss. They are 
able to provide a protection for you. I wouldn’t want to quit in future too, because I 
am accustomed to the comfort, I am willing to get the salvation of my hereafter, I 
believe truly they can provide this salvation. (Bahar, Female, Philosophy, 4th year, 
30/3/2012) 
In a secular society and educational system, according to my interviews, religiously 
observant students and their parents experience a tension between religious principles and 
a secular lifestyle. They are apt to be concerned about the undermining of their religion 
and cultural values. Under these circumstances, religious groups which do not completely 
reject the modern state and society, are felt to fulfil the needs of people, both economically 
and socially. Creating spaces suitable for religiously observant people results in a number 
of benefits for both the groups and students, and most especially for female students 
coming up to university in Istanbul from the provinces. Sending their daughters to a huge 
and unknown city seems difficult for the average Turkish family. Religious girls are apt to 
be still more concerned about going to university in a foreign city. In a conversation, the 
secretary of a foundation university told me of concerned prospective female students 
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calling and asking even about such matters as the distance between male and female 
student residences. Here I suggest that religious groups make a significant contribution to 
the modernization of Turkish society in general, and university students in particular. 
The cemaat offers an alternative. To you, like, it opens an area where you can swim 
in your own water. Therefore there is no need to get out of water and die. But 
neither is there a need to vanish in that water and become part of that pool, because 
you have your own water, your own pool. (Kudret, Male, Law, 4th year, 11/4/2012) 
Most of my friends who are from other cities are staying with religious groups. 
Maybe they stay even although they do not want to, but their families trust the 
groups, saying “daughter, you shall stay in a place I know or we can trust”. At least 
with the religious group they are somewhere safe at nights… That’s the case 
mostly. A friend of mine wanted to leave the religious group house [cemaat evi] but 
couldn’t because her family did not want her to, because living outside in the end is 
difficult. That is, their family was worried like, in Istanbul what shall we trust… 
Certainly this is much more common for girls. There is also financial aspect of it. 
At the end there is a fixed amount you will pay when you stay at a religious group 
house; if you start to live in your own house you will pay at least 3-4 times more. 
At the end of the day, families of people from small villages, towns, have certain 
financial capacities. Therefore, some stay with religious groups out of necessity. 
(Fatma, Female, Architecture, 3rd year, 2/4/2012) 
Berna mentioned about the spaces in business life that are opened by religious groups: 
Together with secularism, in the simplest term, working hours, for example, are not 
arranged according to prayer times. And associations are organised so that they can 
follow the obligations of their religion. Schools likewise. Children at a secular high 
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school do not have a place to pray. For example, there is no prayer room [mescit] 
whatsoever at these institutions. And these people got organised in a way that 
would provide them with these. I think being such big and strong religious groups 
is a reaction to top-down imposition of modernisation and secularization. People’s 
concerns are first and foremost to live their religion in peace without being 
condemned or judged by anyone.  
In what possible way could membership in a religious group help with that? 
All have work places. They work at certain places. They are dominant in certain 
areas. If they would have a profession like banking they go to Kuveyt Turk for 
instance. If they would like to be a teacher, they become one at the religious group 
schools. Arising of the issue, it seems like that to me. Somewhat reactive. (Berna, 
Female, Sociology, 3rd year, 10/12/2012) 
Religious groups relate to politics variously. However, understandably, all are 
opposed to state repression of religious movements and their symbols. As I mentioned in 
Chapter Four, religiously observant people are not, by and large, against a secular state, but 
are troubled by the Kemalist-secularist state, which applies pressure on religion and 
religious culture, and also intervenes in religious lifestyles in order to change them in 
favour of a secular and modern lifestyle. According to some of my informants, religious 
groups aim to remove the pressure on religious people and groups. Emre sees the 
opposition as a fight between tradition and modernity. 
How do I find Fethullah Gülen? Let me put it like that: Revenge of tradition against 
modernism.  
What do you mean?  
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He is a kind of traditionist. He was educated at a traditional school, medrese. He 
studied medrese style science; he is the person who opposed the state mind-set by 
fighting modernisation and nationalism, who defeated the state mind-set. He 
defeated the modern state’s mind-set, the nation-state’s mind. But whether the 
current state mind-set he is standing before is the one he defeated, this should be 
discussed once more. Others should start to discuss these too. Because the state 
mind-set too has changed. In this, there probably is also Fethullah Gülen’s effort. In 
this there also is the effort of the Anadolu Platform, and the effort of the Nur 
movement and Milli Görüş, and efforts of the tarikats and İskender Paşa too. 
(Emre, Male, Computer Engineering, 4th year, 20/4/2012) 
The practical experience of Sunni religious groups in the history of Turkey has 
revealed a different kind of oppositional culture. Kara (2011b) defines it as “passive 
opposition”, arguing that religiously observant people in Turkey do not want the sphere of 
religion to be one of political fighting. They prefer patience and to wait for the appropriate 
time to change the system in an evolutionary way. Kara argues that this attitude is a serious 
and a vernacular kind of opposition; it is enduring and functional, at the same time. A well-
known Islamist and feminist writer, Tuksal (2012), similarly argues that in Sunni political 
culture people believe that rebellion results in great disorder (fitne) and bloodshed (kan 
dökme). This fear stems from the fighting after the time of the Prophet Muhammad. They 
prefer reconciliation with authority and living in a space granted by those in authority. In 
such a space, Sunni people or religious groups developed alternative dynamics to attain 
liberty and remove oppression (zulüm). 
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6.5 CRITICISM OF RELIGIOUS GROUPS BY STUDENTS 
The growth of Islamic groups since the 1980s has been read in various ways by scholars 
and writers. Some, particularly Kemalists, argue that the state intends to Islamize Turkish 
society from top to bottom. Religiously observant people, on the other hand, fret at the 
inadequate provision by the state of suitable conditions for practising religion. Çakır 
(2008) finds merit in both these viewpoints but considers them inadequate to explain the 
increased activity and proliferation of Islamic groups. He argues that Turkish society, 
which is conservative and religious, has turned to religion for personal peace and social 
solidarity, in the face of the disruption of modernization. It’s to this he ascribes the 
increase in prayer, worship and reciting of the Qur’an, as well as the increase in socializing 
through religious groups (cemaat and tarikat) organizations and events. Çakır classifies 
organized Sunni Islam under three headings: Diyanet organizations, working through the 
mosques and foundations; religious groups; and political Islamists. Islamic groups have 
felt the need to have religiously observant people thinking and speaking alike in order to 
have strength in unity to achieve their objectives: Islamizing society, removing state 
repression; and influencing politicians through their potential voters. At the same time, the 
state, Çakır argues, also did not want any enterprise by religiously observant individuals 
but rather to control society through groups and organizations. 
In the same way, there are various views and criticisms about religious groups 
among my research participants. The prominent criticisms were about freedom of 
expression and independent thinking. Although they appreciated the importance of 
religious groups, religiously observant students complained about the way that they 
discourage independent thinking. Students who were not connected with any religious 
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group wanted to take control of their own lives and take their own decisions for their 
future. 
I merely have some respect. I am against tarikat, cemaat that kind of things, I mean 
I do not have to follow a particular path. God created me, we have our book, and 
we have our prophet. Our responsibilities are certain. (Meryem, Female, Sociology, 
4th year, 19/4/2012) 
To me, the current cemaats feel like states sometimes. Sometimes it is like you are 
making an effort for them, you are doing something for them. And also what is 
called a cemaat has a leader, there is someone for you, this does not feel rational to 
me. To me it feels weird, having a leader and constantly following what he says, is 
going to say. They [students] should decide on their own what they are going to do 
with their life by thinking on their own. When one joins a cemaat it happens to be 
like you have to do this and that every day, we are going there in the evening, in the 
morning, at the weekend, there is a meeting there, we are going to do whatever they 
say. I mean with your own will you can go a couple of times and see. That’s fine 
but when one is constantly involved in it, then the students’ independence vanishes. 
(Fatma, Female, Architecture, 3rd year, 2/4/2012) 
Some religious groups evidently allow substantially more liberty of thought than 
others, and this was remarked on by some of my interviewees. Notwithstanding this, there 
are many secularist students who take the view that all religious groups are inherently 
inimical to the freedom and independence for their members. 
What makes your group different from other cemaats?  
I think that is, there is not a leader and there are no somebodies’ channelling, I 
mean, a format shifting, channelling, that is not there. Surely somebody would set 
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an example and support you. But according to me, this has never been formalist or 
in some way to channel your brain… Apart from the no-leader thing, they are 
valuing people for who they are as people. (Buse, Female, Theology, 4th year, 
28/4/2012) 
Nevertheless, secularist students argued that not all religious groups support independence 
and liberty, and that those students who are active in religious groups cannot have their 
own thoughts and cannot decide about their own lives. 
I absolutely am against tarikats and cemaats because an idea is being imposed 
there. They do not allow people to be as they are. There you act according to the 
opinions of others. You do not own your own thought. Everything utterly shall 
happen as a certain person says. (Galip, Male, Radio Art and TV, 4th year, 
30/3/2012) 
We used to go to the Qur’an course when I was little, I didn’t like it at all. To 
follow an order has not appealed to me since I was a kid. One comes there and 
reads something and others are, like, yes, we should live like that. This does not 
feel right to me. Maybe the intentions are good but I do not need the books read. 
Yes I shall read, and form it [my own opinion], embrace the things I need to but I 
will live my life as I know and wish… (Adem, Male, International Relations, 3rd 
year, 24/4/2012) 
Rationality is a notable feature of the new generation of Turkish society’s approach 
to religion with the expansion of higher education in the country. This leads, often enough, 
to conflict with their parents, religious groups, and traditions. My research participants, 
university students, want to maintain their belief in God, and other religious doctrines, but 
in a rational way. Rather than being fatalist, they want to be the captain of their own soul. 
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In contrast to their forebears, they want to read the Qur’an in Turkish, with understanding. 
This propensity towards rationality seems not to dispose students to irreligion but rather to 
“conscious religiosity” (şuurlu dindarlık). However, there is uncertainty and a diversity of 
opinion among students regarding the limits and scope of rationality. What counts as 
rational varies between individuals and from group to group. All the Nur movements for 
instance, focus on the faith that is acquired through investigation (tahkiki iman), and 
criticize faith acquired through imitation of the ancestors or predecessors (taklidi iman). 
Some groups highlight the importance of having a conscience (şuur, bilinç) in faith, 
prayer, morality, and human affairs. Other groups and religiously observant individuals 
criticize them for being irrational in-group brainwashing forms of relationships and 
teachings. Some students, while being uncompromising when it comes to decisions in their 
own lives, might submit unquestioningly to guidance on a political issue, for instance. 
Both the NGOs and religious groups [cemaats and tarikats] have undoubtedly 
played a role in the rise of religiosity in the society. But an Islamic definition 
without a social and political awareness is not right. Since this definition is 
regressive, also it regresses the perception of civilization. We do not accept this 
definition. So to carry out this definition maybe, how effective are the tarikats. So 
cemaats, yes, they are somewhat effective, maybe very effective but how effective 
are tarikats? That should be talked about too. Like, tarikats might be having a 
negative effect.  
Like making people more passive?  
Unfortunately it happens.  
Is that a bad thing?  
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Yes, it is, because a person’s way of thinking, contemplating on their own is an 
important matter. For example, a cemaat or tarikat leader who tells people to vote 
for a party is denying the minds of people, the mind of the individual, I think. A 
person should always have the liberty to choose, to live according to their own 
rights and wrongs. Such that, look to the Qur’an verses warning on this matter. 
From Taha to other chapters, it merely says, warn, threaten or give the good news. 
The order may change. It says you tell the people. It does not say, force people to 
do something. But there is that kind of handicap in the perceptions of the cemaats 
and tarikats. This is a handicap that should be overcome. There is a handicap in the 
groups about valuing the person, valuing Muslims. (Emre, Male, Computer 
Engineering, 4th year, 20/4/2012) 
Religiously observant students who prefer not to be members of a religious group, 
but to be active in an NGO or a non-religious society criticized the conservative character 
of religious groups. They often held the view that they do not need external control, that 
individuals can control themselves if they really believe in the principles of their religion. 
One of my interviewee students likened the protective structure of the religious groups to 
living under a glass bell, able to see but not feel. Having left a particular group, he said that 
now he experienced the genuine taste of both good and bad deeds. Fatma, as a religiously 
observant female student, also argued that although religious groups are useful in various 
ways, they isolate students from the world. 
To be honest, I do not think we should be that much protected from the outside 
world. Like, at the end of the day, bad habits are the person’s own, nobody is 
imposing them on you. One can protect oneself. In the past too, during my high 
school and university years I was never devoted to the cemaat life but never fell 
into doing bad deeds either. In the end, it is up to you. And I have never seen 
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someone who would acquire bad deeds, or so. This way it is like a person has never 
been able to decide for themselves about something. Like if they see people 
drinking and enjoying themselves, they immediately do the same thing. But this 
won’t happen. (Fatma, Female, Architecture, 3rd year, 2/4/2012) 
Hale approached the subject in terms of the different characteristics of people and 
groups, arguing that religious groups appeal to the heart (kalp), rather than reason (akıl), 
and people were different in their interests. While religious groups and their teachings 
were attractive to some people, they would be unattractive to others. Her argument, 
though, seems much more suited to the tarikats, than the cemaats and political Islamist 
groups, as the tarikats of Turkey concentrate on spirituality rather than philosophy and 
politics. 
Cemaats and tarikats have an effect of bringing people closer together or moving 
them further apart. In the Islamic tradition we can distinguish this like the theology 
[Kelam] culture and a sufi [tasavvuf] culture originated in the Islamic tradition, and 
these two have never got along very well, they are constantly conflicted. Because 
while one appeals to the person’s mind, the other appealed to the heart. This 
situation also signals people’s approach to religion. While some people want 
religion to address their minds others want their hearts to be addressed. Thus while 
religious cemaats are attractive for some, they are repulsive for others. Since some 
actions in the cemaats seem irrational to people, it can actually push people away 
from religion. And others approach it feeling that “this is the thing I needed”. As I 
mentioned regarding myself, I think I have spiritual needs and want them to be 
fulfilled. For example there are many people having those kinds of needs and to 
fulfil these gaps people are heading towards cemaats. But that is okay, if it is their 
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own individual choice, it is a nice thing. (Hale, Female, Theology, 3rd year, 
1/5/2012) 
 
6.6 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has analysed the place of Turkish religious groups in the lives of university 
students in terms of their religiosity and secularity. Elucidation is sought of the perceptions 
university students have of religious groups, and the ways the groups affect students’ lives; 
how they influence the students’ political attitudes towards the secular Turkish state; the 
impact on the lifestyles of the students publicly and privately; and what students think of 
the religious groups for good and for ill. 
In Turkey, university students generally encounter religious groups early years in 
education or lately at university. Some religious groups have established private primary 
and secondary schools and universities. Students attend these schools either because of the 
academic success of these schools or because of their parents’ desire that their children 
receive a good education, including a good religious and moral education. Because of the 
inadequacy of religious education in public schools, some students of public schools attend 
Qur’an courses run by religious groups. Some religious groups have established university 
preparatory courses, which have become popular, and have spread all over the country. 
These courses have come to be seen as necessary to be able to get into university, so that 
many university students attend them and thus encounter a religious group. As everywhere 
in the world, cheap accommodation is a must for most university students; and the 
facilities, accommodation and scholarships offered by religious groups to students is very 
attractive. Even non-religious, non-practising, or secularist students benefit from these 
opportunities. The groups establish student societies at universities and organize youth-
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oriented events. At the same time, they organize other kinds of events outside of the 
universities such as picnics, football matches, movie nights, tours, religious meetings, and 
religious conversations. 
In Turkey, Islamic groups mainly fall into two camps: tarikats and cemaats. While 
tarikats focus on the spiritual aspect of Islamic teaching, Sufism, and date back to the first 
centuries of Islam, cemaats, although they originally arose from tarikats, are new religious 
movements, which were founded in the period of the Republic. Along with the spiritual 
aspect of Islam, cemaats are particularly concerned with education, politics, relief of 
distress and other social matters. Of the Tarikats, Nakşibendilik, Mevlevilik and Kadirilik 
are the most influential of a wide range; while Nurculuk or the Nur movement, Gülen or 
the Hizmet movement, the Milli Görüş movement, and Süleymancılık are the most 
organised, widespread and well-known cemaats. In this thesis, these are all referred to as 
religious movements and religious groups. As the focus here is on Islam and Muslim 
university students, other religions and their religious groups have not featured in this 
research. 
The history of religious groups is, at the same time, the history of the relationship 
between the religious and secularist state in Turkey. In addition, it can be seen as a conflict 
between privatization and non-privatization of religion. While the Turkish state was 
struggling to push religion into the margins and into the private sphere, religious groups 
and their activities were seen as a threat by the state and secularists, who were inclined to 
suspect the religious of being unhappy with the secular Republic and wanting to go back 
(irtica) to an Islamic regime implementing Shari‘a law. The finding is that among the 
priority targets of these groups is placing religion, religiosity and religiously observant 
people into the public sphere, and in the meantime, securing for university students 
suitable alternatives to “unsuitable” secular spaces and leisure activities. They seek to 
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educate the new generation in Islamic values, teaching them Islamic beliefs and principles. 
According to the students, private schools and universities established by religious groups 
respond to the needs of religiously observant people giving a quality science and religious 
education. 
Based on my observations, it seems religious groups are achieving their aims of 
creating social surroundings suitable for practising religion, while providing opportunities 
for socializing through their institutions and events. This also responds to the felt need of 
both parents and students, particularly female students with their home at a distance from 
Istanbul. For an average conservative Turkish family it is difficult sending their children, 
especially their daughters, to another city, which are perceived as full of “dangerous” 
places and people both in terms of safety and Islamic values. There is reason for thinking, 
therefore, that religious groups make a significant contribution to the mobilization and 
modernization of Turkish society. In addition, there has been a significant role of the 
religious groups in ‘de-privatization’ of religion, that is, bringing it into the political and 
public spheres. As Tocqueville points out, “the democratization of politics and the entrance 
of ordinary people into the political arena would augment, rather than diminish, the public 
relevance of religion” (cited in Casanova, 2006: 20). 
Another observation of mine on my both secularist and religiously observant research 
participants has been their growing tendency to embrace an individualization of their 
religion. Even religiously observant research participants criticize religious groups for 
some of their characteristics. While they appreciate the importance of religious groups, 
they complain of them discouraging independent thinking. Not all religious groups are 
authoritarian, but students do generally feel the need to take control of their lives and make 
their own decisions. There was some criticism by students of groups they had had a 
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relationship with at one time, but had left because, they said, of lack of respect for 
individuality. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: DIVISION OR COHESION? 
 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter, my aim is to find out whether there are sharp divisions among Turkish 
university students with regard to religion and secularism and, if so, to ascertain this 
division. I also explore how university students understand this division, and then assess 
the debate from conceptual, political, and social angles. Another aim of this chapter is to 
explore whether the differentiation in Turkish society results in extreme polarisation or 
whether it is a consequence of a pluralistic society. 
In order to elucidate these issues, I will first consider the literature on the Turkish 
fragmentation or division debates in the conceptual, political and social spheres. After 
summarizing and reviewing the views of relevant scholars, I present and analyse the 
responses to and experiences of the Turkish university students with whom I conducted in-
depth interviews in Istanbul on this issue. I will also present the observations I made in 
Istanbul during my fieldwork. 
This chapter consists of three sections. In the first section, I consider, culturally and 
conceptually the issue of differentiation of some philosophical underpinnings. 
The second section concerns debates at the political level. Although a part of 
chapter four concentrated on Islamism and secularism, here the subject is examined from 
another aspect, seeking answers to the following questions: what are the meanings of the 
terms Islamic state and secular state in Turkey? What are the perceptions of Turkish 
university students of these terms and subjects? 
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And finally, the third section concentrates on differentiation within Turkish society. 
Whether Turkish youth culture, particularly among university students, has become 
fragmented in terms of religion and secularity, is the central subject of this section. In order 
to find the answer, I consider the statements of my informants and my observations during 
my fieldwork in Istanbul. In answering the following questions, this section is related to 
the central questions of my thesis; namely, are there different lifestyles in Turkey in terms 
of religiosity and secularity? Does religiosity necessitate a different lifestyle for religiously 
observant Muslims? Are there different spaces for religiously observant and non-observant 
people in Turkey? Is there tension experienced by religiously observant or non-observant 
Turkish university students because of differences in lifestyle? How much difficulty do 
religiously observant university students encounter in practising religious values and 
principles in their lives, and what are the main difficulties? How do they try to solve 
problems philosophically, politically and socially? 
In the literature, scholars with different worldviews and from different disciplines 
generally agree that there has been tension in Turkish society over religiosity and 
secularity. According to Berkes (2002) the major problem in secularization is the 
restriction and supression of the sacred sphere in economic, political, educational, sexual, 
and informational life spaces. He argues that those who are against to this process are 
called reactionary (irticacı, mürteci), and hence this is defined as a conflict between 
reactionaries and “modern people”, between people and the state, or between intellectuals 
and the uneducated. 
Religiously observant Muslims have been in philosophical, cultural and political 
crisis for more than a century. As Akyol (2011b) says, the biggest Islamic problem of the 
21st century is how to be a good Muslim in an open, democratic and global world in which 
Islamic values are to be defended. 
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Together with industrialization, political, social and cultural modernity or secularity 
have brought a big change to Turkish cultural codes. The major change has been in the 
minds of the people. Arslan (1998) highlights the psychological and philosophical aspects 
of the tension experienced saying that there is a price we need to pay for modernity, and 
this price is the tension that arises from balancing different identities. He argues that we 
juggle our different identities in modern life, and that without facing this difficulty and 
experiencing this tension, we cannot be modern. 
Some scholars discuss tension at the societal level. A secular judicial system, for 
instance, causes tension in Turkish society because a judicial system should respond to the 
needs of society. As Öktem says, “in a country with an overwhelmingly Muslim majority, 
secular legislation always presents practical problems in the conduct of social life” (2002: 
371). 
 
7.2 DIVISION AT THE CULTURAL AND CONCEPTUAL LEVEL 
The original distinction between religious and secular affairs in Islamic thought is different 
from that in Western thought. The term used for religion and religious affairs is din and the 
term for the world and worldly affairs is dunya. However, these are not seen as completely 
separate by Muslims. Berkey argues that the distinction between the sacred and secular is 
“meaningless” in Islamic thought and tradition (2004: 203). Dunya or dunyawi does not 
mean secular; it refers to worldly affairs through which Muslims work, and which test their 
moral right to ascend to heaven in the hereafter (ahiret). 
Muslims argue that Islam is not only a belief system but has principles and values 
concerning every aspect of life, from politics to the civil sphere (Daver, 1988). 
Monshipouri claims that Islamic principles and institutions are associated with all spheres 
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of life. He says, “In the majority of Muslim societies, there is not a distinct separation 
between religion and other aspects of people’s lives. Islam is both din wa dunya (religion 
and the world).” According to him, there is not a conflict between religion and the world; 
rather, the problem is “between the forces of tradition and the forces of modernity” (2004: 
615).  
During my fieldwork, I asked my informants about the relationship between 
religion and the world. Religiously observant students emphasized the significance of the 
penetration of religious values into worldly affairs. When we talked about the wide-
ranging activities of Kudret’s religious group he compared the comprehensiveness of the 
religious group with the comprehensiveness of religion itself. According to him, religion, 
Islam in particular, is related to every aspect of life: 
We are in a period that if you are not in every part of the society, you will not be 
able to be part of it. We speak of the communication era. That is, you need to be in 
each and every place. You need to have a word. Because this is precisely what 
religion is. That is, religion is in every part of society. Secularism, religiousness, 
these are not Islamic terms really. To separate these is like to separate the earth, to 
put the hereafter in a faith apart; this is secularism, I think. In Europe, for instance, 
it is working very well, like in France. Like the sphere of the Church is fixed, the 
sphere of the state is fixed; they do not interfere in each other, everyone does their 
job in their area. So nobody steps in to the area of the other. But Islam is not like 
that. Islam encompasses the whole of life, it is a living thing. Something that 
organizes everything. Hence, if you separate the earth, the state, apply secularism 
to an Islamic state, that will not happen. Because in the end, Islam is a religion that 
designs both life on earth and in the hereafter. In this respect, it is a system in its 
entirety that rules everything together. Actually, in their essence, the monotheistic 
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religions like Christianity and Judaism were so as well. They designed both life on 
earth and in the hereafter. You could say that when these separations took place 
they brought about the bankruptcy of religion, because religion is a totality. 
Religion encompasses the whole adventure of being human; if you divide it, it is 
finished. Hence if you are a Muslim you have to be so in every sphere of life. Since 
religion is a system that encompasses all spheres, all actions, you need to carry the 
values of religion to all spheres so that religion can be established. Maybe you 
sould be in media as well. At least, you should do your version of it, I mean, you 
should do it the way a Muslim is supposed to do it. (Kudret, Male, Law, 4th year, 
11/4/2012) 
The distinction between din and dunya is used in Islamic literature to classify 
Islamic rules and duties. The terms are used for different areas of religious duties: din 
means ‘ibadat, namely worship and ritual, while dunya means mu‘amalat, namely worldly 
transactions (Zubaida, 2005: 438-9). As a result of this distinction, while a state can apply 
law enforcement to worldly transactions, it cannot apply legal sanctions in the sphere of 
worship. Worship being related to the hereafter, people can only give advice and preach on 
matters of this nature. As Kamali says, “The Shari‘ah itself draws a distinction between 
juridical obligations and religious obligations (wajib qada’i, wajib dini) and takes the latter 
out of the jurisdiction of the courts of justice” (Kamali, 2008: 266). Another reason for 
drawing this distinction is to clarify which areas and rulings can be changed according to 
the needs of the time and new circumstances, and which areas and rulings cannot be 
changed. Renewal (tajdid) is crucial for religion and for a judicial system. In Islamic 
tradition, renewing the rulings according to essential Islamic principles and sources is 
provided with ijtihad, which means the striving of Muslim scholars to find new rulings or 
solutions for new problems (Çelik, 2012). If the ruling concerns worship, it can never be 
	   215 
changed. However, as Kamali indicates, “If it concerns worldly transactions, the majority 
of jurists have held that it is open to interpretation and ijtihad” (Kamali, 2008: 26). 
The general Western view of modernity and secularity, which involves separating 
religion from worldly affairs, is not seen as compatible with Islam because, first of all, the 
main principle of Islam, according to al Faruqi, is unity (tawhid) and it, together with the 
oneness of God, implies the unity of din and dunya, faith and practice, politics and religion 
and so on (Al Faruqi, 1982). For approximately a century, Muslim scholars have discussed 
the possibility of separating religion from politics, the judicial system, education, and 
science. Some modernist scholars argue that it is possible, and that adopting modernity and 
secularity is the only way to escape the social and political problems of the Muslim world, 
since the main cause of these problems is Islamic tradition. Some traditional scholars, on 
the other hand, defend the conservation of religion against modernity, rejecting 
Westernising attempts at reform (Çelik, 2012). 
Opposed to these extremes, the majority of influential Muslim scholars defend 
renewal and revival. According to this view, Islam is related to all spheres of life at all 
times, and is not for a particular time or circumstance. Islam was revealed at a particular 
time for all times until the day of judgement. Employing the concept of ijtihad, Islam may 
be seen as not completely opposed to modernity, nor in need of adapting to it, but rather 
renewal may be achieved through an internal dynamics, relying on the primary sources 
(the Qur’an and the Sunna) and the principles deduced from them. Past Muslim scholars 
created a methodology to do this called Usul al-fiqh (legal theory or the principles of 
Islamic jurisprudence). This methodology aims to ascertain what is mutable and immutable 
in Islamic law, and guides Muslim scholars when they perform ijtihad in response to a 
change in circumstances (Karaman, 2010). 
Saeed makes the aforementioned classification in the following way: 
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Muslims can be divided into three broad categories as far as their responses to the 
challenges posed to Islam by modern ideas, institutions and values are concerned. 
The first category sees no need to change 14 centuries of tradition and regards any 
‘modernization’ of the understanding of religion as tantamount to a mortal blow 
against Islam. The second feels that opposition to change is unwise and 
counterproductive if Muslims are to be active participants in the modern world. 
They present Islam in a way that suits people living in the modern period, but do 
not go as far as significantly altering traditionally held Islamic ideas, institutions 
and values. The third category wants to re-present Islam by questioning key aspects 
of the tradition, ignoring what is not relevant to the modern period, while 
emphasizing what is relevant and attempting to remain faithful to the immutable 
Qur’anic ethos, objectives and values (2006: 8). 
Tariq Ramadan (2009) is a well-known Muslim scholar who advocates the 
compatibility of Islam and modernity. He refers to the ambiguity of some Muslim thinkers 
concerning modernity and Westernization. Ramadan draws a distinction between 
modernity and Westernization: “Nothing in Islam is opposed to modernity and we can 
firmly state that Muslim thinkers and ‘ulama’ (learned scholars) who are opposed to this 
notion, and to the idea of change and evolution that it covers, often confuse it with the 
model which is current in the West. Clearly, they confuse modernity with Westernization” 
(2009: 307). He sees the values and principles of modernity as compatible with the 
principles of Islam: “Muslims have themselves, therefore, to discover the challenges of 
their time. Nothing in Islam is opposed to individual engagement, social reform, to 
progress and well-being. On the contrary, one of the principles of Usul al-Fiqh is to 
consider that all social reform and scientific progress.” (2009: 308). 
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There is a crucial difference between modernist scholars and revivalist scholars (or 
the advocates of renewal, tajdid) in Turkey, as in the Muslim world in general. Revivalist 
scholars and movements highlight the importance of the starting point. According to them, 
modernist Muslims make mistakes when they interpret Islamic sources and tradition on the 
basis of modern and secular values. They argue that, even if they arrive at the same result, 
Muslims need to identify themselves on the basis of Islamic values, and they should seek 
solutions for the sake of Islam. They say that Muslims must shun the influence of Western 
values and politics; otherwise all interpretations will only legitimate modern circumstances 
(Paçacı, 2008).  
In Islamic thought, worship (ibadet) is not limited to rituals, such as prayer 
(namaz), fasting during the month of Ramadan (oruç), and pilgrimage (hac), but comprises 
all activities. One of the most influential revivalist Muslim scholars of the republican 
period in Turkey, and founder of the Nur movement, Said Nursi (1878-1960), emphasised 
the importance of intention (niyet), saying that, having considered it for forty years, he 
believed that intention even has the potential to transform ordinary activities (adetler) into 
worship (ibadet) (Nursi, 1993). This view is put forward in various works; there being the 
condition that people must practise the obligatory prayers (farz ibadetler). According to 
one of my informants, even going on holiday can become worship as long as she continued 
to perform the necessary prayers: 
Religion is of course at the centre of my life. There are rights and wrongs in my 
head. I go along with the world as long as I do not do wrong, not neglect my 
worship, respect the rights of my parents over me (these can be multiple). There are 
general rules of religion. Others are there to ensure that you do not violate those 
rules. For example, one should be in tesettür (clothing and being covered in an 
Islamic way). I could do it with either a headscarf or a shawl. For example, “jeans 
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are not to be worn” is not a general rule, it is formalist. In fact if you wear jeans and 
a topcoat over it, you are in tesettür. Like that. To me, worship is not solely prayers 
and fasting. For instance, as long as one follows one’s obligations towards God, 
going on a vacation is also worship. Unless I neglect my prayers being on vacation. 
Or, if they are performing charity, practising charity (zekat), and so a Muslim 
shouldn’t be judged over possessing, maybe not the most expensive, but the most 
comfortable car. (Ebru, Female, Theology, 4th year, 27/8/2012) 
The definition of the term “Islamic” comes into prominence here. What is Islamic 
and what is un-Islamic? Some Muslim thinkers advocate separating religion (din) and 
Islamic law (fiqh) from each other, arguing that while religion cannot change, law can. In a 
symposium organized by Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı (Turkish Religious Foundation) in 2002, 
Ali Bardakoğlu, who was the president of the Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı (Directorate of 
Religious Affairs) between 2003 and 2010, defended this view. However, one of the most 
prominent Muslim scholars, Hayrettin Karaman, objected, arguing that it apparently 
implies the secularization of the sphere of jurisprudence. Karaman said that God does not 
give free rein to people and the universe; rather, He or religion intervenes in all spheres of 
life. This intervention includes permissible (mubah) acts, spheres of life, and issues 
(Karaman, 2007).  
In Islamic jurisprudence there is a distinction between legal, moral and religious 
rulings depending on their levels of necessity. Although the number and names of terms 
vary from one school of law (madhhab, in Turkish mezhep) to another, the original names 
of the terms in Arabic are wajib (obligatory), mandub (recommended), mubah 
(permissible), makruh (reprehensible), and haram (forbidden). In this way Islam does not 
exclude any sphere and, as Kamali argues, “concerns itself with all areas of human activity, 
not always in an imposing and overbearing way, but in the form of moral encouragement 
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and persuasion” (2008, 18). Karaman (2007) says that even the permissible (mubah) is 
under the control of God, being permissible in the light of Islamic values and principles. 
Since the beginning of modernization and secularism in Turkey, the terms 
“Islamic”, “un-Islamic”, secular (in Turkish, seküler, laik) have not been used in the public 
sphere. Instead, these terms have been used as a quick way of identifying institutions, 
products, organizations, and so forth as compatible with Islamic values and principles or 
not. This creates a bifurcation in society between the Islamic and un-Islamic. One of my 
student informants worked for an “Islamic” newspaper, and I asked what he thought of the 
distinction between his paper and a secular one, having regard to the fact that secular 
papers also have religious columns and a special page during Ramadan. 
What are the features that make your newspaper Islamic? For instance, say 
authors of theology, it happens to be in a secular newspaper, like Hürriyet, too?  
You can’t see an advert for alcohol in our newspaper, it would not take an advert 
for alcohol, this is loud and clear, this is what makes our newspaper Islamic. For 
example, you cannot see an advert with nude women, which would not be 
compatible with religiousness. You can’t see an advert of a swimsuit, not a model 
with a swimsuit. A décolleté will not happen, say naked legs, etc. will not happen, 
and neither will be alcohol advert.  
Banks?  
Banks could be but not advertisements for interest. Akbank, for instance; say they 
started a campaign giving consumer loans. But establishing a system without 
interest, arbitrarily, saying “we are just charging a commission but not any 
interest”. It specifies zero per cent interest tables and sends the advert of that to 
you. These are the matters on the advertising side; apart from that there are things 
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on the publication side. For example, for a movie with [sexually] nasty content, 
there could be reviews, but no promotion.  
With the columnists, would there be things that would not be compatible with the 
values of Islam?  
It might be, because not all of our columnists are Muslims, like we have Armenian 
authors. Certainly every publication corporation has a policy and they do not let 
you breach this, would not let you contravene it, if you will not follow that 
publication policy this is not your place. That does not mean everyone will say the 
same thing, like in a single choir. Our newspaper’s publication policy is not a 
narrow one, for instance, you shall not swear at sacred values, insult people; apart 
from that, write whatever you wish. That is put aside; it is not like there is no space, 
say, for a socialist statement. We have socialists, Armenians, etc. authors. (Kudret, 
Male, Law, 4th year, 11/4/2012) 
The relationship between Islam and science is another significant issue in the 
philosophical sphere. This issue was discussed in the twentieth century by almost all 
religious scholars in Turkey and in other Muslim countries. I observed in Turkey that this 
debate has lost its appeal because people see a less contradiction between Islam and 
science. It appears, in my view, that religious groups, and the religiously observant 
students supported by religious movements, played a part in this change. All the university 
students I met during my fieldwork in Istanbul agreed that Islam and science are 
compatible with each other. The only exception to this, albeit a most significant one, is 
evolution theory. Some non-science students tended to doubt it. One student told of a 
Kemalist-secularist uncle of his who was very surprised that he believed in science. All the 
secularist students also held the view that Islam and science were not in contradiction. 
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There is a significant detail in this worth mentioning. Al Attas summarizes the 
sensitivity of religiously observant people regarding relationship between Islam and 
science:  
We do affirm that religion is in harmony with science. But this does not mean that 
religion is in harmony with modern scientific methodology and philosophy of 
science. Since there is no science that is free of value, we must intelligently 
investigate and study the values and judgements that are inherent in, or aligned to, 
the presuppositions and interpretations of modern science. We must not 
indifferently and uncritically accept each new scientific or philosophical theory 
without first understanding its implication and testing the validity of values that go 
along with the theory. Islam possesses within itself the source of its claim to truth, 
and does not need scientific or philosophical theories to justify such a claim (1995: 
38). 
 
7.3 DIFFERENTIATION AT THE SOCIETAL LEVEL 
Turkey has a society divided into various groups in terms of various aspects, such as 
ethnicities, religions, sects, religious groups, leftist groups, politics, religiosity and so on. 
Those who are religiously observant and those who are not are one of these divisions in the 
country. Culturally this fact can be observed in every walk of life, from neighbourhoods to 
schools, clothing to newspapers, hotels to TV channels, there are widely understood and 
shared coding systems through which people detect degrees of religiosity and secularity. 
Having different understandings of religion and the world causes a division in 
Turkish society. Those who embrace modernization and Westernization and those who 
embrace and prioritize Islamic values live in the same society, but in different ways. A 
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social differentiation occurs in various spheres of life and, as a result, there might be 
tensions experienced by all sides of society. As Göle argues, “Changes in life-styles and 
aesthetic values that reflected the shift from an Islamic to a Western culture created cultural 
distinctions and social stratification in Turkish society” (1997: 51). 
During my fieldwork, in my interviews, in the events organized by religious and 
secular groups, and in daily conversations, I observed a general discourse of  “we” and 
“them”, the use of these pronouns depending on the speaker. When it comes to lifestyle, 
religiously observant student typically uses “them” in reference to secularist people. This is 
the same for secular or secularist students. However, while secularist students use “dinci” 
(religiost) or “İslamcı” (Islamist) as synonyms, religiously observant students generally do 
not use particular words to describe secularist people. Only some extremists and political 
Islamists distinguish themselves as “Muslim” as opposed to the secular status ascribed to 
everyone else. When I asked, “If you are Muslims, what are the others? Are they non-
Muslims?” they appeared taken aback and at first said nothing, and then reluctantly agreed 
that others are Muslim too. The students in the Nur movements identify secular Muslims as 
“ehl-i dünya”, i.e. worldly or worldly-minded people. This term refers to Muslims 
neglectful of religious duties and the hereafter, for whom religion is not at the forefront of 
their life. The adherents of most religious groups do not usually hold this view of secularist 
people, but refer to secular groups by name or political stance, e.g. “CHPli” is used in 
regard to the secularist and Kemalist political party, CHP, and “solcu” in reference to those 
they regard as left wing. 
I also observed great differences between the everyday language of religiously 
observant and secularist students. While religiously observant students prefer words from 
Ottoman Turkish and Arabic, and words evocative of religious values, secularist students 
avoid using such Ottoman Turkish and Arabic words, preferring a secularized language 
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restricted to “pure” Turkish (öztürkçe) and Western loan words. Sometimes conflicts over 
wording blow up, especially in the media. The way the Eid following Ramadan, the month 
of fasting, is referred to, for instance, gives rise to comment in the media every year. While 
the secular media will generally refer to it as “Şeker bayramı” (the Sweet Feast), 
conservative or Islamic media call it “Ramazan bayramı” (the Ramadan Feast). With some 
of my informants I prepared a list of words used mostly by secularist people and those 
used mostly by religiously observant people. 
Table 1 – Different Languages in Daily Life in Turkey 
 ENGLISH RELIGIOUS SECULAR 
GREETINGS Good day Selamün aleyküm İyi günler 
 Good morning Hayırlı sabahlar Günaydın 
 Take care Allah'a emanet ol Kendine iyi bak 
 Good night Allah rahatlık versin İyi geceler 
 I am fine, thanks İyiyim elhamdülillah İyiyim, teşekkür ederim 
 Congratulations Hayırlı olsun Kutlu olsun; tebrikler 
 Happy eid Bayramınız mübarek olsun Bayramınız kutlu olsun 
 Happy birthday Allah hayırlı ömürler versin Nice senelere 
WISHES God bless you Yerhamükallah Çok yaşa 
 I hope İnşallah Umarım 
 Thank you Allah razı olsun Teşekkür ederim 
 Rest in peace Allah rahmet eylesin Toprağı bol olsun 
 Get well soon Allah şifalar versin Geçmiş olsun 
NAMING Ramadan feast Ramazan bayramı Şeker bayramı 
 God Allah Tanrı 
 Headscarf Başörtüsü Türban 
NOTIONS Science İlim Bilim 
 Coincidence Tevafuk Tesadüf 
 Islamic İslamî Dinî 
 Fortunate Bereketli Uğurlu 
 Fortune Kader Talih 
 Kismet Nasip, kısmet Şans 
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Some points should be made about the uses of the different words in this list. While 
religiously observant people use secular language along with their religious language, 
secularist people rarely use religious words in private or in public. It seems to me that this 
is a matter of power relations. As my religiously observant informants declared, they felt 
under secularist pressure at school and work and in almost every sphere of their public life 
until the rise of the AKP government. Under these circumstances, religiously observant 
people had to use secular language in order to hide their true affiliations and avoid social, 
political and economic discrimination. From my observations, circumstances have slightly 
eased for religiously observant people since the AKP came to power in 2002, and although 
secularist people still do not use religious expressions, the expressions of religiously 
observant people has been normalized in daily life, business, politics and the media. 
Students in their public life feel the religious-secular social divide. Faruk, for 
instance, complained about the contemptuous attitudes of his secular classmates: 
When they talk with young people of our side, young people of the social section or 
socialist youth try to mock them. Like at the very least there is sarcasm going on. 
They do it as if it is somewhat a joke, if they are close friends. Or, if they are not, 
they might look down on them (religiously observant students). That is the case. 
This is a common situation that we can generalize, such that I observe it. (Faruk, 
Male, International Relations, 3rd year, 23/3/2012) 
The headscarf or its absence is the most visible sign of a woman’s worldview. 
According to Ferda, students wearing the headscarf feel the social division much more 
than others: 
I started wearing a headscarf while I was at a private high school. Although it was a 
school of a cemaat, many of my friends did not wear the headscarf. It was two of us 
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who wore headscarves. I too started to wear a headscarf and suddenly realized how 
much attention I got from (those) around me. Because, even in our family, my 
uncles for example, when I wanted to greet them during the feast (eid or bayram), 
did not extend me their hands. There were ones behaving unpleasantly because I 
wore a headscarf. I then realized the people had started to act differently; there was 
such separation in public. When I was a kid, I realized that separation. I still have 
this thought in my head. There is a separation in every aspect, for instance as to 
ideas. I think people are categorizing themselves according to it. They classify in 
that sense, I realized. And another thing, I see that people who understand Islam 
completely surely are different from the ones who do not know and understand 
Islam, and maybe I want to think so a bit also. (Ferda, Female, Philosophy, 4th year, 
26/3/2012) 
Another religiously observant student, who wears the headscarf, studying in the 
faculty of architecture, talked about her anxieties at school, over her religious identity: 
I feel bad when I see some behaviour of teachers at school. For example, our 
teachers are still harassing us at school because we wear headscarves. When 
defending a project to a panel, the teacher might criticise the one wearing a 
headscarf twice as often as the others. As a result of that, there is lack of good will 
towards the school. Certainly I cannot say that for all teachers, but you come across 
some such teachers. And that ruins your whole day. You feel like you struggle for 
nothing. And there is that also: when you look to the general profile of the 
architects, in general, it is a Kemalist, left wing society. People feel like they need 
to be accepted by them. Like you always need to explain yourself to them and 
prove yourself to them, like “look I too can do it, I actually am that kind of person”. 
To me this is something I do not like at all. There is a fear that they can block my 
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way in future, can obstruct me, but I do not know whether this will happen. (Fatma, 
Female, 21, Architecture, 3rd year, 2/4/2012) 
However, when I asked the same student whether she experiences these problems with all 
lecturers and all secular friends, she said that she does not. 
Generally old teachers are like that. Young new teachers do not have such a 
problem. Some lecturers, who are old and have been at that school for years, act 
that way.  
Are you having that problem with your friends?  
There is no such problem with friends. I mean you realize [they notice] but, there is 
no verbal harassment. (Fatma, Female, Architecture, 3rd year, 2/4/2012) 
There is a crucial point here: although these kinds of problems were and are 
experienced among the older generation, it would seem that the new generation does not 
experience these troubles as much as the previous one. In the new social structure of 
Turkey, young people have much more interaction with each other and spend more time 
together. Nevertheless, even though they get closer with the passing of time and know each 
other more than before, both secularist and religiously observant students have prejudices 
about each other. According to religiously observant students, the secularists have many 
prejudices against them. They think that religiously observant people only listen to 
religious music; only read books by religious writers; are not interested in science; do not 
like having fun; always vote for the AKP; and are all involved only with religious groups 
and their events. Fatma, after outlining such assumptions, admitted that religiously 
observant students have similar prejudices about secularist students.  
Actually if you think about it, there are many women wearing the headscarf in our 
school. When you look around the school, actually many of the people wearing the 
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headscarf are also extremely prejudicial towards secularist people. (Fatma, Female, 
Architecture, 3rd year, 2/4/2012) 
Although big social tensions do still exist in Turkish society between the religiously 
observant and the secular, according to my own experiences, observations and the 
statements of my informants, the social distancing and prejudices have dramatically 
decreased in recent years. I attended the spring festivals of four different universities. In 
the festivals, schools and student societies organize concerts, lay on entertainments, set up 
on open markets, all for approximately one week. When I was at the festivals, I observed 
that there were thousands of attendees at each of the campuses, there were many female 
students wearing headscarves, and male students who are active in religious groups. Even 
though they did not drink alcohol and join the dance groups, they attended the concerts, 
listened to the pop music singers and spent some times enjoying the festivals. 
Among my informants, many religiously observant students mentioned their good 
relations with secularist, Armenian, Jewish and leftists students. And secularist students 
mentioned good relations with religious male and female friends. They generally stated 
that although they had different worldviews and political views, there were not that many 
social problems among young people, and the problems were gradually decreasing over 
time. The problem, as they saw it, was mainly with the older generation. Sema’s activism 
is a good example for dialogue between the students from different backgrounds and from 
different worldviews. She is a very well known activist student among both religiously 
observant and secularist students, who sometime appears in TV programmes due to her 
activities.  
Among young people, there is no problem of isolating others. I have many friends 
who do not wear a headscarf and many who do. I have friends who wear a burqa 
(çarşaf), Jewish friends and Armenian friends. For all, we are able to get along with 
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each other, and we can talk. Moreover I have friends who wear the headscarf and I 
introduce them to my secularist friends. And I do observe they get along. Very 
well, I mean. There are some women, narrow-minded dinosaurs. They are still not 
happy with our getting along well. As if art is their monopoly, Istanbul is their 
monopoly, they stare like saying “Oops where did you come out! Wear your clogs 
and return to your neighbourhood, Çarsamba!” Not common among young people, 
but some happen to come from a Kemalist family, for instance. They cannot 
understand, cannot empathise. They do not often share an occasion with a person 
wearing a headscarf. They can only share a bus, but that is because they have to. 
Such young people are suffering from prejudice and distance. (Sema, Female, 
Photography, 2nd year, 25/3/2012) 
This supports Toprak’s argument that the division between the urban elites and the 
traditionalist mass of the population is in fact disappearing because of social and 
geographical changes:  
“The division of the population into a secular, urban elite committed to the 
Westernization project of the republic’s founders versus a largely traditional mass – 
a division which has been widely discussed by Turkish social scientists as a centre-
periphery gap – is a much less useful categorization today. Social and geographical 
mobility, coupled with the development of modern communication networks, to a 
large extent have integrated the periphery with the center” (1995: 94).  
Toprak indicates that new social, geographical, and economic conditions have brought 
significant changes in society. Although the secular elite of Turkey did not welcome the 
new elite, now they share the benefits and share the same spaces. As a result, both sides are 
now being transformed. Yahya says that although university students embrace different 
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lifestyles, social relationship and communication between different groups at university are 
quite good: 
There is public pressure on the religious, such that, at the university, a person who 
wants to practice their religion is, like, somewhat isolated. I mean this is a natural 
process. At the end the so-called youth who follow popular culture go for fun, hang 
around at Taksim, do this, do that. But since a conservative person is bound by 
some rules and lives social life of this kind only to a certain extent, because of that 
there is a separation, a split, but among friends there is no such discrimination. That 
is, whoever prays, prays, and whoever does not, does not. There is no such problem 
among university students. So generally that pressure is not there. Put aside certain 
marginal groups, except the marginal groups, the left wing and the right, ones not 
wearing headscarf and ones wearing it, they can all hang out together. All can sit 
and chat around a table. (Yahya, Male, Biology, 4th year, 27/3/2012) 
 
7.4 SPATIAL DIFFERENTIATION IN TURKISH SOCIETY 
The religiously observant students I interviewed in Istanbul generally mentioned lifestyle 
(hayat tarzı) and said that religion and religiosity necessitate a particular way of life. In 
some spheres of life religious lifestyles are very apparent: attending Friday prayers; 
praying five times a day; fasting during Ramadan; abstaining from alcohol and wearing the 
headscarf are some prominent examples (Andy-Ar, 2011). Having different lifestyles 
results in differentiation in some social places of gathering. Although religiously observant 
and secularist people in Turkey share the same spaces, religious duties and principles 
associated with lifestyles create particular needs for some places, and keep religiously 
observant people out of others. For instance, the prohibition on looking at the body of a 
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woman, except her face, hands and feet, which is seen as forbidden (haram) for men in 
Islam, might restrict public space for religiously observant men and women. Drinking 
alcohol also seen as forbidden, while being present and doing shopping in a place selling 
alcoholic drinks is not approved of in the Islamic tradition. As a result, some religiously 
observant people might experience tension in their social lives. 
I like being out. I particularly like school. You could say I like almost every 
occasion. Certainly, except for being secular. The secular part is the way people 
dress. You know, I like the way a Muslim wants to dress. If we would at least think 
about the Prophet, if he was to be at my school, he would not like to see the people 
I see. I am not comfortable with that scene, particularly how women dress. Men, 
too, we observe aspects of their dress not much in accord with the Sunna, but I am 
particularly uncomfortable with women. I am suffering from that… Certainly, 
praying, during the daytime is also a big problem… (Birol, Male, Sociology, 2nd 
year, 27/4/2012) 
You cannot go to a nightclub with a religiously observant person. With them, 
maybe a chat at a teahouse can happen. Or, for example, you cannot go somewhere 
serving alcohol. They would not come, or convey to you a negative message. So 
they would not be involved in these occasions. Because in their heads, they have 
that code: alcohol is sinful. According to their beliefs, if we were in a place selling 
alcoholic drinks, we also would be sinners. (Galip, Male, Radio Art and TV, 4th 
year, 30/3/2012) 
Praying (salah, in Turkish namaz) five times a day is one of the most significant 
causes of tension in daily life for a religiously observant student. Praying five times a day 
is an obligatory (farz) duty in Islam, and the times of prayers are determined by the 
position of the sun. Under these circumstances religiously observant people, students in 
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particular, have difficulty finding places to perform the obligatory ritual ablution (wudu, in 
Turkish abdest) in the approved and proper fashion. The normal washbasins in the toilets at 
school, say my informants, are not suitable and are found offensive by others. It can often 
be similarly difficult to find a suitable place to perform namaz. Namaz, along with reciting 
Qur’anic verses, includes certain acts such as standing (kıyam), bowing (rüku) and 
prostration (secde). The ground must be clean and shoes must be taken off. Practising 
Muslims need particular places such as a cami (a big mosque) or a mescid (a small mosque 
or prayer room). Otherwise they need to carry around a prayer cloth. In universities and 
other places which do not include camis or mescids, religiously observant students can 
experience tension affecting their socialising, and even their education and work lives. 
Meryem was a religiously observant student of a private university founded by a 
religious group. She compared her university with other universities. 
I, for instance, would not want to go to places like Kültür University, Bahçeşehir 
University, Beykent University and so on.  
Why?  
If I went to these universities I would neglect my prayers, would not pray, but here 
there is a prayer room (mescid) on every block, comfort for ablution (abdest), I do 
not neglect my prayers. But those universities would not have that.  
Do campuses not have prayer rooms in general?  
In our school there is one in each block. Some have just one.  
Are there places, like, for ablution on the campus?  
There are ablution sinks in the prayer room; this is in every building, both for men 
and for women.  
	   232 
Then do you not wish that all public buildings had mescids?  
I do, the thing I am best at is being an organizer, but in a religious sense this would 
hinder my daily worship. Although it is the job I am best at, I cannot do this 
efficiently.  
Why?  
Because that sort of job, being organizer, does not have regular days and nights, I 
need to be constantly supervising it; I need to constantly supervise a three-hour 
event that would cause me to miss my prayer. Because of that, I gave it up. I wish 
there was freedom of religious worship and more possibilities and facilities; but if it 
is not happening, I will make my choices appropriately to myself. We have to. 
(Meryem, Female, Sociology, 4th year, 19/4/2012) 
Another student mentioned difficulties relating to namaz: 
The high school was outside the city. There we did not have a facility for our 
worship, like a mescid or something, neither was there a mosque nearby. Only a 
village mosque that is a twenty-minutes walk away but with no vehicles to get 
there. The lunch break was forty minutes. It was very hard to go to the mosque and 
come back, and if you did, you could not eat. But as religiously observant or 
conservative people we chose to go anyway, squeezing the meal into the break 
time, and so we went to pray anyway. I got along with the biology teacher, got the 
keys of the biology lab from him. Because the gap between prayer times was 
narrowing. First, he did not know but after I asked for the keys for it a couple times 
he asked, and I told him; he did not make a problem. The biology lab was in good 
shape. There was a sink; you could use it for ablution. There were long, big tables, 
you could pray on top of them. (Kudret, Male, Law, 4th year, 11/4/2012) 
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These difficulties led some religiously observant students to being active at 
universities in creating spaces to practise their religion. They founded student societies, 
endeavoured to establish a mescid, organized religious events and conferences. These are 
some examples of their activities. It seems that the AKP government has made their work 
much easier than before. 
Our faculty heads are from the Nur movement. Faculty heads played a big role in 
the opening of mescids on this campus. So somehow with their influence these 
mescids were opened, because they have been trying to open them for two-three 
years. They are making efforts, saying that we want a mescid at the campus and so 
on, but this year a mosque was finally opened. And also, now mescids have been 
opened in all the faculty buildings. In the new schools too, and certainly at the other 
universities. Surely, the changing of those Presidents of the Republic might have 
helped. In every building mescids have started to be opened for men and for 
women. (Ali, Male, Electronic Engineering, 2nd year, 10/4/2012) 
Neighbourhood pressure seems also another cause of tension for religiously 
observant students. Although secularist and religiously observant students have good 
relationships and good communication with one another compared to their parents’ 
generation, they still witness and experience some problems in some places. As an active 
secularist student, Galip complained about the social pressure on his religious friends. 
According to him, there are some neighbourhoods and places where secularist people live 
and they do not accept religiously observant people in their public spaces: 
With a female friend who embraces Islamic thought completely, we cannot spend 
time at the Asmalı Mecit district right behind here. There are public prejudices 
there. When we go to a restaurant with an evidently religiously observant girl 
wearing a headscarf we would not be served well by the waiter, because the 
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customers of that place would not accept it. Or at Cihangir. You think of the 
population there, as writers, thinkers, researchers, doctors, and such sections of the 
society happen to have tendency towards left wing thought. When you go to the 
places where these sections of society socialize together with a girl wearing 
headscarf, you happen to be somewhat unwelcomed. I personally experienced this. 
(Galip, Male, Radio Art and TV, 4th year, 30/3/2012) 
Another factor influencing spatial differentiation is the desire to provide a suitable 
environment seen, in terms of religious values, to educate children. Religiously observant 
students generally said that their families preferred suitable neighbourhoods and schools, 
particularly for their children. The family of one student I interviewed even moved to 
another city known for its religiosity: 
My parents transformed into an Islamic family and since they thought that in Muğla 
practicing their religion would not be possible, or rather that it would not provide 
for a solid thing for their future and the future of their children, they sought 
somewhere closer to Istanbul and moved to Kocaeli. To feel more comfortable 
living an Islamic life, for their children to live more easily, thinking they probably 
would not be able to look out for them in Muğla. Since they encountered religion 
late, they were in conflict whether they would be able to make it as to practising 
their religion, and because of that they moved fourteen hours away from home. 
(Buse, Female, Theology, 4th year, 28/4/2012) 
How did your father become religiously observant?  
I suppose my mom has had some effect on that, mom taught some things. There 
used to be programmes on TGRT by then, he watched them. Then he went on 
pilgrimage; there was a change after that. Then we moved to İhlas Houses, city-
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state, where a more religious section resided. Then he learned to recite the Qur’an. 
(Meryem, Female, Sociology, 4th year, 19/4/2012) 
Separating males and females (haremlik-selamlık) is a much debated and most 
problematic issue in the daily lives of religiously observant people nowadays. There are 
strict rules in the Islamic tradition governing the relations between men and women. For 
Turkish Muslims, İlmihals (catechises; concise books of Islamic faith, worship and ethics) 
play an important part in their religious lives. These books include basic information on 
Islamic principles and rulings for use in private and public life. Such things as: the 
principles of prayer; fasting; business life; male-female relationships; and permissible and 
forbidden acts. These works, which are seen as reference guidebooks in Turkey, explain 
such religious matters in detail, referring to the main sources of Islamic jurisprudence, the 
Qur’an and the Sunna. The sources are interpreted in the light of the Sunni Hanafi sect, 
which is embraced by most of the Turkish population. According to an ilmihal published 
by the Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı (the Directorate of Religious Affairs), sex outside 
marriage (zina) is forbidden in Islam. Other rulings about relations between men and 
women seek to lessen the temptation to zina arising from pornography or lewdness. These 
rulings are for unmarried, non-kin men and women. The main forbidden acts in this regard 
are: looking at the bodies of women apart from their faces, hands and feet; for women, 
looking at men’s bodies between the belly and the knees; looking, listening and touching 
salaciously a person of the opposite sex; being alone together with a person of the opposite 
sex (Bardakoğlu, Karaman, and Apaydın, 1998). The attitudes of university students to 
these prohibitions vary depending on their understanding and interpretation of these 
rulings, and on their degree of religiosity and secularity. Ebru, for instance, although 
willing to be interviewed, declined to meet me face-to-face but responded to my questions 
by email. She, like other religiously observant students, sees social relations between men 
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and women as one of the imtihans (religious tests set by God). I asked Ebru what she 
thought of this issue:  
Mixed occasions of men and women chatting and having fun is what we are talking 
about, they should be totally avoided. Certainly this is also somewhat related to the 
environment. The test of one who is going to a girls-school is not boyfriends but 
something else. But if it is co-ed, then the environment becomes a test. Not having 
been involved in these circumstances I cannot lecture from a distance, maybe I too 
could not stand the situations and would talk with boys, I do not know. But there 
are rules that will not change. If I were tested, I would know that what I was doing 
was wrong. One should talk with boys only if necessary, one should not be 
comfortable as if talking to a girl. I do not believe in girl-boy friendships. It 
conflicts with our nature. It should be like a teacher-student relationship. You like, 
you respect but you do not get informal, you have your boundaries… However 
crowded the occasion, I do not sit together and drink tea with a stranger man. And 
whatever the subject is, it is not only a matter of principles. Since it is against what 
I have learned, it is against my principles. (Ebru, Female, Theology, 4th year, 
27/8/2012) 
In the course of a speech in January 2013, the then Transport Minister, Binali 
Yıldırım, talked about his time at university, saying, “After I sat the university entrance 
exam and received my exam result, I was torn between two options. I would either go to 
Boğaziçi (Bosphorus) University or Istanbul Technical University. I first visited Boğaziçi 
University. I took a look and saw that it was a different world. Different buildings and so 
on, and then I saw young people in the garden; girls and boys were sitting together on the 
lawn. I was very surprised. I told myself, I will stray off the road here at this university, so 
I selected Istanbul Technical University” (Haber Türk, 2013a). Although his remarks were 
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not openly supported, he reflected the ideas of some religiously observant people who do 
want to maintain spatial differentiation in public life as far as possible. Ali was one of 
them: 
Certainly I want the girls and boys to be separated in the classrooms. It is not a 
good thing for them, being in the same classroom. And of course it is about the 
sensitivities of girls too, actually, for the ones thinking this way. Besides, for the 
boys’ comfort too it would be better for them being in separate classes. (Ali, Male, 
Electronic Engineering, 2nd year, 10/4/2012) 
The provincial chairman of Saadet Partisi, the party of the religious Milli Görüş 
movement, said that they wanted pembebüs, a ‘pink bus,’ a women-only bus service in 
Istanbul, because of the difficult conditions on public transport (Posta, 2012). Buses are 
generally so crowded that this causes real discomfort especially for female passengers. One 
student blamed the mayor of Istanbul, saying that if he were truly religiously observant he 
would have done something about this problem. Two students also mentioned pembebüs 
approvingly. Yet one student argued that male passengers are also uncomfortable in the 
current conditions on public transport, and said he wants a “mavibüs,” a males-only “blue 
bus” service! 
Certainly, surely so, it is even more important for both men and women, even if 
there is a “pink-bus” there should also be a “blue-bus” for men. Because it seems 
like it is always women feeling uncomfortable, but among man too there are many 
feeling uncomfortable. A few times on the bus, I saw men getting annoyed like 
“Hold tight! I am trying to keep clear yet you fall over me”. And she (the female 
passenger) replies “What can I do?” Such conflicts are happening all the time, 
actually, so ladies and gentlemen should use different buses. But apart from that for 
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others there can be a metrobüs which can be used by all together. (Ali, Male, 
Electronic Engineering, 2nd year, 10/4/2012) 
However, although all religiously observant students see this issue among the 
imtihans, the degree of sensitivity varies depending on their culture, family education, and 
sense of religious priority. In my observations, the social relations of males and females are 
no longer strict in the spaces frequented by those who are religiously observant. During my 
fieldwork, I created a Facebook page with the title of my thesis, Din ile Sekülerlik 
Arasında [Between Religion and Secularity]. I shared some news, articles, advertisements, 
and books in order to get students’ opinions about these issues, ask questions and conduct 
polls. There were approximately two hundred members on my list, most of whom were 
Turkish university students and university graduates. I shared, for instance, news about 
new houses in the Netherland that were built in accordance with the needs of religiously 
observant Muslims, called “Halal” or “Islamic houses” (NRC, 2012). According to the 
report, the main features of these houses, which made them “Islamic”, were the shoe 
cupboards, bidet nozzles in the toilets, and separate kitchens and sitting rooms in order for 
men and women not to see each other. I asked the members of the page whether they 
approved this house plan. Surprisingly, most of the religiously observant members were 
not happy with this kind of naming and plan, which they labelled formalist religious 
thinking and a waste of time. 
Similarly, when I asked my student informants during the fieldwork on how they 
planned their wedding parties, some traditionalists and a small number of religiously 
observant students said they wanted the wedding organised with men and women sitting 
separately (haremlik-selamlık). Other religiously observant students disagreed with this. 
Although they accepted religious rulings relating to relations between men and women, 
they did not approve of the sexes sitting separately on such occasions. According to them, 
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there was no problem at all if women go to school, work, and travel together with men. 
The important thing, according to them, is the principles rather than the external forms. 
Emre was a religiously observant student who was active in a religious society and worked 
together with both men and women. He argued that the haremlik-selamlık is bound up with 
rural culture and is out of place in the city. 
In the Republican period, Islamic tradition, Islamic components in Anatolia were 
supressed and these supressed Islamic components retreated to the rural area. In 
other words, retreated to the village and there arose again. The rules of the village 
and the city are not the same. The city is different. Sitting males and females 
separately (haremlik-selamlık) being more common in cities. This is wrong. These 
rules might be right for the village. But they are not for the city. (Emre, Male, 
Computer Engineering, 4th year, 20/4/2012) 
A female student complained about males, and her, conservative male classmates in 
particular. She criticized them for being sexist and selfish. According to her, the main 
problem is in the minds and feelings of men, not women. She argues that men want a 
perfect and easy world in which there is no imtihan (divine test), no difficulty, no striving 
to win through in the face of difficulties and obstacles. 
A man says that women should not appear in public life so that I should not commit 
a sin. Does that kind of world really exist? Woman should reside inside the home 
so that I should not commit sin! Then, you are not doing anything to be rewarded 
with paradise. Like he would not say, I should close my eyes. If it is to close your 
eyes which you need to do, there, then you will be able to do it. That is what falls 
into your responsibility as a man. But they do not actually close their eyes. In that 
matter I am very troubled with men. Rather than a woman problem actually there is 
a man problem. There is a perception problem. Since we are not able to correct 
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that, it is not right for us to focus on ‘the woman problem.’ If you are affected by 
looking at any woman then you are perverted, in the moral sense. In this country I 
saw even women in burka being harassed. Only the eyes are apparent and on the 
eyes there is no makeup and so on. Then the problem is not what women wear; it is 
men’s point of view, their perception of woman. (Hale, Female, Theology, 3rd year, 
1/5/2012) 
Two religious writers, who represent two different viewpoints of my informants, 
debated these matters recently. One of the foremost Islamic scholars in Turkey, Hayrettin 
Karaman, wrote a much-debated article in his newspaper column. In his article, Karaman 
(2011) criticized the pressure of the secularists on religious life, arguing that secularists try 
to impose their lifestyles on religiously observant people in various ways, and are thus 
totalitarian. He also argued that everyone must be free to distinguish right from wrong, 
what to approve and what to disapprove of. The liberal Muslim writer, Mustafa Akyol 
(2011a) commented in his newly published book about this article and said he agreed with 
Karaman’s ideas. Nevertheless, he did not agree with him on the attitude religiously 
observant Muslims should adopt towards people of whose lifestyles and acts they do not 
approve. In the article, Karaman argued that normally particular places should be provided 
for people who act in ways that are inconsistently with Islamic principles, in order that 
they do not influence the new generation. However, this is not possible in the current 
political conditions. Another solution would be moving to particular neighbourhoods with 
other religiously observant people, but this is also impossible in the current social 
circumstances. It is necessary to live among people who do not observe religious values, 
principles and duties, and even alongside those who sin openly, sharing the same 
neighbourhood, apartment block, workplace or school. According to Karaman, religiously 
observant Muslims can respond in two ways: internally, they hate those bad deeds and they 
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intend to correct them at a suitable time and opportunity; externally, they at least do not 
smile at people behaving badly. Akyol objected to the idea of spatial separation, calling it a 
“zone defence”. Instead of defending the traditional social order and traditional 
interpretation of religion, he argues that Muslims should consider modern realities and the 
present social order, and should focus on improving personal morality (bireysel ahlak). 
Instead of applying pressure and isolating religiously observant people from society in 
order to protect them from sin or heresy, Akyol argues, they should give religiously 
observant people individual consciences; this would be fruitful for both religion and 
religiously observant people. 
 
7.5 SEEKING SOLUTIONS: CREATING ALTERNATIVES 
Living in a secular state and country and aspiring to practise religious principles in daily 
life, at work, in business and education, leads religiously observant people to seek 
solutions that would emancipate them from dilemmas, ambiguity, and tension between 
their Islamic faith and secular life. Along with intellectual endeavours, activist religiously 
observant people, religious movements, charities and societies take concrete steps in order 
to resolve this matter within the bounds of possibility. The key word for this solution is 
‘alternative’. Religiously observant Muslims in Turkey, except for some fundamentalists 
and extremists, want to practise their religion while accommodating themselves to 
modernity. However, they realize that there are some inconsistencies between Islamic 
lifestyles and modern lifestyles. Under these circumstances the majority of religiously 
observant Muslim individuals and religious groups, instead of completely rejecting the 
values and institutions of the modern world, try to reconcile them with Islamic principles. 
So, for example, loan interest (faiz) being forbidden in Islam, some religiously observant 
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Muslims have founded so called interest–free, ‘Islamic banking’, which is currently 
offered by such banks as Bank Asya, Albaraka Türk and İhlas Finans. 
This subject is also closely related to the debate on what “Islamic” and 
“Islamization” are. In some cases, religiously observant Muslims struggle to protect 
Islamic values and forms of society from the influences of the secular state and society, 
while in others, accommodating the realities of the modern age, they reproduce modern 
ideas and institutions in the light of Islamic values, and call them “Islamic”, like Islamic 
banking, hotels, schools etc. 
New Year celebrations are debated every year among religiously observant people 
in their social circles and the social media. The question is whether attending the 
celebrations, or even watching them on TV, is permissible (helal, caiz) or forbidden 
(haram), the reservations being that the celebrations have Western roots and involve 
drinking alcoholic drinks, and watching nasty images on TV. In order to protect university 
students from these, the various religious groups endeavour to organize alternative events 
on New Year’s Eve: a movie night; a night of computer and other games. The Milli Görüş 
movement, for instance, organizes Fetih Gecesi (the night for the conquest of Makka) 
events for university students, via Anadolu Gençlik Derneği, every New Year. 
We do not celebrate New Year’s Eve. On the contrary we oppose the celebrations 
because it causes very unpleasant results, like the incidents in Taksim. When many 
people drink, when people’s friends start to drink, the ones hanging out with them 
who normally happen not to be drinking at all sometimes start to drink. In fact 
because of that there is always a celebration of the conquest of Makka on New 
Year’s Eve. The Anadolu Gençlik Derneği (Anatolian Youth Society) does it in all 
the districts. It is done in other cities as well. It is intended for university students, 
the public, for all. At big halls. The aim is to prevent bad deeds from occurring. 
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The conquest of Makka actually was not on New Year’s Eve, but you see, they 
celebrate it exactly on that night. (Ali, Male, Electronic Engineering, 2nd year, 
10/4/2012) 
Restaurants and cafés serving alcoholic drinks are generally seen as unsuitable 
places for religiously observant students to go and spend time. Although some of them do 
not see a problem with going to those places with their secularist friends, they do not 
normally choose to go there.  
In general I do not go to places serving alcohol; when there is an alternative I do 
not prefer to go there. (Hale, Female, Theology, 3rd year, 1/5/2012) 
Fifteen years ago, I met an Islamist man who had prevented his children from going 
to primary school when they were younger, arguing that those schools, being institutions of 
a secularist and Kemalist state, are forbidden (haram) in Islam, and could harm his 
children with their secular teachings. Now he deeply regretted his decision, confessing that 
he had made a big mistake, and asked me to help his children with their maths and Turkish. 
Religiously observant people realize the significance of education and send their children 
to school and university. However, while wanting them to be successful at school, they still 
strive to protect them from secular values (aspiring to secular mindset) and lifestyles to 
keep them away from “unsuitable” social circles, and to provide a religious education 
outside of school. The activities of the religious groups for students have been reinforcing 
alternatives on this issue; İmam-Hatip schools (religious training high schools) have been 
another important alternative. However, the main and the most successful alternatives have 
been private primary and high schools and foundation universities established by religious 
groups. People send their children to these schools for them to get a good education, 
including in religion and morality, taught by religious teachers in a suitable social setting. 
The significant point here is that religiously observant people do not want their children to 
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get only religious education. They want them to be “modern Muslims,” getting both 
modern science and religious education at the same time. While the term ‘modern’ can be 
used as a criticism in some contexts, it is more usually used approvingly, pointing to a 
person who practices his religion while keeping pace with the modern age. 
A student mentioned online collaborative dictionaries as a social sharing platform, 
built on the contributions of users, and in particular an Islamic alternative dictionary called 
İHL Sözlük (the Dictionary of İmam-Hatip High School). Although she admitted the 
alternative dictionary had lost its popularity, her explanation is important in terms of why 
the dictionary was established, and how the terms alternative and Islamic are perceived: 
There are non-religious Turkish online dictionaries on the Internet. Entries are 
opened on various subjects and the members make comments, as if they are 
definitions. Entries are not composed of single terms. Sometimes a sentence, 
sometimes a new item, an opinion of someone, sometimes writers’, books’, 
movies’ names… Anything you can think of can be an entry. There are famous 
dictionaries that you must have heard of, like, Ekşi, İTÜ, Uludağ, etc. These are 
“no holds barred”. In the name of liberty of thought, obscene cursing, insults, 
disrespect of faiths… Administers do not intervene. One dictionary that was 
founded with the need felt in the social media for a respectful dictionary with 
morality is the IHL dictionary. It happened as they said it would be. Cursing and 
obscene jokes are prohibited. Harassment of peoples’ sacred values, and insulting 
God or His prophets, are prohibited. It was safe. But the discussions were boring. 
Boys were picking on girls by branding them with names like Islamic intellectuals 
or so. At times girl-boy mixed gatherings happened in order to meet each other. 
They would steadily discuss whether it was permissible (caiz) or not. But usually 
the gatherings were of girls and boys separately. Other things were also done. As 
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far as I know, there is a reading group, which is still running now. As if almost 
everyone was from the theology faculty (!). Most of them would know everything 
(!). Certainly there were members with different life styles too. I was at a one time 
active there but I got bored. It did not leave a good impression on me. And now 
they are said to just potter about. The desire to complete the project is very 
diminished. (Ebru, Female, Theology, 4th year, 27/8/2012) 
The alternatives and the term ‘Islamic’ can be encountered many spheres of life. 
The number of  “alternative holiday centres”, for instance, has increased in recent decades. 
These hotels are known as alternative, conservative (muhafazakar) and Islamic hotels. 
They have separate swimming pools for men and women, Halal food, prayer rooms 
(mescid), and they do not serve alcoholic drinks or pork. Although they organize concerts 
and have places of entertainment, they have no disco or nightclub. Caprice Hotel and Sah-
Inn Hotel, for instance, are the most well known Islamic hotels in Turkey. They have many 
customers among ethnically Turkish religiously observant people in Europe.  
Differentiation of the religious or Islamic from the secular exists prominently in the 
media too. There are numerous Islamic newspapers (Yeni Şafak, Akit, Zaman), TV channels 
(Kanal 7, STV, Hilal TV), and fashion magazines (Âlâ, Aysha, İkra, Hesna). There are also 
building complexes (İhlas Konutları, Şehrizar Konutları), and foundation universities 
(Fatih University, Şehir University) that are Islamic. One of the student respondents used a 
general expression for all these: Islamic or Turkish civilization. She sees “Islamic 
civilization” or “Turkish civilization” as the alternatives to secular-Western civilization: 
I see secular lifestyle and western civilisation as dangers. We have our own 
civilization: Islamic Civilization. This geography (place) has a civilization. We 
could call it Turkish Civilization too, it is totally okay for me. There is a lifestyle, 
an understanding of the world that is promoted by this civilization. This is the 
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alternative to the modern and secular civilization of the West. (Hale, Female, 
Theology, 3rd year, 1/5/2012) 
 
7.6 CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, I examined the argument that there is a division in Turkish society in terms 
of the worldviews of the people as religiously observant and secularist. I looked at the 
issue from different aspects: mainly philosophical and sociological. I had already 
elucidated the political aspects of this division in Chapter Four, so I touched on it very 
briefly in the present chapter. Focusing on the philosophical and sociological aspects of the 
division in Turkish society, particularly university students, I ascertained the details of the 
division through the relevant works of some scholars, and my interviews and observations 
from fieldwork in Istanbul. In addition, I explored the fact that the differentiation in 
Turkish society does not result in extreme polarizations; rather, it is a consequence of a 
pluralistic society, and by somewhat exclusive, alternative lifestyles. 
I showed that religious individuals, and religious groups which have softened state 
oppression and worked underground to avoid surveillance, are now able to be more open. 
They are more powerful than before in politics, economics and culture. The most 
significant factor behind this has been the AKP government ascendance to power since 
2003. The AKP government has given rise to a new elite, and has come as a relief to 
religiously observant people, who now feel free to express and practise their religious 
beliefs and principles. 
In the Islamic literature, while the term din is used for the religion and religious 
affairs, the term dunya is used for the world and worldly affairs. These two key terms are 
not generally seen as in conflict and completely separate areas from each other. My 
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research participants agreed with this idea and both secularist and religiously observant 
students said that religious and worldly affairs should not be in contradiction with each 
other. However, the problem appears when students begin to discuss what religion and 
religious requirements are. Although they were all Muslims, they were grouped with 
respect to their understanding and interpretation of religion and religiosity. Each 
interpretation results in a particular lifestyle that separates its followers from others. And 
this separation appears diversely, from discourse to language, from private institutions to 
preferences in daily life.  
During my fieldwork, including interviews and my involvement into the everyday 
activities of students, I observed a general discourse of  “we” and “them”, the use of these 
pronouns depending on the speaker. I also observed great differences between the everyday 
language of religiously observant and secularist students. In some spheres of life religious 
lifestyles are very apparent: attending Friday prayers; praying five times a day; fasting 
during Ramadan; abstaining from alcohol and wearing the headscarf are some prominent 
examples. Having different lifestyles results in differentiation in some social places of 
gathering. Although religiously observant and secularist people in Turkey share the same 
spaces, religious duties and principles associated with lifestyles create particular needs for 
some places, and keep religiously observant people out of others. Gender relations, 
drinking or not drinking alcohol, praying five times a day, educating children in 
accordance with their values and principles in a “suitable” neighbourhood and schools, are 
other examples that might cause social and spatial divisions. However, although all 
religiously observant students see these issues among the divine challenges (imtihan), their 
degree of sensitivity varies depending on their culture, family education, and sense of 
religious priorities. In my observations, the social relations between men and women are 
no longer strict in the spaces frequented by those who are religiously observant. 
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Students in their public life feel the religious-secular social divide. While some of 
religiously observant students complained about the contemp tuous attitudes of their 
secularist classmates, some other female students argued that wearing the headscarf made 
them feel the social division much more than others, as its existence or its absence is the 
most visible sign of a woman’s worldview. However, when I asked the same students 
whether they experience these problems with all lecturers and all secularist friends, they 
said that they do not. It can be asserted that although these kinds of problems were and are 
experienced among the older generation, the new generation does not experience these 
troubles as much as the previous one.  
Living in a secular state and country and aspiring to practise religious principles in 
daily life, at work, in business and education, leads religiously observant people to seek 
solutions that would emancipate them from dilemmas, ambiguity, and tension between 
their Islamic faith and secular life. Along with intellectual endeavours, activist religiously 
observant people, religious movements, charities and societies take concrete steps in order 
to resolve this matter within the bounds of possibility. The key word for this solution is 
‘alternative’.  
Religiously observant Muslims in Turkey, except for some doctrinaire extremists, 
want to practise their religion while accommodating themselves to modernity. However, 
they realize that there are some inconsistencies between Islamic lifestyles and modern 
lifestyles. Under these circumstances the majority of religiously observant Muslim 
individuals and religious groups, instead of completely rejecting the values and institutions 
of the modern world, try to negotiate and reconcile them with Islamic principles, like so 
called interest–free ‘Islamic banking’, colleges, universities, holiday places, online 
dictionaries, media etc. 
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As Toprak points out, “Social and geographical mobility, coupled with the 
development of modern communication networks, to a large extent have integrated the 
periphery with the center” (Toprak, 1995: 94). New social, geographical, and economic 
conditions have brought significant changes in society. 
I argue that in the new social structure of Turkey, religious and secular young 
people have much more interaction with each other and spend more time together. 
Nevertheless, even though they get closer with the passing of time and know each other 
more than before, both secularist and religiously observant students still have some 
prejudices about each other. Based on my own experiences, observations and the 
statements of my informants, I also argue that although serious social tensions in the 
political arena do still exist in Turkish society between the religiously observant and the 
secular, the social distancing and prejudices have dramatically decreased in the last decade. 
 While religiously observant people use secular language along with their religious 
language, secularist people rarely use religious words in private or in public. It seems to 
me that this is a matter of power relations. As my religiously observant informants 
declared, they felt under secularist pressure at school and work and in almost every sphere 
of their public life until the rise of the AKP government. Under these circumstances, 
religiously observant people had to use secular language in order to hide their true 
affiliations and avoid social, political and economic discrimination. From my observations, 
circumstances have slightly eased for religiously observant people since the AKP came to 
power in 2003, and although secularist people still do not use religious expressions, the 
expressions of religiously observant people has been normalized in daily life, business, 
politics and the media.  
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CHAPTER EIGHT: THE GEZI PARK PROTESTS 
	  
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter, I address the main subject of my thesis by exploring the significance of the 
Gezi Park protests in Istanbul, since the protests created a valuable opportunity to 
understand students’, and more generally young people’s, perspectives on politics, religion, 
political Islam and secularism. My interviews with them enabled me to crosscheck the 
findings and discussions of my research presented in the other empirical chapters.	  
The protests, which occurred during the research, focused on university students in 
Istanbul and their experience of tension between religion and secularism in the Turkish 
context. Based on my observations on social media, the encounter between religiously 
observant people and secularists in the park seemed at the outset one of potential conflict. 
It prompted me to explore this further in the field through first-hand qualitative research. 
Thus, although I already had sufficient data to complete my thesis by then, as this was such 
an unexpected political and social turn of events touching on the concepts of religiosity, 
secularity, youth, and the anxieties of secularist people for their secular lifestyle, I decided 
to initiate this new fieldwork episode and went to Gezi Park.	  
When the Gezi Park protests took place at the end of May 2013, the ‘real’	  
motivation behind the protest was unclear, particularly for religiously observant people. At 
the outset the protests were in opposition to work on replacing the park with a shopping 
mall, together with drastic alterations to the adjacent Taksim Square. Only a few hundred 
strong in the beginning, the number of the protestors increased dramatically in the first 
week, evidently encouraged, rather than deterred, by police brutality. 
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By the time I arrived at the park, one week after the beginning of the protests, I 
found myself able to move only with difficulty owing to the many thousands of protestors 
in the park and square. There were a great number of booths of various organisations, 
mostly secular and leftist, handing out leaflets and discussing their demands, the policies of 
the government, and the aims of the protest. 
Observing developments through various media, including social media, much of 
the population was unsure whether the protesters were engaged in democratic action 
against the government and some of its policies, or whether theirs was rather an objection 
to the religious identity of the Prime Minister and the religiously observant people who he 
particularly represents. Was the main issue religion, the Islamic revival in the country? Did 
these protests demonstrate that religion cannot co-exist with secularity, and that there is a 
deep-rooted and irresolvable tension between religiously observant and secularist Muslims 
in Turkey?  
These questions being so closely related to my research, I visited Istanbul. For two 
weeks, day and night, I stayed in the park, visiting tents, talking to protesters about their 
views of the protest. I took hundreds of photographs in Gezi Park and Taksim Square and 
wrote down every slogan I encountered: more than three hundred in the area. None was 
hostile to religion or religiosity. A small number criticized the Prime Minister’s 
ostentatious practice of religion.	  
I interviewed nineteen university students related to the protest; most of them were 
protesters who were present at Gezi Park, the others were those who opposed the protests 
and did not go to the park. While all of them were Muslims, there were differences in their 
understanding religion. The interviews included secularist and religiously observant 
Muslims, and also Sunni and Alevi Muslims. Along with that I got helps from my 
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gatekeepers in order to select suitable informants for my research, I also visited all the 
tents and groups in the park to talk and to offer to do interviews. 
The interviews were semi-structured, asking their personal details and their views 
of the protest, criticisms of the protesters and the policies of the government, their views 
on religiosity and secularity in the country, and to what extent they saw the conflict as 
being between religiously observant and secularist Muslims. The questions are listed in 
Appendix Three. 
This chapter presents the data and analyses the data in terms of my research 
questions, my aim being to find answers to the aforementioned questions. What were the 
activists protesting against? What government policies and practices were they criticising? 
Did religiously observant people also criticise the Prime Minister or the government? If so, 
why were they dissatisfied with the Prime Minister and the AKP government? Although 
some religiously observant people supported the protests by either going to the park or 
expressing sympathy on social media, why did most religiously observant people withhold 
support? Was the huge protest movement actually about religion, religiously observant 
people and the religious identity of the Prime Minister? What kind of impact did the Gezi 
Park protests have on the views of Turkish people, particularly university students, 
concerning religion and secularity? Is there a conflict between secular and religiously 
observant Muslims in Turkey and, if there is, what has been the impact of the Gezi Park 
protests on this? 
This chapter has four parts, each covering an aspect of the issue. The first part 
consists of a summary account of the Gezi Park protests with such information as seems 
necessary to an understanding of the discussion in other sections. I present interviewees’ 
responses in this chapter. 
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The second section focuses on the place of religion in the protests, asking whether 
the main objections of the protestors were religion, religiously observant people, and 
religious identities of the current policy makers. 
The third part concerns the attitudes of religiously observant Muslims to the Gezi Park 
protests. After considering the extent of support that the government has among religiously 
observant people, it focuses on the withdrawal of support for the protests by religiously 
observant people. Though also critical of the government regarding the replacement of the 
park by a shopping centre, many who had taken part in the protest in the park initially, and 
given support online, later, especially after fights between police and protestors, and after 
statements by the Prime Minister, withdrew support. Reasons for these events are 
considered here. 
And finally, the fourth section considers the repercussions of the Gezi Park protests 
for democracy in Turkey, and the polarisation and conflict in the context of secularity and 
religion.  
 
8.2 THE OBJECTS OF THE PROTESTS 
The Gezi Park protests started on 27th May 2013 in order to protest the pedestrianisation of 
Taksim Square. In the beginning, a few hundred activists gathered in Gezi Park, 
demonstrating peacefully. They set up tents and read books for a few days. 
Brutal police intervention on the night of 31st May provoked protests around the 
world, and brought thousands more people to the park to support the protesters. Thousands 
more protested across Istanbul and Turkey, some banging pots and pans at their windows, 
and there were protests by Turkish people in capitals across Europe. 
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At the beginning of June the content of protests changed to more general criticism 
of the government, and the attitude of the Prime Minister in particular. During this period, 
between the 1st and the 15th of June, there were a number of clashes between police and 
demonstrators both in Istanbul Taksim Square and in some other cities of the country, such 
as Ankara, Izmir, Adana, Hatay, Eskisehir and Mersin. During these the police used tear 
gas and water cannons. 
On the 15th of June, the police emptied the park of protesters and unrest decreased 
slightly. Activists and resident of certain neighbourhoods gathered in other Istanbul parks 
discussing recent incidents followed by Gezi Park protests, local issues, and the future of 
their activities, making announcements on websites and the social media.  
These protests were among the most significant and influential public displays of 
political opposition in the history of the Turkish Republic. According to the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs, 2.5 million people attended the protests in total, across the 79 cities of 
Turkey. 4,900 protestors were arrested, around 600 police and 4,900 activists injured, and 
7 activits died during the protests. The total economic damage was estimated at about 
£46,000 (Şardan, 2013). 
I conducted my fieldwork in Gezi Park, where the protest movements initially 
started, and which has become the main symbol of the protests across the country. I visited 
the park between 7th and 21st June 2013, conducting semi-structured interviews with 
activists.  
When asked the objectives of the protests, interviewees gave a variety of answers, 
common complaints being the political rhetoric of the Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip 
Erdoğan, his contemptuous attitude towards those who had not supported him in elections, 
and some of his policies. 
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Derya had been in Gezi Park since the first day, trying to protect it. She was a 
student in the Cinema and TV Department in Istanbul. When I saw her, she was picking up 
rubbish in the park and putting it in a big bag, voluntarily. She was not being paid and 
belonged to no organisation. I asked her about the continued resistance to the authorities. 
Actually we still resist in order that Gezi Park will stay. This movement might have 
grown, it might have become a symbol for other things, but my friends and me 
want the park to stay the same and not change. This event has grown. It shows that 
many people have various problems that exhausted their patience. Everything just 
surfaced here. Of course, the police brutality has also affected this since the third 
day of the protests. After that, people lost all patience and started to come and talk 
about their other criticisms of the government. Before that, this was just a 
demonstration of 300 to 400 people. But we still are here for the same reason, the 
park. (Derya, Female, Conservatory, 4th year, 9/6/2013) 
Most of the people I interviewed away from the park were AKP voters who did not 
go and add their support to the protesters in the park, but most were, nevertheless, critical 
of the government and opposed to the plans for Gezi Park. A group of religiously 
observant students in a café, for instance, spoke to me of the chopping down of trees in the 
park that it seemed to them like cutting down people. 
One of the most commonly heard expressions in the park was “Hayat tarzına 
müdahale” (intervening in a person’s lifestyle). Secularist or religiously non-observant 
informants, particularly, accused the then Prime Minister R. T. Erdoğan of intervening in 
the secular lifestyle of citizens of the country both in his speeches and policies. His 
policies created a strong suspicion among secularist people as if they were threat to their 
lifestyle.  
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There has been anxiety among secularist Muslims in Turkey about this issue ever 
since the AKP came to power in 2002. Until the protests, the relatively few secularist 
intellectuals who expressed anxiety about the conservative government were sometimes 
referred to as “anxious moderns” (Keyman, 2010). These people were not at the fore of the 
Gezi Park protests; it has rather been the generality of secularist people. I asked secularist 
people about the understanding of threat to their secular lives. 
Aylin was another university student cleaning the park, sack in hand. She said that 
the protestors were resisting for the sake of their freedom, because there was no justice and 
democracy in the country. She was particularly uncomfortable about proposed new 
regulations restricting the sale of alcohol. The new regulations were intended to ban off-
licence sales between 10 p.m. and 6 a.m. The law also forbids the sale of alcohol near 
schools and places of worship (Karanfil, 2013). Alcohol and the headscarf may be seen as 
visible symbols of secular and religious lifestyles respectively. 
In what respect do you think your freedom is restricted? 
They do not have the right to interfere with our individual issues. They are our 
social representatives. They cannot make any decision on the issues that people 
make their own decisions about individually. 
Which implementation is the most uncomfortable for you? 
I am uncomfortable about the new regulations on alcohol sales. I am not a drinker, 
but there can be people who like to drink alcohol. I also might like to. They cannot 
set limitations with regard to this issue. 
What is your main demand of the government now? 
It was just for an apology in the beginning, but that is not enough now. There must 
really be a change. I do not say that the government must change, but at least they 
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should change some of their characteristics, for example they should give up (their) 
arrogant attitudes. Of course, some of us think differently, but as a shared point, we 
all want democracy. (Aylin, Female, Medicine, 1st year, 9/6/2013) 
Mavi agreed that the reaction to the new regulations arises from their symbolic 
significance. She said that it has been the final point that is closely related to the secularist 
youth. Instead of discussing the advantages and disadvantages of a new draft of law, it is 
very common in Turkey to discuss who is proposing it, and its potential symbolic 
meanings. It seems that secularist citizens generally view any government move on issues 
like alcohol, with suspicion. Nejat explained what the new regulations meant for him: 
Of course, I do not want people to be drunk and disturb people on the street. But I 
think the government, by imposing this restriction, is using it as a control 
mechanism to limit the living space of people. They also dispossess the people who 
drink on the street of their freedom. (Nejat, Male, Electrical Engineering, 3rd year, 
11/6/2013) 
Until the clash between the police and the activists spread to other neighbourhoods 
and cities, the cries of “Resign Erdoğan!” were little heard and were mostly symbolic, but 
the more the tension grew the more vocal this call became. Although most of the protestors 
who shouted for the then Prime Minister’s resignation, meant it, others thought it not a 
desirable goal. 
So many people in the park scream, saying “Resign Tayyip, resign the 
government!” I read a book now. It says, “As a resister, I do not want the 
government to resign; I want it to work properly.” This sounds more reasonable to 
me now. They must work perfectly. They are our servants. We elected them in 
order that they will serve us. (Derya, Female, Conservatory, 4th year, 9/6/2013) 
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I have never believed that if Erdoğan resigns all the problems will be solved. On 
the contrary, lots of things would be worse. People scream on the streets saying 
“Tayyip resign!” (Tayyip resign!) but I do not think they really want it. If we think 
of the fact that most of them come (here) individually, without any organization, I 
believe that they say some words without thinking about the future carefully. 
(Reyhan, Female, Political Science, 3rd year, 9/6/2013) 
The question of the place of women in society is a distinguishing issue separating 
between religiously observant and secularist people in Turkey. The place of women in the 
business, political and social life of society, and their roles in the family, have long been 
discussed in the country, as I have shown throughout the thesis. Although the AKP 
established a women’s branch of the party this, they assert, does not imply any restriction 
on women in the political, economic and business areas. The party is mainly criticized over 
policy-makers’ rhetoric and especially over the new draft of an abortion law. All the 
women I spoke to in the park objected to the views of the then Prime Minister on abortion. 
They see the law as a violation of women’s rights. 
The woman problem is an important factor explaining the fact that so many women 
have come to the park. Because we do not feel ourselves safe. As citizens who do 
not want to live the conservative lifestyle of the AKP followers, especially being 
women, we do not feel safe. When they discuss abortion, they imply that abortion 
is used as a birth control method. How does something like that happen? For whom 
this can be an easy decision to have abortion, come on! I know some of my friends 
who went through a trauma. Nobody can go and do that willingly. If her family 
would not ostracize her, she would prefer to give birth. But such a woman (who 
gives birth out of wedlock) would be labelled a hussy. If he, as the Prime Minister, 
implicates us as being like this, the views of both the extremists and moderate 
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people about us would change. In the circumstances, we have to explain ourselves 
in such private matters! (Ceyda, Female, History, 4th year, 10/6/2013) 
As a secularist woman, Ceyda was pessimistic about the situation of women if the thinking 
and discourses of conservative policy-makers does not change. 
Why do I have to defend myself against these people? Who will protect me from 
them? Who guarantees that these people will not harass me on the street? If they 
assault me, who guarantees that they will be found guilty? I will be accused! They 
will probably say: “Why did you dress like that?” or “You should have worn a 
headscarf!” (Ceyda, Female, History, 4th year, 10/6/2013) 
Mavi said that even its coming into question is felt as a big threat by women, because 
abortion is one of their essential freedoms. She recommended that, women felt restricted 
by the discussion of the issue. 
Since he came to power in 2002, the then Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan 
often emphasized the importance of a young population and recommended that all couples 
to have three children. Although this recommendation was seen by most AKP supporters 
as just his personal view of what is in the best interest of the country, protestors saw this 
too as an intervention in people’s private lives. There were a number of slogans in the park 
concerning his views on abortion and family size, with ironic comments such as: “Are you 
sure you still want people to have three children like us?” 
How can one say “You should have three children”. He is a Prime Minister. Is that 
why we put him there? So that he will tell us how many children we should have? 
Of course, he does not make it obligatory. Rubbish! But I will do it or not! (as I 
like). (Lale, Female, English Teaching, 4th year, 9/6/2013) 
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Am I a baby machine? Of course not! How can he decide on my behalf? (Ceyda, 
Female, History, 4th year, 10/6/2013) 
The words “authoritarian” and “dictator” were much heard among protestors in the 
park, mainly in criticising the Prime Minister, rather than the government in general. 
According to the protestors, Erdoğan, having been elected three times and been in power 
for eleven years, has been an authoritarian leader who fails to show respect for his 
opponents. The reaction of the Prime Minister to the protesters at the outset of the protest, 
was perceived as insulting. On 2nd June, during an opening ceremony, he said, “We will 
also build a mosque in Taksim Square. Of course I will not get permission from the CHP 
[the main secularist opposition party]. I will also not get it from a few marauders!” (Sol, 
2013). Since then, the word “marauder” (çapulcu in Turkish) has been used as key word to 
express the reactions of the protestors to the Prime Minister. The word has been used to 
create a collective identity among protestors from various backgrounds: Kemalists; 
Leftists; LGBT members; Islamists; football fans and non-political individuals. All 
adopted this word as epitomising the authoritarian and contemptuous nature of the Prime 
Minister. 
Why has this movement been so widely disseminated in such a short time? 
It has started to become a kind of a dictatorship in the country. The Prime Minister 
has a self-opinionated attitude. For example, despite these problems, he can call his 
own (Turkish) people “marauders” and “marginals”. He has never taken steps 
backward after all. This is a kind of dictatorship and all these reactions are actually 
towards it. Of course, we cannot compare him with the well-known dictators like 
Hitler and Assad. But I think if there were not these protests he would have been 
like them at the end. (Reyhan, Female, Political Science, 3rd year, 9/6/2013) 
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What is this resistance for? 
Now it is very different than it was in the beginning. It has transformed into a 
resistance against oppression. On the first day, it was for the park. Gezi Park and 
Taksim Square are the symbols of the possibility of expressing oneself, and the 
new project of Gezi Park was seen as a blow on the freedom of expression. We, the 
residents of Cihangir, wanted to protect this place in which we always spend time. 
This was our object in the beginning, but now it is definitely against the police 
brutality and also against the oppression of the government that has lasted for a 
long time. (Mavi, Female, Political Science, 1st year, 10/6/2013) 
One of the most well known theologians in Turkey, İhsan Eliaçık, was the most 
interesting person I met on my visits to the Gezi Park protests because of his religious 
identity and society. He and his friends were in the park under the name of the “Anti-
capitalist Muslims Society”. They had a tent in which they argued their case against 
government policies. The society is, as a matter of ideological principle, leaderless, but 
İhsan Eliaçık, is generally seen in Turkey as the head. He is a theologian and Islamist 
activist. People were surprised when they saw him and his friends, some of them women 
wearing headscarves, and some bearded religiously observant young men. When I visited 
them in their tents, I talked to a few members of the society, including İhsan Eliaçık, and 
he agreed to be interviewed, for which purpose we went and sat in a café to escape 
interruptions from his many visitors there. When I asked him the reasons for the protest, he 
said: 
This indicates that there has been a collective anger in the society and it appears 
through these protests. Everybody or every group has a different reason for their 
anger. The main group in the park is the youth, called the generation of the ‘90s. 
When the AKP came to power in 2002 they were about 12 years old, and now they 
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are university students of about 22 years-old. Since their childhood, they have 
always seen Recep Tayyip Erdoğan on television. They are at first reacting to this 
situation saying “It is enough!” Secondly, the young people do not like the attitudes 
and the way of speaking of the Prime Minister towards citizens. He has a 
commanding style and they do not like it. Erdoğan is now like a conservative and 
oppressive father intervening in the hairstyles and earrings of his children. He made 
regulations about alcohol sale, but it was understood in this confusing atmosphere 
as though he forbids alcoholic drinks. Young people react to his oppressive 
manner, and they say “Do not interfere our lives, we know what we will do!” 
(Eliaçık, 9/6/2013) 
The statements of students I interviewed largely conformed with the views of 
Eliaçık. They distinguished between the personality of the Prime Minister, on the one 
hand, and government policies, on the other. The main demand was not to change the 
Prime Minister; they wanted more freedom and respect in their personal life choices, and 
they criticized all who seek to curb their “freedom”, including secularist parties. 
There are serious criticisms against the government’s policies, and the Prime 
Minister as well. The restriction on alcoholic drinks, the discussions on abortion, 
and the education system, all of them came together. In addition, ignoring the 
people who did not support the government in the elections brought these people 
here into the park. Actually, I do not think that these reactions are against only one 
political party. The main reaction is against some regulations and an oppressive 
system. If the other political parties did the same things, they would have got the 
same reactions. The ideology of the government authorities is not the issue. The 
regulations have threatened the lifestyles and the standard of living of the people, 
and then they have reacted in this way. Yes, there are the slogans of “Tayyip 
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resign!” and there is an opposition to the government in the park, but it was not the 
starting point of this movement. If the circumstances go that way, I think it would 
not be good. (Zeynep, Female, Economics, 1st year, 10/6/2013) 
Eliaçık, explaining the main things he objects to, said that he reacts against all kinds of 
totalitarian regimes: “If the battle tanks of the army show up tomorrow, I will try to 
prevent them, because I am against military coups as well. I suffered a lot because of the 
military coups in the past.” 
Berkay was a member of TGB, Türkiye Gençlik Birliği (Youth Union of Turkey). 
This union was established in 2006, having 65 student clubs in 40 Turkish universities. 
One of the founders explained the main reason for founding this union was the need for a 
central organization to represent revolutionary, patriotic, Kemalist youth (TGB, 2013). At 
the society’s tent I spoke with Berkay, a member of the union. According to Berkay, 
everyone gathered in the park for freedom. But he emphasised that it was not only for the 
freedom of each particular group: they want freedom for all citizens. However, he did call 
for all the others to unite behind his ideology. 
There is a liberation struggle here. If you like, ask whichever group you want in the 
park. The main objective for us is neither the park nor a political thing. Everyone is 
united in a single demand: Freedom for everyone! We do not want freedom for any 
particular group or community. We want it for all people. We, as the union, believe 
that it is possible if we converge on Atatürk. I mean, if we really understand the 
values, principles and the thought system of Atatürk, freedom and solidarity would 
increase. We want the other groups and societies to come together on common 
ground, which is Atatürk. (Berkay, Male, Chemical Engineering, 3rd year, 
10/6/2013) 
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Love of Atatürk and defending him was another motivation given by some 
protestors. In Turkey this can be regarded as another way of expressing support for 
secularism. As I presented in Chapter One, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (1881-1938) was the 
founder of the secular Turkish Republic. He was determined to secularize and westernize 
the country. Debate about Islamism and secularism in Turkey generally centres on esteem 
and opposition to him. Love of Ataturk and his images symbolizes secularism and the 
secular lifestyle (White, 2010). There were a great number of flags with the image of 
Ataturk in Gezi Park and in Taksim Square. These would seem to indicate a secular 
anxiety and a secular reaction to conservative government policies (Harding, 2013). In my 
interview, Eliaçık made reference to secularist protestors: 
When this reaction spread around, secularist, Kemalist and neo-nationalist people 
also came and joined the protests. They have been discontented with a conservative 
government for eleven years. They are living with the feeling that ‘Ataturk’s 
secular republic is being lost, the government is destroying everything, they put the 
admirals in prison, and we have become isolated’. There is great cumulative anger 
among them. (Eliaçık, 9/6/2013) 
After the police emptied Gezi Park, another kind of protest started in Taksim 
Square. On 17th June 2013 an activist, Erdem Gündüz, stood in the middle of the square for 
eight hours in order to protest the police ending demonstrations in the park. His protest 
brought a great number of protesters to the square. Many stood in silence facing the 
Atatürk Cultural Centre with its Atatürk flag. In a short time the “standing man” protest 
spread to other neighbourhoods and other Turkish cities (BBC, 2013; Radikal, 2013). I 
went to the square for three days talking to protesters about their aims. Aslı, one of the 
university students in the square, believed that the government does not show respect to 
Atatürk. 
	   265 
The aim of my standing act is Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and the disrespectful 
attitudes of the government towards him. I am not a revolutionary in any way or 
form. I am also not a member of the CHP or any other political party. I am here 
only for Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. (Aslı, Female, Primary School Teaching, 1st year, 
19/6/2013) 
The clearest reason for these reactions was a statement by the Prime Minister just 
before the protests, on 28th May 2013. Criticized over the alcohol regulations, he asserted 
that he acted with religious justification, saying, “When two drunkards make a law, it is 
respected, but why must a law ordered by religion be rejected?” (CNN Turk, 2013). A 
member of parliament from the CHP, Muharrem İnce, claimed that Erdoğan, when he was 
saying “two drunkards”, meant Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and the Prime Minister of the time, 
İsmet İnönü (Akşam, 2013). People generally accepted this interpretation. This statement 
of the Prime Minister heightened the anxiety of secular Turks and provoked reactions in 
the country. One concern was his way of speaking of Atatürk and İnönü; another was the 
reference to religion when making law in a secular state.  
The statement of the “two drunkards…” You are expecting respect for your values. 
But they are, Atatürk and İnönü, are also the people whom some people value 
greatly. (Ceyda, Female, History, 4th year, 10/6/2013) 
This protest is a reaction to the AKP that has become more and more restrictive and 
conservative in the last couple of years. As you know, there has been a polarization 
again in the country and people feel the polarization between secularity and 
conservativeness. The government becomes more conservative, and the other 50 
per cent of the population are worried. These activities are the result of that. 
Because every step of the government, symbolically, is perceived like that we are 
becoming a more conservative country. Of course, I have the same anxiety. In the 
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beginning, I did not feel uncomfortable like my friends and relatives. But the 
implications and the speeches of the government in the last two years show that we 
have been transforming from a secular society to a conservative society, and this is 
frightening me. (Mavi, Female, Political Science, 1st year, 10/6/2013) 
One of the most prominent groups in Gezi Park was the Çarşı group, the best 
known supporters’ group of Beşiktaş football club. This group was founded in 1982, and 
has been popular in Turkey for a long time. A famous slogan of theirs is “Çarşı her şeye 
karşı.” Which means “Çarşı is against everything”, referring to its supporters who are, 
according to the supporters I interviewed in the park, anti-racist, anti-sexist, anti-
authoritarian, ecological and pluralist. They were very active in the park, especially during 
periods of police brutality. They were the most well organized group when activists 
struggled against the police to protect the park and the protesters. I interviewed two 
members of the group. Ahmet was one of the university student supporters of the Çarşı 
group. 
What exactly are you against (karşı) in this protest?  
We just want the government to indulge the demands of the people, because there 
has been a disproportionate force by the police here since the beginning. People 
were just reading books here, and there was no other activity. I came in the first 
days and am still here. I also attended some of the few fights against the police.  
What is the main objective of your group? 
Some friends, who organize the park, prepared some lists explaining the demands 
of the people. Apart from that, we just want Gezi Park to stay in place. As the Çarşı 
group, we do not want anything else. As we are a non-political group, we have 
nothing to do with the government. We just want the government to stop the 
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disproportionate force of the police, using excessive power against the protestors, 
and to rule the country in a democratic way, instead of a dictatorial way. The 
speeches of the Prime Minister have never calmed the protestors down and never 
stopped them worrying about the problems of the country. On the contrary, the 
government has always talked in an abusive and sarcastic way. We wanted other 
people to come and see the solidarity in the park. (Ahmet, Male, Mechanical 
Engineering, 4th year, 11/6/2013) 
Although few, there were female students in the park who wore headscarves. 
Zeliha, a veiled university student, was among them. She had been there since the 
beginning of the protest. Although she was a member of the Anti-capitalist Muslims group, 
she visited other tents, speaking with the other activists. Her objectives were not confined 
to the protection of the park. 
For what purpose are you here in the park? 
First of all, I am here for the trees in the park, and to prevent the park being 
concretised for the sake of development. And then, I am here to argue against the 
sexist and racist discourses in the park. 
Is there racism and sexism in the park? 
If I say that there is now, it would not be right, actually. But during the big protest 
on Saturday, on the 8th of June 2013, which was most probably the first protest of 
most of the people, a lot of slogans included sexist swearwords and some of them 
were neo-nationalist, like “Mustafa Kemal’in askerleriyiz” (We are the soldiers of 
Mustafa Kemal). Now they are generally cleaned from the area. More precisely, 
when we have spent time together in the park, we have seen and known each other 
well, and have overcome our prejudices. Nevertheless, some problems still 
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continue. Consequently, I am here to clean sexism and racism from the park. 
(Zeliha, Female, Environmental Engineering, 4th year, 10/6/2013) 
The experience of Ceyda shows that Zeliha had succeeded in her object. When we 
met with Ceyda in a café, we talked about her views and experiences regarding religion. 
She mentioned prejudices that the previous secularist generation have about religiously 
observant people: women wearing the headscarf in particular. 
My mother is a believing person. But when she saw a woman wearing a headscarf 
she was standing on end! She said, “I believe they are the supporters of the AKP, 
they are the members of a religious group (cemaatçi), they are the people who put 
Erdoğan into power!” Even my mother, who is one of the hardest people I have 
ever seen, has become moderate during the Gezi Park protests. When I went to the 
park on the first day, she asked me, saying, “Are there really women wearing the 
headscarf in the park?” She was surprised when I said yes, and she has softened her 
stance… (Ceyda, Female, History, 4th year, 10/6/2013) 
The Anti-capitalist Muslims group was there to protest against the government and 
wealthy religious business people, most particularly because of their close relationship 
with the capitalist economic system. Eliaçık calls the economic policies of the government 
“Abdestli kapitalizm” (ritually cleansed capitalism). 
I have been criticizing the religiously observant or conservative for being addicted 
to money and property and having desire for prohibited ill-gotten gains (haram), 
and also criticizing the government for misappropriating capital, and being very 
greedy and money-grabbing. We have come here for this reason. (Eliaçık, 
9/6/2013) 
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Finally, another reason for the Gezi Protests was the absence of viable opposition 
parties. The protesters found the CHP very unsuccessful in terms of providing an effective 
opposition.  
If the CHP had stood as a proper opposition so far, set our minds at rest, and if they 
expressed our discomforts, we would not feel these protests necessary. Always 
criticizing Erdoğan is not a proper opposition. We saw that none of the political 
parties and organizations did anything for our sake. Our minds have never been set 
at rest for a long time. The journalists who voiced my views have been given the 
sack, squelched, or they have been practising self-censorship. The party that I voted 
for as the lesser evil is functionless. So there is nobody defend my rights. It has 
been so up to now! (Ceyda, Female, History, 4th year, 10/6/2013) 
 
8.3 THE PLACE OF RELIGION IN THE PROTESTS 
The data that I presented above challenges the popular explanation that the protests were 
about religion and religiously observant people. Although some committed secularist 
people were there in the park, who believe that the government aims to transform the 
country into an Islamic state, or that the government is trying to institutionalize religiously 
inspired policies – and there is evident anxiety among secularist people about indications 
of Islamism by the government – they were not against religion and religiosity itself. As 
emphasised in previous chapters, in order to understand the place of religion in the 
protests, it is necessary to have a clear conception of political Islamism, religiosity, 
secularism, and secular Muslimism. The secular Muslims of Turkey are worried about 
political Islamism, rather than religiosity. They are not troubled with having a religious 
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Prime Minister, but they are troubled with a political Islamist Prime Minister who aims to 
Islamize the country as a whole, from the legal system to education.  
Are the religious identities of Erdoğan and the AKP important for you? 
In my view, it is up to people themselves. He might be religious, but he should 
keep his or her relationship with religion private. His religiosity is not a bad thing, 
but in my view, it should not be that much, like interfering in all people. There can 
be both faithful and unfaithful people in the society. Therefore, they should not 
insert religion in all issues that much. This protest has nothing to do with religion. 
Nobody can say something about the religiosity of the Prime Minister. Most of the 
people are believers here. And nobody can say something about the non-believers. 
Religion is something that people are bound up with emotionally, and it is easy to 
organize people around it. Some people use religion to provoke religiously 
observant people, claiming that this protest is against religion. No such thing! 
(Aylin, Female, Medicine, 1st year, 9/6/2013) 
An Alevi informant, İlyas, also emphasized that the Gezi Protest was not about religion, 
much less any particular sect. He remarked that Sunni and Alevi people live together in the 
park peacefully, and that Erdoğan incites his supporters using religion and discriminating 
against the protesters. 
I visited the Ataturkist Thought Association (Atatürkçü Düşünce Derneği, ADD), 
which was founded in 1989 aiming to preserve the revolutions and the principles of 
Atatürk, and committed to the necessity of being the guardians of those principles (ADD, 
2013). Tizcan was a university student and a member of the Association who was in the 
park. He criticized the then Prime Minister for referring to religion when making laws. He 
saw this as contrary to Ataturk’s secularism.  
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Actually, there is a significant difference between what the government tries to do 
and which method they use. For example, making alcohol regulations is acceptable 
in a social law state. Nevertheless, if you refer to religion when you do it, or if you 
say something like “When two drunkards make a law, it is respected. But why the 
law that is ordered by the religion must be rejected?” it means that you are doing 
something against the principles of a social law and the secularist state. This kind 
of approach, rhetoric and method is unacceptable, at least for me. Our association 
generally thinks like that. In the park there is a reaction against the government for 
using religion for the sake of their politics. Even some women wearing a headscarf 
say this. (Tizcan, Male, Journalism, 3rd year, 10/6/2013) 
I asked him if he had a problem with the Prime Minister’s religious identity. He 
said that people cannot object to him praying and carrying out religious rituals; everybody 
should respect his worldview. However, he must practise religion personally, as Recep 
Tayyip Erdoğan, not as a Prime Minister forcing people to practise religion. Government 
decisions should be made from a world viewpoint, not a religious one. 
After the protests started, the Prime Minister went on a trip to North Africa from 
the 3rd to 6th June. I was in the park and saw that the protestors were waiting for him to 
calm people down. The then President of the Republic, Abdullah Gül, said the protestors 
were being heard, and that “Democracy is not only a matter of elections” (Milliyet, 2013). 
He was implying that the government should respect those who were not its supporters, 
and listen to them. The then Deputy Prime Minister, Bülent Arınç, also acted to calm the 
protesters, by receiving a group claiming to represent them (Radikal, 2013). 
These developments softened the atmosphere to a degree in the country. 
Nevertheless, the protestors were expecting a similar step from the Prime Minister whom 
they were mostly protesting against. However, when Erdoğan got back to Istanbul, 
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thousands of people went to the airport to welcome him and voice opposition to the 
protesters, accusing them of having wider aims than stopping the development of the park. 
In a speech at the airport, Erdoğan blamed a supposed business lobby, “faiz lobisi”, for 
fomenting the trouble. During the speech, hostile slogans were chanted by the crowd, 
further heightening tension. “Ya Allah, bismillah, Allahu akbar” and “Yol ver gidelim, 
Taksim’i ezelim” (Allow us, let us go and let us trample on Taksim [the protesters]) 
(Hürriyet, 2013).  
On 2nd June, when the police and the protesters clashed in the Beşiktaş 
neighbourhood, protestors running from the tear gas and water cannon, sought sanctuary in 
the Bezm-i Alem Valide Sultan Mosque in Kabataş. Most of the protesters went in without 
taking off their shoes, using the mosque as both shelter and first aid post. Later a few beer 
cans appeared in photos apparently taken in the mosque, and seeming to indicate that some 
protesters may have drunk alcohol there (Star Gündem, 2013). The media and others 
sympathetic to the government, used these pictures and reports for a long time to claim the 
protesters were disrespectful of religion. Much was made of the incident: Some claimed 
the muezzin allowed protesters into the mosque, and there was no disrespect displayed, 
while others claimed they threatened the muezzin and entered into the mosque by force 
(Haber Türk, 2013b; Türkiye, 2013). 
When I enquired about this incident, protesters in the park denied the allegations 
about the drinking of alcohol in the mosque, and said entering with shoes in such haste, 
distress and commotion should be considered with understanding and tolerance. They 
believed it does not show that the protests are against religion and religiously observant 
people. 
İhsan Eliaçık and the other members of the Anti-capitalist Muslims Society played 
a key role, during the Gezi Park protests, in the debate on the place of religion in the 
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protests. They were obviously a religious group with the female members wearing 
headscarves, the male members having characteristically Islamic beards, and with Islamic 
slogans on their tent, such as “Mülk Allah’ındır” (Property belongs to Allah). They 
organized Friday prayers in the park twice during the protests. While some protesters 
attended those prayers, others stood guard around them in order to show respect for 
religion and religiously observant people. 
The Isra and Mi‘raj (Miraç in Turkish) are the parts of a night journey of the 
Prophet Muhammad in 621. According to Islamic belief, he went from Mecca to Jerusalem 
and then he ascended to heaven where he spoke to God. This journey is celebrated in 
Turkey every year reciting some verses of the Qur’an, praying and distributing the pastry 
rings consumed in holy days. The anniversary of this journey is called Miraç Kandili in 
Turkish. The Anti-capitalist Muslims society organized a Miraç Kandili in the park, and 
almost all the protesters joined the celebration. Most of my informants mentioned these 
events as evidence that the Gezi Park protests were definitely not against religion, 
religiously observant people or principles, but, on the contrary, were rather against the 
Prime Minister and particular policies of his government.  
We, in the middle of Taksim Square, in the middle of a lot of factions and neo-
nationalists, celebrated the Mi‘raj, recited the Qur’an, and prayed. I prayed, and 
then thousands of citizens came and said “amin”. The day after, we called the azan 
and prayed the Friday prayer. People welcomed it enthusiastically. They are still 
coming, hugging and crying. These two scenes have destroyed their claim of their 
“enmity to religion”. People think that the people who went to the gathering at the 
airport are the religiously observant populations of the country, and the people who 
come to the park are the having no religion, being disrespectful to religion, and 
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willing to live a modern lifestyle. What will happen after our religious 
organizations? (Eliaçık, 9/6/2013) 
Actually we highlighted this in the social media saying that this is not against 
religion, but just against the government. Yes, neo-nationalists have an 
accumulated reaction against religiously observant people, and they reflect it, but 
these protests are not consisting of just that. There are many other political views 
coming here. Their discourse is not the discourse of Gezi Park. We are trying to 
prevent there from being any offensive discourses and attitudes. People are very 
careful in the park about not harassing religiously observant women wearing a 
headscarf. This is considered as a process of reconciliation. Everybody must try to 
accept others as they are. (Mavi, Female, Political Science, 1st year, 10/6/2013) 
There were reports of harassment of headscarf-wearing women by protesters. 
Activists I spoke to about this in Gezi Park, including women protestors wearing the 
headscarf, rejected reports of this kind, while some of my informants who did not support 
the protests said that they and some of their friends were subjected to harassment away 
from the park, and even in Taksim Square, on account of their headscarf. Almost all of 
them blamed the neo-nationalists (Ulusalcılar) for these harassments. Zeliha was a female 
protester wearing a headscarf. 
As a religious person wearing a headscarf, do you have any problem with 
secularist people here? 
Not here. I have never had any trouble, and never heard from the others. I have just 
heard that Kemalists do harass women wearing the headscarf in other protests out 
of the park. The Taksim Dayanışma Platformu (Taksim Solidarity Platform) has 
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already made a statement saying, “Harassment towards women, also harassment 
and anger towards women wearing the headscarf is non-acceptable”.  
A woman I interviewed yesterday said that she has never come here because of the 
harassments she heard from her friends, and because of her anxiety of 
encountering harassment. 
It is normal. I know a lot of people like that. They think that the park is the place of 
neo-nationalists. As it is seen like it from the outside, they are worried about 
coming here. This is already the problem of the neo-nationalists as well. Most of 
them also have not come here; however they believe that the Gezi Park protest is 
their own attempt. Therefore there are some extremist neo-nationalists who attack 
women wearing the headscarf outside of the park. (Zeliha, Female, Environmental 
Engineering, 4th year, 10/6/2013) 
Zeliha gave some examples she had heard from friends of attacks on religious 
women wearing the headscarf. They ranged from teasing, and swinging the Atatürk flag in 
their faces, to pushing and shoving and knocking them about, or banging a stick on their 
car. During the interview, she remarked that a friend sitting with us was the most recent 
example she had heard of. I asked her friend about this, and she told me of being in the 
capital city the previous weekend, walking on one of the main thoroughfares. There were 
many protesters in the street. Some shouted as they passed “Başlarını kapatanların 
başlarını yolmaya gidiyoruz!” (We are going to cut off the heads of the people who cover 
their heads!). 
Ela was another university student studying Radio and Cinema. She had been 
wearing the headscarf for only a year, having grown up in Kadıköy, a secular 
neighbourhood of Istanbul. She has both a religious and a secular social circle. One of my 
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informants recommended to me that I interview her about her activism, she having been an 
activist almost since primary school. We met in another neighbourhood, Beşiktaş, and 
talked about her activist experiences and the Gezi Park protests in particular. I asked her to 
compare these protests with her previous experiences. According to her, a secular and 
Turkish nationalist atmosphere was dominant in the park. She was unhappy with the 
attitudes of some secular protesters towards some other protesters, especially the religious 
females and the Kurdish nationalists.  
As a female wearing a headscarf, I do not feel myself belonging in the park. When 
I go there, if there are female friends wearing a headscarf, I go to them 
straightaway. There are some groups in the park, although I do not agree with some 
of their ideas, I feel comfortable near them. Gezi Park is not an area I completely 
feel comfortable in, and this is a problem for me. I think, the women wearing the 
headscarf are not the only ones who experience this. I cannot speak on behalf of 
them, but I think the Kurds experience this too. They have an area in which I 
always see them there. In my view, they think that they will not be accepted by the 
others. (Ela, Female, Cinema, 1st year, 10/6/2013) 
She said that however uncomfortable she felt about these situations, these problems were 
not such big enough as to persuade her to move away from Gezi Park. She still went there 
and attended to the protests despite the “disagreeable things”, saying that this protest was 
not their protest only. She gave an example of a disagreeable experience. 
We, as the Muslim girls, organised a meeting there. We were talking and writing 
some things. It was obvious that we were in a meeting. A woman came to us, 
interrupting the meeting, sitting near us without asking permission as matter of 
courtesy; she was saying some interesting things like “Oh, you girls wearing the 
headscarf are also here! Thank you very much for supporting us.” First of all, who 
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are “you”? Who are we supporting when we support you? What do you mean? In 
addition, what is it, to interrupt our meeting? It means that we are females wearing 
the headscarf, therefore they can treat us however they like! We know that if we 
got dressed in a different way, they would not have come and done things like that! 
They look down at us and speak to us like they were a teacher. During our meeting, 
10-15 people came and said something like “Oh, women wearing the headscarf! 
Look at them! Can we take a picture?” Their way of speaking was actually so 
disrespectful! 
Is it generally like this, or does any particular group treat you in that way? 
Neo-nationalists, Atatürkists are like this. I have not experienced this with other 
people. (Ela, Female, Cinema, 1st year, 10/6/2013) 
Most of my informants who talked of harassment of women wearing the headscarf 
mostly accused the neo-nationalist, or the Atatürkists, particularly the elderly (over 50s) 
Atatürkist women. I put these charges to two of my informants who identified themselves 
as neo-nationalists and Atatürkists or Kemalists. They did not accept the accusations. They 
indicated that, although there was some hostility between secularists and religiously 
observant people during the protests, the new secularist generation is more respectful of 
their religiously observant peers who embrace a different lifestyle. 
How can the people accusing the neo-nationalist for the harassments towards the 
women wearing the headscarf, say something like that? How many neo-nationalists 
did they see and talk to? How do they come to this conclusion? We should 
distinguish between people and institutions. It is not right to tie an institution into 
something if the administrator or the authority of the institution did not say 
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anything about it. In that case, it would be an individual fault. (Tizcan, Male, 
Journalism, 3rd year, 10/6/2013) 
The harassment that is associated with the neo-nationalists concerns individual 
reactions. As the Türkiye Gençlik Birliği (The Youth Union of Turkey), it is not 
possible for us to embrace this kind of thought. It is also not possible for me to be 
uncomfortable with women who wear the headscarf. They have the right to do so, 
not only here, anywhere in Turkey, like I do (wearing western cloths). We just do 
not understand why some people cause disturbance with these statements. Because 
of these statements, when people see a neo-nationalist, they think that they are anti-
religiously observant people. It is not possible to agree with that. People pray the 
Friday prayer here and some of our members attend it. We, both the religious and 
atheist people, meet and talk here every evening. There is not any discrimination 
here. (Berkay, Male, Chemical Engineering, 3rd year, 10/6/2013) 
For Turkish secularists, religiosity and political Islamism are different concepts. 
While they defend the right to practise religion, they are against political Islamism. Berkay 
says the government has to have no religion, and that religion exists for people. He says 
that Turkish secular youth believe that every person, in the individual sense, whichever 
religion he or she believes in, has got to have the freedom of practising his or her religion. 
Tizcan, like Berkay, rejected the perception of Atatürkists as irreligious. “Those 
who lump Atatürkism and irreligiousness together, I believe, lack science, culture, and 
even religion!” He sought to demonstrate that Atatürk was respectful, personally and as a 
politician, towards Islam, saying, “Because Atatürk established the faculty of theology 
himself in 1926. He founded a mosque in China. In order that the religious scholars be 
educated in the best way, contrary to other secular countries, he generalized and he gave 
more importance to them than the faculty of medicine and the military academy.” 
	   279 
 
8.4 THE POSITION OF RELIGIOUSLY OBSERVANT PEOPLE IN THE 
PROTESTS 
Based on my observation, in the first days of the Gezi Park protests, there were a great 
number of religiously observant people who supported the protest through either the social 
media, especially Twitter and Facebook, or going to the park in person. Among them were 
writers, university academics, Islamist activists, and university students. At first they were 
criticizing the government about some parts of the new Taksim project that included 
removing the park, rebuilding an Ottoman-era military barracks, and constructing a 
shopping centre. This project involved the cutting down of several trees. Later they 
protested against the police brutality towards the protestors in the park. This was seen as a 
reflection of the style of the Prime Minister. Based on my own observations of the media 
and society in Turkey, there had been criticism among some religiously observant people, 
especially about his authoritarian style of speaking and acting. Nevertheless, most of the 
religiously observant people withdrew their support increasingly. There remained only the 
Anti-capitalist Muslims Society and some individuals. 
When I went to Istanbul at the end of the first week of the protests, along with the 
protesters in the park, I also met with some religiously observant university students 
outside the park. My religiously observant informants outside the park criticized the Prime 
Minister for a variety of reasons, but they also criticized some of the protestors’ methods 
and some of the things they were saying, and support was becoming more muted. Sevil, as 
a university student wearing the headscarf, was among my religiously observant 
informants who supported the protests although she never went to the park. 
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I still support the protest. I am one of the people who do not support the Taksim 
project, building the barracks on the place of the park. According to the last 
research I have seen, 75 per cent of people do not want it. In fact, I was going to go 
to the park on 31 May. I was busy and could not go there. When I went home, I 
saw the news that the police attacked on the protesters who did not do anything 
wrong. It provoked the protesters. I am thinking now, if I were there I would have 
become very angry after the attack with tear gas. (Sevil, Female, Sociology, 4th 
year, 8/6/2013) 
Sevil gave some examples of criticisms levelled by religiously observant people against 
the government. According to her, there had been anger among the religiously observant or 
conservative community towards the so-called “tenderers” who got rich quick by corruptly 
tendering for government contracts. Secondly, she said that religiously observant people 
fumed over the Prime Minister’s authoritarian attitude: “like a sultan”. Another cause of 
anger among them, according to Sevil, was that the headscarf problem had still not been 
solved. 
The history of lifting the headscarf ban at the universities is just two years old. Did 
they not come to power in 2002? I mean, what did they do in the first nine year 
period? Socio-political conjuncture and things like that, but I believe that, of 
course, it could have been done before, because they do whatever comes into their 
minds. On the one hand, yes, they line their own pockets, they also hold high 
positions, but they have forgotten the girls! They allowed some of them to go to 
universities, but where are the officers, where are the government agencies? This is 
a good card. It is always a support vote. They want to use it in all elections, part by 
part. I think they do not give priority to it. (Sevil, Female, Sociology, 4th year, 
8/6/2013) 
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Faruk was a university student and a member of a religious group. When we talked about 
the complaints of the protesters concerning the authoritarian manner of the then Prime 
Minister, he said he was in agreement with them about it, and that the power of the Prime 
Minister should come to an end. “But our only problem is that there is no one else in 
Turkey like Tayyip Erdoğan. That’s why he’s becoming more and more authoritarian.” 
Beril was another female religiously observant student. She also criticized the Prime 
Minister’s style saying, “Although I like the Prime Minister, I admit that his attitude 
towards the other fifty per cent of the citizens who did not support him in the elections, is 
hard. I cannot accept his style of a Prime Minister of a big country. It is possible that he 
has got some other faults apart from his style.”  
During the Gezi Park protests, some religious writers also criticized the government, 
especially the Prime Minister, for the same reasons as the students quoted above, and they 
urged the government to show respect to the secularist people protesting in the park. Ayşe 
Böhürler was among those writers. She is also one of the founders of the AKP with 
Erdoğan, and a member of the central executive committee of the party. She wrote in the 
first week of the protests: “Until recently we (as the religiously observant Muslims) have 
been defending our own religious values and lifestyles by challenging the state’s attitude to 
impose a secular lifestyle as the only option for a way of life. And now, we should be 
respectful to the people’s objection to the bans and indoctrination presented within 
religious disguise like we were expecting at past” (Böhürler, 2013). 
Despite their supports for the protests in the first few days, and despite the criticisms of the 
government and Prime Minister, religiously observant people withdrew their support as 
time went on. The foremost reason for this change was the violence: the fact that the 
protesters did not keep their distance from violence during the protests. In my interviews 
with religious informants, all of them criticized the protesters concerning this. In their 
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eyes, the protests, although they started “innocently”, lost their legitimacy when they 
resorted to violence. It was unacceptable to them. In the recent history of Turkey 
religiously observant people have felt themselves subjected to various injustices, some of 
which still continue to exist, such as the headscarf ban at universities and government 
institutions; the dissolving of the Milli Görüş, a religious political party; the banning of 
religious movements (cemaat), religious orders (tarikat), and dervish monasteries (tekke). 
Although they are still working to resolve these matters, they have avoided resorting to 
violence to get their rights. My religiously observant informants gave these examples and 
said they were exposed to much more oppression and unfairness, but tried to get their due 
in a democratic way. 
There have been some people who vandalized and took down some cars... We saw 
them on the TV screens. There are obvious statistics. Some cars were burned. 
There has been material damage. We cannot ignore these facts, because we saw 
them. I think the people in Gezi Park have not excluded these. I have not heard any 
obvious disapproval. I wish I had heard. (Sevil, Female, Sociology, 4th year, 
8/6/2013) 
If everything was like it was on the same day, I mean, if the protest was like 
reading books and entertaining each other, it would have been a rightful, legitimate 
protest. Of course, I also do not want the cutting down of the trees. But the events 
moved away from the tree issue. It turned into a clash with the government and a 
desire for revolution. Those clashes and fights are not all there. (Fatih, Male, 
Geophysical Engineering, 1st year, 10/6/2013) 
Of course I did not support the attack by the police. But I also do not support the 
people who reacted to the attack using violence and still resist. It is not our problem 
that the “innocent” environmentalist protesters are associated with provocateurs 
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and assailants. They should have seen the situation and withdrawn from there. It 
was their choice. (Beril, Female, Psychology, 1st year, 10/7/2013) 
Have you participated in the protests, or have you supported them from a distance? 
No. In the first three days I supported them from a distance, but I changed my 
attitude. There is not only one reason of this; there are a lot of reasons. But I think 
the most important thing is the hate speech that has been created by the people who 
are in the park and their supporters. (Aylin, Female, Medicine, 1st year, 9/6/2013) 
Some of my informants were exposed in person, some of them heard both from 
their friends and the social media.  
If you go to the squares, then your reaction (protest) is against the Prime Minister 
and the government. But if you do your protest with your pots and pans from your 
window, your are reacting to me, then! Because your protest disturbs and 
suppresses me. I look at it in terms of who you are disturbing. I see these protests 
are not against the government, rather, they are a reaction to the people who elected 
the AKP. (Sevil, Female, Sociology, 4th year, 8/6/2013) 
The most notorious incident of harassment occurred on 1st June 2013. According to 
the media, the daughter-in-law of the mayor of Istanbul Bahçelievler was attacked by a 
group of protesters. The 23 year old, wearing a headscarf and with a six-month-old baby, 
said 70 to 100 Gezi protestors, on seeing her had started shouting “Beat her! Whatever 
happened to us is because of the headscarf! We are the rightful owners of this country; do 
you understand? We are going to hang Erdoğan; do you understand?” She said she fainted 
and when she came to, she founded they had urinated on her. The Prime Minister 
mentioned this incident and tension increased among religiously observant people (Haber7, 
2013).  
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These events strengthened the perceptions of religiously observant people that the 
protestors were anti-religious. More importantly, these kinds of events reminded 
religiously observant people of the period starting on 28th February 1998. In that period 
religiously observant Turks found themselves restricted in several ways. Thousands of 
female university students had to leave their schools or, as an interim solution, wore wigs 
at university. In addition to the government pressure, some secularists organized 
harassments such as banging pots and pans, and putting the lights off at a certain time in 
the evening. Some of my female informants look back on this as a traumatic experience. 
Because of the headscarf bans, I had to wear a wig in the last year of high school 
and at university. I experienced many difficulties, had very big troubles. I mean, 
really very big troubles! It is still affecting me. Therefore, I still go through a 
trauma when I hear the sounds of pots and pans, and my tweets change 
immediately. All my thoughts, views, attitudes, keeping my balance, change! That 
period, 28 February, was also a trauma for a lot of friends of mine, like me. We are 
a generation that experienced these difficulties. Consequently, we must not be 
reminded of these traumas. (Sevil, Female, Sociology, 4th year, 8/6/2013) 
Erdoğan came to power after the 28th February 1998 period, largely as a result of 
these events. Memory of that time still inclines many religiously observant people to back 
Erdoğan against the secularists, despite his faults. Some religious groups and individuals, 
although critical of the government privately, see public criticism of Erdoğan as dangerous 
for religiously observant people. 
Another factor causing religiously observant people to withdraw support for the 
protesters was some complaints and demands made during the Gezi Park protests. 
According to some informants, Erdoğan urging people to have three children, for instance, 
was just the offering of advice and not an encroachment on freedom. Alcohol regulation 
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was also not about lifestyle, but was necessary for social order. Some of them did not 
accept the claim that Erdoğan has become authoritarian; they think that it is just his 
personality and was one of the reasons he was elected. Slogans like “Resign Tayyip!” and 
“Government out!” because of his style and his way of speaking were perceived by 
religiously observant people as unjust to the Prime Minister. For them, there was no 
serious reason for the resignation of the Prime Minister and the government. They 
generally criticized the protesters for not making constructive criticism, and generally 
using only negative arguments. According to them, there was no other politician as 
powerful and charismatic as Erdoğan. There was no alternative. 
Lastly, one of the most important reasons given for not supporting the protests and 
even for being against them, was the belief that the Gezi Park protests were organized by 
“external powers” (Star Gazete, 2013). Extended coverage by the foreign media, especially 
the BBC and CNN, the appearance of a German politician, Claudia Roth, at the protests, 
and demands by some protesters to, for example, prevent the building of the third 
Bosphorus bridge and third Istanbul airport, were seized on as evidence by people claiming 
that the main target of the protests was the overthrow of the Prime Minister and 
government for economic and political reasons. 
 
8.5 DEMOCRATIZATION VS. POLARIZATION 
Although there were a confusing variety of issues during the Gezi Park protests, these 
protests, in my view, have developed a social consciousness especially among secularist 
people in Turkey. Based on my observations and interviews, the new generation, the 
university students in particular, are much more aware of the necessity to defend rights and 
freedom of all segments of society. The Internet, the social media, and the social 
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environment at universities play a very significant role in this democratic consciousness-
raising. In socializing at university, students come to be familiar with other worldviews, 
political views and lifestyles. Berkay accepted that secularist people have changed in terms 
of social awareness in the last decade, especially through the universities. 
Do you accept that secularist people were not so sensitive about the difficulties of 
the women wearing headscarves? 
Definitely I do, because we, as the folk, learn some things slowly. We learn not to 
be afraid of one another. I am 21 years old. I do not know what exactly went on in 
the 28 February period you mentioned, but people learn in time. It might have been 
prevalent 10-15 years ago, but nowadays, we are university students, and we have 
female friends in our classrooms. So it would not be suitable to have such an 
anxiety, because we live together now. We are going to be together everywhere 
evermore. They are my classmates, and after the university, they maybe my 
colleagues in future. (Berkay, Male, Chemical Engineering, 3rd year, 10/6/2013) 
Communication in Gezi Park caused the young people to gain a greater depth of 
understanding. They spent days and weeks eating together, helping each other, discussing 
and observing worldviews and lifestyles, entertaining together, even praying together and 
striving together for freedom for all in society. Ela, as a religiously observant female 
university student wearing a headscarf, spent at least ten days in the park. Despite 
shortcomings she found there, she said that she continued going because of the importance 
of the protest for the future of Turkey. 
Although there are some problems and shortcomings in the park, I think Gezi Park 
is a very positive thing. There has never been anything like this before in Turkey. 
So many people with different views in a park, without bothering each other! I 
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think this is definitely a positive development for both Turkey and us. I learn a lot 
of things listening to other people here. Others also learn a lot of things listening to 
others. We are going to move towards peace listening to the unpleasant experiences 
of the others and communicating. (Ela, Female, Cinema, 1st year, 10/6/2013) 
The protests raised people’s awareness of the distinction between majoritarian 
democracy and pluralistic democracy. After President Abdullah Gül released a statement 
in which he declared that “Democracy is not just elections” (Milliyet, 2013), there was 
discussion, in the park and elsewhere, of the importance of respect for people opposed to 
the government of the day. Protestor informants emphasized that “He [Erdoğan] must 
listen to us as well”. Derya saw these developments as right and proper, seen in the context 
of the long imperialist past of the country. According to her, Turkey is now going through 
what the USA and Europe went through in the 1960s. She did not criticize only the AKP 
but warned all the political parties about keeping up with the new social situation. 
I have always been opposed to this divisiveness. I come from a socialist family. 
There is no ‘you’ and ‘I’, there is ‘we’ as the whole Turkey. There is no other way 
than this. What the Prime Minister is doing now is a great sin. Dividing the society 
in two is to press the button of a civil war. Nobody will come out ahead. All the 
political parties must change their policies, because the society is changing, 
because the world is changing. (Derya, Female, Conservatory, 4th year, 9/6/2013) 
Ceyda saw a difference between the previous secularist generation and the new 
generation. She criticized as “unhealthy” (sakat) the understanding of democracy of the 
previous generation. For her, the previous generation defended only their own rights and 
freedom, while the new generation defend the rights of all members of society. 
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I think that the most important duty of us, as the youth, is to persuade the previous 
generation about the necessity of objecting to all kinds of oppression. It is not 
limited to my parents. I should attend to different platforms and give the message 
that you should reject the oppression of everyone, not only yourself, because 
oppression of a section of society is an oppression to all of us; if we all object we 
can live happier, more freely, and more comfortable. The understanding of 
democracy by the previous generation was not right. The belief of secularist people 
who said that they believe in democracy is also invalid. If we do not want this 
movement to be limited here, we should build a bridge between the previous 
generation and the current generation. (Ceyda, Female, History, 4th year, 
10/6/2013) 
I asked Nejat’s opinion of the anxiety felt by religiously observant people about a 
possible return to the situation of the 28th February period. He understood their fears, but 
was sure that Turkey would never return to that situation. According to him, nobody in the 
park wanted that: even the people shouting, “We are the soldiers of Mustafa Kemal”. He 
explained “The freedom of one segment of the society is also my freedom. I think we 
understood this now.” 
Religiously observant students, who did not go to the park and did not distinguish 
between the protest in the park and other, supporting, protests outside it, tended to view the 
protests as the reaction of secularist people unable to overthrow the AKP democratically 
through the ballot box. They did not recognize that the Gezi Park period was a decisive 
moment for the new generation regarding the future of Turkey, and supported equal rights 
for all in society. The rights being ones like freedom of expression, freedom of religion, 
freedom of lifestyle, and right to education. Emphasis was given to the importance of a 
pluralistic democracy, respecting the other’s worldview and lifestyle, and for justice in the 
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country. Notably absent was any mention by religiously observant students of a desire to 
Islamize the legal and educational system, nor any other areas of public life in the country. 
Common points in their statements were justice, freedom and respect. Bedri and Aylin 
were among the religiously observant students interviewed. 
We need to decide first. Are we going to will to live together, accepting the 
existence of different views and beliefs? The people who answer this question as 
“no” are going to be recorded as the people who desire polarization in the country. 
(Bedri, Male, Business Management, 4th year, 28/7/2013) 
The people who stand firm on justice and equity are going to develop a common 
word and actions that underlie healthy social relationships. I hope so. (Aylin, 
Female, Medicine, 1st year, 9/6/2013) 
The university students I interviewed seemed strikingly limited in their 
partisanship. They readily offered criticism of the political party they had voted for at the 
election, and seemed ready to consider switching support. 
I think that the main factor that put the AKP into power is the CHP, that hindered 
female students wearing headscarves from going to universities. Frankly speaking, 
that’s what I think. The CHP had a lot of wrong policies. (Ceyda, Female, History, 
4th year, 10/6/2013) 
I voted for the AKP but I am not a partisan person. I voted for them, because I 
believed they were going to do a good job. If there are elections now, I will vote for 
them again. But if there were alternatives working much better, realizing good 
projects in terms of the development of Turkey, my vote would change then. I 
mean, I am not a fanatic. I am not a person who will be the partisan towards the 
AKP or the CHP for life. (Mehmet, Male, Science Teaching, 4th year, 13/6/2013) 
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The Prime Minister did not manage the crisis properly. His saying “We decided 
once!” was really… (Sevil, Female, Sociology, 4th year, 8/6/2013) 
 
8.6 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has analysed the Gezi Park protests, which started on 27th May 2013 in Gezi 
Park, Istanbul, Turkey, in terms of the place of religion in the protests. Making 
observations in and outside the park for two weeks, and conducting interviews with both 
secularist and religiously observant university student protestors, and with other religiously 
observant students not supporting the protests, I concentrated on the following questions: 
What were the objectives of the protests? Were religion, Islam, religiously observant 
people, and the religious identity of the current policy makers among the main objections? 
What was the attitude of religiously observant people during the protests? Why did many 
religiously observant people withdraw their support from the park, and from the protests 
generally? What has been the result of the protests in terms of democracy and polarization 
in Turkish society? Have these protests contributed to the raising of a democratic 
consciousness, or have they rather contributed to polarization between secular and 
religious Turkish citizens? 
Among the protestors and others, I particularly focused on university students. And 
among the protests in different neighbourhoods of Istanbul and in most of the cities of 
Turkey, I focused on Gezi Park, which was the starting point and symbolic heart of the 
protests. In this chapter, I presented my observations and interviews and analysed them, 
linking them with the whole thesis and the general theory of the thesis. This chapter has 
given an opportunity to test the hypotheses of this thesis as seen mostly from the points of 
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view of secular university students, and the opportunity to crosscheck the analyses of the 
previous chapters.  
Based on my observations and interviews, the protests in Gezi Park had certain 
objectives. People went in limited numbers to the park at first in order to stop its 
destruction and replacement with a reconstruction of a historic barracks and with a 
shopping centre. After the attack by the police on the protesters, thousands of people went 
to the park to support the protesters and to protest against police brutality. Later the 
protests spread all over the country and developed into protests targeting government 
policies, and the attitude and rhetoric of the then Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. 
The main points of criticism were interference in people’s chosen lifestyle; women’s 
rights; authoritarian attitudes and policies; anxiety regarding the possibility of the 
transformation of the country into an Islamic state; freedom of expression, especially the 
freedom of journalists and the media; oppressive alcohol regulation; abortion law; the 
Atatürk personality cult; the capitalist economy; and the lack of a satisfactory opposition in 
parliament.  
During my fieldwork and my research through the social media, I never witnessed 
or heard any opposition to religion, religiously observant people or the religious identity of 
the policy makers of the country. As mentioned, I took hundreds of photographs in Gezi 
Park and Taksim Square and wrote down all the slogans, which were more than three 
hundred, in the area, and there was not any slogan targeting religion and religiosity in 
general. Only a small number of them criticized the then Prime Minister in terms of his 
way of practising religion. In addition, when I asked people whether the protests were 
about religion and religiously observant people, they were surprised and said that they 
were also believers and respectful of religion, adducing evidence such as the presence of 
female protesters wearing headscarves at the protests, observance of Friday prayers in the 
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park without problem, and the celebration of the Mi‘raj religious festival and meal together 
in the park. While they had no problem with religion and religiously observant people, and 
defended their rights to believe and practise, they were sensible about political Islam. The 
statements of the Gezi Park protestors concerning politics as related to religion and 
secularism confirmed the ideas of my o ther research participants, presented in Chapter 
Four. Like these others, the protestors also defended the idea of a secular country and were 
against Turkey being a religious state or of the government referring to religion when 
making its laws. Religious protesters defended the same set of ideas. They also wanted a 
secular state, rather than a strictly secularist state, giving equal rights to all religions and 
sects. 
Religiously observant people also criticized the government and the policies and 
the statements of the then Prime Minister in particular. There were a great number of 
religiously observant people involved; some of them went to the park to support the 
protests and some of them gave support through social media in those first days. Along 
with protesting the redevelopment of Gezi Park and police brutality, they criticized the 
government for its capitalist policies; corruption; lawlessness; the then Prime Minister’s 
authoritarianism; the intervention in secularist people’s lifestyles and lack of respect shown 
them; delaying the resolution of the headscarf issue; economic policies and urbanization 
policies. 
Many religiously observant people withdrew their support after the first few days 
of the protest, and when I asked them about this, I was given the following reasons: hate 
speech heard from some protesters; the failure of protesters to maintain a suitable distance 
from violence and extremist left-wing people; harassment of women wearing headscarves 
in other places where protests were held; memories of the 28th February period stirred up 
by the pots and pans protests of secularist people in other neighbourhoods of Istanbul, and 
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in other cities; reports in the media which made religiously observant people suspect 
protesters of being anti-religious, with the actual target of the protests being Islam and 
religiously observant Muslims. Some religiously observant people compared the country 
now to the situation of a decade and more ago, and were eager not to return to the 
problems with the economy and the lack of freedom of past times. They thought the 
protesters, although right in some of their criticisms, did the then Prime Minister an 
injustice, with demands for his resignation and that of the government. Doubts were 
expressed about the wisdom of stopping building work on the third Bosphorus bridge and 
the third Istanbul airport. Most did not see an acceptable alternative for the then Prime 
Minister or an acceptable alternative to the AKP. And then there were the ideas put about 
that foreign countries were interfering in Turkey’s domestic affairs. For these reasons, 
religiously observant people, except some Islamist groups, like Anti-capitalist Muslims 
Society, and some individuals, withdrew their support from the Gezi Park protests and then 
the protests transformed into a secular reaction movement. 
There was great ambiguity among people, especially religiously observant people, 
after the protests spread to other neighbourhoods of Istanbul and other Turkish cities, and 
when the extremist protesters, who responded police brutality with violence, cars and 
shops, and the neo-nationalists (Ulusalcılar), some of whom were against headscarves and 
the religious identity of policy-makers, got involved in the protests. Especially after some 
items of news, which were make-up and/or manipulated news for the protestors, - such as 
entering a mosque without taking shoes off, drinking alcohol in the mosque, attacking a 
pregnant woman wearing a headscarf, and harassing women wearing headscarves, it 
became easy to believe that the main target of the protests was the overthrow of the then 
Prime Minister and the AKP because of the increasing power of religiously observant 
people. 
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Although the political effects of the Gezi Park protests created conflict, they also 
resulted in significant negotiations during the protests between religiously observant and 
secularist participants, especially in the park. Based on my observations and interviews in 
the field, the park became a public sphere in which people gathered, encountered and 
negotiated with other people having different worldviews, political views and lifestyles. 
People ideas about religiosity and secularism were influenced by what they experienced in 
the park. Various religiosities were encountered in the park and this encounter created 
significant results for my research. Firstly, both secularist and religiously observant 
research participants were against a strictly secularist state or an Islamist state. The main 
purpose of the gathering in the park was to protest against all kinds of authoritarianism, the 
authoritarian policies of the then government in particular. Most of the secularist protestors 
realized there that not all religiously observant people were demanding an Islamist state; 
and most of the religiously observant protestors realized there that not all the secularist 
people were eager to push religion into private sphere. On the contrary, both sides were 
agreed on the non-privatization of religion. The religious activities in the park presented in 
this chapter were the indicator of this social agreement, and they are compatible with the 
findings of Chapter Four. 
The encounter between different understandings of religiosity was significant event 
during the protests, arising from interaction in the park itself. Like the perceptions of my 
other research participants, presented in Chapter Five, secularist protestors among my 
informants who identified themselves as believers (inançlı) and religious (dindar), met a 
different religiosity that comprises observance of the rulings and practices of religion as 
well as opposing a conservative or Islamist government for the sake of freedom and 
justice. At the same time, religiously observant informants among the protestors met 
another kind of religiosity that concentrates on belief and morality, rather than rulings and 
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practices. The negotiation between these two sides created an interaction and new 
perceptions about politics, religion and the place of religion in the public and political 
spheres. 
Finally, both secular and religious university student informants were optimistic 
about the future of the country in terms of democratic consciousness. They were against a 
polarization of the country, oppressive government, the limiting of freedom of expression, 
and freedom for all lifestyles. As the previous chapters of my thesis indicate, the main 
problem for all segments of society, especially for university students, was rule by 
oppressive and authoritarian governments, whether secular or religious. 
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Picture 1 – The tents and flags of the Anti-capitalist Muslims Society 
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Picture 2 – The members of an Islamist society, “tokad”. “Let’s resist together against the capitalist policies 
that plunder city, nature, and human!” 
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Picture 3 – Friday prayer during the protets in Gezi Park 
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Picture 4 – Traditionally dressed Kurd women 
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Picture 5 – “We are Muslims, Tayyip, you do not believe in our religion – Çapulcus2 from Kasımpaşa”3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Protestors called themselves “çapulcu” (looter), in response to the then Prime Minister Erdogan’s 
desrtiption of them as looters. Protestors took up this name as a symbol of pride, describing their peauceful 
and humorous civil disobedience actions. 
3 Kasımpaşa is a neighbourhood in Istanbul, in which Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was born and grown up. 
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Picture 6 – “Gezi speaks – Wish tree”  
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Picture 7 – “We can take care of the religion without AKP; Ataturk without CHP; the nation without MHP; 
the Kurds without BDP. We are the people.” 
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CHAPTER NINE: CONCLUSION 
 
This research has explored the ways in which university students in Istanbul understand, 
express and negotiate religion and secularity in the early twenty-first century amidst 
changes in the historically constituted, politically affirmed and culturally mediated 
polarization between Islamism and secularism. Examining this issue, I have explored the 
perceptions and views of university students on secularism and Islamism, the secularist 
state and the Islamic state; their understanding and experience of religiosity and secularity; 
the impact of religious groups in Turkey regarding the relationship of university students 
with religion and secularity; and finally, the existence of division or cohesion in society 
based on religion, culture, and lifestyle.  
The main argument of this thesis is that Turkish university students, both secular 
and religiously oriented, do succeed in negotiating the relationship between religion and 
secularism successfully; they develop new kinds of religiosity and new understandings of 
Islam that shape their attitudes towards the state, politics, the public sphere, and those who 
embrace different lifestyles. 
This thesis has examined the interaction between Islam and secularity as 
understood and experienced by university students in Turkey. I have looked at the different 
aspects of the issue in order to explore the real dynamics of secularization and Islamization 
among the university students of Turkish society. 
An examination of daily experiences of university students in a secular setting is 
interesting because Islam is a religion with specific interventions into the daily life of the 
community of believers; it includes having a legal system, Shari‘a, with certain rules 
ranging from general morality to everyday life, and distinctively specified traditions.  
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The phenomenon is woth further exploring since the terms ‘secularization’ and 
‘secularism’ are not used in the same way in the West and in Turkey. Both political and 
sociological meanings needed to be debated in the Turkish context. In this study I contend 
that political secularism has various meanings and interpretations in Turkey. My 
qualitative research makes it possible to unveil the perceptions of university students about 
secularism and explore what are the roots of on-going political debates using the terms 
political Islamism and secularism. 
In this study I differentiate between political Islamism and civil Islamism, 
indicating that political Islamism is a different ideology, implying the Islamization of the 
country using political tools, while the latter gives importance and priority to civil works 
and the everyday lives of Muslims. 
The point I emphasize is that most of my research participants prefer secularity in 
government agencies and freedom for all religions, ideologies, views and practices in the 
country. However, this form of secularity is not that implemented by the state since the 
beginning of the republic of Turkey. The mode of secularism that is preferred by a 
majority of Turkish university students seems to be essentially along the lines of the 
Anglo-Saxon style of secularism, which is defined in Chapter Four. 
I also show here that spheres where religion is lived are not distinctly separated 
from each other, rather they are overlapped. This is not so much visible in the social and 
political areas as it is apparent in individual spaces. In this respect, religiosity and 
secularity cannot be measured by only looking at political views and attitudes. 
Through empirical research with forty-five university students in Turkey, I 
attempted to answer the following four main questions: 
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1. What are the understandings and experiences of university students in Turkey related to 
Islam and secularity? How do they perceive religion and religiosity? 
2. What tensions and conflicts are there between Islam and secularity, the process of 
secularization and the state ideology of secularism, as experienced by Turkish university 
students? 
3. What are the roles of the major actors struggling to develop and maintain an Islamic 
consciousness among university students and what influence do non-governmental 
organizations and religious groups have on the lives of university students, on their 
religiosity and religious or non-religious sense of identity? 
4. To what extent may polarization and conflict be observed among young people of 
Turkey, particularly university students, in relation to religion and lifestyles? 
In Chapter Three I reflected on the methodological approaches I utilized in this 
research. Since qualitative research was the most appropriate method for my study, 
interviewing and observations were chosen as the research methods. Considering ethical 
issues first, I conducted in-depth interviews in my fieldwork site in Istanbul. The semi-
structured interviews were a good tool, first, to get the views of university students 
concerning the research questions, and secondly, to get personal stories, experiences and 
views relevant to the details of the main issues and sub-topics. As for the methodological 
tools I used, qualitative individual interviews enabled me to obtain in-depth narratives 
from respondents. Participant observation over a period of nearly seven months in Istanbul 
aided my understanding of students’ social contexts as they negotiated social spaces such 
as university settings. 
I used systematic and purposive sampling and I accessed research participants with 
the help of my gatekeepers. Through this method, I conducted forty-five in-depth 
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interviews with male and female university students. In the fieldwork, my position was 
both insider and outsider to the society because I had lived in Turkey until I graduated 
from university there, and I have been working and studying in Europe for twelve years. 
This position created various advantages such as easily finding the right gatekeepers and 
properly choosing the research participants. At the same time, I could easily distance 
myself from the society when necessary, viewing my respondents’ understanding and 
experiences from the outside.  
I presented the relevant theoretical debates in Chapter Two to frame my research. 
The literature on this relationship between religion and secularity is mostly from and 
concerning the West because terms such as secularization, modernization and sacralisation 
emerged first in the West, and this necessitates consideration of their meanings in their 
original context, in order to establish their significance in modern Turkey.  
I began by demonstrating that there is no single definition of secularism: American 
secularism, Anglo-Saxon secularism, the French style of secularism, and the Turkish each 
has its own characteristics. This poses questions about the peculiarities of the Turkish 
style. Since the beginning of the republic, Turkish secularism has not been merely related 
to the political sphere. It aims to secularize the country in both its institutions and culture. 
It has been successful in secularizing institutions such as education and law, while less 
successful at secularizing the consciousness and culture of the society. I contend that the 
tension between state and society in Turkey has arisen especially in this second area. 
I discussed one of the main characteristics of Turkish-style secularism, that is the 
centrally institutionalized Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı (The Directorate of Religious Affairs). 
Although Turkish secularism is often likened to the French form, the Diyanet, which is 
generally seen as the Turkish state’s dedicated tool for control of religion, marks a big 
difference between them. Although there is no consensus among scholars on this issue, it 
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seems that Westernizing and modernizing reforms in the nineteenth-century Ottoman 
Empire led on to the far more thoroughgoing and systematic secularization of the 
Republic, with the institutionalising of strict secularism by the founders of the Republic, 
aiming to secularize the country from top to the bottom.  
In terms of secularization, I have argued that the different definitions of the notion 
vary from one scientific discipline to another, and on the country being examined, as each 
country has its own experience of religion and secularity. It would definitely mislead 
researchers to treat all Muslim countries and societies as a homogenous group, as almost 
every one has its own mixture of cultures and interpretations of Islam.  
This thesis focuses also on the roots of secularism in Turkey. I have argued that the 
definitions of religiosity and secularity need to be reconsidered in the context of Turkish 
society. As my research and fieldwork shows, secularity in Turkey is mostly debated and 
considered in the political arena rather than the philosophical and religious spheres. 
Supported by my qualitative research, it appears that even many politically secularist 
Turkish university students can identify themselves as religiously observant (dindar). At 
the same time, my research shows that practising or religiously observant university 
students generally do not want Shari‘a Islamic law in Turkey. This finding in itsef 
necessitated further research to develop a better understanding of the secularization and 
Islamization of Turkish society. Thus, this research will contribute to the area approaching 
the phenomenon from a different perspective and allow to deep dive into the issue through 
qualitative method and gathering insights directly from field. 
I did not confine consideration of the tension that is experienced between religion 
and secularity, to the political and sociological areas. It also has a philosophical dimension. 
The debates on the compatibility of Islam and secularity are diverse and vary from scholar 
to scholar. Traditionalist scholars mostly argue that Islam is a complete and closed system 
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and cannot be divided into religious and secular practices, nor can the religion be modified 
to accommodate new circumstances. Other scholars divide Islamic rulings and principles 
into two parts: ‘ibadat (rituals and modes of worship) and mu‘amalat (worldly 
transactions). Modernist scholars generally suggest that religion is concerned with the first, 
and not the second. I have argued that Turkish university students generally approach the 
issue from the point-of-view of modernist scholars. While they embrace Islamic values in 
their private lives, they defend the idea that government agencies and the legal system 
should be organized according to secular universal principles. Islamic jurisprudence does 
allow for legal changes according to new circumstances, on condition that the changes are 
not contrary to basic Islamic values and principles. This characteristic creates the 
possibility of integrating Islam into a modern lifestyle. 
The first empirical chapter (Chapter Four) looked at how Turkish university 
students understood and experienced the relationship between religion and secularity in its 
political aspects. I also provided a framework for understanding how the lifestyles of 
Turkish society are changing, and how these changes are impacting on the new 
generation’s lives. My object was to explore if polarization exists in Turkish society today, 
and whether Kemalist-secularist and political Islamist projects may be deemed to have 
thrived or failed in their aims. I discussed the difficulties students experience in practising 
their religion in the public sphere, the current condition of political Islam and the views of 
my research participants on this. 
I argued on the basis of the interviews that although it has some similarities, 
secularism in Turkey differs from other kinds. My research found that Turkish university 
students, both religiously observant and secularist are not generally opposed to having 
secularism as a state ideology; rather, they are opposed to the Turkish style of secularism, 
which is strict, authoritarian and anti-religious. On the contrary, university students believe 
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that a “genuine secularism” can safeguard religions and religious activities in a country. 
The complaints are of unjust policies, and the desire is for what is conceived of as a 
genuinely secular and democratic state. 
There are some particular tensions and conflicts experienced by university students 
with the secularist state. According to my research, the following issues caused problems 
for students in the past and during my research, nevertheless some of them have been 
partially solved during the time of the AKP government in the last decade. This included 
difficulties practising their religion (lack of facilities, tools, the study schedule); 
inadequacy of school religion lessons in terms of “quality”; problems for women with the 
headscarf at school and university, and in the workplace and public spaces; unjust policies 
concerning ethnic, denominational and religious minorities such as the Kurds, Alevites and 
non-Muslim foundations; obstacles put in the way students of İmam-Hatip religious high 
school students gaining entrance to universities; and a serious anxiety about finding a good 
job while displaying their religious identities and practices or with their relationship with 
some religious groups both in the strictly secularist public and private sectors. 
A key finding was that there is ambiguity and uncertainty expressed by university 
students in the field of politics and religion. They tended to be uncertain on political issues 
and in particular on matters such as: the banning of headscarves at public schools and civil 
institutions; the upholding of Islamic law; media censorship for the sake of some religious 
rules; religious education by the state educational system; and the state institution of the 
Diyanet (Directorate of Religious Affairs). Some students objected to seeing women in 
public places dressed in a way contrary to Islamic principles and rulings, and would like, in 
these matters, to return society to the status quo ante of the Ottoman Empire in which 
social spaces were organized according to the religions of residents. However, those 
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Islamist students were not sure what the solution would be in the modern Turkish context, 
and how Muslims could completely practise their religion in the new social circumstances.  
Another result of the strict secularist state policies on religiously observant students 
was the need to hide their religious identity and activities, to avoid problems at school and, 
later, at work. The reason for hiding their religious connections varied depending on the 
student’s sex, occupations, and future expectations. This difficulty, even though it has not 
disappeared fully yet, has decreased during the AKP era. However, in recent years some 
segments of Turkish society opposed to the AKP government, are anxious about being 
blacklisted by the government and having difficulties in some areas of the life. While most 
of these segments are secular, interestingly there are also religious groups in opposition. 
This requires further research because it is important to explore if other religious groups 
experience difficulties regarding their religious practices and lifestyles during the time a 
religious government is in power, claiming to deal with the publicity of religion. 
Although religiously observant students believe, I found, that Islamic principles 
should be implemented, they were not certain of the feasibility of this in modern Turkey in 
the immediate term or, indeed, ever. At election time, however, religious population 
admitted to being concerned about the religiosity of politicians and still more so the 
policies of political parties regarding religion. 
The AKP’s role in the Islamization and secularization of the country has been much 
debated in Turkey. Secularist students worried that the country was gradually Islamizing 
under the AKP government. Some students asserted, however, that the Arab Spring came to 
Turkey when the AKP came to power and overturned Mustafa Kemal’s regime. There have 
been significant changes in the last decade, on both the religious and secular side of 
society. With the new “conservative” government, religiously observant people have 
entered the upper echelons of the state, and have established peace to a degree within the 
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secular system and with the secular tools of the state. Although there still are tensions 
between religiously observant and secularist people, I found, there is an increasing 
convergence, interaction and accommodation, particularly among university students. 
Students generally are most concerned about problems such as democracy, injustice, 
inequality, the economy, and liberation for all ethnic and religious groups. 
The findings of Chapter Four clearly support Casanova’s idea of the non-private 
nature of religion, as we saw in Chapter One. According to Casanova, “we should expect 
religion and morality to remain and even to become more contentious public issues in 
democratic politics”	   (2007: 22). The findings of this research also show that there is 
significant negotiation in the political arena between the religious and secular in Turkey. 
Secularist students negotiating religion and secularism accept the existence of religion and 
the appearance of religious symbols in the public sphere, seeing this as necessary in a 
democratic country. Similarly, religiously observant students also successfully negotiate 
the secular spaces of the public sphere and religiosity, and accept the validity and necessity 
of secular democratic principles in the political sphere, interpreting the terms “Islamic”	  and 
Islamic politics in a restricted way. Except for radical Islamist students, the students I 
studied do not see a deep-rooted contradiction in politics between democracy and Islam. 
In Chapter Five, I examined religiosity, being religiously observant and secularity 
as understood and perceived by today’s university students. I also examined the 
secularization thesis as it may be applied to the university students of Turkey. The 
approach adopted was to consider the beliefs and values of the students, rather than 
examining such metrics as the percentage of them attending prayers at mosques, for 
instance. 
In the understanding of my informants, religiosity consists not only in worship and 
prayer but also in ethics in every sphere of public as well as private life. The  prioritising of 
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moral values is a significant development in Turkish society in the understanding of 
religiosity. I found that today’s religiously observant students place emphasis on 
embodying religion in their lives and activities, rather than limiting it to formal obedience 
to Islamic rulings.	  
Religiousness has various meanings and perceptions among university students. A 
student who is very active in a secularist party and drinks alcohol might, according to their 
own perception of religion, identify him or herself as religiously observant. While a 
student who performs the daily religious practices and wears the headscarf, can declare 
that she does not regard herself as religious. The students generally agreed that religiosity 
was not a constant feeling. On the contrary it could change from time-to-time and from 
context-to-context, and this was therefore a continuous, divine challenge (imtihan), namely 
endeavouring to keep religious feeling and thinking alive at all times. 
Religiously observant university students rejected the Kemalist ideology in so far 
as it aims at restricting religion to the areas of belief and worship only. Generally the 
students also objected to their parents’ and grandparents’ understanding of religion, arguing 
that traditional religiousness (Kültürel müslümanlık) concentrates on the form of religious 
rituals and rulings rather than the inner meaning or, ‘soul’, of them, while neglecting 
rational and critical thinking. They typically held the view that they do not have to follow 
mere culture arising from historical circumstances, but rather follow the religious 
principles and rulings rationally, creating their own way of living. 
Of all the factors affecting the religiousness and secularity of university students, I 
found that family background remained the most important. Students embraced the 
worldviews of their parents while generally critically appraising them to create their own 
perceptions and lifestyles. They saw formal religious education in schools, even religious 
high schools and theology faculties at universities, as an insufficient basis for their 
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religious lives. This led them to attend unofficial Qur’an courses and various religious 
events organized by religious groups and movements. 
Performing the worship of salat or namaz fives times a day and performing 
ablutions before each namaz were the biggest difficulties students encountered in their 
daily routine of carrying out religious practices. Secular environments in Turkey limit the 
consistency of religious observance, thus causing tension in the minds and social relations 
of religiously observant students. The marginalization of the religiously observant people 
directly or indirectly by some secularist people is another cause of tension. 
Secularism, understood as Westernization, was not an acceptable process for 
religiously observant students, since they generally understood it as anti-religiosity, being 
against Turkish culture and tradition, and imitating European culture, way of thinking and 
lifestyle. Even secularist students were opposed to Westernization.  
Almost all students consented to political and institutional secularization, though 
many were concerned at being unable to practise adequately so as to follow religious 
principles in the areas of economics and education, and in their private lives. This shows 
that the modernization theory of the privatization of religion seems not to have been valid 
for the university student participants. 	  
All these findings support what Casanova (1994) suggests about the term 
‘secularization’. According to him, in order to analyse secularization properly, we need to 
distinguish between three meanings of the term: decline of religious beliefs and practices; 
privatization of religion; and differentiation of the secular spheres from religious 
institutions and norms. Taking into account these three meanings, the third connotation 
seems to fit the situation of my research participants as they accept the secular democratic 
political system, while opposing pressure on their religious lifestyle in the public sphere. 
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Thus, as Casanova suggests, the classical modernization theory of secularization is no 
longer a proper basis for research into religiosity and secularity in a society; we need to 
develop new approaches. 
In Chapter Six I examined Islamic religious groups and associations in Turkey and 
their place in both the private and public lives of Turkish university students. After 
considering who the main targets are of the various Islamic groups, I looked at the issue 
from the students’ point-of-view: considering their views and experiences; the object being 
to elucidate the perceptions university students have of Turkish religious groups, and the 
ways these groups affect their lives in terms of religiosity and secularity; how they 
influence the students’ political attitudes towards the secular Turkish state; the impact on 
the lifestyles of the students publicly and privately; and what students think of the religious 
groups for good and for ill. 
In the light of my finding, it would seem that depending on their interests and 
needs, most Turkish religiously observant people have or had a interaction with at least one 
religious group in their political, public or private lives. With all their varied characteristic 
interests, concerns and constituencies, the various religious groups have in common the 
aim of strengthening the religiosity of individuals, Islamizing society, and eliminating the 
barriers to the practice of religion in public and private. To further these objectives they 
employ various methods, establishing organizations and institutions such as student 
accommodation, political parties, local and international aid organizations, university 
preparatory courses, private schools and universities. I found therefore that religious 
groups have a significant role in the religiosity of Turkish society and particularly in the 
lives of university students. 
The history of Turkish religious groups is, at the same time, the history of the 
relationship between religion and the secularist state in Turkey. It can be seen as a conflict 
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between privatization and non-privatization of religion. The Turkish state, since its 
foundation, has striven to push religion into the margins and into the private sphere. 
Religious groups and their activities were seen as a threat by the state and secularists, who 
are inclined to suspect the religious of being against the secular republic and wanting to 
return (irtica) to an Islamic regime implementing Shari‘a law. The finding of this thesis is 
that religious groups, rather than threatening the secular state, are placing religion, 
religiosity and religiously observant people into the public sphere, and in the meantime, 
securing for university students suitable alternatives to “unsuitable”	  secular spaces, social 
relations and leisure activities. They seek to educate the new generation in Islamic values, 
teaching them Islamic beliefs and principles. According to the students, private schools and 
universities established by religious groups respond to the needs of religiously observant 
people, giving a quality science and religious education. It is notable that, as this research 
shows, religious groups are conspicuously lacking in the political ambitions ascribed to 
them by many those who are not religiously observant. 
Religious groups are nevertheless achieving their aim of creating social 
surroundings suitable for practising religion, by providing opportunities for socializing 
through their institutions and events. This also responds to the felt need of both parents and 
students, particularly conservative or religious female students with their home at a 
distance from Istanbul. There is reason for thinking, therefore, that religious groups make a 
significant contribution not only to the mobilization but also the modernization of Turkish 
society. In addition, there has been strong resistance by religious groups to the privatization 
of religion and moves to restore it to the political and public spheres.	  
Although religious groups are common and effective in Turkish society, this does 
not mean, I found, that the new generation, particularly university students, are dependent 
on them in their private and social lives. On the contrary, students appear to becoming 
	   316 
more and more individualist. Instead of secularization in society, individualization seems 
much more appropriate to describe the current situation of university students. Even 
religiously observant students criticize religious groups for some of their characteristics. 
While they appreciate their importance, they complain of them discouraging independent 
thinking. Not all groups are authoritarian, but students do generally feel the need to take 
control of their own lives and take their own decisions. Similar criticism was made by the 
students who had a relationship with these groups but had left later because of lack of 
respect for individuality. 
In Chapter Seven, I questioned whether Turkey has a society divided into those 
who are religiously observant and those who are secularist. I looked at this issue through 
observing the greetings used, words preferred, hotels people holiday at, and so on.  
I showed that religious individuals, and religious groups which have softened state 
oppression and worked underground to avoid surveillance, are now able to be more open. 
They are more powerful than before in politics, economics and culture. The most 
significant factor behind this has been the AKP government ascendance to power since 
2002. The AKP government has given rise to a new elite, and has come as a relief to 
religiously observant people, who now feel independent more than before to express and 
practise their religious beliefs and principles. 
My findings and observations indicate that the creation of new spaces, in which 
religiously observant people are able to practise their religion, does not mean necessarily 
that there is a polarization in the society in terms of religion and secularity. I argue that 
these developments are the natural results of becoming more openly pluralistic society and 
endeavouring to live as practising Muslims in a secular environment. 
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Living in a secular state and country and aspiring to practise religious principles in 
daily life, at work, in business, education, and holiday leads religiously observant Muslims 
to seek solutions that would emancipate them from dilemmas, ambiguity, and tension they 
experience particularly in their social and public lives. Along with intellectual endeavours, 
religious activists, religious movements, charities and societies take concrete steps to 
resolve this problem within the bounds of possibility, creating alternatives. As a result, 
having their own spaces in private and public lives, people can have opportunity to live 
their lifestyles without any clash with the other people who choose a different lifestyle. 
In the Islamic literature, while the term din is used for the religion and religious 
affairs, the term dunya is used for the world and worldly affairs. These two key terms are 
not generally seen as in conflict or as completely separate areas from each other. My 
research participants agreed with this, and both secularist and religiously observant 
students said that religious and worldly affairs should not be seen as in contradiction with 
each other. However, problems appear when they discuss what religion and religious 
requirements are. Although all of the students I met were Muslims, they grouped with 
respect to their understanding and interpretation of religion and religiosity. Each 
interpretation results in a particular lifestyle that separates its followers from others. And 
this separation appears diversely, from discourse to language, from private institutions to 
choices in daily life.   
During my fieldwork, including interviews and my involvement in the everyday 
activities of students, I observed a general discourse of  “us”	  and “them”, the referents of 
these pronouns depending on the speaker. I also observed great differences between the 
everyday language of religiously observant and secularist students. In some spheres of life 
religious lifestyles are very apparent: attending Friday prayers; praying five times a day; 
fasting during Ramadan; abstaining from alcohol and wearing the headscarf are some 
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prominent examples. Having different lifestyles results in differentiation in places for 
socialising. Although religiously observant and secularist people in Turkey share the same 
spaces, religious duties and principles, with their associated lifestyles, create the need for 
certain places, and keep the religiously observant out of others. Man-woman relationships, 
drinking or not drinking alcohol, praying five times a day, educating children in 
accordance with their parents’ values and principles in	   “suitable”	   neighbourhoods and 
schools, are other examples that might cause social and spatial divisions. However, 
although all religiously observant students see these issues as being among the divine 
challenges (imtihan), the degree of sensitivity varies depending on their culture, family 
education, and sense of religious priorities. In my observations, the social relations of 
males and females are no longer strict in the spaces frequented by those who are 
religiously observant. 
Students in their public life feel the religious–secular social divide to varying 
degrees. While some religiously observant students complained about the contemptuous 
attitudes of their secularist classmates, some female students were of the view that those 
wearing the headscarf feel the social division much more than others, as it’s existence or its 
absence is the most visible sign of a woman’s world view. When I asked the same students 
whether they experience these problems with all lecturers and all secularist friends, they 
said that they do not. It can be asserted that although these kinds of problems were and are 
experienced among the older generation, the new generation does not experience these 
troubles as much as the previous one.  
Living in a secular state and country and aspiring to practise religious principles in 
daily life, at work, in business and education, leads religiously observant people to seek 
solutions that would emancipate them from dilemmas, ambiguity, and tension between 
their Islamic faith and secular life. Along with intellectual endeavours, activist religiously 
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observant people, religious movements, charities and societies take concrete steps in order 
to resolve this matter within the bounds of possibility. The key word for this solution is 
‘alternative’.  
Religiously observant Muslims in Turkey, except for some fundamentalists and 
extremists, want to practise their religion while accommodating themselves to their 
understanding of “modernity”. However, they realize that there are conflicts between 
Islamic lifestyles and modern lifestyles. Under these circumstances the majority of 
religiously observant Muslim individuals and religious groups, instead of completely 
rejecting the values and institutions of the modern world, try to negotiate and reconcile 
them with Islamic principles, as with so called interest-free	   ‘Islamic banking’, and at 
colleges and universities, holiday places, choose of online dictionaries, use of media etc. 
As Toprak points out, “Social and geographical mobility, coupled with the 
development of modern communication networks, to a large extent have integrated the 
periphery with the center” (Toprak, 1995: 94). New social, geographical, and economic 
conditions have brought significant changes in society. 
I argue that in the new social structure of Turkey, young people have much more 
interaction with each other and spend more time together. Nevertheless, even though they 
get closer with the passing of time and know each other better than before, both secularist 
and religiously observant students still their have prejudices about each other. Based on my 
own experiences, observations and the statements of my informants, I argue that although 
big social tensions in the political area do still exist in Turkish society between the 
religiously observant and the secular, social distancing and prejudices have dramatically 
decreased in the last decade. 
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In Chapter Eight I addressed the main subject of my thesis with reference to the 
Gezi Park protests in Istanbul that occurred mainly in May and June 2013. Observing 
developments through the various media, including social media, much of the population 
was unsure whether the protesters were engaged in action against the government and 
some of its policies, or whether it was an objection rather to the religious identity of the 
Prime Minister and the religiously observant people who he particularly represents. Was 
religion the main issue, namely, the Islamic revival in the country? And were these protests 
headed for another 28th February crisis in Turkey, with who-knew-what consequences for 
the traditionally religious population? Did these protests demonstrate that religion cannot 
co-exist with secularity, and that there is a deep-rooted and irresolvable tension between 
religious and secular Muslims in Turkey? 
My research in Gezi Park was an outstanding opportunity to test all the arguments 
of my thesis. Based on my research, I found that the main points of criticism during the 
protests were the non-environmentalist policies of the government, interference in people’s 
chosen lifestyles; women’s rights; authoritarian attitudes and policies; anxiety regarding 
the possibility of the transformation of the country into an Islamic state; freedom of 
expression, especially the freedom of journalists and the media; oppressive alcohol 
regulation; abortion law; the Atatürk personality cult; the capitalist economy; and the lack 
of a satisfactory opposition in parliament. 
From my observations and interviews with protesters, I concluded that there was 
negligeable opposition to religion, religiously observant people or the religious identity of 
the policy-makers of the country. I took hundreds of photographs in Gezi Park and Taksim 
Square and wrote down every slogan I encountered: more than three hundred. I failed to 
find one targeting religion and religiosity in general, just a few criticizing the Prime 
Minister’s ostentatious practice of religion. Statements by the Gezi Park protestors about 
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politics in relation to religion and secularism confirmed comments by my other research 
participants, presented in Chapter Four. They were in defense of the idea of a secular 
country and were against Turkey becoming a religious state or of the government referring 
to religion when making laws. Religious and secularist protesters wanted a secular state 
giving equal rights to all religions and ideologies. 
The Gezi Park/Taksim Square protests resulted in much discussion and negotiation 
between religiously observant and secularist people, especially in the park. Based on my 
observations and interviews in the field, the park became a sphere in which people 
gathered, encountered and engaged in debate with people with different backgrounds and 
world views, political views and lifestyles. Along with other developments, the ideas of 
people about religiosity and secularity were influenced by what they experienced in the 
park. Various religiosities encountered one another in the park, with significant results for 
my research. Both secularist and religiously observant research participants were against a 
strictly secularist state and an Islamist state. The main purpose of the gathering was to 
protest all kinds of authoritarianism, the authoritarian policies of the government in 
particular. Most of the secularist protestors realized there that not all religiously observant 
people were demanding an Islamist state; and most of the religiously observant protestors 
realized that not all the secularist people were eager to push religion into the private 
sphere. On the contrary, both sides were agreed on de-privatization of religion. The 
religious activities in the park presented in this chapter were an indicator of this social 
agreement, and they are compatible with the findings of Chapter Four. 
Encounters between those with different understandings of religiosities were 
significant events during the protests. Like the perceptions of other research participants 
presented in Chapter Five, secularist protestors among my informants, who identified 
themselves as believer (inançlı) and religious (dindar), met a different religiosity that 
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comprises observance of the rulings and practices of religion combined with opposition, 
for the sake of freedom and justice, to religiously conservative or Islamist government. At 
the same time, religiously observant informants among the protestors met another kind of 
religiosity that concentrates on belief and morality, rather than rulings and practices. 
Debate between these rival understandings created new perceptions of politics, religion 
and the place of religion in public and political spheres.	  
My university student participants having different world views were optimistic 
about the future of the country in terms of democratic consciousness. They were against 
polarization, oppressive government, the limiting of freedom of expression, and in favour 
of freedom for all lifestyles. As the previous chapters of my thesis indicate, the main 
objection for all segments of society, but especially for university students, is to rule by 
oppressive and authoritarian governments, whether secular or Islamic. Turkish university 
students, both secularist and religiously oriented, do successfully negotiate the secular 
spaces of the public sphere and religiosity; they develop new kinds of religiosity and 
Islamic understanding that shape their attitudes towards the state, politics, and those who 
embrace different lifestyles. 
Finally, some ideas for further research in other contexts, in order to gain a more 
comprehensive view…	  
A parallel study to this could be done in other cities of Turkey in order to find out if 
we would be justified in generalizing the findings of this research. That kind of study 
would make it possible to compare the university students of Istanbul with those at 
university in towns and cities large and small across Turkey. 	  
As discussed in this thesis, there have been big changes in Turkey since the AKP 
came to power in 2002, and in just the last few years especially, regarding religion, 
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religiosity, the position of religiously observant people, and policies related to religion. 
Research concentrating on recent developments in Turkey, such as the corruption scandal 
of 17–25 December 2013 and R. Tayyip Erdogan’s becoming the President of Turkey, 
would be useful in order to find out how these developments and changes have affected 
perceptions, understandings, and relationships of both religiously observant and secularist 
students of the country with respect to religion, Islamism and secularism. Especially 
valuable would be a study of the anxieties and experiences of secularist students in recent 
years.	  
Research into the thinking of university students in other Muslim countries could 
be very valuable in making comparisons between Turkey and those countries. Muslim 
countries have a variety of state ideologies, with differing understanding and interpretation 
of religion and experiences of modernity, and with other differences of character and 
demographic structure etc. Studying the perceptions and experiences of other Muslim 
countries can allow social scientists to develop a better understanding of secularization, 
secularism, modernity, Islamism, Islamic movements, religiosity and secularity. Such 
studies would also provide an opportunity to compare the experiences and perceptions of 
the Christian West and the Muslim East with respect to these issues.	  
My ambition for the near future is to conduct research on Islam in the European 
context. Millions of Muslims in Europe, born and raised in Europe and citizens of 
European states, have a very different experience from those of traditionally Muslim lands, 
since they negotiate religion and secularity in a Christian context. Being a British citizen 
and embracing Britishness as part of one’s identity, for instance, and at the same time 
having a sense of belonging to the Muslim community, results in new perceptions and 
understandings of identity, religiosity, secularity, and politics. How European Muslims 
negotiate different identities and senses of belonging in the European context, and how 
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they perceive and interpret Islamic rulings and principles in a secular or Christian country 
would be the main questions of the research.	  
It is hoped that this thesis creates the opportunity for further studies in order to make these 
comparisons.  
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APPENDIX ONE - Demographics 
 
Pseudonyms of 
the participants Sex Faculty Year 
Date of 
interview 
1 Emre Male Computer Engineering 4. year 20.04.2012 
2 Can Male Chemistry 4. year 02.04.2012 
3 Kudret Male Law 4. year 11.04.2012 
4 Ali Male Electronic Engineering 2. year 10.04.2012 
5 Faruk Male International Relations 3. year 23.03.2012 
6 Baran Male International Relations 3. year 24.04.2012 
7 Muharrem Male Mathematics 4. year 01.04.2012 
8 Hakan Male Theology 4. year 02.04.2012 
9 Yahya Male Biology 4. year 27.03.2012 
10 Birol Male Sociology 2. year 27.04.2012 
11 Osman Male Sociology 3. year 27.04.2012 
12 Bedri Male Business Management 4. year 28.07.2013 
13 Fatih Male Geophysical Engineering 1. year 10.06.2013 
14 Mehmet Male Science Teaching 4. year 13.06.2013 
15 Mahmut Male International Relations 2. year 24.04.2012 
16 Adem Male International Relations 3. year 24.04.2012 
17 Galip Male Radio Art and TV 4. year 30.03.2012 
18 İlyas Male Mechanical Engineering 4. year 30.03.2012 
19 Nejat Male Electrical Engineering 3. year 11.06.2013 
20 Ahmet Male Mechanical Engineering 4. year 11.06.2013 
21 Berkay Male Chemical Engineering 3. year 10.06.2013 
22 Tizcan Male Journalism 3. year 10.06.2013 
23 Berna Female Sociology 3. year 10.12.2012 
24 Bahar Female Philosophy 4. year 30.03.2012 
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25 Buse Female Theology 4. year 27.08.2012 
26 Fatma Female Architecture 3. year 02.04.2012 
27 Sema Female Photography 2. year 25.03.2012 
28 Hale Female Theology 3. year 01.05.2012 
29 Ferda Female Philosophy 4. year 26.03.2012 
30 Ebru Female Theology 4. year 27.08.2012 
31 Kübra Female Philosophy 1. year 20.04.2012 
32 Atiye Female Sociology 4. year 20.04.2012 
33 Meryem Female Sociology 4. year 24.05.2012 
34 Ela Female Cinema 1. year 10.06.2013 
35 Zeliha Female Environm. Engineering 4. year 10.06.2013 
36 Sevil Female Sociology 4. year 08.06.2013 
37 Beril Female Psychology 1. year 10.07.2013 
38 Reyhan Female Political Science 3. year 09.06.2013 
39 Derya Female Conservatory 4. year 09.06.2013 
40 Aylin Female Medicine 1. year 09.06.2013 
41 Ceyda Female History 4. year 10.06.2013 
42 Lale Female English Teaching 4. year 09.06.2013 
43 Mavi Female Political Science 1. year 10.06.2013 
44 Zeynep Female Economics 1. year 10.06.2013 
45 Aslı Female Primary School Teaching 1. year 19.06.2013 
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APPENDIX TWO - The List of the Secularist Reforms of Turkey 
1921 and 1924 – Constitutions of the Republic  
1922 – Abolition of Sultanate 
1923 – Proclamation of the Republic 
1924 – Abolishing the religious courts (Şer’iyye mahkemeleri) 
1924 – Abolition of Caliphate 
1924 – Abolition of the religious schools (medreses) 
1924 – Establishment of the Directorate of Religious Affair (Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı) 
1924 – Unification of education (Tevhid-i tedrisat) 
1925 – Closing down the religious shrines (türbes) and dervish convents (tekkes) 
1925 – Prohibition of turban and fez, replacing them by the Western-style hat or cap 
1926 – Adoption of the Italian penal code 
1926 – Adoption of the Swiss civil code; the abolition of religious marriages and polygamy  
1926 – Adoption of the Western clock and Gregorian calendar 
1928 – Adoption of the Western numerals and the Latin alphabet 
1928 – Removal of the statement of “The official state religion is Islam” from the constitution 
1930, 1933, 1934 – Enfranchisement of women  
1931 – Adoption of the Western weights and measures 
1932 – Language reform; removing some Arabic and Persian words and grammar rules  
1932 – Replacement of Arabic ezan (call to prayer) with a Turkish one 
1934 – Abolition of all courtesy titles (Bey, Effendi, Pasha) except in the army 
1934 – The introduction of family names 
1935 – Change of the official day of rest from Friday to Sunday 
1937 – Inserting the principle of laicism or secularism in the constitution 
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APPENDIX THREE - Interview Schedule 
The semi-formal interviews young Turkish university student and followed the following 
schedule: 
Tell me about yourself.  
Do you define yourself as Muslim? 
Do you live with your family?  
What are you studying? What year? Why did you choose this subject? 
Do you belong to any student group?  
Who are your main friends at university? 
Can you describe your daily routine?  
Do you belong to any student groups?  
Who are your main friends at the university? 
Do you participate in the organizations of any religious or secular group? Since when? 
Do you celebrate your birthday? How about your family? 
Would you say that you are a religiously observant (dindar) Muslim?  
Do you pray five times a day, for example? How often do you pray? 
Do you observe prohibitions on alcohol? 
Have you ever attended a Qur’an course? 
How would you describe a religious person? 
Are you interested in Turkish politics? Is there a particular political party who views you 
agree with? Have you ever voted? Which party did you support? 
Do you think the society is secular in Turkey?  
Do you think the society should be more – or less – Islamic? 
What kind of place does religion have in Turkish daily life? In the economy? In culture? In 
politics? In the state? 
What do you think about the direction Turkey is going in? 
Do you think religion has lost its appeal for young people today? Why is that? 
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Are there any tensions in Turkish society due to imposed secularism? 
Are there some core values of Islam, as you understand it that clash with secularism? 
What is Shari‘a? What do you think of Shari‘a?  
Could you give me an example of a proper Islamic state now and or in the past? 
Some people believe that Islam and secularism complement and enhance one another; 
others believe that this is impossible. What is your view? 
What kind of place is there in your opinion for non-governmental organizations, and for 
religious groups?  
Do you think religion has now been privatized? If so, why has that happened? 
What is your view about the future of Islam and secularism in Turkey? 
Has there been a change, in your opinion, in the way that religion and secularity are 
understood nowadays by young people in Turkey? 
Has the secularization project of Kemalism failed or succeeded? What are the various 
factors in this failure or success? 
What do you think of the fact that women are much more visible in social and economic 
lives? 
In future, would you be happy if your child marries an Alevi or Sunni? 
Which newspaper do you read generally? 
Which TV channels do you watch generally? 
Which TV programs do you watch? 
Which social medias do you use? 
What type of marriage ceremony would you like to have for yours? 
Which writers are your favorites? 
Which Islamic scholars do you like best? 
What do you think of the following people: Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, Adnan Menderes, 
Turgut Özal, Tayyip Erdoğan, Fethullah Gülen, Yaşar Nuri Öztürk. 
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Questions for the Gezi Park protests 
How do you identify yourself? 
Are you a religiously observant (dindar) or secularist person? 
Are you a practicing Muslim? 
Why do you support the Gezi Park protests? 
In your opinion, what are the aims of the protests? What are the activists against? 
Do you think that religion, religiously observant people, and the religious identity of the 
Prime Minister are the main targets of the protests? 
What government policies and practices are you criticising?  
Why do not you support the Gezi Park protests? Why are you dissatisfied? 
Do you think the AKP is a political Islamist party? 
Did you vote for the AKP in the previous elections? If so, have you got any criticism 
particularly in terms of their attitudes towards secularist people? 
Although some religiously observant people supported the protests by either going to the 
park or expressing sympathy on social media, why did most of religiously observant 
people withhold their support?  
Is there conflict between secularist and religiously observant Muslims in Turkey and, if 
there is, what has been the impact of the Gezi Park protests on this? 
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APPENDIX FOUR - Letter of Invitation 
 
Address: …………………………………… 
 
…………………………………… 
 
Dear  ………………………………………..,  
My name is Emrah Çelik and I am currently undertaking a Doctorate in Sociology at Keele 
University, Staffordshire, England. As part of the Doctorate I am carrying out research into 
the understandings and experiences of university students in Turkey.  
The specific aim of this study is to investigate the tension between religion and secularism 
as understood and experienced by Turkish university students. 
I would like to invite you to take part in the study and would be very grateful if you would 
consider participating.  
Before you decide whether or not you wish to take part, it is important for you to 
understand why this research is being done and what it will involve.  
Please take time to read the attached information document carefully and discuss it with 
friends and relatives if you wish.  
My research supervisor is Dr. Farzana Shain, who is a Senior Lecturer in Education at 
Keele University.  
Please direct any questions you may have to me or my supervisor, if there is anything that 
is unclear or if you would like more information about the study.  
With best wishes, 
 
___________________ 
Emrah Çelik  
 
	   332 
APPENDIX FIVE - Information Sheet 
Study Title: “Between Religion and Secularity: An ethnographic enquiry into the 
understandings and experiences of university students in Turkey” 
Aims of the Research 
This research will examine the views and perspectives of university students on religion 
and secularism in Turkey I am particularly interested in students’ understandings of Islam 
and secularism, and the various factors that contribute to these understandings. I also aim 
to explore the extent to which students might have experienced any tension between 
religion and Islam in their own lives.  
Invitation 
You are being invited to consider taking part in the research study “Between Religion and 
Secularity: An ethnographic enquiry into the understandings and experiences of university 
students in Turkey”. This project is being undertaken by Emrah Çelik who is conducting a 
PhD project in sociology at Keele University. 
Before you decide whether or not you wish to take part, it is important for you to 
understand why this research is being done and what it will involve. Please take time to 
read this information carefully and discuss it with friends and relatives if you wish. Ask me 
if there is anything that is unclear or if you would like more information.  
Why have I been chosen? 
You have been chosen, because this research project is about Turkish university students. 
Your current status as a student makes you an ideal candidate for this research.  
Do I have to take part? 
You are free to decide whether you wish to take part or not.  If you do decide to take part 
you will be asked if you are willing to sign two consent forms, one is for you to keep and 
the other is for our records. You can also give your consent verbally, or on tape. You are 
free to withdraw from this study at any time and without giving reasons.  
What will happen if I take part? 
After you consent to take part in this research, you will be asked some questions face to 
face related to your life and experiences, particularly about the topic of my research. There 
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will be only one session for the interview, and it is expected to last approximately two 
hours. 
If I take part, what do I have to do? 
We will only meet once wherever is comfortable for you, and talk on the research 
questions about two hours or more. You will be asked to answer questions about your 
understanding and experiences related to the tensions between religion and secularization. 
What are the benefits (if any) of taking part? 
There will not be any benefit for you personally, for taking part but you will be making a 
contribution to knowledge and understanding students in contemporary Turkey. 
What are the risks (if any) of taking part? 
There are no risks. This is because I will not give the records to anyone else and I will not 
disclose your name. The data will be anonymised before it is submitted for publication. 
What if there is a problem? 
If you have a concern about any aspect of this study, you can contact me on: 
e.celik@keele.ac.uk.  Alternatively, if you do not wish to contact the researcher(s) you may 
contact Nicola Leighton, Research Governance Officer on 01782 733306 or 
n.leighton@uso.keele.ac.uk, and also you may contact: Istar Gozaydin, 
isavasir@dogus.edu.tr 
If you remain unhappy about the research and/or wish to raise a complaint about any 
aspect of the way that you have been approached or treated during the course of the study 
please write to Nicola Leighton who is the University’s contact for complaints regarding 
research at the following address: 
 
Nicola Leighton 
Research Governance Officer 
Research & Enterprise Services 
Dorothy Hodgkin Building 
Keele University, ST5 5BG 
E-mail: n.leighton@uso.keele.ac.uk 
Tel: 01782 733306 
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How will information about me be used? 
Our meeting(s) will be recorded by a voice recorder and will be used in my thesis. The 
data also might be retained for use in future studies such as publications arising from the 
study. Any such data will be anonymised. 
Who will have access to information about me? 
Your confidentiality will be safeguarded during and after the study. 
The data will be securely stored on a password-protected computer. It will be coded. 
The researcher will retain the data for at least five years. 
The data will be securely stored and the Keele guidelines of five years for the period of 
time for the storage of data will be adhered to and then securely destroyed. 
Who is funding and organising the research? 
The research is self-funded. 
Contact for further information 
Emrah Çelik: e.celik@keele.ac.uk 
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APPENDIX SIX - Consent Form 
Title of Project: “Between Religion and Secularity: An ethnographic enquiry into the 
understandings and experiences of university students in Turkey” 
 
Name of Principal Investigator: Emrah Celik 
Please tick box 
1 I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet for the above 
study and have had the opportunity to ask questions. 
□ 
2 I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw 
at any time. 
□ 
3 I agree to take part in this study. □ 
4 I understand that data collected about me during this study will be 
anonymised before it is submitted for publication. 
□ 
5 I agree to the interview/focus group/observation being audio taped/video 
recorded. 
□ 
6 I agree to allow the data collected to be used for future publication. □ 
7 I agree to be contacted about possible participation in future research projects. □ 
 
________________________ 
Name of participant 
___________________ 
Date 
_____________________ 
Signature 
________________________  
Researcher 
___________________ 
Date 
_____________________ 
Signature 
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APPENDIX SEVEN - Ethical Approval Letter 
              
26 March 2012 
Emrah Celik 
138 St Paul’s Road 
Smethwick 
West Midlands 
B66 1HA 
 
Dear Emrah 
Re:  ‘Between Religion and Secularization in Turkey: An ethnographic enquiry into the 
understandings and experiences of Turkish university students’ 
Thank you for submitting your revised project for review. 
I am pleased to inform you that your project has been approved by the Ethics Review Panel. 
If the fieldwork goes beyond the date stated in your application (June 2012) you must notify the 
Ethical Review Panel via Michele Dawson.  
If there are any other amendments to your study you must submit an ‘application to amend study’ 
form to Michele Dawson.  This form is available from Michele (01782 733588) or via 
http://www.keele.ac.uk/researchsupport/researchethics/ 
If you have any queries, please do not hesitate to contact Michele Dawson in writing to 
m.dawson@uso.keele.ac.uk 
Yours sincerely 
 
 
 
Dr Nicky Edelstyn 
Chair – Ethical Review Panel 
CC RI Manager, Supervisor 
RESEARCH	  AND	  ENTERPRISE	  SERVICES	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APPENDIX EIGHT – Glossary of Turkish Words 
Cami: Mosque 
Cemaat: Religious group or movement 
Diyanet: Religious affairs 
Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı: The Directorate of Religious Affairs 
Ezan: Call to prayer 
Hadith: The sayings of the Prophet Muhammad 
Halife: Caliph 
İmam-Hatip Lisesi: Religious high school 
İmam: An Islamic leadership position; worship leader  
Medrese: A type of educational institution, secular or religious. 
Qur’an: The holy book of Islam 
Shari‘a: Islamic law system 
Sunna or Sünnet: The sayings, deeds, and approvals of the Prophet Muhammad, and also 
his lifestyle 
Tarikat or Tariqa: Religious order, Islamic brotherhood 
Tasavvuf: Sufism, Islamic mysticism 
Tekke and zaviye: Islamic monasteries 
Ulama or Ulema: Islamic jurists and scholars 
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